our provincial constitution, government at home made the judges
independent of the grants of the general assembly. That is, in order
to avoid the hazard of taking the fort by storm, they determined to
take it by sap. In order to avoid altering our constitution, they
changed it in the most essential manner: for surely by our charter
the province was to pay the judges as well as the governor. Taking
away this privilege, and making them receive their pay from the
crown, was destroying the charter so far forth, and making them
dependent on the minister. As to their being dependent on the leading
whigs, he means they were dependent on the province. And which is
fairest to be dependent on, the province or on the minister? In all
this troublesome period, the leading whigs had never hesitated about
granting their salaries, nor ever once moved to have them lessened,
nor would the house have listened to them if they had. "This was
done, he says, to make them steady." We know that very well. Steady
to what? Steady to the plans of Bernard, Hutchinson, Oliver, North,
Mansfield and Bute; which the people thought was steadiness to
their ruin, and therefore it was found, that a determined spirit of
opposition to it arose, in every part of the province, like that to
the stamp act.
The chief justice, it is true, was accused by the house of
representatives, of receiving a bribe, a ministerial, not a royal
bribe. For the king can do no wrong, although he may be deceived in
his grant. The minister is accountable. The crime of receiving an
illegal patent, is not the less for purchasing it, even of the king
himself. Many impeachments have been for such offences.
He talks about attempts to strengthen government, and save our
charter. With what modesty can he say this, when he knows that the
overthrow of our charter was the very object which the junto had
been invariably pursuing for a long course of years? Does he think
his readers are to be deceived by such gross arts? But he says "the
whigs subverted the charter constitution, abridged the freedom of
the house, annihilated the freedom of the board, and rendered the
governor a doge of Venice." The freedom of the house was never
abridged, the freedom of the board was never lessened. The governor
had as much power as ever. The house and board, it is true, would
do nothing in favour of parliamentary taxation. Their judgments and
consciences were against it; and if they ever had done any thing in
favour of it, it would have been through fear and not freedom. The
governor found he could do nothing in favour of it, excepting to
promote, in every department in the state, men who hated the people
and were hated by them. Enough of this he did in all conscience;
and after filling offices with men who were despised, he wondered
that the officers were not revered. "They, the whigs, engrossed all
the power of the province into their own hands." That is, the house
and board were whigs; the grand juries and petit juries were whigs;
towns were whigs; the clergy were whigs; the agents were whigs; and
wherever you found people, you found all whigs; excepting those
who had commissions from the crown or the governor. This is almost
true, and it is to the eternal shame of the tories, that they should
pursue their ignis fatuus with such ungovernable fury as they have
done, after such repeated and multiplied demonstrations, that the
whole people were so universally bent against them. But nothing will
satisfy them still, but blood and carnage. The destruction of the
whigs, charters, English liberties and all, they must and will have,
if it costs the blood of tens of thousands of innocent people. This
is the benign temper of the tories.
This influence of the whigs, he calls a democracy or republic,
and then a despotism: two ideas incompatible with each other. A
democratical despotism is a contradiction in terms.
He then says, that "the good policy of the act for regulating the
government in this province, will be the subject of some future
paper." But that paper is still to come, and I suspect ever will be.
I wish to hear him upon it however.
With this, he and the junto ought to have begun. Bernard and the
rest, in 1764, ought to have published their objections to this
government, if they had been honest men, and produced their arguments
in favour of the alteration, convinced the people of the necessity of
it, and proposed some constitutional plan for effecting it. But the
same motives which induced them to take another course, will prevail
with Massachusettensis to wave the good policy of the act. He will
be much more cunningly employed in labouring to terrify women and
children with the horrors of a civil war, and the dread of a division
among the people. There lies your fort, Massachusettensis, make the
most of it.
NOVANGLUS.
ADDRESSED
_To the Inhabitants of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay_,
February 27, 1775.
MY FRIENDS,
Such events as the resistance to the stamp act, and to the tea act,
particularly the destruction of that which was sent by the ministry,
in the name of the East India Company, have ever been cautiously
spoken of by the whigs, because they knew the delicacy of the
subject, and they lived in continual hopes of a speedy restoration
of liberty and peace. But we are now thrown into a situation, which
would render any further delicacy upon this point criminal.
