POLISH INDEPENDENCE (MADE IN GERMANY)
In this proclamation of a Polish state made jointly at Warsaw in the
name of the Central Empires there was a provision attached that the
Poles should raise an army to defend it. Poland, being now “protected”
and proclaimed a state by Germany, must be defended against Russia, the
common foe, and in consequence this defensive army would form part of
the armies of the Central Empire. This was convenient, for Germany
needed men, and since in the proclamation of the new State she gave
nothing away with regard to the liberties or independence to be granted
it, she hoped to raise fresh troops without loosing a little finger hold
on Poland. She wanted troops against Russia, and hoped that Poland would
furnish them. The idea was not devoid of cunning, but as so often
happens with cunning ideas, it lacked perception, and was based on an
uncomprehending stupidity.
The proclamation was followed up four days later by another joint
proclamation bidding the citizens of the new State to enrol themselves
in the army, and the Governor-Generals of Warsaw and Lublin, von Beseler
and Kuk, as directors of recruiting, issued manifestos declaring that
“In order to secure for the Polish army the position of belligerents, it
will for the time being be included in the German Army.” But the
citizens of the new state, instead of responding to the call, began to
ask themselves whether they were enlisting in a National army or in a
German Army, for the phrase “for the time being” seemed to call for
elucidation. If it was a National army for the defence of their new
independent state there must be a government of that state, and a
military department for the organization of the army. In fact, there
were four demands which must be met before the new state could feel sure
that it was asked to furnish recruits for a National army and not for a
German army. These preliminary necessities were as follows:
(i) A head of the new state, in whom shall be invested supreme
authority, must be appointed.
(ii) The spheres of occupation of the German and Austrian control
must be abolished before the State can come into existence.
(iii) Some national Council of the State must be appointed to draft
its constitution.
(iv) There must be a Military department to organize the new Army.
In a word (the logic of which is irrefutable) you cannot have an army to
defend a state, before that army has a state to defend. A state
postulates by the very meaning of the word, a constitution and laws.
Create the state, and after that it is time to think of creating an army
to defend it.
With regard to the proclamation of the state of Poland, out of all the
parties and cliques that composed that state only two voices raised
themselves in its favour. The first was that of the notoriously
pro-German “Club of the Polish State,”[18] a very small group which
sent, under the signature of its President, Studnicki, a very pleasant
telegram to the Kaiser. Studnicki, it may be remarked, had been
throughout a specimen of the rare pro-German Pole. Subsequently, in
March, 1918, he published a manifesto in the _Narod i Panstwo_ declaring
that Poland must lean on Germany “for we can only consolidate our forces
with the help of the German occupation.” The following are extracts from
Studnicki’s telegram.
“Great Monarch! On this day of joy for the Polish nation, when it
learns it will be free, the hearts of freedom-loving Poles are full
of gratitude for those who by their blood have liberated them....
“The victories of Thine invincible arms have given (us) liberation
from the Russian yoke of our two capitals, equally dear to the
Polish heart. Warsaw and Vilna ...
“We know that in all this is Thy will, Highest Lord, that the
governing faith of those historic events is the strength of Thy
spirit....”
Here, the inclusion of Vilna as a “Polish capital” is interesting. The
Club of the Polish State foresaw a further benefit in store, which has
not at present been permitted to materialize, namely, the union of
Lithuania with Poland. There was a certain ground for this aspiration
since at the capture of Vilna by the Germans, Pfeil, in command of the
German troops, proclaimed that he considered Vilna a Polish town. But
the German government did not agree with him.
The other note of congratulation was in the Cracow paper _Czas_, the
organ of the pro-Austrian Conservative party. It sees the act of God
(probably “Gott”) in the proclamation and adds,
“On the spot from which the victorious sword has driven out Russia,
the invader and oppressor, appears now, on the map of Europe the
inscription ‘Poland’.”
Naturally the German press swelled into a perfect chorus of Lobgesang,
exclaiming that while the Entente vented high talk and Pecksniffian
ejaculations about the rights and liberties of small nations to a
national existence, magnanimous Germany alone had acted instead of
talking, and had freed a down-trodden nation from the yoke of Russian
oppression.
But apart from these two instances a universal chorus of discontent
went up from every section of Polish politics. M. Roman Dmowski, leader
of the National Democrats, and of the Polish party in the Duma, issued a
manifesto on their behalf, calling attention to these points:--
(i) The Polish Nation is one and indivisible. Its aspirations can
not be content without the reunion of partitioned territory.
