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[Illustration: Sketch Map,
SHOWING ROUTES OF MÖNNICHHOFEN AND RAMSAY]
HISTORY OF THE
SCOTTISH EXPEDITION
TO NORWAY IN 1612.
_By_
_THOMAS MICHELL, C.B.,_
_Her Majesty's Consul General for Norway._
London:
T. NELSON AND SONS, PATERNOSTER ROW.
EDINBURGH; AND NEW YORK.
CHRISTIANIA: T. BENNETT, TOURIST AGENT.
1886.
_Rights of Translation and Reproduction reserved for the benefit of
the Anglican Church at Christiania._
Dedicated,
BY GRACIOUS PERMISSION,
TO
HIS MAJESTY OSCAR II.
KING OF SWEDEN AND NORWAY,
&c. &c. &c.
WITH THE DEEPEST GRATITUDE
AND THE MOST PROFOUND RESPECT OF
THE AUTHOR.
Preface.
The idea of investigating the story of the Scottish Expedition to
Norway in 1612 occurred to the author on a trip through the beautiful
valleys of Romsdal and Gudbrandsdal in the autumn of 1884--many of
the statements made on that subject in guide-books, and in almost
every work on Norway, having appeared incredible when he left the
highway and explored the old bridle-path along which the Scots
marched on their way to Sweden.
Subsequent researches in State Archives, made with the kind
assistance which has been heartily acknowledged in the pages that
follow, resulted in the discovery of official documents hitherto
unavailable, and with their aid the traditional account of the
"Skottetog" has, in its chief outlines, been reduced to strict
historical proportions.
The information thus acquired was utilized by the author in a
lecture delivered in 1885 at the University of Christiania, in the
gracious presence of His Majesty the King of Sweden and Norway, for
the benefit of the Building Fund of the Anglican Church in that city.
It is with the same practical object that, with the generous
co-operation of the publishers, the lecture has been embodied in
the little book now commended to the attention of those who take an
interest in Scottish history, as well as to that of the British and
American travellers who visit in such largely increasing numbers the
beautiful and hospitable valleys and highlands of Norway, in which
they find so much sympathetic evidence of a common origin of both
race and language.
LONDON, _March 1886_.
Contents.
PART I.--HISTORICAL.
I. SOURCES OF INFORMATION, 11
II. THE CALMAR WAR, AND SWEDISH MEASURES FOR RAISING
MERCENARIES, 18
III. SUCCESSFUL MARCH OF MÖNNICHHOFEN THROUGH NORWAY, 23
IV. ORGANIZATION OF SCOTTISH LEVIES FOR SWEDEN, AND THEIR
FORCED DISBANDMENT, 32
V. ORDERS OF KING JAMES I. DISOBEYED BY A FEW SCOTTISH
OFFICERS, WHO PROCEED WITH A SMALL PORTION OF THE
LEVIES TO NORWAY, 42
VI. THE LANDING OF ALEXANDER RAMSAY IN ROMSDALEN, 48
VII. DESTRUCTION OF THE SCOTS IN GUDBRANDSDALEN, 52
VIII. THE COMBAT AT KRINGELEN, 56
PART II.--TRADITION.
I. THE SINCLAIR BALLAD, 71
II. NORWEGIAN TRADITIONS COLLECTED BY THE REV. H. P. S.
KRAG, 75
PART III.--APPENDICES.
Historical Documents.
I. EXTRACTS FROM THE "SWEDEN AND DENMARK CORRESPONDENCE,
1612," IN THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON, 133
II. COPIES OF DOCUMENTS FROM THE GENERAL REGISTER HOUSE,
EDINBURGH, 160
III. DOCUMENTS FROM STATE ARCHIVES, STOCKHOLM, 173
IV. DOCUMENTS FROM STATE ARCHIVES, COPENHAGEN, 180
INDEX TO NAMES OF PERSONS, 187
Part I.
Historical.
I.
SOURCES OF INFORMATION.
More than two centuries and a half have elapsed since the date of the
occurrence so well known in Norway as the "Skottetog," or Scottish
expedition, of which but little has hitherto been authentically known
in Scotland. Notwithstanding, therefore, the conspicuous position
which the so-called "Sinclair Expedition" holds in the traditions,[1]
and to some extent also in the literature and the art,[2] of
Norway, a fresh examination of the subject by the impartial light
of historical truth is justified by the recent discovery of several
documents in the State Archives of England, Scotland, and Sweden.
Although Mönnichhofen's expedition through Stordalen, and the
Scottish invasion of Romsdalen and Gudbrandsdalen which formed an
integral but unsuccessful part of that expedition, took place in
1612, no account of the latter appeared in print earlier than the
year 1688, when Puffendorff wrote his "Introduction to Swedish
History;" and it was only three years later that Widikindi, another
Swedish historian, gave a narrative of it in a History of Gustavus
Adolphus.
Among Danish historians, Niels Slange was the first of any eminence
to reproduce the now palpable errors of Puffendorff and Widikindi, in
a History of Christian IV., written in 1732.
In 1782, the subject of the Skottetog first became popularized in
Norway by the publication, in a periodical journal called the _Dansk
Museum_, of the spirit-stirring poem by Edvard Storm, which Norwegian
children still learn by heart and in song, and which has even been
well circulated in the English and German languages.[3]
[Illustration: THE LANDING OF THE SCOTS IN ROMSDALEN, 1612.
As depicted by the Norwegian artists Tiedemann and Gude.
_Page 11._]
But the first really important contribution towards the history of
the event was made in 1838, when Dean Krag of Vaage dedicated to
the descendants of the Bönder[4] who had fought at Kringelen
the _Sagas_, or traditions, he had personally collected in
Gudbrandsdalen, annotated with such historical references as were
then available.[5]
While the traditions he has so scrupulously preserved for us are of
great interest, if only because they indicate plainly the source
of the information on which Swedish, Danish, and even Scottish
accounts of the expedition into Romsdalen had been chiefly based,
he enriched history with copies of the first and only documents
that had apparently ever been drawn before his time, from State or
other archives, relative to the Scots who landed in Romsdalen. Those
documents were: a Report by the Norwegian Stadtholder, Envold Kruse,
to the Danish Chancellor, dated Aggershuus, 17th September 1612; and
three deeds of gift of land (all dated 3rd September 1613) to Lars
Hage, Peder Randklev, and Berdon Sejelstad, for their bravery and
loyal devotion on that occasion.
In that laborious little work Dean Krag pointed out that, with the
exception of Kruse's first Report (of which he had obtained a copy
from Copenhagen), all the writers after Puffendorff (1688) and
Widikindi (1691) had repeated, more or less, only what those two
historians had related. He also showed that Storm's poem had been
preceded by a popular ballad on the same subject, and of which he
collected and printed as much as was still extant in Gudbrandsdalen.
More recent historical research resulted in the discovery, also at
Copenhagen, of a second Report from Envold Kruse, the Stadtholder,
dated 3rd October 1612. It was first published between 1858 and
1860,[6] and was reproduced in a little work printed at Molde in
1877.[7]
The history of the Scottish expedition to Norway in 1612 has,
therefore, until this day been supported in Scandinavian accounts by
only two documents of indisputable authority--namely, the two Reports
of Envold Kruse, of which the second was brought to light less than
twenty years ago.
Nor have Scottish and English historians[8] and writers, so deeply
interested in the question, been more successful in discovering
and making use of authentic contemporary documents. A careful
examination of their several descriptions, both of Mönnichhofen's
expedition and of that of the Scots, reveals the fact that their
information had been derived either from the old Danish and Swedish
historians already mentioned, or more recently from the traditions
current in Gudbrandsdalen. Those accounts may consequently be
dismissed as unworthy of serious attention.
But the Public Record Office in London has at last delivered up
its long-hidden treasures, consisting of the correspondence that
passed between King James I. of England (VI. of Scotland) and Sir
Robert Anstruther, his ambassador or envoy at Copenhagen, on the
subject of the Scottish levies for Sweden in 1612.[9] In the General
Register House, Edinburgh, have also been preserved[10] the acts
and proclamations of the Scottish Privy Council in respect of those
proceedings; while the keeper of the State Archives in Stockholm has
supplied copies of several documents[11] that have not hitherto been
published, amongst which must be mentioned a letter or commission
issued by Gustavus Adolphus II.[12] to Sir James Spens of Wormiston,
a Scottish officer of high rank, found sometimes in the service of
James I., sometimes in that of Sweden.
That commission is of more especial value, since it explains the
connection between the expedition of Mönnichhofen and that of the
Scots.