Be it remembered then, that there are tumults, seditions, popular
commotions, insurrections and civil wars, upon just occasions, as
well as unjust.
Grotius B. 1. c. 3. § 1. observes, "that some sort of private war may
be lawfully waged--It is not repugnant to the law of nature, for any
one to repel injuries by force."
§ 2. The liberty allowed before is much restrained, since the
erection of tribunals. Yet there are some cases wherein that right
still subsists; that is, when the way to legal justice is not open;
for the law which forbids a man to pursue his right any other way,
ought to be understood with this equitable restriction, that one
finds judges to whom he need apply, &c.
Sidney's discourses upon government c. 2. § 24. 'Tis in vain to seek
a government in all points free from a possibility of civil wars,
tumults and seditions: that is a blessing denied to this life, and
reserved to complete the felicity of the next. Seditions, tumults,
and wars do arise from mistake or from malice; from just occasions
or unjust. Seditions proceeding from malice are seldom or never seen
in popular governments; for they are hurtful to the people, and none
have ever willingly and knowingly hurt themselves. There may he, and
often is, malice in those who excite them; but the people is ever
deceived, and whatever is thereupon done, ought to be imputed to
error, &c. But in absolute monarchies, almost all the troubles that
arise proceed from malice; they cannot be reformed; the extinction
of them is exceeding difficult, if they have continued long enough
to corrupt the people; and those who appear against them seek only
to set up themselves or their friends. The mischiefs designed are
often dissembled, or denied, till they are past all possibility of
being cured by any other way than force; and such as are by necessity
driven to use that remedy, know they must perfect their work or
perish. He that draws his sword against the prince, say the French,
ought to throw away the scabbard; for though the design be never so
just, yet the authors are sure to be ruined if it miscarry. Peace is
seldom made, and never kept, unless the subject retain such a power
in his hands, as may oblige the prince to stand to what is agreed;
and in time some trick is found to deprive him of that benefit.
It may seem strange to some that I mention seditions, tumults and
wars, upon just occasions; but I can find no reason to retract the
terms. God, intending that men should live justly with one another,
does certainly intend that he or they, who do no wrong, should
suffer none; and the law that forbids injuries, were of no use, if
no penalty might be inflicted on those, that will not obey it. If
injustice therefore be evil, and injuries be forbidden, they are
also to be punished; and the law, instituted for their prevention,
must necessarily intend the avenging of such as cannot be prevented.
The work of the magistracy is to execute this law; the sword of
justice is put into their hands to restrain the fury of those within
the society, who will not be a law to themselves; and the sword
of war to protect the people against the violence of foreigners.
This is without exception, and would be in vain if it were not.
But the magistrate who is to protect the people from injury, may,
and is often known, not to have done it: he sometimes renders his
office _useless by neglecting to do justice_; sometimes _mischievous
by overthrowing it_. This strikes at the root of God's general
ordinance, that there should be laws; and the particular ordinances
of all societies that appoint such as seem best to them. _The
magistrate therefore is comprehended under both, and subject to both,
as well as private men._
The ways of preventing or punishing injuries are judicial or
extrajudicial. Judicial proceedings are of force against those
who submit, or may be brought to trial, but are of no effect
against those who resist, and are of such power that they cannot
be constrained. It were absurd to cite a man to appear before a
tribunal, _who can awe the judges, or has armies to defend him_;
and impious to think that he who has added treachery to his other
crimes, and usurped a power above the law, should be protected by the
enormity of his wickedness. Legal proceedings, therefore, are to be
used when the delinquent submits to the law; _and all are just; when
he will not be kept in order by the legal_.
The word sedition is generally applied to all numerous assemblies,
without or against the authority of the magistrate, or of those who
assume that power. Athaliah and Jezebel were more ready to cry out
treason, than David, &c.
Tumult is from the disorderly manner of those assemblies, where
things can seldom be done regularly; and war is that "decertatio
per vim," or trial by force, to which men come, when other ways are
ineffectual.
If the laws of God and men, are therefore of no effect, when the
magistracy is left at liberty to break them; and if the lusts of
those who are too strong for the tribunals of justice, cannot be
otherwise restrained than by sedition, tumults and war; those
seditions, tumults and wars, are justified by the laws of God and man.