(ii) The proposed creation of a Polish state formed only of
occupied territories of a single part of Poland merely confirms the
partition of the country.
(iii) Without making definite pledges as to the rights and
prerogatives of the kingdom, the Central Empires only emphasize its
dependence on them. In return they require the Poles to furnish an
army.
(iv) This army is to be sent into battle to defend a cause which is
not Poland’s, and is subordinated to Germany and Austria.
(v) The military projects of Germany and Austria are disastrous for
Poland.
A large meeting of peasants, usually an unorganized body of opinion, was
held at Lodz, demanding (i.) an immediate constitution for the state;
(ii) the appointment of a King of ancient Polish lineage, who should be
a Catholic, should speak Polish, and be the supreme commander of the
Polish army, to be formed for the defence of the state. In the Duma, as
was natural, the Polish Club, with Harusewicz as spokesman, denounced
the German proclamation, saying that all true Poles repudiated it
entirely. Though German propaganda announced enthusiasm over it among
Poles in Paris, the Poles there, as a matter of fact (largely National
Democrats), passed a resolution condemning it. The Central Committee of
the Polish Socialist party did the same, making specific demands about
the appointment of a Diet, with a view to summoning which a provisional
Government must be appointed, composed of democratic elements. They were
willing to defend Poland against Russia, but Germans and Austrians could
not call them to arms. Peasants in Lublin followed the example of Lodz,
and presented a similar petition to Kuk, the Governor-General, who found
nothing better to say than that he saw with joy that the peasants took
an interest in the building of the state. In the United States an
enormous demonstration was held, representing the four million Poles
there, declaring the proclamation to be a strategic move on the part of
Germany, and protesting (i) against the formation of a Polish army to
help Germany, (ii.) against a pretended Polish government which is
merely an instrument in German hands, and (iii.) against a new partition
of Poland. The Realist party, consisting of landowners, similarly
rejected it, claiming an independent Poland (though in 1914 they had
accepted autonomy under Russia) and declared that the proclamation of a
belligerent cannot constitute a solution of the question. In
Switzerland, the Poles expressed their sentiments about the proclamation
by a manifesto of which the following is the key--“The ‘rights’ of the
independent Kingdom of Poland under German auspices seem to be the right
to die for Germany.” Even Lednicki, a supporter of the German solution,
was a patriot on paper for a moment, and issued a manifesto that “Poland
proclaims her standpoint, unmindful of German bayonets.”
Without further multiplication of such views, which were accompanied by
expressions of loss of confidence in the promises of the Entente powers,
it is sufficient to say that never were so many different political
parties in Poland united over any question as over their repudiation of
the German proclamation of the State and the consequent (November 9th)
attempt to raise a Polish army to fight German battles. This attempt may
be dismissed very shortly with the statement that instead of the army of
700,000 or 800,000 men whom Germany hoped to recruit, she succeeded,
during the next two months in enlisting 1,800 men, of whom 1,200 proved
to be physically unfit, from the effect of a year’s starvation. Six
hundred, in fact, were all the efficient support that she was able to
raise. Even the _Czas_, which had shown some enthusiasm over the
proclamation of the Polish State could not support the idea of an army
raised for the defence of the State, before the State had any existence,
and said “There can be no army without a Government. Some way must be
found whereby the Polish nation can initiate and direct the formation of
a Polish army.” Even in highly-censored Germany, the true nullity of
this declaration of Independence, was recognized, and we find Herr Max
Weber neatly summarizing it in the _Frankfurter Zeitung_ of February
25th, 1917. He says “(the Central Empires) issued an unactionable
promissory note with no definite contents in favour of a beneficiary who
had not yet attained a corporate existence.”
The almost unanimous reception accorded to these two schemes made it
clear to the German authorities that some sort of Polish government must
come into existence, and four days later an order was issued for the
establishment of a government which was neither more nor less than a
swindle. Unfortunately, it was an obvious swindle. The Government was to
take the form of a Diet and a Council of State, and the provisions were
as follows:--
(i.) The Diet is to consist of seventy members belonging to the
German sphere of occupation, and to be appointed by the Town
Councils of Warsaw and Lodz.
(ii.) This Diet will appoint eight members of the Council of State,
and four more will be nominated by the Governor-General of Warsaw,
who will also appoint its Chairman.
(iii.) The language to be used both in Diet and Council is to be
Polish.
