RESPONSIBILITY
All students of the psychology of childhood agree that not until the dawn
of adolescence does reasoning as such begin to show itself in the child
mind; that judgment and foresight and self-control, such as enable a
person to counteract his natural impulses and make himself fit into the
conventions of society, are practically unknown previous to this age. It
is true that many children are taught to say what the adult alone can feel
in connection with such matters. But as for having the real feeling and
the understanding of the situation, we seem to have no right to expect it
before the beginning of this adolescent period, from twelve to fifteen
years of age. Everything points to the correctness of the conclusion that
during this early period of pre-adolescence the child is a creature of
impulse and instinct and is controlled largely by counteracting one
instinct by another. For example, the instinct to love and obey a parent
impels the child to do what that parent says, when he tells him not to
yield to some impulse which would lead him into trouble according to the
canons of modern society. Without going further into a discussion of the
point, which would necessarily lead to many philosophical considerations,
the writer may express his conviction, born of a study both of normal
children and also of mental defectives of twelve years and under in
mentality, that persons of this mentality do not know much about right and
wrong. They act upon impulse and upon instinct, without very much thought.
Even the child of the best opportunity and the most elaborate training in
a good home may quite likely not know the wrongfulness of an act of
homicide in the sense of having a real feeling of that wrong. He can
doubtless, as already stated, _say_ that the thing is wrong, because he
has learned that this is the right thing to say.
Let us turn now to the other part of the legal phrase, "Does such a person
know the nature and quality of his act?" If the writer understands these
terms, the first may be translated into the expression, "Does he know what
he is doing?" We take it that the expression originated in the attempt to
cover those cases where persons, either momentarily or permanently
deranged, literally do not know what they are doing. If this is correct,
then one cannot, as a rule, say that a high-grade imbecile does not know
what he is doing. He is not like the lunatic who acts blindly and is
probably no more responsible for his acts than a person walking in his
sleep. The imbecile is not in this condition. He has, so to speak, full
possession of all the mind that he has ever had and that, in the case of
these high-grade imbeciles or morons, is certainly sufficient to enable
him to know what he is doing. In the case of Jean Gianini, the writer
testified that in his opinion he knew what he was doing. He knew the
nature of his act. One cannot speak, it is true, with certainty in such
cases. It is entirely possible that, as already intimated, the situation
at first may have been a simple altercation or discussion which finally
got to a point where the anger of the boy was aroused to such an extent
that he acted without really knowing what he was doing. However, there is
no more argument for that theory than against it, and without definite
evidence on the question it is probably going too far afield to make any
such claims of immunity on that ground. We are frank to admit that the
probabilities are high that the boy knew the nature of his act. Did he
know the quality of his act?
By the quality of a thing is meant that which distinguishes it from all
other things. This implies a complete and extensive knowledge of the thing
in question. To know the quality of an act--murder, for example--means to
know all of the elements, forms, or modes of being or action which seem to
make it distinct from all other acts. To know the quality of an act of
murder is to know that it is unjustifiable; it is to know that it differs
from the killing of a rat in that different consequences follow; that
human suffering is involved, both that of the victim and of the victim's
friends and associates. It is to know, at least in some vague way, that
human society could not exist if murder were the rule. To know the quality
of an act of murder is to know enough to be able to distinguish it from
justifiable homicide, from killing in war, not to mention more obvious
necessary distinctions.
Did Jean Gianini know the quality of his act? On the stand, under
cross-examination, the writer was led to express the opinion that he did.
Later study of the problem and consideration of the circumstances leads to
the conclusion that this was erroneous. Such knowledge implies mental
capacity which is not possessed by a boy under twelve years of age. It
involves experience; it involves abstraction, which is notoriously lacking
in such persons. If there is one characteristic more noticeable than
another among the high-grade imbeciles or morons, it is their failure to
deal with abstract ideas; to draw generalizations from specific instances.
Did Pennington know the quality of his act? There is not the slightest
evidence that he did. Indeed, in his case we may go farther and hold very
probably that he did not even know the nature of his act. It is easily
conceivable that he struck the man with the blackjack without knowing that
he was committing murder, without knowing that he might kill him. His
stupidity was clearly of such a character that it is a perfectly tenable
position that he thought he was to strike the man and stun him until they
could rob him and escape.
Did Tronson know the nature and quality of his act? Using revolvers as he
did, it seems undeniable that he knew the nature. He was familiar with
revolvers; he knew what they would do. He, undoubtedly, knew that he was
killing Emma Ulrich. That he did not know the quality of his act is
equally certain. She would not marry him, he did not want her to marry any
one else, and he had no conception that he had no right to put her out of
the way so that she could not marry another if she would not marry him.
Again, we might go further and deeper into the philosophy of the
question, the logic and ethics of it. But these few considerations seem
sufficient to make it of the highest probability that persons of a mental
age under twelve years, like the normal boys or girls of the same age, do
not know and cannot be expected to know the quality of their acts. And
this is sufficient, because the law requires no more than a reasonable
doubt, and there certainly is a very reasonable doubt as to whether such
persons know the quality of an act of murder and know that it is wrong.