The former enterprise--an important part of the famed Skottetog--is
not the subject of any Norwegian Sagas, or of any popular ballads,
but Scandinavian historians have dealt with it somewhat more
correctly than with the Scottish expedition, probably because
the Dutch contingent reached Sweden, and thereby supplied living
testimony as to the circumstances that attended its march through
Stordalen into Jemtland.
Nevertheless, the first documents relating to that daring exploit
were not published before 1858, in a Norwegian historical magazine.
These were copies of letters from Steen Bilde, amtmand, or
prefect; Christian Jensson Jude, burgomaster; and Jacob Pederson,
lagmand,[13] all of Trondhjem--addressed to the Danish Chancellor,
and dated severally between the 15th August 1612 and the 19th
February 1613.
Some years later--namely, in 1877--Dr. Yngvar Nielsen of Christiania
published[14] "Some Notices respecting Johan von Mönnichhofen,"
derived from a series of letters from Swedish agents at Amsterdam
which he found in the State Archives at Stockholm.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] For Norwegian traditions and literature, see Part II.
[2] Two of the most celebrated artists of Norway--Gude and
Tiedemann--have jointly produced a very beautiful, but fanciful,
picture representing the arrival of "Colonel Sinclair" on the
coast of Romsdalen with five or six vessels, and the plundering of
the inhabitants by his followers, one of whom, in the garb of a
Calvinistic priest, is engaged in abducting a fair Norwegian maiden,
while the rest are engaged in looting.
[3] A translation of it is given in Part II.
[4] The Norwegian term for peasant proprietors or yeomen; _sing._
Bonde.
[5] A translation _in extenso_ is given of this work in Part II.
[6] Vol. II. of "Samlinger til det Norske Folks Sprog og Historie."
[7] "Skottetoget efter Folkesagnet og Historien." O. O. Olafsen,
Molde, 1877.
[8] See Sir Robert Gordon's "History of the Earldom of Sutherland;"
the "History of Caithness," by J. T. Calder; Chambers's "Domestic
Annals of Scotland;" the "History of Gustavus Adolphus," by B.
Chapman; "Memoirs and Adventures of Sir John Hepburn, Kt.;" Laing's
"Residence in Norway;" Clarke's "Travels."
[9] Examined and kindly copied by the late Mr. Alfred Kingston of the
Public Record Office, London.
[10] Communicated by Mr. T. Dickson, Curator of the Historical
Department, Register House, Edinburgh, to whom the author is indebted
for much valuable assistance.
[11] Search was made for those documents by the orders of the King
of Sweden and Norway. In this respect the thanks of the author
are due to Mr. C. G. Malmström, Keeper of the State Archives at
Stockholm, and to Mr. C. H. de Lagerheim and Mr. M. de Björnstjerna
of the Swedish Foreign Office, for their researches and friendly
co-operation. His acknowledgments are also due to Joseph Anderson,
LL.D., Keeper of the National Museum, Edinburgh.
[12] November 16, 1611, for the levying of auxiliary troops in
Scotland. For copy, see p. 173.
[13] A judicial officer attached to a tribunal as a kind of witness
of its proceedings.
[14] Vol. XIV. of the _Historisk Tidskrift_, or Historical Magazine.
Dr. Nielsen's aid and advice have been invaluable to the author.
II.
THE CALMAR WAR, AND SWEDISH MEASURES FOR RAISING MERCENARIES.
Such being the documents and the information at last available in the
matter of the Mönnichhofen and Scottish expeditions of 1612, it is
time to narrate briefly why auxiliary troops were at that time wanted
in Sweden.
When Gustavus Adolphus, on the 26th December 1611, took into his
own hands, at the age of seventeen, the government of Sweden, his
first step was to seek the conclusion of peace with Denmark; and
with that object he formally surrendered the title of King of the
Lapps, the assumption of which by his father had caused so much ill
blood between Christian IV. and Charles IX. that it became one of the
principal causes of the so-called Calmar War, commenced in the spring
of 1611.
The overtures of Sweden and the offered mediation of Great Britain
and other powers were rejected by Denmark, and the war was thereupon
continued with great vigour, but with varying success on either
side. However, in the early summer of 1612 the Danes took the
important fortresses of Elfsborg and Gullberg, and having the entire
command of the Cattegat and the Belts, cut off Sweden from the sea.
Later, the Danish fleet anchored inside the rocks at Stockholm, of
which the seizure was averted only by the bold strategy of Gustavus
Adolphus.
This abortive attempt on the capital of Sweden practically concluded
the war. Peace was ultimately signed at Knäröd, in Halland, January
18, 1613.[15]
During that war the Danish monarch had in his service about eighteen
thousand English,[16] French, and German mercenaries; while Gustavus
Adolphus, having on his side[17] only one foreign regiment of
eight or nine companies, soon found himself "in need of foreign
soldiers as well, wherewith to check the attacks of the enemy."[18]
Charles IX. had indeed foreseen such a necessity, but no action
was apparently taken in that direction until the month of November
1611, when Gustavus Adolphus addressed to Sir James Spens the letter
or commission already mentioned, and when also the Queen Dowager
of Sweden issued an order[19] for the payment of 10,500 rigsdaller
out of a fund at Lübeck to Mönnichhofen, then preparing to proceed
to the Netherlands for the enlistment of men, who, according to
the letter addressed to Sir James Spens, were to have joined the
Scottish auxiliary contingent at Elfsborg. On the 2nd December 1611
Mönnichhofen[20] was appointed commander-in-chief of the Swedish
ships-of-war with which he was to have sailed from Elfsborg and
brought back his levies. Money being apparently scarce, orders were
given that he should be supplied with a certain quantity of ox-hides,
for sale on his arrival in Holland, to meet the further expenses of
his expedition. But the original plan of fetching and transporting
the Netherlands levies in Swedish ships-of-war was ultimately
abandoned, and Mönnichhofen reached Holland by another route.
The letters discovered at Stockholm by Dr. Yngvar Nielsen prove
that Mönnichhofen had by the 1st June 1612 embarked a force of
about twelve hundred men at Amsterdam on board four ships, which
were detained for five weeks by contrary winds. Mönnichhofen had,
therefore, the Swedish agent writes, incurred "extraordinary
expenses, to the extent of at least four thousand thalers, in
providing the men in the small ships with food and drink, and had
consequently to pledge and mortgage all he possessed." He had "also
encountered much difficulty and incurred great expense in keeping his
men together even before the ships lay wind-bound."
Although in most Danish and Swedish histories the troops enlisted
by Mönnichhofen in Holland are stated to have been Scottish, there
is no documentary proof of such having been their nationality. The
Netherlands were at the time full of foreign auxiliary troops, the
republic having, on the signature of the truce of 17th June 1609,
retained in its service 6,000 French, 3,000 English, and 3,000
Germans, but only 2,000 Scots. The absence of all mention of Scottish
officers being with Mönnichhofen; the rivalry that existed between
the military adventurers of that period; the circumstance that
General Halkett,[21] a Scottish officer, was in Amsterdam at about
the same period, engaged, not in enlisting Scots, but in hiring a
ship to transport levies from Scotland; and more especially the fact
that Mönnichhofen had been instructed to procure arms for the men
simultaneously levied in Scotland;--all this leads us to infer that
Mönnichhofen, himself a Fleming, enlisted Hollanders, and perhaps
Germans.
FOOTNOTES:
[15] In that treaty of peace, King James I. of England, whose
ambassador had assisted at its negotiation, was described as "a
friendly broker and negotiator"--a phrase which, slightly varied,
Prince Bismarck applied to himself at the late Congress of Berlin.
King James I. is mentioned as "the general peace-broker of Europe."
(Jahn's "History of the Calmar War.") The king himself aspired to be
called "Rex Pacificus."
[16] "His M. doth holde that their are not a thousand strong fighting
men of Inglysh soiours heere; and doeth wonder of my Lord Willowbeis
staying."--Sir R. Anstruther to King James I., from the "Camp at
Golberg," July 5, 1612.
[17] The alien officers were General Rutherford and Lieutenant
Learmonth, Captain Wauchope, and Greig, who commanded the
artillery--all Scotsmen; also General Due, Caspar Matzen, and
Mönnichhofen. (Deposition of Andrew Ramsay and Robert Douglas,
Copenhagen, December 19, 1611.) In 1613 Mönnichhofen and Rutherford
were employed with Swedish troops in Russia. (Cronholm's "History of
Sweden.")
[18] Gustavus Adolphus to Sir James Spens, November 16, 1611.
[19] November 26, 1611.