Now, so far there seems to be a certain “Polishness” about the new
Government, which vanishes cleanly and completely when we consider the
proposed functions of the Diet and of the Council of State, for--
(iv.) The Council of State is to discuss matters submitted to it by
the Governor-General, and to “possess an initiative in
legislation.”
(v.) The Diet is to discuss matters submitted to it by the
Governor-General, and have powers of taxation.
The Governor-General, in fact, provides subjects of discussion for the
two bodies, but is under no obligation to accept their conclusions. One
of these bodies, the Council of State may “initiate legislation,” a
phrase utterly meaningless, since no provision is made for the
completion of such legislation. In other words, neither body has any
powers at all, and their only functions are to converse on subjects
indicated to them by the Governor-General.
This led to a protest from the Poles, who independently formed a
Provisional National Council in Warsaw, consisting (according to the
original scheme) of 81 members, of whom Warsaw contributed 41. They
ignored the Diet and Council of State as set up by the Germans, and
demanded that,
(i.) The Council of State shall be formed on an understanding with
parties in the National Council.
(ii.) The Council of State shall have legislative power and a voice
in military affairs.
(iii.) A Regent from a friendly Roman Catholic dynasty shall be
appointed.
(iv.) The Council of State shall consist of 20 members, 12 from the
German territory of occupation and 8 from the Austrian. Of these
only one shall be appointed by the Governor-General.
These proposals, put forth by the Polish self-appointed National Council
in two successive demands, were admitted, and in this fact we can find a
certain significance. Germany had to recognize the National Council, and
thus the Poles got a certain real voice in the making of the
Constitution which they did not enjoy under the original German scheme.
Probably also pressure was put on her ally by Austria, the official
press of which country had entirely ignored the first declaration, since
it implied the total abandonment of the “Austrian Solution,” and the
only announcements given of it in the unofficial press were derived from
Berlin.
Thereupon, with a slight modification of numbers, the Provisional
Council of State, to which National Democrats, Realists, and Social
Democrats refused to belong, came into existence. It consisted of 25
instead of 20 members, 10 for the sphere of Austrian occupation, and 15
for the German. Its functions, however, were prescribed by the occupying
powers, and were to all intents and purposes as barren as according to
the first German promulgation, running as follows:
(i.) The Council is to be summoned by the two Emperors. When a
vacancy occurs it shall be filled up by them, on the order of the
Governors-General.
(ii.) Both Governors-General are at liberty to send representatives
to the Council to get opinions or to give explanations. They are
allowed to speak whenever they desire.
(iii.) Representatives of the Empires are to speak in German: Poles
in Polish.
(iv.) The Council is to make proposals about the administration.
(v.) It is to co-operate with the Allied powers in the formation of
an army.
In other words, the Council was only to meet when summoned by the two
Emperors, either of whom apparently had the power of proroguing it _sine
die_. When it was summoned, the only powers it possessed were those of
discussion, and therefore as far as constitutional functions go, it
might just as well not meet at all.
As far as I have been able to ascertain, there were, apart from the
supporters of the National Democrats, who refused to sit in the Council
of State altogether, some eighteen or nineteen parties, most of whom
consisted of a mere handful of men, and in consequence the wranglings
over the appointment of the Council of State were likely to prove
interminable. General von Beseler, after urging conciliation and speed,
without success, finally (in January, 1917) issued an ultimatum that the
Council of State must be complete in 24 hours, and apparently it was. In
this Council the National Democrats, the Realists, and the Social
Democrats refused to take part, though Pilsudski, who had raised the
Polish legions (of whom presently) said he would not enter the Council
without them. Since Germany’s own appeal for raising recruits had proved
such a complete fiasco, she knew that the only man who could possibly
obtain recruits for them was this very remarkable person. He had great
influence with the younger generation and among the working-class, and
represented the class of Polish patriotism that was directed against
Russia. For these reasons, the Germans considered him essential to their
plans, and eventually they succeeded in getting him, without the
inclusion in the Council of State of the party for which he had
bargained, since the National Democrats absolutely refused to enter it
without such rearrangements of seats as would give them and their
affiliated groups a predominant vote. Finally also the Jewish element
was included in this futile Council, which strengthened the sadly
deficient pro-German sympathies of it.
The Council of State opened; von Beseler and Kuk, the Governors of
Warsaw and Lublin first spoke, and their joint speech from the throne
was replied to by the chairman, Niemojewski, hitherto unknown as a
politician. After that no progress of any sort was made, and we learn
from _Die Post_ of January 6th, that the principal Polish parties will
not co-operate, and this is followed by a lament that in spite of
Germany’s exertions on behalf of Poland, Poland will not be her friend.
