The machine of Arkwright was adapted for roving by means of a revolving

cam. For the process of carding, additions and improvements of great

ingenuity were affixed to the carding-cylinder patented by Lewis Paul in

1748, transforming it into an entirely new machine. The most important

of these were the crank and comb, said to have been used by Hargreaves,

but which it is now known that Hargreaves stole from Arkwright; the

perpetual revolving cloth called the feeder, said to have been used by

John Lees, a Quaker of Manchester, in 1778, but which Arkwright had

undoubtedly used previously at Cromford; and filleted cards on the

second cylinder, which also must have been used by Arkwright in 1778,

although a manufacturer named Wood claimed to have first used them in

1774. Indeed, the whole of the complicated self-acting machinery, which

without the intervention of hand labor performed the different processes

necessary to change raw cotton into thread suitable for warp, was

substantially the invention of Arkwright; and while each separate

machine was in itself a remarkable triumph of inventive skill, the

construction of the whole series, and the adaptation of each to its

individual function in the continuous succession of operations, must be

regarded as an almost unique achievement in the history of invention.

INTELLECTUAL REVOLT OF GERMANY

GOETHE'S "WERTHER" REVIVES ROMANTICISM

A.D. 1775

KARL HILLEBRAND

The latter half of the eighteenth century was, throughout Europe, a

period of revolt against the old ideas, the outworn bonds of mediæval

society. In art and literature the older system, with its elaborately

planned rules and formulas, is technically called "classicism"; and the

outburst against it established "romanticism," the spirit of desire, the

longing for higher things, an impulse which ruled the intellectual world

for generations, and which many critics still believe to be the chief

hope for the future.

Romanticism found expression, more or less impassioned and defiant, in

every land, but its earliest and strongest impulse is generally regarded

as having sprung from Germany. The sceptical, half-cynical rule of

Frederick the Great had left men's minds free, and imagination was

everywhere aroused. The early culmination of its extravagance is found

in the youth of Goethe and Schiller, Germany's two greatest poets; and

Goethe's famous novel, _The Sorrows of Young Werther_, became the

text-book of the rising generation of romanticists. Werther kills

himself for disappointed love, and the book has been seriously accused

of creating an epidemic of suicide in Germany. Hillebrand, writer of the

following analysis of the period and the movement, is among the foremost

of present-day German authorities upon the subject.

Goethe was twenty-six years old when he accepted (1775) the invitation

of Charles Augustus, and transported to Weimar the tone and the

_allures_ of the literary bohemia of Strasburg. There, to the terror of

the good burghers of that small residence, to the still greater terror

of the microscopic courtiers, began that "genial" and wild life which he

and his august companion led during several years. Hunting, riding on

horseback, masquerades, private theatricals, satirical verse,

improvisation of all sorts, flirtation particularly, filled up day and

night, to the scandal of all worthy folk, who were utterly at a loss to

account for his serene highness saying "_Du_" to this Frankfort

_roturier_. The gay Dowager Duchess, Wieland's firm friend, looked upon

these juvenile freaks with a more lenient eye; for she well knew that

the fermentation once over, a noble, generous wine would remain. "We are

playing the devil here," writes Goethe to Merck; "we hold together, the

Duke and I, and go our own way. Of course, in doing so we knock against

the wicked, and also against the good; but we shall succeed; for the

gods are evidently on our side." Soon Herder was to join them there,

unfortunately not always satisfied with the results of his teaching

about absolute liberty of genius.

The whole generation bore with impatience the yoke of the established

order, of authority under whatever form, whether the fetters were those

of literary convention or social prejudice, of the state or the church.

The _ego_ affirmed its absolute, inalienable right; it strove to

manifest itself according to its caprices, and refused to acknowledge

any check. Individual inspiration was a sacred thing, which reality with

its rules and prejudices could only spoil and deflower. Now, according

to the temperament of each, they rose violently against society and its

laws, or resigned themselves silently to a dire necessity. The one in

Titanic effort climbed Olympus, heaving Pelion on Ossa; the other wiped

a furtive tear out of his eye, and, aspiring to deliverance, dreamed of

an ideal happiness. Sometimes in the same poet the two dispositions

succeed each other.