[20] Johann von Mönnichhofen was an officer of high rank in the
Swedish service. In the documents preserved in the Swedish State
Archives he is indifferently styled "Quartermaster-General and Chief"
and "Chief Quartermaster." Together with the other foreign officers
in the pay of Sweden, he was at the siege of Calmar, at which they
were all, with the solitary exception of himself, wounded. A Scottish
officer deponed at Copenhagen that Mönnichhofen had alone escaped on
that occasion "because he surpassed the others in prudence, and knew
how to fight from a distance." This disparaging observation may be
due to jealousy on the part of his Scottish brethren in arms, for he
certainly showed great daring in planning and executing successfully
his march through Norway.
[21] Called in some documents "Colonel" and "Lieut.-Colonel."
III.
SUCCESSFUL MARCH OF MÖNNICHHOFEN THROUGH NORWAY.
According to the Report of the same Swedish agent, Mönnichhofen
sailed at last on the 14th July from Amsterdam,[22] and landed five
days later in Stordalen, on the coast of Norway--at that time united
with the Crown of Denmark--without combining, as originally intended,
with the levies made in Scotland, although measures for their
detention were taken only on the 4th August following.
The ships (evidently Dutch) which had transported his troops to
Norway returned safely to Amsterdam with the information that
Mönnichhofen had disembarked "three or four miles above Trondhjem, in
Moersdall," and that his men had landed in such an ill-conditioned
state that they "could not reach Sweden without great difficulty and
danger."
When read in connection with the Reports of the Swedish agents at
Amsterdam, first discovered and made known by Dr. Yngvar Nielsen in
1877, the letters of Steen Bilde, C. J. Jude, and J. Pederson[23]
afford a credible and fairly complete account of that expedition.
Those collective documents show that it was not composed, as alleged
by Niels Slange, of "about fourteen hundred soldiers, or Scots,"
enlisted in Scotland, but nominally of twelve hundred men raised in
the Netherlands under the circumstances already described.
The burgomaster of Trondhjem (who, like Bilde and the other Danish
officials, was interested in over-rating rather than in under-rating
the strength of the invaders,) reported, on 15th August 1612, that
the expedition consisted of "eight hundred soldiers, besides their
women and boys;" and according to Cronholm,[24] Gustavus Adolphus
himself wrote that the number of those men, when they arrived in
Jemtland, out of all further danger, amounted to eight hundred.[25]
The four small Dutch ships could scarcely have carried more,
especially if the men were accompanied by their women and children,
as alleged by the burgomaster.
The Swedish and Danish historians relate that Mönnichhofen took his
men to Scotland, and sailed from thence, in command of a combined
force, for the coast of Norway; but all these statements only serve
to prove yet more conclusively that the true history of the foreign
levies made for Sweden in 1612 has until quite recently lain hidden
in State Archives.
Mönnichhofen sailed from Amsterdam on the 14th July 1612, and having
landed in Norway on the 19th July, could not possibly have carried
out the original plan of joining his levies with those made in
Scotland. Besides, the documents now brought to light prove that the
small portion of the intended Scottish contingent that escaped the
vigilance of the Scottish Council of State did not sail for Norway
until the 2nd of August.
According to the Reports of the Trondhjem officials above mentioned,
Mönnichhofen seized two other ships off Giske (which place he
plundered), put some of his soldiers on board, and compelled the
Norwegian vessels to pilot his own fleet of four ships into Trondhjem
roads. In order to prevent the enemy from entering the river, Steen
Bilde removed the poles and buoys that marked the channel, brought
six iron cannon down to the sea-shore, and hastily made many other
arrangements for repelling an anticipated attack on the city. As it
grew dark soon after the ships had anchored, the fire opened upon
them from the shore was harmless; and at daybreak they set sail
again, after firing a few shots in return.
The wind being favourable, they soon rounded a point on which stood
a farm called Viig, where the soldiers were quickly disembarked and
marched towards Meragerfjeld, four or five Norwegian (twenty-eight to
thirty-five English) miles distant.
They reached the summit of the fjeld without much molestation from
the three military officers in command of the "frontier guard" of
about two hundred soldiers or militia, reinforced by three hundred
mounted Bönder. Steen Bilde and the three officers had collected
a considerable number of peasants (the burgomaster says fifteen
hundred) to repel the invasion; but according to the prefect, when a
part of those levies reached the enemy, the captain of the frontier
guard "could not get them forward where they were wanted." The enemy
kept them off with their muskets, which the peasants mistook for
cannon, probably because they were fired from rests, while their own
firearms they considered to be relatively "pop-guns" (_Snap-bosser_).
Moreover, provisions were unobtainable, as the local Bönder had fled
on the approach of the troops, after hiding their scanty supplies of
food in the woods. A panic ensued, the common people insisting that
the invaders were "very strong, and picked soldiers and warriors."
Steen Bilde was subsequently tried and punished for his alleged
remissness in not repelling the enemy, and therefore some caution
is necessary in receiving the official complaints made by the
burgomaster and lagmand against the peasantry on that occasion, and
which were to the following effect: "How can we carry on war in
this country with peasants? It suffices to see how they conducted
themselves against the soldiers." Steen Bilde affirmed that the
lagmand had to "ride and walk about the whole of the night to get
those peasants and ill-disposed persons into order; and yet nothing
can be accomplished with them, as they do not stand, but run away
at once when they see the enemy." He urged in his own defence: "I
did my best, diligently, according to the counsel and means at hand,
and according to what could be accomplished with those peasants.
God comfort those who have no other help than peasants on such an
occasion!"
It would appear at this distance of time that both Steen Bilde
and the peasants were unfairly reproached for their conduct. The
sudden landing of so many armed men was quite sufficient to create
a panic, while the burning of "four farms in Stordalen, and of all
the farms (twelve in all) which lay towards the river at Merager,"
was well calculated to strike terror into and to paralyze a peaceful
population.[26] Under such circumstances, it would have been
difficult to drive the men back to their ships, even with the fifteen
hundred peasants hastily collected, under the command of three
captains, and supported only by two hundred soldiers or militia.
Mönnichhofen's troops appear to have had the same difficulty as the
peasant levies in providing themselves with food; for the men sent by
Steen Bilde into the mountains as scouts found some of the soldiers
dead from hunger, and many pieces of armour as well as pikes and
other weapons thrown away by them.
On the other hand, Cronholm[27] asserts that the progress of the
troops, which, laden with booty, were driving before them the
cattle robbed from farms, was arrested in numerous mountain passes,
where the soldiers were slaughtered by a host of peasants. But this
statement is not in harmony with the Official Reports made to the
Danish Chancellor, or with the punishment inflicted on Steen Bilde.
The latter pointed out, on the contrary, that if some armed bands of
peasants had understood how to utilize the advantages afforded by the
physical conditions of the highlands, the rocks and precipices over
which the bold Mönnichhofen and his men made their way "might easily
have become their graves."
However, it is on historical record that the expedition reached
Jemtland, where it found itself on Swedish soil, the population
having previously taken an oath of allegiance to the Swedish Crown,
which at the end of the war acquired permanently that Danish province.
Gustavus Adolphus occupied Herjedalen and Jemtland in pursuance
of a threat made (March 1612) in a proclamation to the Norwegian
peasantry, who yet spurned the idea of seceding from Denmark, and had
attacked in force the lands on the Swedish borders, when, according
to a contemporaneous writer, Dal and Vemland bore the brunt of the
Norse onslaught.[28]
In that proclamation Gustavus Adolphus attributed the war to the
Danish king, "whose aim," he said, "was war and bloodshed, and who
had caused, menaced, and forced both his late father and himself
to have recourse to self-defence." He reminded the Norwegians how
"Sweden and Norway had from the most ancient days been united by
relationship of descent and language; how there was a time when they
had one and the same king; how the bond that should unite Norwegians
and Swedes was, after all, closer and more natural than anything
that could unite Norwegians with Danes; and how even geographical
conditions seemed to witness that it was the will of Fate that Norway
and Sweden should be united."
That far-seeing sovereign therefore called upon the Norwegians to
submit to him as their lord and king, promising to confirm all their
rights and privileges, and to restore to their legitimate position
the remnants of the old aristocracy of Norway.
This appeal produced gradually the desired effect both in Herjedalen
and Jemtland. The march of Mönnichhofen towards the old Swedish
provinces was thus rendered easy; and on receipt of orders from
Gustavus Adolphus, he took the direct road to Stockholm, then
seriously threatened by the fleet of Christian IV.
Gustavus led in person the Netherlands contingent to Waxholm, a few
miles from Stockholm, in order to attack the Danes, and in a month or
so the Calmar War came to an end.
FOOTNOTES:
[22] Steen Bilde reported that Mönnichhofen's ships had sailed from
Emden.
[23] Published about 1858.
[24] "Sveriges Historia under Gustav II Adolph's Regering."
Stockholm. Part I., p. 175.
[25] In his letter to Sir J. Spens, Gustavus Adolphus speaks only of
one thousand infantry to be raised by Mönnichhofen.