The truth was that the Poles knew very well that this Council of State
created by Germany was a sham, constructed and opened merely with the
pretence of granting the Constitution which Poland demanded as an
essential first step that must be taken before the raising of a national
army, which the Poles declared must be an army for the defence of the
state, but which Germany designed to fight her own battles. Poland, as a
whole, wanted independence and self-government, what it found it had got
was a constitution without power, and the privilege of dying for
Germany. This was openly asserted by Pilsudski, to whom Germany looked
to raise the army, and he announced in the Council that Germany had
created the Polish State in order to raise a Polish army for herself.
A semi-official admonishment to the Poles that supplies a significant
comment on opinion in Germany appeared in the _Kölnische Zeitung_ of
January 15th, 1917. It remarks that though it is only two months since
Poland was liberated, doubts as to the success of this have arisen in
Germany. It is necessary for German frontiers to be secured against
Russia, on conclusion of peace, but she cannot simply annex Poland.
Independent Poland has therefore been created, but the main condition
for its success is that it should have a close connection with Germany
and her Allies, and its army with the armies of the Quadruple Alliance.
The danger lies in the existence of Polish Nationalism which is bound to
arouse the spirit of irredentism. The acquisition of German Poland and
access to the sea are naturally part of the Polish ideal, but since
Germany can never entertain such an idea these aspirations must be given
up once and for all. As long as the war lasts, Poland must be content to
be in German occupation. Poland can only prosper under German and
Austrian protection, and the Poles must see to it that they use their
rights in a way corresponding to German interests, for both Germans and
Poles know that it was not sheer humanitarianism that called the new
state into life, but the consideration of important political interests.
The right thing for the Poles to do is to give up, once for all, their
irredentist claims on Prussian territory, and stake their lives on a
victory of German arms.
Similar exhortations appeared in the _Frankfurter Zeitung_ and the
_Rheinisch Westfälische Zeitung_, urging the necessity of holding Poland
firmly in German Grip and strengthening the interests of German Kultur.
Now this extract sums up the exact _impasse_ between the “_independent_”
state and its German rulers. Germany insists that the whole well-being
of Poland depends on its German orientation--no mention of Austria
occurs at all--and that to stand well with Germany it must prove its
devotion by the shedding of its blood in the cause of Germany.[19] It
has to take Germany on trust, blind, identify itself with German aims,
give up all its aspirations, and revel in its independence! For its own
peace of mind it had better dismiss once and for all any idea of
becoming a united Poland, if by unity is meant a “German solution”
implying the joining to it of Posen, in the same way as under an
“Austrian solution.” Galicia would have been united to it. But as a
counter-attraction to this unrealizable programme we find the Council of
State permitted to issue a manifesto declaring that one of its chief
tasks is to “extend the independent state-existence to all the
territories taken away from Russia, and gravitating towards Poland.” In
other words, if Germany was determined not to give back any part of
Prussian Poland, she might be induced to promise that some of the
Russian territories once belonging to Poland should be reunited to her.
This change of subject suited Germany very well; by all means let the
Council of State amuse itself by dreams of enlarging Poland at the
expense of Russia. That would make bad blood between Poles and Russians,
and, according to the German formula, the more bad blood between other
countries the better. Professor Romer, the Cracow geographer, joined in
the chorus against Russia, conducted by Germany, and produced figures to
disprove Russian statistics which gave the Polish population of
Lithuania as 1,000,000, whereas he claimed 5,000,000 as inhabitants of
it. It is more than possible that the Russian estimate is below the
mark, but when we find that Gustav Olechowski, himself a Polish
Nationalist, only claims 1,500,000 Poles as inhabiting Lithuania, we
must conclude that the Russian estimate is nearer the mark than
Professor Romer’s. He seems to have arrived at his calculation by
including as Poles all Roman Catholics on the ground of a common
religion. The assumption is picturesque, but has nothing to do with
fact. Similarly the Polish right to annex Volhynia was put forward on
the ground that owing to the emigration of Russians eastwards, the
population now was mainly Polish.
