contend with the turbulent spirit of the Romans and the influences of
the principles disseminated by Arnold; and this contest was prolonged
into the reign of his second successor, Adrian IV. Among the people and
among the nobles, a considerable party had arisen who would concede to
the Pope no kind of secular dominion. And there seems to have been a
shade of difference among the members of this party. A mob of the people
is said to have gone to such an extreme of arrogance as to propose the
choosing of a new emperor from among the Romans themselves, the
restoration of a Roman empire independent of the Pope. The other party,
to which belonged the nobles, were for placing the emperor Frederick I
at the head of the Roman Republic, and uniting themselves with him in a
common interest against the Pope. They invited him to receive the
imperial crown, in the ancient manner, from the "senate and Roman
people," and not from the heretical and recreant clergy and false monks,
who acted in contradiction to their calling, exercising lordship despite
of the evangelical and apostolical doctrine; and in contempt of all
laws, divine and human, brought the Church of God and the kingdom of the
world into confusion. Those who pretend that they are the
representatives of Peter, it was said, in a letter addressed in the
spirit of this party to the emperor Frederick I, "act in contradiction
to the doctrines which that apostle teaches in his epistles. How can
they say with the apostle Peter, 'Lo, we have left all and followed
thee,' and, 'Silver and gold have I none'? How can our Lord say to such,
'Ye are the light of the world,' 'the salt of the earth'? Much rather is
to be applied to them what our Lord says of the salt that has lost its
savor. 'Eager after earthly riches, they spoil the true riches, from
which the salvation of the world has proceeded.' How can the saying be
applied to them, 'Blessed are the poor in spirit'? for they are neither
poor in spirit nor in fact."
Pope Adrian IV was first enabled, under more favorable circumstances,
and assisted by the Emperor Frederick I, to deprive the Arnold party of
its leader, and then to suppress it entirely. It so happened that, in
the first year of Adrian's reign, 1155, a cardinal, on his way to visit
the Pope, was attacked and wounded by followers of Arnold. This induced
the Pope to put all Rome under the interdict, with a view to force the
expulsion of Arnold and his party. This means did not fail of its
effect. The people who could not bear the suspension of divine worship,
now themselves compelled the nobles to bring about the ejection of
Arnold and his friends. Arnold, on leaving Rome, found protection from
Italian nobles. By the order, however, of the emperor Frederick, who had
come into Italy, he was torn from his protectors and surrendered up to
the papal authority. The Prefect of Rome then took possession of his
person and caused him to be hanged. His body was burned, and its ashes
thrown into the Tiber, lest his bones might be preserved as the relics
of a martyr by the Romans, who were enthusiastically devoted to him.
Worthy men, who were in other respects zealous defenders of the church
orthodoxy and of the hierarchy--as, for example, Gerhoh of
Reichersberg--expressed their disapprobation, first, that Arnold should
be punished with death on account of the errors which he disseminated;
secondly, that the sentence of death should proceed from a spiritual
tribunal, or that such a tribunal should at least have subjected itself
to that bad appearance.
But on the part of the Roman court it was alleged, in defence of this
proceeding, that "it was done without the knowledge and contrary to the
will of the Roman curia." "The Prefect of Rome had forcibly removed
Arnold from the prison where he was kept, and his servants had put him
to death in revenge for injuries they had suffered from Arnold's party.
Arnold, therefore, was executed, not on account of his doctrines, but in
consequence of tumults excited by himself." It may be a question whether
this was said with sincerity, or whether, according to the proverb, a
confession of guilt is not implied in the excuse. But Gerhoh was of the
opinion that in this case they should at least have done as David did,
in the case of Abner's death, and, by allowing Arnold to be buried, and
his death to be mourned over, instead of causing his body to be burned,
and the remains thrown into the Tiber, washed their hands of the whole
transaction.
But the idea for which Arnold had contended, and for which he died,
continued to work in various forms, even after his death--the idea of a
purification of the Church from the foreign worldly elements with which
it had become vitiated, of its restoration to its original spiritual
character.