[26] F. H. Jahn, the Danish historian of the Calmar War, says the
Bönder were so stricken with fear that they allowed the transport
ships, which they might have taken, to sail back.
[27] "Sveriges Historia under Gustav II Adolph's Regering."
[28] "Nordens Historie." N. Bache, Copenhagen, 1884.
IV.
ORGANIZATION OF SCOTTISH LEVIES FOR SWEDEN, AND THEIR FORCED
DISBANDMENT.
Having dealt with that part of the general plan of bringing foreign
troops to the aid of Sweden which was so successfully carried
out by Mönnichhofen, we approach the main subject of this little
work--namely, the history of the Scottish levies, and of the disaster
that befell the very small portion of them that succeeded in leaving
Scotland and landing in Norway.
Our starting-point in this part of the inquiry must be the commission
addressed by Gustavus Adolphus to Sir James Spens, Laird of
Wormiston.[29]
It gives an authentic indication of the measures subsequently adopted
for obtaining levies in Scotland as well as in Holland. The young
warrior and statesman refers to promises made by Sir James Spens
to Charles IX., and to the services which his father had required
of him, urging him to hasten his return (evidently from Scotland)
with the "promised three thousand soldiers of proved faithfulness
and bravery." He wished them to be infantry, not cavalry. The main
object was the arrival of Sir James Spens at Elfsborg, by the 1st of
April 1612, "with the before-mentioned number of troops, properly
equipped with the needful accoutrements." Spens was to be paid at
Hamburg the sum of 20,000 imperials, and was assured that any further
expense he might incur in the matter of the levies would be repaid
to him punctually and with the greatest cheerfulness. Gustavus
Adolphus added: "Furthermore, we have thought (right) that it should
be notified to you that we have arranged with our general (_duce_),
our truly-beloved Johannes Mœnichovius, that he is to transport his
thousand infantry, fully furnished with necessary arms, from Holland
to Elfsborg, in the beginning of spring. If, therefore, you combine
your fleet and army with the ships of the aforesaid Mœnichovius, we
shall be extremely glad."
The execution of this part of the plan was subsequently rendered
impossible by the fall of Elfsborg and the command which the Danes
obtained of the approaches to Sweden by sea.
The proceedings of Spens in this matter are not disclosed in the
documents so far discovered,[30] which prove that Colonel Andrew
Ramsay was the active organizer of the levies in Scotland. King James
I. in one of his letters calls him "the chief of the business, whose
brother all men know what place he hath with us." The influence
Andrew Ramsay possessed at the Court of King James probably caused
him to be engaged by Spens. One of his brothers was Sir John
Ramsey, a favourite of King James, and who, while one of the royal
pages, in the year 1600, was instrumental in rescuing the king from
assassination at Gowrie House, near Perth. It was another brother of
his--Alexander Ramsay--who was the leader of the small detachment of
Scots destroyed at Kringelen, in Norway, and not George Sinclair, as
hitherto assumed.
That the king's name was privately but unjustifiably used in the
proceedings of Colonel Andrew Ramsay, was subsequently acknowledged
by the latter, and hence the suspicion arose in Denmark that King
James was cognizant of those proceedings. But the documents preserved
in Edinburgh show that King James did not become aware of what Andrew
Ramsay and the officers with him were doing in Scotland until about
the 31st July 1612, the date on which the king wrote to his Scottish
Privy Council as follows:--
"Whereas it is said there is a colonel and certain captains levying
men to go to Sweden, we wonder that any subject of ours dare presume
in that kind to serve any foreign prince, not only without our
licence but directly against our meaning and special promise made
to our dear brother the King of Denmark[31].... It is therefore
our pleasure that ye certify as to what that levying of soldiers
meaneth; by what authority it is done; and that ye make stay of
all proceedings therein till ye shall be advertised of our further
pleasure concerning that matter."
Nine days later, the king wrote to his envoy at Copenhagen[32] that
he had heard, "by mere accident, of levies in Scotland ready to
embark under Ramsay, Steward, and some other captains;" and "being
displeased, gave order presently for the stay of the levy. And
whereas good numbers of them were already embarked before His Majesty
heard the news, or ready to embark, His Highness hath given order to
discharge them, and doth utterly disavow any acts of theirs," etc.
But the Danish king was already well acquainted with those
proceedings; for the British envoy at Copenhagen wrote to King James
on the 10th August 1612 (the king had written to him on the 9th
August) that the King of Denmark was informed that "one Menigowe,
a Fleming, having in company with him fifteen hundred men, is to
meet with Andrew Ramsay in some part of the north of Scotland, about
Caithness or Orkney, who has more than a thousand Scottish men with
him; and so they mind to join their forces together, and to fall upon
Norway and spoil some towns, and so go into Sweden." The King of
Denmark, added the envoy, had been informed by persons from Scotland
that Ramsay had levied men about Edinburgh and embarked them at
Leith; and His Majesty argued that "such levies so near Edinburgh
could not be done without permission of the State."
Indeed, the excuses of the Scottish Privy Council, to the effect
that the levies had been made secretly, did not satisfy even King
James, who wrote to his envoy that, to quote his own expression, he
"misliked some dulness of theirs."
The action taken by the Scottish Privy Council immediately on
receipt of the peremptory orders of the king was as follows:--
On the 4th August 1612 a proclamation was issued "discharging the
transporting of soldiers to Sweden," and another "against the
soldiers enlisted for Sweden;" while two acts were passed--the one
"charging" or accusing "Captains Hay, Ker, and Sinclair" of having
enlisted men for the wars of Sweden, and ordering them to desist from
their enterprise, etc.; the other summoning Colonel Andrew Ramsay
to appear before the Council to "hear and see His Majesty's will,
pleasure, and direction" in respect of the men of war enlisted under
his pay and command to be transported to Sweden. Next day the Lords
of the Council ordered officers of arms "to pass, command, and charge
the masters, owners, skippers, and mariners of ships and vessels
freighted for transport of soldiers to Sweden, that they bring in
their ships to the harbour of Leith, and there suffer them to lie,"
and not to set sail until they know the Council's will and pleasure
towards them, under pain of being denounced as rebels and "put to the
horn."[33]
On the 15th August an act was passed by the Council, ordering
that "the companies of men lately enlisted under the charge and
commandment of Colonel Ramsay and some other captains, for the
wars of Sweden, be broken up, and that they shall in no wise be
transported to Sweden;" and on the same day another act, ordaining
that the companies under Colonel Ramsay, who had meanwhile professed
his willingness to render obedience to the king by disbanding them,
should be landed, one half at Leith, the other half at Brunt or Burnt
Island, on the other side of the Forth.
The latest document regarding these matters, obtained from the
General Register Office in Edinburgh, is dated the 18th September
1612. Colonel Andrew Ramsay had been summoned to appear before the
Council on the latter date, to answer regarding the unlawful levying
of troops; and having failed to do so, he was forthwith denounced as
a rebel.
Those acts and proclamations[34] give a very interesting and, indeed,
important insight into the methods Colonel Andrew Ramsay and his
confederates had adopted in Scotland.
We first of all find that Sir Robert Ker had apprehended in the
middle shires[35] of Scotland a number of malefactors, part of whom
he sent, or rather intended to send, to Sweden. In the second place,
the proclamations assert that the Scottish officers therein named
"have violently pressed and taken a great many honest men's sons,
and have carried them to their ships against their will, of purpose
to transport them to Sweden." They are accused of going "about the
country in a swaggering manner, awaiting the time and occasion how
and where they may apprehend any persons travelling on their lawful
adois,[36] and if they be masters of them they immediately lay hands
on them and by force and violence convey them to the next shore,
where they have their boats in readiness to take them on board of
their ships.... So that there is such a fear and dread arising among
the common people that none of them dare travel," unless they be
"able to withstand and resist the violence and injury of the said
persons." ... "And divers young fellows," continues the proclamation,
"who were resolved to have come to these parts to have awaited upon
the harvest and cutting down of the corn are," for those reasons,
"afraid to come here." In the charge against Captains Hay, Ker, and
Sinclair, it is alleged that the "honest men's bairns and servants"
are detained on board the ships "as slaves and captives."
Any person disobeying the orders of the Council was threatened with
the penalty of death. The levies were to be discontinued, the ships
seized, their sails taken from the yards, and the men on board set
at liberty; but not before the local authorities had visited the
vessels, and taken out of them and delivered over to the bailies
of Edinburgh "the persons who had been delivered to them by the
Commissioners of the late Borders," as well as the persons whom
Colonel Ramsay and his captains had received out of the tolbooths of
Edinburgh and Dunbar.