"Cover thy sky with vapor and clouds, O Zeus," exclaims Goethe's

Prometheus, "and practise thy strength on tops of oaks and summits of

mountains like the child who beheads thistles. Thou must, nevertheless,

leave me my earth and my hut, which thou hast not built, and my hearth,

whose flame thou enviest. Is it not my heart, burning with a sacred

ardor, which alone has accomplished all? And should I thank thee, who

wast sleeping whilst I worked?"

The same young man who had put into the mouth of the rebellious Titan

this haughty and defiant outburst, at other moments, when he was

discouraged and weary of the struggle, took refuge within himself. Like

Werther, "finding his world within himself, he spoils and caresses his

tender heart, like a sickly child, all whose caprices we indulge." One

or the other of those attitudes toward reality, the active and the

passive, were soon taken by the whole youth of the time; and just as

Schiller's _Brigands_ gave birth to a whole series of wild dramas,

_Werther_ left in the novels of the time a long line of tears. More than

that, even in reality Karl Moor found imitators who engaged in an open

struggle against society, and one met at every corner languishing

Siegwarts, whose delicate soul was hurt by the cruel contact of the

world.

What strikes us most in this morbid sentimentality is the eternal

melancholy sighing after nature. Ossian's cloudy sadness and Young's

dark Nights veil every brow. They fly into the solitudes of the forests

in order to dream freely of a less brutal world. They must, indeed, have

been very far from nature to seek for it with such avidity. Many, in

fact, of these ardent, feverish young men became in the end a prey, some

to madness, others to suicide. A species of moral epidemic, like that

which followed upon the apparent failure of the Revolution in 1799, had

broken out. The germ of Byronism may be clearly detected already in the

Wertherism of those times. Exaggerated and overstrained imaginations

found insufficient breathing-room in the world, and met on all sides

with boundaries to their unlimited demands. Hearts, accustomed to follow

the dictates of their own inspiration alone, bruised themselves against

the sharp angles of reality. The thirst for action which consumed their

ardent youth could not be quenched, in fact, in the narrow limits of

domestic life; and public life did not exist. Frederick had done great

things, but only, like the three hundred other German governments, to

exclude the youth of the middle classes from active life. Thence the

general uneasiness. _Werther_ was as much an effect as a cause of this

endemic disease; above all, it was the expression of a general state of

mind. It is this which constitutes its historical importance, while the

secret of its lasting value is to be found in its artistic form.

Besides, if I may say so without paradox, the disease was but an excess

of health, a juvenile crisis through which Herder, young Goethe,

Schiller, and indeed the whole generation had to pass.

"Oh," exclaimed old Goethe fifty years later in a conversation with

young Felix Mendelssohn, "oh, if I could but write a fourth volume of my

life! It should be a history of the year 1775, which no one knows or can

write better than I. How the nobility, feeling itself outrun by the

middle classes, began to do all it could not to be left behind in the

race; how liberalism, Jacobinism, and all that devilry awoke; how a new

life began; how we studied and poetized, made love and wasted our time;

how we young folk, full of life and activity, but awkward as we could

be, scoffed at the aristocratic propensities of Messrs. Nicolai and Co.,

in Berlin, who at that time reigned supreme." "Ah, yes, that was a

spring, when everything was budding and shooting, when more than one

tree was yet bare, while others were already full of leaves. All that in

the year 1775!"

Old pedantic Nicholai, at whom he scoffed thus, foresaw, with his prosy

common-sense, what would happen "with all those confounded striplings,"

as Wieland called them, "who gave themselves airs as if they were

accustomed to play at blind-man's buff with Shakespeare." "In four or

five years," said he in 1776, "this fine enthusiasm will have passed

away like smoke; a few drops of spirit will be found in the empty

helmet, and a big _caput mortuum_ in the crucible." This proved true

certainly for the great majority, but not so as regards the two coursers

which then broke loose, and for him who had cut their traces and

released them. Goethe, indeed, modified, or at least cleared up, his

early views under the influence of a deeper study of nature and the

sight of ancient and Renaissance art in Italy (1786-1788); Schiller put

himself to school under Kant (1790), and went out of it with a

completely altered philosophy: Kant himself became another after, if not

in consequence of, the great King's death (1786); Herder alone remained

faithful throughout to the creed he had himself preached.