DECLINE OF THE BYZANTINE EMPIRE: RAVAGES OF ROGER OF SICILY
A.D. 1146
GEORGE FINLAY
(From the enthronement of the Commenian dynasty in A.D. 1081, which was
accomplished through a successful rebellion, attended by shameful
treachery and rapine, the Byzantine empire, and especially
Constantinople, its capital, passed through many vicissitudes; but the
sack of the city by Alexius Commenus, the founder of the line, was
remembered by the populace to the disadvantage of all his successors;
the last of whom, Andronicus I, ended his reign in 1185. John, the son
of Alexius [1118-1143], ruled with discretion and ability, and recovered
some territory from the Turks.
Manuel I, the son of John [1143-1181], ruled during a period of almost
constant war, and for a time he held the enemies of the empire in check.
But he appears to have been more endowed with courage and the spirit of
enterprise than with good judgment, and his conduct of the empire
coincided with events that, as seen in history, contributed to its
decline, which after his death followed rapidly. As this decline is to
be dated especially from the passing but not ineffectual invasion of
Roger II, King of Sicily, in 1146, some account of that, together with a
view of conditions immediately preceding, becomes important in a work
like this.
The century and a half before Roger's invasion had been a period of
tranquillity for the distinctively Greek people of the empire, who had
increased rapidly in numbers and wealth, and were in possession of an
extensive commerce and many manufactures. Therefore they were perhaps
the greatest sufferers from the adverse events which befell the State.)
The emperor Alexius I had concluded a commercial treaty with Pisa toward
the end of his reign. Manuel renewed this alliance, and he appears to
have been the first of the Byzantine emperors who concluded a public
treaty with Genoa. The pride of the emperors of the Romans--as the
sovereigns of Constantinople were styled--induced them to treat the
Italian republics as municipalities still dependent on the Empire of the
Caesars, of which they had once formed a part; and the rulers both of
Pisa and Genoa yielded to this assumption of supremacy, and consented to
appear as vassals and liegemen of the Byzantine emperors, in order to
participate in the profits which they saw the Venetians gained by
trading in their dominions.
Several commercial treaties with Pisa and Genoa, as well as with Venice,
have been preserved. The obligations of the republics are embodied in
the charter enumerating the concessions granted by the Emperor, and the
document is called a _chrysobulum_, or golden bull, from the golden seal
of the Emperor attached to it as the certificate of its authenticity.
In Manuel's treaties with the Genoese and Pisans, the republics bind
themselves never to engage in hostilities against the empire; but, on
the contrary, all the subjects of the republics residing in the
Emperor's dominions become bound to assist him against all assailants;
they engage to act with their own ships, or to serve on board the
imperial fleet, for the usual pay granted to Latin mercenaries. They
promise to offer no impediment to the extension of the empire in Syria,
reserving to themselves the factories and privileges they already
possess in any place that may be conquered. They submit their civil and
criminal affairs to the jurisdiction of the Byzantine courts of justice,
as was then the case with the Venetians and other foreigners in the
empire. Acts of piracy and armed violence, unless the criminals were
taken in the act, were to be reported to the rulers of the republic
whose subjects had committed the crime, and the Byzantine authorities
were not to render the innocent traders in the empire responsible for
the injuries inflicted by these brigands. The republicans engaged to
observe all the stipulations in their treaties, in defiance of
ecclesiastical excommunication or the prohibition of any individual,
crowned or not crowned.