The remainder of the companies were ordered to be landed, as already
said, at Leith and Burntisland, but on condition that the men should
not remain together or travel back in groups of more than two
after their disembarkation, under penalty of death, to obviate the
possibility of their committing acts of violence on passing through
the country.
The remarkable fact that, in all these stringent and detailed
regulations for the disbanding and landing of so many men, no
mention whatever is made of the most ordinary military precaution of
disarming them will be noticed in a succeeding chapter.
FOOTNOTES:
[29] Sir James Spens was the son of "Spens of Wormiston," who made
Lennox, the regent of Scotland, captive at the seizure of Stirling
by the forces of Kirkaldy in 1571, and who was slain at the same
time while protecting his prisoner. The personage in question, so
high in the favour of Gustavus Adolphus, was a prominent type of the
Scottish adventurer of that age. He went to Sweden in 1610 as envoy
from King James I., there being at the time a question of betrothing
Gustavus Adolphus, then Crown Prince, to an English princess--namely,
to Elizabeth, the daughter of James I., married subsequently to
Frederick, the Elector Palatine of the German Empire. We find him
later in Denmark, offering the mediation of England between Christian
IV. and Charles IX. On this occasion he was so ungraciously received
at Copenhagen that he narrowly escaped with his life. Sir James
Spens entered the Swedish military service, from which, however,
he was recalled by King James, who, a short time after, sent him
back to Stockholm as ambassador, in which character he invested
Gustavus Adolphus with the Order of the Garter, and took part in the
negotiations that resulted in the Peace of Knäröd. On one occasion
he went to England as ambassador from the Swedish Court. In 1622 he
was created Baron Spens of Orreholmen, in Vestergotland. He died
at Stockholm in 1632, after having been made, in 1629, General in
Command of the English and Scottish regiments in the pay of Sweden.
[30] It appears from the correspondence of Sir Robert Anstruther that
the "Lord of Wormiston" landed at Elsinore on the 4th June 1612,
having been sent simultaneously with Sir Robert Anstruther to arrange
a peace between Denmark and Sweden. The Danish Chancellor was induced
to grant him a safe-conduct into Sweden; "whereupon a nvmber hath
wondred and thinks he shall haue small thank for his panis." F. H.
Jahn, the Danish historian of the Calmar War, asserts that Spens was
"secretly supported in his recruiting business."
[31] When as yet only King of Scotland, James was married (November
24, 1589) at Oslo, now a suburb of Christiania, to Anne, sister
of Christian IV. of Denmark. She had previously gone through the
ceremony of marriage with Earl-Marshal Keith, as proxy for the king,
at the castle of Cronenberg; but on their way to Scotland the Danish
ships, driven by storms to the coast of Norway, landed the princess
at Oslo. With great gallantry King James came over to fetch her
with a large fleet, and remained at Oslo, after his marriage there
(performed by Robert Bruce, court chaplain), until the 21st January
1590, when he sailed with his bride for Copenhagen. The ties of
relationship, and the duties and obligations of King James towards
his "good brother" the King of Denmark, are fully recognized in the
documents now published; but the impartial historian cannot fail
to take into consideration the character of that sovereign and his
conduct in other matters, such as the negotiations with Spain and the
family interests connected with them.
[32] King's Secretary to Sir Robert Anstruther, 9th August 1612.
[33] The latter threat meant, in Scottish law, a declaration of
outlawry, after three blasts of a horn, and the putting up of a
citation at the quay, pier, or shore in Leith, or at the market cross
in Edinburgh.
[34] _Vide_ text in Appendix.
[35] The Border counties of Scotland were ordered to be called the
middle shires on the union of the two kingdoms.
[36] Plural of _ado_, business.
V.
ORDERS OF KING JAMES I. DISOBEYED BY A FEW SCOTTISH OFFICERS, WHO
PROCEED WITH A SMALL PORTION OF THE LEVIES TO NORWAY.
The vigorous measures of the Council were not, however, adopted in
sufficient time to prevent a small contingent of the Scottish levies
from crossing over to Norway.
On the 17th September 1612, the Norwegian Stadtholder Kruse announced
to the Danish Chancellor the arrival of two Scottish ships at
Romsdalen between the 19th and 20th August, and the destruction at
Kringelen, on the 26th August, of all the men, except eighteen, that
had landed from those vessels.
On the 26th October 1612, Sir Robert Anstruther reported the matter
in the following terms to King James:--
"Doubtless your M^{tie} hath heard of that unfortunate accident,
that happened unto 300 of your M^{is} subjects, which landed in
Norroway under the conduct of Alexander Ramsay, Lieutenant-Colonel
unto Colonel Ramsay, Captain Hay, and Captain Sinclair. After they
had marched six days within the country, pressing to go through to
Sweden, (they) were over-charged by the inhabitants of the country,
and all killed, except some few, of which the said Lieutenant
Ramsay,[37] and Captain Bruce,[38] James Moneypenny,[39] and James
Scott[40] these four, were sent to Denmark. After their coming hither
a Council of War was called, to have examined them, and afterwards
to have given judgment upon them. After I had spoken with them, and
found that their journey was enterprysed (undertaken) rashly, and
rather simple than well advised, for not one of them had any kind of
commission or warrant to show, neither from the late King Charles,
neither from Gustavus, neither from Colonel Ramsay; wherein first
they would have been condemned of great simplicity or ignorance: and
next found to be plain invaders, and ravers of the king's dominions
and subjects, and a severe judgment would have followed. In regard
the king was much discontented, for eviting of this public censure
and danger, I thought good to labour to have them privily examined in
the presence only of the Chancellor and Bredo Rantzow, where I was
myself (unworthy) present. Their deposition is sent with themselves
unto your M^{tie,} hoping it shall be far better for them to come
into the hands of your Royal M^{tie,} who ever had used grace and
clemency unto those that offend of simplicity, not of wilfulness."
In a letter of the same date to the king's secretary, the envoy
stated that the 300 Scots had all been "killed and murdered," except
some few.
The deposition in question of Alexander Ramsay, made in Latin, was to
the following effect:--
He had been appointed to the post of Lieutenant-Colonel by Andrew
Ramsay, who, on his part, had declared that he had been appointed
to the office of Colonel by a letter from Charles, King of Sweden.
Andrew Ramsay had told him that the levying of men in Scotland had
been carried on with the knowledge and approval of His Majesty of
Great Britain--"that an agreement had been made between himself and
two others: George Sinclair and George Hay, each being in command
of a hundred infantry."[41] He, Alexander Ramsay, "had embarked at
Dundee: but the two aforesaid captains had set sail from Caithness."
"They had crossed the sea relying on the words and promises of Andrew
Ramsay; and the Council of the Kingdom of Scotland was unacquainted
with those matters." "A stopping-place," he further deponed, "had
been fixed upon beforehand, off Shetland, where Mönnichhofen with a
thousand soldiers and 3,000 arms and General Halkett[42] of Scotland
with a thousand infantry, were to meet, the number increasing to
3,000." Lastly, that they had set sail from that place on the second
day of August, James Nisbet of Edinburgh having "taken upon himself
the risk which the ship" (in the singular--probably Ramsay's) "might
incur," and that the Norwegian peasants showed them the way "when
they had landed at Romsdal in Iisfiord."
Alexander Ramsay and his three companions were "sent home to their
country," King James finding them "no otherwise in fault than as
abused by Ramsay." This Colonel Andrew Ramsay, after being a fugitive
in Scotland, was apprehended in England on the occasion of his
seeking a quarrel (or duel) with Sir Robert Carr of Ancram,[43] whom
he accused of having divulged to the king his "gathering of men in
Scotland."
On being examined, on the 27th November 1612, in the presence of
the Duke of Lennox and Viscount Fenton, he confessed that he had a
commission from the King of Sweden for levying men, and that he had
undertaken and gone about to levy men in Scotland out of ignorance,
not knowing but that he might lawfully "take such as would go." For
his fault, he submitted himself to His Majesty's mercy, "as also for
using the king's name to induce others, which he confesseth he did,
and promised them to stand between them and any danger." At the same
time, he denied ever having had "any leave, oversight, or connivance
directly or indirectly from the king, either by himself, or by means
or signification of any other body." Nor had he acquainted any member
of the king's Council of Scotland with his doings, or "received any
encouragement from them or any else."
This deposition was transmitted to Denmark, King James ordering Sir
Robert Anstruther to say that Andrew Ramsay's "fault being of that
nature as doth not forfeit life or limb, and the custom of declaring
Schellum"[44] (which the King of Denmark had evidently suggested as a
punishment for the breach of his parole not to serve Sweden) "being
not with us in use, we have by our warrant under our hand banished
him out of all our dominions; which next unto death is the highest
punishment we could inflict."