These claims and others like them on Russian provinces called forth a
protest from the Government at Petrograd and the most violent
counterblast from the Lithuanian Nationalists, who declared that the
Poles were their worst enemies. It is probable that Germany instigated
those Imperialist demands, with the object not only of fomenting
ill-feeling between Russia and Poland, in which it perfectly succeeded,
but of giving the National Council something to occupy it, so as to
distract it from its real business of drafting the Constitution. This
succeeded also, and up till March, 1917, the Council, apart from
starting schools for officers, seems to have accomplished nothing except
to settle what the official seal of the new state was to be, and to
approve of the establishment of a Committee of National Contribution,
the first aim of which was to raise money for the Polish army.
The parties for complete Polish independence, with the union of
territories now belonging to Russia, Austria and Germany, though they
were quite incapable of getting independence, grew in numbers and weight
during this period. The cynical farce of Polish government, the
recruiting of Poles for industrial work in Germany, and their forcible
detention there, the measures introduced by Germany for compulsory work
for Poles in Posen, the census ordered by Germany for all men in the
occupied territories between the ages of 17 and 50, which the Poles
construed into a foreshadowing of conscription, the continued refused of
Germany to appoint a Regent, were rapidly bringing resentment to a head,
and Germany, who had been so successful in inspiring Polish distrust of
Russia, was diverting the main flow of suspicion against herself.
Then in March the Russian revolution broke out, and on the 29th of that
month the revolutionary Russian Government definitely proclaimed the
independence of Poland (which was a very different thing from the
meaningless phrases of the Grand Duke’s proclamation) and asked in
return for a “free military union” with the country to which it promised
liberty. In other words, Russia like Austria and Germany made a bid for
the support of a Polish army. To this reiterated promise of independence
the Council of State sent a cool reply, congratulating Russia on the
liberty that she, too, had regained, but reminding her that the Central
Empires had also promised Poland independence. But on the population
generally the effect of this Russian proclamation was wildly exciting:
Russia, democratic and free, stretched out an equal and fraternal hand,
and they vented their enthusiasm in strikes and anti-German
disturbances. The Council of State, however, had taken a truer view of
the value of the Russian declaration, for the nature of the “free
military union” was soon hinted at by the new Russian Government, who
elegantly alluded to the fact that there were a very large number of
Polish refugees in Russia (there were probably upwards of 1,000,000 of
them, of whom 500,000 were between the ages of 17 and 45.)[20] Most of
these, up to the age of 37 at any rate, had already enlisted in the
Russian armies, and what was aimed at by the “free military union”
referred to the time after the war, when Russia hoped, in spite of the
independence of Poland, to retain a considerable number of Poles in her
military forces.
The disenchantment spread, and before long it was felt that this
declaration of independence would probably prove as nugatory as previous
Russian declarations. But, in any case, Russia now, in chaos herself,
had abandoned all claim to any suzerainty over Poland, and perhaps the
most important result of the proclamation was that at this precise
moment the National Democratic party, who had previously accepted the
Grand Duke Nicholas’s proclamation, which implied the restoration of
German and Austrian Poland to a kingdom, independent, but under Russian
suzerainty, expanded their aspirations and claimed for the future
Kingdom of Poland much of the territory originally belonging to Poland
which had passed to Russia in consequence of the partitions.
To quiet the growing disgust with Germany, von Beseler made a journey to
Berlin, and returned with the German Government’s consent that a Regent
should be established, _but_ (this “but” was a familiar feature in
German indulgences) they had not yet arrived at agreement “with regard
to the person of the Regent.” This, of course, again postponed the
appointment of a Regent _sine die_, and rendered meaningless the further
promise that the Germans were resolved to leave Warsaw as soon as the
Regency had been established in such a way that the zones of German and
Austrian occupation came under his authority. In other words, though
they were resolved to appoint a Regent and thereupon leave Warsaw, they
intended to remain in possession because (in spite of their resolve)
they could not settle on a Regent. Austria had designated a Habsburg
Regent, and Germany a Hohenzollern: the appointment of either would
remove Poland too far away from the “sphere” of the other power, and
therefore Poland must wait. But this message from Berlin, delivered by
von Beseler, is of interest, because it shows that there was still some
sort of vitality in the policy of the “Austrian solution,” or, if not
vitality, the force of inert resistance. If it could not create, it
could veto. Next month (June, 1917), after a further ineffectual protest
from the Council of State and a threat of resignation, the German and
Austrian Governments both reaffirmed their desire to appoint a Regent.