The way opened by Herder, although partly and temporarily abandoned

during the classical period which intervened, was followed again by the

third generation of the founders of German culture, the so-called

Romanticists, and by all the great scholars, who, in the first half of

this century, revived the historical sciences in Germany. Herder's ideas

have, indeed, penetrated our whole thought to such a degree, while his

works are so unfinished and disconnected, that it is hardly possible for

us to account for the extraordinary effect these ideas and works

produced in their day, except by marking the contrast which they present

with the then reigning methods and habits as well as the surprising

influence exercised by Herder personally. From his twenty-fifth year,

indeed, he was a sovereign. His actual and uncontested sway was not, it

is true, prolonged beyond a period of about sixteen years, albeit his

name figured to a much later time on the list of living potentates. It

is also true that when the seeds thrown by him had grown luxuriantly,

and were bearing fruit, the sower was almost entirely forgotten or

wilfully ignored. The generation, however, of the "_Stuermer und

Draenger_,"[58] or, as they were pleased to denominate themselves, the

"original geniuses," looked up to Herder as their leader and prophet.

Some of them turned from him later on and went back to the exclusive

worship of classical antiquity; but their very manner of doing homage to

it bore witness to Herder's influence. The following generation threw

itself no less exclusively into the Middle Ages; but what, after all,

was it doing if not following Herder's example, when it raked up Dantes

and Calderons out of the dust in order to confront them with and oppose

them to Vergils and Racines? However they might repudiate, nay, even

forget, their teacher, his doctrines already pervaded the whole

intellectual atmosphere of Germany, and men's minds breathed them in

with the very air they inhaled. To-day they belong to Europe.

Herder, I repeat, is certainly neither a classical nor a finished

writer. He has no doubt gone out of fashion, because his style is

pompous and diffuse, his composition loose or fragmentary; because his

reasoning lacks firmness and his erudition solidity. Still, no other

German writer of note exercised the important indirect influence which

was exercised by Herder. In this I do not allude to Schelling and his

philosophy, which received more than one impulse from Herder's ideas;

nor to Hegel, who reduced them to a metaphysical system and defended

them with his wonderful dialectics. But F.A. Wolf, when he points out to

us in Homer the process of epic poetry; Niebuhr, in revealing to us the

growth of Rome, the birth of her religious and national legends, the

slow, gradual formation of her marvellous constitution; Savigny, when

he proves that the Roman civil law, that masterpiece of human ingenuity,

was not the work of a wise legislator, but rather the wisdom of

generations and of centuries; Eichhorn, when he wrote the history of

German law and created thereby a new branch of historical science which

has proved one of the most fertile; A.W. Schlegel and his school, when

they transplanted all the poetry of other nations to Germany by means of

imitations which are real wonders of assimilation; Frederick Schlegel,

when, in the _Wisdom of the Hindoos_ he opened out that vast field of

comparative linguistic science, which Bopp and so many others have since

cultivated with such success; Alexander von Humboldt and Karl Ritter,

when they gave a new life to geography by showing the earth in its

growth and development and coherence; W. von Humboldt, when he

established the laws of language as well as those of self-government;

Jacob Grimm, when he brought German philology into existence, while his

brother Wilhelm made a science of Northern mythology; still later on,

D.F. Strauss, when, in the days of our own youth, he placed the myth and

the legend, with their unconscious origin and growth, not alone in

opposition to the idea of Deity intervening to interrupt established

order, but also to that of imposture and conscious fraud; Otfr. Mueller,

when he proved that Greek mythology, far from containing moral

abstractions or historical facts, is the involuntary personification of

surrounding nature, subsequently developed by imagination; Max Mueller,

even, when he creates the new science of comparative mythology--what

else are they doing but applying and working out Herder's ideas? And if

we turn our eyes to other nations, what else were Burke and Coleridge,

B. Constant and A. Thierry, Guizot and A. de Tocqueville--what are Renan

and Taine, Carlyle and Darwin doing, each in his own branch, but

applying and developing Herder's two fundamental principles, that of

organic evolution and that of the entireness of the individual? For it

was Herder who discovered the true spirit of history, and in this sense

it is that Goethe was justified in saying of him:

"A noble mind, desirous of fathoming man's soul in whatever direction it

may shoot forth, searcheth throughout the universe for sound and word

which flow through the lands in a thousand sources and brooks; wanders

through the oldest as the newest regions and listens in every zone."