Having thus disposed of the history of the Scottish levies, we
proceed to inquire into the fate of the small detachment that landed
in Norway under the command of Alexander Ramsay.
FOOTNOTES:
[37] In Envold Kruse's first Report to Copenhagen he is styled
Captain Ramsay.
[38] Called in Sir R. Anstruther's letter to Sir James Spens (26th
September 1612) "good Sir Henry Bruce." (See p. 177.) In Kruse's
first Report he is stated to have served as a soldier in Holland,
Spain, and Hungary.
[39] In the same Report Moneypenny is called Lieutenant to Ramsay,
and mentioned as having been "used as an interpreter" in this
expedition. He had previously been in Denmark and Sweden.
[40] Not mentioned in Kruse's Report.
[41] There is no mention of the "part of his company" which William
Stuart, in his desire to obtain favours at Stockholm in 1613, alleged
he had sent to Norway. (See p. 178.)
[42] According to the deposition of Alexander Ramsay, General
Halkett, who was to have raised one thousand men in Scotland for the
joint expedition, had been at Amsterdam some time in the month of
August, and had hired a ship to sail to Edinburgh, in order, as he
gave out, "to take to Sweden the men whom Spens was to have caused
to be engaged in Scotland." The Swedish agent, "who reported this on
the 24th August, thought it, however, little probable that such an
expedition would succeed so late in the season, especially as the
_men were not armed_, while in Norway the people were everywhere in
arms."--Letter from the Swedish agent at Amsterdam to Johann Skytte,
discovered by Dr. Yngvar Nielsen.
[43] "Favourit in ordinary," and Viscount Rochester, K.G. In 1613,
Earl of Somerset.
[44] Rogue or vagabond(?).
VI.
THE LANDING OF ALEXANDER RAMSAY IN ROMSDALEN.
The Scots disembarked at a place since named Skothammer, or
Skotkleven (the Scots' Cliff), in the vicinity of Klognæs farm, in a
part of the Romsdal fiord called the Iisfiord, some miles from the
present hamlet of Veblungsnæs, which was not then in existence. The
Sagas of Gudbrandsdal, collected by Dean Krag, begin with a stirring
account of the patriotism of Peder Klognæs or Klungnæs, the occupant
of the farm of that name, who is popularly supposed to have prevented
the two Scottish vessels from proceeding higher up the fiord, by
representing that there was not sufficient water for them. He is
therefore credited with the skilful deception of having induced the
Scots to march two Norwegian miles (about fourteen English miles) out
of their way, round the Iisfiord, over mountains and marshes, and
through roadless forests intersected by almost impassable streams;
all which delayed their progress, and enabled Peder to send a message
to the authorities and to the Bönder, to save their goods in advance
of the troops.[45]
It is more likely that the real reason for landing at Skotkleven
was the desire of the shipmasters to get back to sea as quickly as
possible, and not further endanger their safety by entering into a
narrower and more remote part of the fiord.
It is scarcely necessary to follow and criticise the remainder
of the Sagas, such as the meeting of Sinclair with the old woman
(transformed by Edvard Storm into a mermaid), who predicted he "would
come to bite the dust when he met the hardy men of the glen," and the
romantic story of Guri, the maiden who made signals to the Bönder,
and played a plaintive melody from the summit of a very high and
distant cliff. The noble sacrifice another girl is reputed to have
made of her lover, whom she sent to save the wife of Sinclair, is
a story so very touching that we may be glad if future historical
research should lead to the discovery that Captain Sinclair was
accompanied on his adventurous expedition, not by "wild Turks" or
bloodhounds,[46] but in reality by a wife and baby.
This Captain George Sinclair, whose name has been wrongly given to
the Scots' expedition, was a son of David Sinclair of Stirkoke, the
illegitimate son[47] of John, Master of Caithness, the eldest son of
George, fourth Earl of Caithness. He was therefore a bastard nephew
of George, fifth Earl of Caithness, who employed him, while he was
preparing to leave for Norway, in the betrayal of Lord Maxwell, and
in making him prisoner at Castle Sinclair, near Thurso.[48]
FOOTNOTES:
[45] No mention is made of Peder Klognæs in the Reports made by
Envold Kruse, who merely says the Scots took with them "two Bönder
in Romsdalen as guides." Andrew Ramsay and his companions deponed at
Copenhagen that "the peasants showed them the way when they landed
at Romsdal in the Iisfiord." Moreover, Peder Klognæs was not amongst
those whom Christian IV. rewarded. The traditions respecting Peder
Klognæs bear an extraordinary resemblance to those which attach in
Russia to a popular hero named Ivan Susanin, whose devotion to his
sovereign, by misleading a detachment of Poles in 1611, forms the
subject of the patriotic Russian opera called "Life for the Tsar."
Kostomaroff, a modern Russian historian of high standing, has proved
that the peasant in question never rendered any such service, as
neither the Czar nor the Polish detachment had been in the locality
indicated at the time to which the legend refers.
[46] See page 96.
[47] It is, however, stated in Henderson's "Notes on Caithness
Families" that he received letters of legitimation in 1588.
[48] Lord Maxwell had been banished the realm for the slaughter of
the Laird of Johnstone; but returning into Scotland in 1612, he
had sought and obtained the hospitality of his friend the Earl of
Caithness, whose countess was Lord Maxwell's cousin. In the hope of
obtaining a reward from the king and favour from the Court and Privy
Council, this Earl of Caithness, with the aid of Captain George
Sinclair, delivered Lord Maxwell to the Council, and he was hanged at
Edinburgh in the year 1613.
In the account given of this treacherous transaction by Sir Robert
Gordon, it is mentioned that Captain George Sinclair was at that time
"preparing himself for Sweden," and that the earl had sent him into
Caithness to seize Maxwell, "under pretence of taking up men for
his voyage to Sweden." The historian adds, that while the Earl of
Caithness never obtained his expected reward, Captain George Sinclair
"came to his deserved end" in Norway; and his version of the affair
is, that as Sinclair "would not be persuaded by Colonel Ramsay to
stay for him until he could be ready also to go," "he went forward
with Captain Hay into Sweden," and so ran "headlong to his own
destruction."--("History of the Earldom of Sutherland.") His brother,
John Sinclair, was killed in the same year (1612) at Thurso.
Sir Robert Gordon is, however, not quite reliable in his account
of that transaction, for he says that George Sinclair, "hearing of
the wars then likely to fall out, and _which ensued shortly between
the Kings of Denmark and Sweden_, he gathered together 150 men in
Caithness. Having made up this company, he joins with Colonel Ramsay
and Captain Hay to go into Sweden." The Calmar War commenced in the
spring of 1611, a year before the levies were made in Scotland; and
we have seen that Sinclair had arranged with Lieutenant-Colonel
Ramsay and Captain Hay to raise one hundred men each (the strength of
a company of infantry in those days), and that only three hundred men
were landed by them in Romsdalen.
VII.
DESTRUCTION OF THE SCOTS IN GUDBRANDSDALEN.
In his first Report[49] to the Danish Chancellor, dated September
17, 1612, the Norwegian Stadtholder stated that when Lauritz Hage,
Lensmand of Vaage in Gudbrandsdalen, heard of the arrival of the
Scots in Romsdalen, "he at once roused the Bönder and peasantry in
the two parishes of Lessje and Vaage, and went forth against the said
Scots and foreign troops. And when he perceived they were too strong
for him, he advanced for two or three days and kept before them
along the road, without, however, engaging in any skirmish or fight.
Meanwhile, he sent messengers to the peasantry in the two adjoining
parishes, called Froen and Ringeböe, who quickly came to his
assistance; and when they were in this manner gathered they were 405
men strong. Thus he advanced in front" (of the Scots) "along the
road until he saw his advantage at a fjeld called Kringelen, situated
in Vaage parish, which they were obliged to pass. Thus he hemmed them
in between the rock on one side and a large river close by on the
other side, in which advantageous position he quietly encamped in the
woods, and there lay with his men until the foreign soldiers arrived
there, without, however, supposing or knowing aught but that the
Norwegian troops were still withdrawing along the road before them.