Neither could do it without the consent of the other, and it served the
purposes of both to give no effective government to Poland. They agreed,
in fact, to differ, since their differing effected the point on which
they were perfectly agreed. For the same reason the joint resolution of
the Polish Deputies in the Reichsrat and of the Diet of Galicia for
Polish unification with access to the sea was the mere tap of a ripple
against a stone breakwater. Austria would certainly have granted that at
the expense of Germany, but could refer to Germany even as Mr. Spenlow
referred to the obduracy of his partner Jorkins. The Central Empires,
though they might disagree with each other, were unanimous in
disregarding any obligation they had entered into with regard to Poland.
Austria would not give way to Germany, nor Germany to Austria, and as
far as Poland was concerned, this disagreement postponed any solution of
the political _impasse_. All the time famine was raging in Russian
Poland, and also in Lithuania, where the mortality among children was
terrible. Yet still parcels of food could be sent to Germany by
occupying troops, without deducting from the food-rations of the
recipients, and still Germany refused to guarantee--whatever her
guarantee might be worth--that foreign relief for the starving Poles
should be used for them and not for exportation into Germany.
Trouble was brewing: again in June, 1917, the Council of State passed a
resolution that Lithuania should be reunited to Poland, and this was
supported by the Inter-Party Club of Warsaw[21] under the leadership of
the National Democrats, in conjunction with Realists, Polish
Progressives, Christian Democrats, the National Federation and the Union
of Economic Independence, for Germany, by her obstinate refusal to give
substance to any of her promises, had done nothing more than
consolidate Polish parties together against herself. Support was given
to the Polish cause by a further declaration of the Allies, for at a
meeting of the Polish National Club in Petrograd, M. Albert Thomas
announced in the name of the French Government that they desired
“unification independence, strength and greatness of Poland, for the
Polish question is a European and an international question.” This was
in flat contradiction of the declaration of the late Tsar’s Government
that the Polish question was an internal Russian question, and was a
direct allusion to the importance of Poland as a check to the
Mittel-Europa policy of Germany. Neither Russia nor the Central Empires
had given substance to the promises they had made, and it was clear that
if Polish national aspirations were to be satisfied, it must be the
Entente to whom Poland had to look. This revulsion of feeling against
the occupying powers led to fresh disturbances that broke out in Warsaw,
and to the refusal of the large majority, 85 per cent., of the Polish
legions to take any oath of allegiance to the Central Powers. On that
the mailed fist descended: the Polish soldiers who had refused to take
the oath were sent to internment camps, and Pilsudski, who had been the
one hope on whom rested the raising of a Polish army to fight for
Germany, was arrested on the charge of conspiracy and imprisoned, upon
which the commanders of the Polish legions resigned. Cannons were placed
in the streets of Warsaw, thousands of civilians were arrested, and the
Governor-General announced that he had authority to burn Warsaw to the
ground, in order to show how deeply Germany had at heart the welfare of
Poland.
But public opinion in Germany by no means endorsed measures of this
kind, which were as unwise as they were tyrannical, and among other
papers the _Kolnische Volkszeitung_ deplored German maladministration
which had made an enemy of the entire country. The state had been formed
too late, no king had been appointed, and it was governed by German
Jacks-in-office, who could not speak a word of Polish or French. The
fact that this was allowed to pass the Censor is an indication of the
general disgust in Germany of the military autocracy as applied to a
country which had been promised independence. More than six months had
passed since that declaration had been made, and there had as yet been
no indication that it was endorsed by the faintest sincerity of purpose.
According to her usual policy, Germany had tried to ingratiate herself
with the Poles by fomenting their hatred of Russia, but now that tide of
suspicion and distrust which she had successfully caused to flow was
ebbing strongly back upon herself. Her fair promises had been shown to
be shams, and even when she replaced cajolery with tyranny, she was
haunted by the sense of imperfect mastery. She had tried to raise an
army of volunteers to fight her battles, and had succeeded in getting
together but 600 men, and when she made a demand for the forcible
recruiting of Poles for the work of munitions and industrial concerns in
Germany, the municipality of Warsaw flatly refused to organise any such
scheme, and she had been obliged to fall back on a voluntary appeal
instead. This proved to be almost as great a _fiasco_ as her attempt to
raise troops, and only 2,629 volunteers came forward. Neither by
conciliation nor compulsion had she attained her aims, and now, when she
had been in occupation for two years, she had not succeeded in making
the Poles either her slaves or her friends. They would not willingly
fight for her or work for her, and she had failed to compel them. She
had not solved the Polish problem, and she was perfectly well aware of
that humiliating fact. She had satisfied neither herself nor her
recalcitrant dependents.