Manuel, in return, granted to the republicans the right of forming a
factory, erecting a quay for landing their goods, and building a church;
and the Genoese received their grant in an agreeable position on the
side of the port opposite Constantinople, where in after-times their
great colony of Galata was formed. The Emperor promised to send an
annual of from four hundred to five hundred gold bezants, with two
pieces of a rich brocade then manufactured only in the Byzantine empire,
to the republican governments, and sixty bezants, with one piece of
brocade, to their archbishops. These treaties fixed the duty levied on
the goods imported or exported from Constantinople by the Italians at 4
per cent.; but in the other cities of the empire, the Pisans and Genoese
were to pay the same duties as other Latin traders, excepting, of
course, the privileged Venetians. These duties generally amounted to 10
per cent. The republics were expressly excluded, by the Genoese treaty,
from the Black Sea trade, except when they received a special license
from the Emperor. In case of shipwreck, the property of the foreigners
was to be protected by the imperial authorities and respected by the
people, and every assistance was to be granted to the unfortunate
sufferers. This humane clause was not new in Byzantine commercial
treaties, for it is contained in the earliest treaty concluded by
Alexius I with the Pisans. On the whole, the arrangements for the
administration of justice in these treaties prove that the Byzantine
empire still enjoyed a greater degree of order than the rest of Europe.
The state of civilization in the Eastern Empire rendered the public
finances the moving power of the government, as in the nations of modern
Europe. This must always tend to the centralization of political
authority, for the highest branch of the executive will always endeavor
to dispose of the revenues of the State according to its views of
necessity. This centralizing policy led Manuel to order all the money
which the Greek commercial communities had hitherto devoted to
maintaining local squadrons of galleys for the defence of the islands
and coasts of the Aegean to be remitted to the treasury at
Constantinople. The ships were compelled to visit the imperial dockyard
in the capital to undergo repairs and to receive provisions and pay.
A navy is a most expensive establishment; kings, ministers, and people
are all very apt to think that when it is not wanted at any particular
time, the cost of its maintenance may be more profitably applied to
other objects. Manuel, after he had secured the funds of the Greeks for
his own treasury, soon left their ships to rot, and the commerce of
Greece became exposed to the attacks of small squadrons of Italian
pirates who previously would not have dared to plunder in the
Archipelago. It may be thought by some that Manuel acted wisely in
centralizing the naval administration of his empire; but the great
number, the small size, and the relative position of many of the Greek
islands with regard to the prevailing winds render the permanent
establishment of naval stations at several points necessary to prevent
piracy.
Manuel and Otho ruined the navy of Greece by their unwise measures of
centralization; Pericles, by prudently centralizing the maritime forces
of the various states, increased the naval power of Athens, and gave
additional security to every Greek ship that navigated the sea.
The same fiscal views which induced Manuel to centralize the naval
administration when it was injurious to the interests of the empire,
prompted him to act diametrically opposite with regard to the army. The
emperor John had added greatly to the efficiency of the Byzantine
military force by improving and centralizing its administration, and he
left Manuel an excellent army, which rendered the Eastern Empire the
most powerful state in Europe. But Manuel, from motives of economy,
abandoned his father's system. Instead of assembling all the military
forces of the empire annually in camps, where they received pay and were
subjected to strict discipline, toward the end of his reign he
distributed even the regular army in cities and provinces, where they
were quartered far apart, in order that each district, by maintaining a
certain number of men, might relieve the treasury from the burden of
their pay and subsistence while they were not on actual service. The
money thus retained in the central treasury was spent in idle festivals
at Constantinople, and the troops, dispersed and neglected, became
careless of their military exercises, and lived in a state of relaxed
discipline. Other abuses were quickly introduced; resident yeomen,
shopkeepers, and artisans were enrolled in the legions, with the
connivance of the officers. The burden of maintaining the troops was in
this way diminished, but the army was deteriorated.
In other districts, where the divisions were exposed to be called into
action, or were more directly under central inspection, the effective
force was kept up at its full complement, but the people were compelled
to submit to every kind of extortion and tyranny. The tendency of
absolute power being always to weaken the power of the law, and to
increase the authority of the executive agents of the sovereign, soon
manifested its effects in the rapid progress of administrative
corruption. The Byzantine garrisons in a few years became prototypes of
the shopkeeping janizaries of the Ottoman empire, and bore no
resemblance to the feudal militia of Western Europe, which Manuel had
proposed as the model of his reform. This change produced a rapid
decline in the military strength of the Byzantine army and accelerated
the fall of the empire.