The above-mentioned Lauritz Hage, having made his arrangements and
perceived his advantage, attacked, together with another lensmand,
Peter Rankleff of Ringeböe, and with all their men together they
fired upon the foreign troops and shot them to death during an hour
and a half. Those who were not shot jumped into the river to save
themselves, but were there drowned; and those of them who got alive
over the river were quickly killed by the Bönder on that side; all
of which happened and occurred on the 26th of August last. From the
Bönder who were themselves present at the battle, and who buried and
counted the dead and the defeated, we learn that the foreign soldiers
must no doubt have numbered at the least 550 men, although the Scots
who remained alive, and of whom there are altogether 18, will not
admit that they were more than 350 men strong at the utmost. On the
day the battle took place 134 Scots were taken prisoners, who were
straightway the next day killed and shot by the Bönder, with the
exception of the above-mentioned 18, the Bönder saying to each other
that His Majesty had enough to feed in those same 18. Some of these
were, however, wounded, and some had bullets in their bodies, when
they arrived here. Of the above-mentioned 18 soldiers we now send
to you the three principal ones" (mentioning their names--Alexander
Ramsay, James Moneypenny, and Henry Bruce). "As regards the remaining
15 persons, some of them have straightway taken service among good
folk here in the country; some of them who will willingly serve your
Royal Majesty in Jörgen Lunge's Regiment, I sent at once to Elfsborg."
[Illustration: ROAD AT KRINGELEN.]
Reference is made at the end of the Report to the written statements
of the prisoners, and to letters found on them, and which the Bönder
had kept.
From Envold Kruse's second Report, dated October 3, 1612,[50] we
learn that the letters in question were ultimately recovered by the
Bailie of Gudbrandsdalen, and transmitted by Kruse to Copenhagen,
where, however, they have so far not been available to the historian.
[Illustration: BARN AT QVAM IN WHICH 134 SCOTTISH PRISONERS WERE
CONFINED.
The bullet holes are still visible in the north wall, marking the
spot where 116 of them were shot or cut down the day after the
fight.--_Page 54._]
The latter Report contains the following striking passage, which
destroys so entirely the accusations made against the Scots in the
Norwegian Sagas and in Edvard Storm's poem:--
"We have also since ascertained that those Scots who were defeated
and captured on their march through this country have absolutely
neither burned, murdered, nor destroyed anything on their march
through this country, either in Romsdalen or in Gudbrandsdalen."
Only one Dane, of the name of Sören Setnæs, had complained that the
Scots had taken from him a box or chest of silver objects, such as
tankards, belts, etc.; but even this booty the Bönder would not
acknowledge having found on the killed or captured Scots.
The end of this valuable document is somewhat damaged, but so far as
the injured part can be deciphered, Kruse stated that six[51] of the
Norwegian men were killed, and ten or twelve wounded, in the fight at
Kringelen.
FOOTNOTES:
[49] For complete text, see page 180.
[50] See full text, p. 184.
[51] The same number of killed is given in the "Ballad of the
Valley," collected by Dean Krag.
VIII.
THE COMBAT AT KRINGELEN.
We have seen that the historical facts are as follows:--A detachment
of about three hundred Scots, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel
Alexander Ramsay and five other Scottish officers, marched safely,
and without committing any acts of murder, pillage, or incendiarism,
through Romsdalen and Gudbrandsdalen, as far as Kringelen, where it
had opposed to it four hundred and five Bönder and peasants, under
the leadership of two civil, not military, officers. Further, that
one hundred and thirty-four of the Scots were taken prisoners, and
were all killed the next day,[52] except eighteen, who reached
Aggershuus, now the fort of Christiania,--the loss of the victorious
Norwegians being only six killed and ten or twelve wounded.
Such a remarkable result could certainly only have been attained
under very advantageous circumstances, and as existing documents give
only the barest outline of the fight at Kringelen, we can only form
an hypothesis upon them.
The following conjecture is deduced from an attentive study of all
that is so far known or established on the subject.
It must be acknowledged that four hundred Bönder, only partly or
imperfectly armed, could not have been an equal match, even in the
early part of the seventeenth century, for the smallest admissible
number of Scots--namely, three hundred--that documentary evidence
will allow us to admit, and especially if they had been well-armed,
trained soldiers. Some of those Scots, those raised by Sinclair,
were apparently Caithness men, whose principal occupation had
no doubt been warfare.[53] Many of them were in all probability
descendants of Norsemen who had conquered and held a great part of
their country. They were, to say the least, as brave and as ready
to defend their lives as the Bönder and peasants of Gudbrandsdal,
a province which had moreover been to some extent drained of its
younger and more able-bodied men for the purposes of the war of
Denmark against Sweden. We have also seen that the attempts made to
destroy Mönnichhofen's force of about one thousand men by a levy of
one thousand five hundred peasants, mounted and on foot, supported by
some soldiers and commanded by three military officers, were quite
unsuccessful.
What then were the exceptional circumstances that rendered possible
the easy and utter defeat of the Scots at Kringelen?
In traditional accounts of the affair, reproduced by almost every
historian, much stress is laid on the deadly effect of the hurling
down of rocks, or of what is known in Norway as a "tömmervælte," on
the heads of the invaders while they were passing unsuspectingly
through a ravine, pass, or defile at Kringelen. To those who have
not visited the locality in question such an explanation would
perhaps be quite satisfactory; for there have been instances, both in
ancient and modern history, of troops being destroyed by such means
in mountain passes by an enemy inferior in number and untrained in
skilled warfare.
But an inspection of Kringelen, or a study of the accompanying plan
prepared for this work from actual survey by Lieutenant Arneberg of
the Norwegian army, renders impossible the acceptance of such an
explanation. The present road, on which stands the stone pillar that
marks the vicinity of the spot where the fighting occurred, dates
from the beginning of this century. It is about forty feet below the
old road, where it sinks into the "Sinclair Dokka" or hollow, in
which the Scots are popularly believed to have been overwhelmed by
huge masses of rock, and where human bones, supposed to be those of
the Scots, have been dug up.
In an account[54] of a journey from Christiania to Trondhjem in
1733 by King Christian VI. and Queen Sophia the road through
Gudbrandsdalen is described as follows:--"Froen Præstegaard
(vicarage). About here the road begins to show the difficulties
travellers in Norway have to encounter." After passing Zell "is
a road called Kringelen, on the side of a fjeld, and so narrow
that every precaution is necessary on the part of travellers and
drivers." Dr. Yngvar Nielsen states in his interesting work on the
"Development of Roads in Norway,"[55] that "in 1766 Kringelen was
the worst bit of road in Gudbrandsdalen, as it was so narrow that a
carriole could scarcely pass." In fact, it was only a bridle-path on
the edge of a precipice fifty to one hundred feet above the Laugen
river. This track, which was all that the condition of the country
required when produce was transported chiefly in winter on sledges,
was quite open and exposed; while above it the almost precipitous
cliffs, averaging seven hundred feet in height, left at their base a
sloping ledge of about one hundred and fifty feet in breadth. It was
neither a pass nor a ravine, and has sometimes been described as a
"defile," probably because not more than two men could have walked
abreast along it, and certainly only a single file of men could have
used it with convenience.
[Illustration: KRINGELEN.
_A_ Old bridle-path along which Scots marched.
_B_ Present road.
_C_ Logs and stones partly concealed by wood.
_D_ Stone monument marking site of combat.
_Page 59._]
The Bönder concealed themselves on the sloping ledge between the
precipitous cliff and the path. The ledge was somewhat thickly
covered with wood, which is said to have been washed away by
a memorable rainstorm in 1789. At the same time there must have
been a clear space in front both of the "tömmervælte" and of the
intrenchments which tradition says the Bönder erected there, although
Envold Kruse makes no mention of them.
The military officer who carefully surveyed the ground in the autumn
of 1884 has shown on the plan the probable position of the celebrated
"tömmervælte." It is supposed to have been an accumulation of rocks
piled on round beams or trunks of trees, arranged in such a manner as
to roll down in a mass as soon as the ropes which held the structure
in position were cut.
The depression in the old road known as the "Sinclair Dokka" has a
length of about two hundred and seventy English feet between the
highest points at its two extremities. It is reasonable to suppose
that the object of the Bönder was to hurl down the rocks at the
deepest or centre part of the depression, which would be about one
hundred feet in length at the utmost, and that the length of the
"tömmervælte" was in proportion with the size of the hollow into
which it was destined to descend. It could not possibly have been
even half as long as the deepest part of the hollow itself; for an
artificial structure a hundred feet in length, with a clear space in
front of it, would certainly have been observed by the Scots, however
unsuspecting they may have been, and however lax their military
precautions. Moreover, it would have been strategically unwise on the
part of the Bönder to have attacked the invaders until a good part of
them had descended into the hollow and were passing through it. It
has therefore been assumed on the plan that the "tömmervælte" could
not have been more than thirty feet in length, whilst its height
above the deepest part of the "Sinclair Dokka" has been fixed at
about one hundred and twenty feet, partly as a result of a thorough
examination of the configuration of the slope on which it stood, and
partly on the conjecture that the structure required elevation in
order to attain a sufficient impetus on being let loose, and in order
also that it should be as much concealed as possible from the Scots
proceeding along the road.