I will not take upon me to enumerate all the cases in which this may
be done, but content myself with three, which have most frequently
given occasion for proceedings of this kind. The first is, when one
or more men take upon them the power and name of a magistracy, to
which they are not justly called. The second, when one or more being
justly called, continue in their magistracy longer than the laws by
which they are called, do prescribe. And the third, when he or they,
who are rightly called, do assume a power, though within the time
prescribed, that the law does not give; or turn that which the law
does give, to an end different and contrary to that which is intended
by it.
The same course is justly used against a legal magistrate, who takes
upon him to exercise a power which the law does not give; for in that
respect he is a private man. "Quia, as Grotius says, eatenus non
habet imperium," and may be restrained as well as any other, because
he is not set up to do what he lists, but what the law appoints for
the good of the people; and as he has no other power than what the
law allows, so the same law limits and directs the exercise of that
which he has.
Puffendorf's law of nature and nations L. 7. c. 8. § 5 and 6.
Barbeyrac's note on section 6. When we speak of a tyrant that may
lawfully be dethroned, we do not mean by the people, the vile
populace or rabble of the country, nor the cabal of a small number
of factious persons; but the greater and more judicious part of the
subjects of all ranks. Besides the tyranny must be so notorious and
evidently clear, as to leave no body any room to doubt of it, &c. Now
a prince may easily avoid making himself so universally suspected and
odious to his subjects; for as Mr. Locke says, in his treatise of
civil government, c. 18 § 209. "It is as impossible for a governor,
if he really means the good of the people and the preservation of
them and the laws together, not to make them see and feel it; as it
is for the father of a family, not to let his children see he loves
and takes care of them." And therefore the general insurrection of
a whole nation does not deserve the name of a rebellion. We may see
what Mr. Sidney says upon this subject in his discourse concerning
government c. 3. § 36. Neither are subjects bound to stay till the
prince has entirely finished the chains which he is preparing for
them, and put it out of their power to oppose. It is sufficient that
all the advances which he makes are manifestly tending to their
oppression, that he is marching boldly on to the ruin of the state.
In such a case, says Mr. Locke, admirably well, ubi supra § 210. "How
can a man any more hinder himself from believing in his own mind,
which way things are going, or from casting about to save himself,
than he could from believing the captain of the ship he was in, was
carrying him and the rest of his company to Algiers, when he found
him always steering that course, though cross winds, leaks in his
ship and want of men and provisions, did often force him to turn
his course another way for some time, which he steadily returned to
again, as soon as the winds, weather, and other circumstances would
let him." This chiefly takes place with respect to kings, whose power
is limited by fundamental laws.
If it is objected, that the people being ignorant, and always
discontented, to lay the foundation of government, in the unsteady
opinion and the uncertain humour of the people, is to expose it to
certain ruin; the same author will answer you, that on the contrary,
people are not so easily got out of their old forms as some are
apt to suggest. England, for instance, notwithstanding the many
revolutions that have been seen in that kingdom, has always kept
to its old legislative of king, lords, and commons; and whatever
provocations have made the crown to be taken from some of their
princes' heads, they never carried the people so far as to place
it in another line. But it will be said, this hypothesis lays a
ferment for frequent rebellion. No more, says Mr. Locke, than any
other hypothesis. For when the people are made miserable, and
find themselves exposed to the ill usage of arbitrary power; cry
up their governors as you will for sons of Jupiter, let them be
sacred and divine, descended or authorised from heaven; give them
out for whom or what you please, the same will happen. The people
generally ill treated, and contrary to right, will be ready upon any
occasion to ease themselves of a burden that sits heavy upon them.
2. Such revolutions happen not upon every little mismanagement in
public affairs. Great mistakes in the ruling part, many wrong and
inconvenient laws, and all the slips of human frailty will be borne
by the people, without mutiny and murmur. 3. This power in the people
of providing for their safety anew by a legislative, when their
legislators have acted contrary to their trust, by invading their
property, is the best fence against rebellion, and the probablest
means to hinder it; for rebellion being an opposition, not to
persons, but authority, which is founded only in the constitutions
and laws of the government; those whoever they be, _who by force
break through, and by force justify the violation of them, are truly
and properly rebels_. For when men by entering into society, and
civil government, have excluded force, and introduced laws for the
preservation of property, peace and unity, among themselves; those
who set up force again, in opposition to the laws, do rebellare,
that is, do bring back again the state of war, and are properly,
rebels, as the author shews. In the last place, he demonstrates that
there are also greater inconveniencies in allowing all to those that
govern, than in granting something to the people. But it will be
said, that ill affected and factious men may spread among the people,
and make them believe that the prince or legislative, act contrary
to their trust, when they only make use of their due prerogative.