For a considerable period the Byzantine emperors had been gradually
increasing the proportion of foreign mercenaries in their service; this
practice Manuel carried further than any of his predecessors. Besides
the usual Varangian, Italian, and German guards, we find large corps of
Patzinaks, Franks, and Turks enrolled in his armies, and officers of
these nations occupying situations of the highest rank. A change had
taken place in the military tactics, caused by the heavy armor and
powerful horses which the crusaders brought into the field, and by the
greater personal strength and skill in warlike exercises of the Western
troops, who had no occupation from infancy but gymnastic exercises and
athletic amusements. The nobility of the feudal nations expended more
money on arms and armor than on other luxuries; and this becoming the
general fashion, the Western troops were much better armed than the
Byzantine soldiers. War became the profession of the higher ranks, and
the expense of military undertakings was greatly increased by the
military classes being completely separated from the rest of society.
The warlike disposition of Manuel led him to favor the military nobles
of the West who took service at his court; while his confidence in his
own power, and in the political superiority of his empire, deluded him
with the hope of being able to quell the turbulence of the Franks, and
set bounds to the ambition and power of the popes.
The wars of Manuel were sometimes forced on him by foreign powers, and
sometimes commenced for temporary objects; but he appears never to have
formed any fixed idea of the permanent policy which ought to have
determined the constant employment of all the military resources at his
command, for the purpose of advancing the interest of his empire and
giving security to his subjects. His military exploits may be considered
under three heads: His wars with the Franks, whether in Asia or Europe;
his wars with the Hungarians and Servians; and his wars with the Turks.
His first operations were against the principality of Antioch. The death
of John II caused the dispersion of the fine army he had assembled for
the conquest of Syria; but Manuel sent a portion of that army, and a
strong fleet, to attack the principality. One of the generals of the
land forces was Prosuch, a Turkish officer in high favor with his
father. Raymond of Antioch was no longer the idle gambler he had shown
himself in the camp of the emperor John; but though he was now
distinguished by his courage and skill in arms, he was completely
defeated, and the imperial army carried its ravages up to the very walls
of Antioch, while the fleet laid waste the coast. Though the Byzantine
troops retired, the losses of the campaign convinced Raymond that it
would be impossible to defend Antioch should Manuel take the field in
person. He therefore hastened to Constantinople, as a suppliant, to sue
for peace; but Manuel, before admitting him to an audience, required
that he should repair to the tomb of the emperor John and ask pardon for
having violated his former promises. When the Hercules of the Franks, as
Raymond was called, had submitted to this humiliation, he was admitted
to the imperial presence, swore fealty to the Byzantine empire as Prince
of Antioch, and became the vassal of the emperor Manuel. The conquest of
Edessa by the Mahometans, which took place in the month of December,
1144, rendered the defence of Antioch by the Latins a doubtful
enterprise, unless they could secure the assistance of the Greeks.
Manuel involved himself in a war with Roger, King of Sicily, which
perhaps he might have avoided by more prudent conduct. An envoy he had
sent to the Sicilian court concluded a treaty, which Manuel thought fit
to disavow with unsuitable violence. This gave the Sicilian King a
pretext for commencing war, but the real cause of hostilities must be
sought in the ambition of Roger and the hostile feelings of Manuel.
Roger was one of the wealthiest princes of his time; he had united under
his sceptre both Sicily and all the Norman possessions in Southern
Italy; his ambition was equal to his wealth and power, and he aspired at
eclipsing the glory of Robert Guiscard and Bohemund by some permanent
conquests in the Byzantine empire. On the other hand, the renown of
Roger excited the envy of Manuel, who, proud of his army and confident
of his own valor and military skill, hoped to reconquer Sicily. His
passion made him forget that he was surrounded by numerous enemies, who
would combine to prevent his employing all his forces against one
adversary. Manuel consequently acted imprudently in revealing his
hostile intentions; while Roger could direct all his forces against one
point, and avail himself of Manuel's embarrassments. He commenced
hostilities by inflicting a blow on the wealth and prosperity of Greece,
from which it never recovered.