A mathematical question here presents itself. If we assume that
the Scots on whom the "tömmervælte" descended occupied the path
in the "Sinclair Dokka" along an approximate length of even one
hundred feet, how many could possibly have stood there? Giving only
three feet to each man, the number could not have been more than
thirty-three men if they marched in single file, or about sixty-seven
if two abreast, along a path so rugged, narrow, and dangerous. But
considering that the rocks must have taken several seconds to roll
down the declivity, which could not have had a steeper gradient
than forty to forty-five degrees, the men at the extremities of the
threatened group must have had time to rush back at one end and
forward at the other; and allowing for further chances of escape, we
cannot possibly account for the destruction of more than twenty-five
or thirty men (even if they walked two abreast) by the sudden descent
of an avalanche of rocks and timbers.
How then were the remainder disposed of?
As soon as the "tömmervælte" had been cast loose, it may be taken
for granted that the concealed Bönder rushed down on the startled
foe, and that a hand-to-hand fight ensued. In fact, we know there
was a combat of an hour and a half, in which Sinclair fell, and
that six of the Bönder were killed and ten or twelve wounded. A few
of the muskets alleged to have been carried by the Scots have been
preserved, the arsenal at Christiania possessing five,[56] Horton
arsenal one, the descendants of Dean Krag parts of two or three
more, and Consul Heftye of Christiania a lock. The earliest English
travellers in Norway mention having seen only a few remnants of those
arms in Gudbrandsdalen. From the smallness of the number of such
muskets that have been preserved or heard of, it must be supposed
that the Scots had not many such weapons. Nor could those few have
been of much use at close quarters on a sudden emergency such as that
at Kringelen, since from the great length of their barrels (about
seventy inches) they had to be fired from a rest.
The traditional or popular account of the mode of attack bears on
its face a considerable amount of probability. It is to the effect
that the "tömmervælte" was not cast loose until the "vanguard" of the
Scots had passed.
On the strength of all these facts and considerations we arrive, in
all humility, at the conjecture that the three hundred Scots were
not all armed, and that the body of men described in the Sagas as the
"vanguard" was most likely the contingent of "honest men's bairns
and servants," and some of the men out of jails, forcibly pressed by
Lieutenant-Colonel Ramsay, and who were being driven captive into
Sweden by Caithness men under Sinclair and Hay, armed, it may be
conjectured, principally with swords, the officers perhaps wearing
armour and carrying pistols as well as swords.[57]
[Illustration: OLD GERMAN PRINT
Representing some of the Scots of Mackay's regiment, landed at
Stettin, 1630. (_Original in British Museum._)
_Page 65._]
It has been already shown that Mönnichhofen was to have supplied
arms for the Scottish levies, with which he failed to combine.
Moreover, the Swedish agent at Amsterdam reported that he feared the
projects of General Halkett (one of Ramsay's confederates) would
fail, "because of the lateness of the season, and because the men
had no weapons, while everywhere in Norway the people were up in
arms."[58] The deposition, taken at Copenhagen, of Alexander Ramsay,
the leader of the expedition, also shows that Mönnichhofen was to
have supplied the Scots with arms from Holland. We have moreover seen
that in its acts and proclamations against the proceedings of the
Ramsays and others, the Scottish Privy Council made no mention of
_disarming_ the men who were to be sent home under precautions that
were in other respects so careful. Nor is it likely that the men who
had been forcibly seized and kept on board the ships would at once
have been supplied with arms by their oppressors. The remarkable
fact that the Scots committed no depredations in the valleys through
which they passed--a forbearance out of keeping with the custom
of that age, either in Scotland or in Scandinavia--suggests that the
troops under Ramsay were subject to strict discipline on so daring
and dangerous a march. This task probably devolved more especially on
Captain Sinclair and Captain Hay, who, while in command of the armed
men employed in guarding and driving before them the captive "honest
men's bairns and servants," were the only officers killed;[59] and
this may account for the popular belief that Sinclair was the chief
of the expedition.
If therefore the conjecture be correct, that none but the Caithness
men were armed at all, and they chiefly with swords, the almost
entire annihilation of the three hundred men by four hundred Bönder
is seen to have been easy enough under the circumstances that have
been described.
Such is the conclusion that results from the premises here submitted;
and remembering how important it is that national history should be
correctly known, it is to be hoped that the researches already made
will lead to the lifting of the cloud confessedly hanging over this
episode of the distant past, and that some historian in time to come
may be helped by them, however slightly, in directing the light of
truth upon the mists that still remain to be dispelled on the subject
of the disastrous expedition of the Scots to Norway in 1612.
[Illustration: PRESENT MONUMENT ON HIGHROAD MARKING GRAVE OF GEORGE
SINCLAIR.
_Page 121._]
FOOTNOTES:
[52] It is only right to mention, not in exoneration, but in
extenuation of the atrocious conduct of the Bönder, that some of
their countrymen had met with a similar fate only a few months
before. Duke John of Sweden sent Colonel Kruus to wrest from the
Danes the town of Nylödelse and destroy its fortifications. The
commandant was forced to surrender at discretion on the 26th February
1612, after the foreign troops in the garrison had mutinied. But
while the foreign officers obtained service in the Swedish army, the
Danish leaders, including many armed Bönder and a party of Norwegian
riflemen, were locked up in a church and all shot down singly.--F. H.
Jahn, "Hist. om Calmarkrigen," p. 175.
[53] Almost the entire reign of James I. was occupied in suppressing
the anarchy that existed on the Borders, in the Highlands, and even
in the more civilized parts of Scotland.
[54] "Journal og Beskrivelse over Hans Kongl. Majestet Kong Christian
VI.," etc. Kjöbenhavn.
[55] "Det Norske Vejvæsens Udvikling. Xtia, 1876." The first
ordinance for the general improvement of roads was issued in 1636,
and renewed in 1648. Little was, however, done in that direction,
for in 1740 the roads even about Christiania were in a frightful
state.--_Ibid._
[56] Through the kindness of his excellency O. R. Kjerulf, Master
of the Ordnance, one of those muskets, and a broadsword with the
cypher of Mary Queen of Scots, were exhibited at the lecture that
has given rise to this little book. The author is likewise under
deep obligations to Consul Heftye of Christiania, and to his son,
Mr. Johannes Heftye of Östraat, the fortunate possessor of the
"Viik collection" of Scottish relics mentioned by all the earlier
English travellers in Norway. They were good enough to allow
their collections to be exhibited on the same occasion, and to be
photographed for the purpose of illustrating this work.
[57] An illustration of the pair of pistols preserved at Copenhagen,
and certified to have belonged to Sinclair, is given at p. 126.
Although undoubtedly Scotch, and of the period, the initials A. S.
engraved on them are most probably those of Sir Andrew Sinclair.
(See note, p. 126.) The swords, of which so many are still offered
for sale as relics of the expedition, are mostly of doubtful origin.
The author is, however, in possession of a rusty short sword, with
the Scottish crown and the letters V. R. very distinct on the
blade, on the broken-off edge of which there would have been room
for the letter J., making J. V. R., or Jacobus V. Rex. It was found
at Kringelen, and is almost exactly like the sword carried by the
third figure in the accompanying illustration, representing some of
the "Irishmen,"--_i.e._, the Scots of Mackay's regiment,--who were
landed at Stettin in 1630. The illustration has been taken from
an interesting work published in 1885, by W. Blackwood and Sons,
Edinburgh and London, entitled, "An Old Scots Brigade: being the
History of Mackay's Regiment, now incorporated with the Royal Scots."
The author, Mr. John Mackay, late of Herriesdale, has generously
allowed the block to be used for the purposes of this little work.
Another sword, in a wooden sheath covered with leather, and which
had evidently been used as a walking-stick by some Bonde, was
purchased by the author as an authentic relic of the Scots, and
presented by him to His Majesty King Oscar II., as a weapon that had
in all probability been used in the service of His Majesty's great
predecessor, Gustavus Adolphus. The motto, "Honni soit qui mal y
pense," engraved on the long straight blade of the sword, made it all
the more appropriate that His Majesty, as a Knight of the Garter,
should be the possessor of so interesting a relic.
[58] Under the Danish law of that period every able-bodied Bonde was
compelled to provide himself with a musket or arquebuse; but it is
most probable that the men who had not been taken away to fight the
Swedes remained, to a great extent, armed only with pikes, crossbows,
and axes, of which an illustration is given at page 106.
[59] That Captain Hay was killed is not stated either in the official
documents or in the Sagas; but as he was not amongst the prisoners
forwarded to Aggershuus, he must have shared the fate of George
Sinclair. It is also not improbable that in order to save their own
lives when taken prisoners, the surviving officers pointed to the
body of Sinclair as that of their commander.