"He knew how to find this soul wherever it lay hid, whether robed in

grave disguise, or lightly clothed in the garb of play, in order to

found for the future this lofty rule: Humanity be our eternal aim!"

Among the young literary rebels who, under Herder's guidance, attempted,

toward and after 1775, to overthrow all conventionalism, all authority,

even all law and rule, in order to put in their stead the absolute

self-government of genius, freed from all tutorship--the foremost were

the two greatest German poets, Goethe and Schiller. Goethe's _Goetz_ and

_Werther_, Schiller's _Brigands_ and _Cabal and Love_, were greeted as

the promising forerunners of the national literature to come. Their

subjects were German and modern, not French or classic; in their plan

they affected Shakespearean liberty; in their language they were at once

familiar, strong, and original; in their inspiration they were protests

against the social prejudices and political abuses of the time, vehement

outbursts of individuality against convention.

Not twenty years had passed away, when both the revolutionists had

become calm and resigned liberal conservatives, who understood and

taught that liberty is possible only under the empire of law; that the

real world with all its limits had a right as well as the inner world,

which knows no frontiers; that to be completely free man must fly into

the ideal sphere of art, science, or formless religion. Not that they

abjured "the dreams of their youth." The nucleus of their new creed was

contained in their first belief; but it had been developed into a system

of social views more in harmony with society and its exigencies, of

æsthetic opinions more independent of reality and its accidents, of

philosophical ideas more speculative and methodical. In other words,

Goethe and Schiller never ceased to believe, as they had done at twenty,

that all vital creations in nature as in society are the result of

growth and organic development, not of intentional, self-conscious

planning, and that individuals on their part act powerfully only through

their nature in its entirety, not through one faculty alone, such as

reason or will, separated from instinct, imagination, temperament,

passion, etc. Only they came to the conviction that here existed general

laws which presided over organic development, and that there was a means

of furthering in the individual the harmony between temperament,

character, understanding, and imagination, without sacrificing one to

the others. Hence they shaped for themselves a general view of nature

and mankind, society and history, which may not have become the

permanent view of the whole nation; but which for a time was

predominant, which even now is still held by many, and which in some

respects will always be the ideal of the best men in Germany, even when

circumstances have wrought a change in the intellectual and social

conditions of their country, so as to necessitate a total transformation

and accommodation of those views.

We cannot regard it merely as the natural effect of advancing years if

Goethe and Schiller modified and cleared their views; if Kant, whose

great emancipating act, the _Critique of Pure Reason_, falls

chronologically in the same period (1781), corrected what seemed to him

too absolute in his system, and reconstructed from the basis of the

conscience that metaphysical world which he had destroyed by his

analysis of the intellect. The world just then was undergoing profound

changes. The great "Philosopher-king" had descended to the tomb (1786),

and with him the absolute liberty of thought which had reigned for

forty-six years. The French Revolution, after having exalted all

generous souls, and seemingly confirmed the triumph of liberty and

justice which the generation had witnessed in America, took a direction

and drifted into excesses which undeceived, sobered, and saddened even

the most hopeful believers. As regards personal circumstances, the

Italian journey of Goethe (1786-1788) and his scientific investigations

into nature, the study of Kant's new philosophy to which Schiller

submitted his undisciplined mind (1790 and 1791), were the high-schools

out of which their genius came strengthened and purified, although their

æsthetic and moral doctrines did not remain quite unimpaired by them. I

shall endeavor to give an idea of this double process and its results at

the risk of being still more abstract and dry than before.