At the commencement of the Second Crusade, when the attention of Manuel
was anxiously directed to the movements of Louis VII of France, and
Conrad, Emperor of Germany, Roger, who had collected a powerful fleet at
Brindisi, for the purpose either of attacking the Byzantine empire or
transporting the crusaders to Palestine, availed himself of an
insurrection in Corfu to conclude a convention with the inhabitants, who
admitted a garrison of one thousand Norman troops into their citadel.
The Corfutes complained with great reason of the intolerable weight of
taxation to which they were subjected; of the utter neglect of their
interests by the central government, which consumed their wealth, and of
the great abuses which prevailed in the administration of justice; but
the remedy they adopted, by placing themselves under the rule of foreign
masters, was not likely to alleviate these evils.
The Sicilian admiral, after landing the Norman garrison at Corfu, sailed
to Monembasia, then one of the principal commercial cities in the East,
hoping to gain possession of it without difficulty; but the maritime
population of this impregnable fortress gave him a warm reception and
easily repulsed his attack. After plundering the coasts of Euboea and
Attica, the Sicilian fleet returned to the West, and laid waste
Acarnania and Etolia; it then entered the Gulf of Corinth, and debarked
a body of troops at Crissa. This force marched through the country to
Thebes, plundering every town and village on the way. Thebes offered no
resistance and was plundered in the most deliberate and barbarous
manner. The inhabitants were numerous and wealthy. The soil of Boeotia
is extremely productive, and numerous manufactures established in the
city of Thebes gave additional value to the abundant produce of
agricultural industry.
A century had elapsed since the citizens of Thebes had gone out
valiantly to fight the army of Slavonian rebels in the reign of Michael
IV (the Paphlagonian), and that defeat had long been forgotten. But all
military spirit was now dead, and the Thebans had so long lived without
any fear of invasion that they had forgotten the use of arms. The
Sicilians found them not only unprepared to offer any resistance, but so
surprised that they had not even adopted any effectual measures to
secure or conceal their movable property. The conquerors, secure against
all danger of interruption, plundered Thebes at their leisure. Not only
gold, silver, jewels, and church plate were carried off, but even the
goods found in the warehouses, and the rarest articles of furniture in
private houses, were transported to the ships. Bales of silk and dyed
leather were sent off to the fleet as deliberately as if they had been
legally purchased in time of peace. When all ordinary means of
collecting booty were exhausted, the citizens were compelled to take an
oath on the Holy Scriptures that they had not concealed any portion of
their property; yet many of the wealthiest were dragged away captive, in
order to profit by their ransom; and many of the most skilful workmen in
the silk manufactories, for which Thebes had long been famous, were
pressed on board the fleet to labor at the oar.
From Boeotia the army passed to Corinth. Nicephorus Caluphes, the
governor, retired into the Acro-Corinth, but the garrison appeared to
his cowardly heart not strong enough to defend this impregnable
fortress, and he surrendered it to George Antiochenus, the Sicilian
admiral, on the first summons. On examining the fortress of which he had
thus unexpectedly gained possession, the admiral could not help
exclaiming that he fought under the protection of heaven, for if
Caluphes had not been more timid than a virgin, Corinth should have
repulsed every attack.
Corinth was sacked as cruelly as Thebes; men of rank, beautiful women,
and skilful artisans, with their wives and families, were carried away
into captivity. Even the relics of St. Theodore were taken from the
church in which they were preserved; and it was not until the whole
Sicilian fleet was laden with as much of the wealth of Greece as it was
capable of transporting that the admiral ordered it to sail. The
Sicilians did not venture to retain possession of the impregnable
citadel of Corinth, as it would have been extremely difficult for them
to keep up their communications with the garrison. This invasion of
Greece was conducted entirely as a plundering expedition, having for its
object to inflict the greatest possible injury on the Byzantine empire,
while it collected the largest possible quantity of booty for the
Sicilian troops. Corfu was the only conquest of which Roger retained
possession.