To this Mr. Locke answers, that the people however is to judge of
all that; because no body can better judge whether his trustee or
deputy acts well, and according to the trust reposed in him, than he
who deputed him. He might make the like query, (says Mr. LeClerk,
from whom this extract is taken) and ask, whether the people being
oppressed by an authority which they set up, but for their own good,
it is just, that those who are vested with this authority, and of
which they are complaining, should themselves be judges of the
complaints made against them. The greatest flatterers of kings, dare
not say, that the people are obliged to suffer absolutely all their
humours, how irregular soever they be; and therefore must confess,
that when no regard is had to their complaints, the very foundations
of society are destroyed; the prince and people are in a state of
war with each other, like two independent states, that are doing
themselves justice, and acknowledge no person upon earth, who in a
sovereign manner, can determine the disputes between them, &c.
If there is any thing in these quotations, which is applicable to the
destruction of the tea, or any other branch of our subject, it is not
my fault; I did not make it. Surely Grotius, Puffendorf, Barbeyrac,
Locke, Sidney, and LeClerk, are writers, of sufficient weight to
put in the scale against the mercenary scribblers in New York and
Boston, who have the unexampled impudence and folly, to call these
which are revolution principles in question, and to ground their
arguments upon passive obedience as a corner stone. What an opinion
must these writers have of the principles of their patrons, the lords
Bute, Mansfield and North, when they hope to recommend themselves
by reviving that stupid doctrine, which has been infamous so many
years. Dr. Sachevaril himself tells us that his sermons were burnt by
the hands of the common hangman, by the order of the king, lords and
commons, in order to fix an eternal and indelible brand of infamy on
that doctrine.
In the Gazette of January the 2d, Massachusettensis entertains you
with an account of his own important self. This is a subject which he
has very much at heart, but it is of no consequence to you or me, and
therefore little need be said of it. If he had such a stand in the
community, that he could have seen all the political manoeuvres,
it is plain he must have shut his eyes, or he never could have
mistaken so grossly, causes for effects, and effects for causes.
He undertakes to point out the principles and motives upon which the
blockade act was made, which were according to him, the destruction
of the East India Company's tea. He might have said more properly the
ministerial tea; for such it was, and the company are no losers; they
have received from the public treasury compensation for it.
Then we are amused with a long discourse about the nature of the
British government, commerce, agriculture, arts, manufactures,
regulations of trade, custom-house officers, which, as it has no
relation to the subject, I shall pass over.
The case is shortly this. The East India Company, by their contract
with government, in their charter and statute, are bound in
consideration of their important profitable privileges to pay to the
public treasury, a revenue, annually, of four hundred thousand pounds
sterling, so long as they can hold up their dividends, at twelve per
cent. and no longer.
The mistaken policy of the ministry, in obstinately persisting in
their claim of right to tax America, and refusing to repeal the
duty on tea, with those on glass, paper and paint, had induced all
America, except a few merchants in Boston, most of whom were closely
connected with the junto, to refuse to import tea from Great Britain;
the consequence of which was a kind of stagnation in the affairs of
the company, and an immense accumulation of tea in their stores,
which they could not sell. This, among other causes, contributed
to affect their credit, and their dividends were on the point of
falling below twelve per cent. and consequently the government was
upon the point of losing 400,000l. sterling a year of revenue. The
company solicited the ministry to take off the duty in America: but
they adhering to their plan of taxing the colonies and establishing
a precedent, framed an act to enable the company to send their tea
directly to America. This was admired as a master-piece of policy.
It was thought they would accomplish four great purposes at once:
establish their precedent of taxing America; raise a large revenue
there by the duties; save the credit of the company, and the
400,000l. to the government. The company however, were so little
pleased with this, that there were great debates among the directors,
whether they should risque it, which were finally determined by a
majority of one only, and that one the chairman, being unwilling
as it is said, to interfere, in the dispute between the minister
and the colonies, and uncertain what the result would be: and this
small majority was not obtained, as it is said, until a sufficient
intimation was given that the company should not be losers.