Man is the last and highest link in nature; his task is to understand

what she aims at in him and then to fulfil her intentions. This view of

Herder's was Goethe's starting-point in the formation of his

_Weltanschauung_ (or general view of things).

"All the world," says one of the characters in _Wilhelm Meister_,

"lies before us, like a vast quarry before the architect. He does not

deserve the name if he does not compose with these accidental natural

materials an image whose source is in his mind, and if he does not do it

with the greatest possible economy, solidity, and perfection. All that

we find outside of us, nay, within us, is object-matter; but deep within

us lives also a power capable of giving an ideal form to this matter.

This creative power allows us no rest till we have produced that ideal

form in one or the other way, either without us in finished works or in

our own life."

Here we already have in germ Schiller's idea that life ought to be a

work of art. But how do we achieve this task, continually impeded as we

are by circumstances and by our fellow-creatures, who will not always

leave us in peace to develop our individual characters in perfect

conformity with nature? In our relations with our neighbor, Goethe--like

Lessing and Wieland, Kant and Herder, and all the great men of his and

the preceding age, in England and France as well as in Germany--recommended

absolute toleration, not only of opinions, but also of individualities,

particularly those in which Nature manifests herself "undefiled." As

to circumstances, which is only another name for fate, he preached

and practised resignation. At every turn of our life, in fact, we

meet with limits; our intelligence has its frontiers which bar its

way; our senses are limited and can only embrace an infinitely small

part of nature; few of our wishes can be fulfilled; privation and

sufferings await us at every moment. "Privation is thy lot, privation!

That is the eternal song which resounds at every moment, which, our

whole life through, each hour sings hoarsely to our ears!" laments

Faust. What remains, then, for man? "Everything cries to us that we must

_resign_ ourselves." "There are few men, however, who, conscious of the

privations and sufferings in store for them in life, and desirous to

avoid the necessity of resigning themselves anew in each particular

case, have the courage to perform the act of resignation once for all;"

who say to themselves that there are eternal and necessary laws to which

we must submit, and that we had better do it without grumbling; who

"endeavor to form principles which are not liable to be destroyed, but

are rather confirmed by contact with reality." In other words, when man

has discovered the laws of nature, both moral and physical, he must

accept them as the limits of his actions and desires; he must not wish

for eternity of life or inexhaustible capacities of enjoyment,

understanding, and acting, any more than he wishes for the moon. For

rebellion against these laws must needs be an act of impotency as well

as of deceptive folly. By resignation, on the contrary, serene

resignation, the human soul is purified; for thereby it becomes free of

selfish passions and arrives at that intellectual superiority in which

the contemplation and understanding of things give sufficient

contentment, without making it needful for man to stretch out his hands

to take possession of them; a thought which Goethe's friend, Schiller,

has magnificently developed in his grand philosophical poems. Optimism

and pessimism disappear at once, as well as fatalism; the highest and

most refined intellect again accepts the world, as children and ignorant

toilers do: as a given necessity. He does not even think the world could

be otherwise, and within its limits he not only enjoys and suffers, but

also works gayly, trying like Horace, to subject things to himself, but

resigned to submit to them when they are invincible. Thus the simple

Hellenic existence which, contrary to Christianity, but according to

nature, accepted the present without ceaselessly thinking of death and

another world, and acted in that present and in the circumstances

allotted to each by fate, without wanting to overstep the boundaries of

nature, would revive again in our modern world and free us forever from

the torment of unaccomplished wishes and of vain terrors.

The sojourn in Italy, during which Goethe lived outside the struggle for

life, outside the competition and contact of practical activity, in the

contemplation of nature and art, developed this view--the spectator's

view--which will always be that of the artist and of the thinker,

strongly opposed to that of the actor on the stage of human life.

_Iphigenie_, _Torquato Tasso_, _Wilhelm Meister_, are the fruits and the

interpreters of this conception of the moral world. What ripened and

perfected it so as to raise it into a general view, not only of

morality, but also of the great philosophical questions which man is

called upon to answer, was his study of nature, greatly furthered during

his stay in Italy. The problem which lay at the bottom of all the vague

longing of his generation for nature _he_ was to solve. It became his

incessant endeavor to understand the coherence and unity of nature.

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