XXXVII.

A steam-engine may be called the greatest of inventions, and could the

best one as yet constructed have sufficient consciousness to register its

excellencies and defects, according to its own knowledge and experience,

it could not be accused of boastfulness or self-depreciation. Again, if

a dog could be endowed, in addition to its faculties, with the power of

expression, and could define in exact terms its sense of smell and so

announce it more keen than that of all other animals, it could not be

accused of vanity.

The steam-engine in its revelation might reflect credit on its designer

and on the man who constructed it, and these might reflect credit on

their maker, but not on themselves; they had no hand in the acquisition

of their faculties. So with the dog, it would simply make its statement,

and in so doing communicate a phenomenon that the science of man would

otherwise be slow to reach.

As it is with the dog, so it should be with men in giving expression to

their natural gifts. A Shakespeare, knowing and avowing himself to be a

vehicle constructed of phosphorized brain and ozonized blood, through

which the higher revelations of nature are poured out on the senses of

men, might describe the glorious machinery as it worked within him;

might declare himself to be the most highly perfected of human beings,

and that without vanity or boast, but not without a benefit to others,

affording them details concerning himself absolutely unattainable by

ordinary means; for no one has yet fathomed him as he did himself, and

his knowledge died with him.

If Lord Bacon had taken the trouble to explain to us all about the

wheels that moved his apparent delinquencies, it would have afforded a

scientific lesson, and have ranked with his other essays. He would have

lost nothing by it; minds of the size of his suffer nothing from opinion,

and can be as indifferent to it as a cat, or a dog, or a horse, or a

cow is to what we call decency. The degree of energy people display in

vociferating against the anomalies of morals is the best measure one

can have of their own failings. If I were to hear a man rail vehemently

against a swindle, I should at once conclude that the machinery of

cheating within him was in good working order, unless it had been his lot

to be the party swindled.

There is no genius without humour, at least no literary genius, for that

differentiating faculty is the basis of all self-criticism. Men have

been challenged to define genius, and they have tried to do it without

being asked. The fact is that clever people can do nothing unless it

is a little difficult; they cannot see what lies directly under their

noses, and one of the truths so situated is that perfect genius has

never existed. Such genius as a man can possess is fragmentary, never

whole. He may have literary genius, and that is enough for one. He may

have scientific genius, like Goethe, Oken, Lamark, Geoffrey St. Hilaire,

Darwin, Helmholtz, Davy, Faraday, Hunter, Cuvier, Laenec; but many of

these were poor creatures in other branches than their own. He may have

genius in mathematical philosophy, like Newton; but that great man had

an intellectual weakness. Real genius of the perfect kind would be more

than one man could carry; the ideal whole is broken up and distributed in

fragments, some immense, like that falling to Leonardo da Vinci’s share,

some small and constituting mere talent.

I have somewhere a list of men of genius who were originators, beginning

with Homer as the father of Poetry, and coming down to Goethe who began

the transcendental philosophy of to-day in his “Metamorphoses of Plants;”

and I could never get beyond sixty or seventy names.

Any one giving an estimate of his own capabilities, whether favourable

or unfavourable, or both, without illustrating what he states by his

own work, and by the opinions of competent critics, is an egotist. If

hereafter I should enter on the subject of my mental capabilities, it

will be on the principle not of self-consciousness, but of mechanical

candour. Having never ceased my work up to the age of eighty-four, I

may have within me an ample experience of my mental operations; but any

account of these the reader has the advantage of testing with what he

finds his own superior judgment.

I produced very little in my early days, though a passion for literary

success then governed me, alternating with a passion for scientific.

A career in the direction of either was impeded in middle life by

professional practice, which had its fascinations. But the young have not

really much that is worth saying to the middle-aged or old. I had been

nourished on the Greek and Roman classics; under the special influence

of Herodotus I composed an Egyptian drama of the time of Cambyses, and

it cost me much labour and greatly improved me in the art of composing;

but not having read it for more than half a century I am quite unable now

to judge of it. The flight I know to have been high, but whether through

clear atmosphere or fog I cannot say. Sir Sibbald Scott, son of my friend

Sir David, told me that he had seen the authorship of “The Piromides”

inquired for in _Notes and Queries_ at two different times. It was

received by the press as a work of solemn purpose throughout.

I may mention that Lord Elgin, to whom I inscribed this play, thought it

betrayed poetic taste, and he expressed his opinion in warmer terms than

I cite.

It is surprising to witness how many good writers of their own language

there are in this country: in reading the papers this is extensively

seen; the leading articles appear equal, all marked by idiomatic

clearness of expression. Then, in literary criticism, it is noticeable

how much deeper the writers penetrate into the arcana, perceiving what

is rendered, and what is left wanting, in a poetic composition, and that

with a psychological acuteness much more general than was met with a

generation or two ago. This is the more valuable, since criticism is the

profoundest of studies; it demands an adequate knowledge of every science

and art, as well as a competent observation of nature.

In speaking of my own intellectual mechanism, this I say once more is

none of my own, but an instrument placed temporarily among visible

things, to reveal what it may to the less knowing.

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