_Continuation of the preceding_
The commander saw that all his good and earnest efforts had been
frustrated, and that the natives of the islands had mocked the
Spaniards openly; because hitherto they had suffered no ill from the
latter, but only the above-mentioned kind treatment and hospitality,
which would have proved sufficient to attract a more unruly race. But
such is the characteristic of this race, which has afflicted and still
afflicts the priests. These people refuse to do anything thoroughly;
and in order to get them to perform what is ordered of them, one must
use the lash and the rattan--whence comes the saying of a holy bishop
of these islands, namely, that on that day when was born the Indian,
next to him was born the rattan, with which the dust was to be beaten
from his back. And if we ministers have experienced this after so
long a period of cultivation and teaching, what must it have been
at the beginning? Accordingly, I am not surprised that the Indians
were so ungrateful to General Miguel López de Legaspi, turned their
backs on all his offers, played such sorry jests on him, and broke
faith immediately--for the Indians do not possess it. And even after
he had participated in their bestial ceremonies of drawing blood
and drinking the blood--a token of constancy among the Indians--the
latter, it was found, failed to observe them just as readily as the
friendship had been confirmed by these customs. The commander began to
suffer almost extreme want, for already he had provisions for but two
days, and was compelled to seek them. Hitherto efforts, such as men
of so generous souls and so desirous of peace could make, had been
made. But the Spaniards saw that they were not advantaged, and that
need was tightening the cords, so that, if they did not look for food
in a different manner, they would doubtless perish at the hands of the
Indians, a thing quite opposed to charity. Hence, it was permitted the
Spaniards, in order to sustain life, to take food by harsh means, since
indeed kind measures did not suffice. Nevertheless, the commander, to
be justified, took counsel with all the others before doing anything
of importance, for he would rather err with the advice of all, than
succeed through his own single action. He called a council of war;
he communicated to all the condition of affairs, and what efforts had
been made with the Indians in order to make firm peace, and to buy from
them with money the food necessary for their sustenance. This, he said,
it was impossible to negotiate with the Indians. Now necessity forced
the Spaniards to get food by severer methods, since the Indians had
repulsed mild measures so obstinately. When the commander stopped
speaking, he ordered every one to express his opinion. Thereupon,
the father prior, Fray Andrés de Urdaneta, arose and spoke first,
as was his custom, because of his experience and his offices, and
because all the Spaniards regarded him as a father, from whom must
originate the remedy. He said that natural law conceded to them the
right to get provisions by the readiest means, in order that that
fleet, which had been constructed for the good of those barbarians,
might not perish. Even if the end of their coming had not been so
great and important to those peoples, it was a well-known wrong
to refuse them the intercourse most natural to men, without the
Spaniards having given any occasion for it. Inasmuch as they were
reduced to the preservation of life itself, they were justified in
taking arms, wherewith to get the sustenance that the Indians had
unjustly withheld from them and refused them for their money. _Quibus
necessarium tunc est bellum_. Therefore, he considered war justifiable,
since by no other way had any remedy been found among those unreasoning
barbarians. But before commencing war, he said, a solemn declaration
of the wrongs should be made, of which the Spaniards would be, in
no manner, guilty, since they had labored so sincerely for peace
and harmony. Father Urdaneta's advice was concurred in unanimously,
as was usual. Accordingly, his advice was followed on this occasion,
as being the sanest and most sensible.
In order to put the decision of the conference into execution,
the governor ordered Martín de Goiti to land with fifty well-armed
soldiers. By means of the interpreter, Pacheco, he was to announce the
articles of peace to the Indians; and declare that, if they did not
accord what was so reasonable to all, then they should prepare for the
war, which, from that moment was proclaimed on them as rebels. The
Indians paid no more heed to this than to all the rest that had
been told them. Thus it was necessary to make use of their arms. The
arquebuses were fired more to scare than to harm the Indians; for, as
soon as those natives heard the report, being so little used to them,
their terror was so great, that, without awaiting more, they abandoned
the shore and village, fled to the hills, and allowed the soldiers
to collect the swine that were found there, and the fowls and rice
that they could carry away. All this was appraised at its just value,
and the money given to the chief's son, whom the commander still kept
with him, in order that he might take it to the village. He was also to
inform the inhabitants that the need of the Spaniards compelled them
to take by force of arms what the Indians refused to sell for money,
and nevertheless after they had been able to accomplish what was seen,
yet they were paying for it, which was a sufficient indication of the
Spaniards' fair and open proceeding, so contrary to what the Indians
had done. He was ordered to return with the reply, notwithstanding its
tenor. Since he was ruler of that village in the absence of his father,
he should reduce the people to obedience, and counsel them to do what
was so thoroughly to their interest. Camutuan, who listened to all of
the above, and seemingly assented to it, took the money and promised
to fulfil his charge with success. But as soon as he left the ship,
he acted just as the others had done; for in their method of acting
all the Indians are cut out by one pair of shears. To a greater or
less degree, all of them are a unit. Whoever has seen one of them,
might well say that he has seen all. The chiefs, by the very fact
of their chieftaincy, should have some better mode of procedure;
yet they are so little better than the others that it can scarcely
be perceived. The commander, who was aware that that matter must
be settled finally with arms, yet did not wish to leave anything
undone. Consequently, to procure the peace justly, he determined to
leave that village of Cabalian and go to another, called Manchagua,
where report said that the first Spaniards had landed. To this end he
despatched the master-of-camp and Father Urdaneta ahead to offer peace
to the chief of that village by means of a present. The commander
went with his fleet from this village to the island of Camiguin,
where he succeeded likewise in finding no people, who but recently
were all to be found. Our men made many other efforts, and even took
as intermediary a Moro factor of the king of Burney, who was there
at that time. The latter said that the governor had captured him in a
battle with the Portuguese. I do not discuss that battle, in order to
consider only the essential thing pertaining to us religious, namely,
the planting of the faith, the fundamental reason for this history. But
in passing, I merely observe that our forces gained many glorious
victories over the Portuguese, for the latter were exceedingly sorry
to have the Castilians for so near neighbors, and tried to drive them
out. Perhaps they were influenced in this by having as neighbors those
who had a better right and reason to the Molucas than themselves. This,
I think, must have been why our Lord favored the Castilians' cause
the more. Perhaps had the Portuguese examined the matter more closely,
they would not have given the Castilians so many occasions for glory,
nor have demanded investigations so greatly to their satisfaction--or
rather, [as it proved,] their loss.
Resuming, then, the thread of my history, I say that this Bornean
youth, who was well versed in affairs of the islands and knew
their chiefs, because of his continual communication with them,
wished to repay the Spaniards for the kind treatment that they had
given him--or rather he wished to obtain their good will, in order
to regain his liberty. He began to treat for peace, and to harmonize
discordant spirits, so that affairs might be meliorated, by reason of
what the Spaniards requested. He assured the islanders of the great
moderation which the Spaniards would exercise toward them, and that
they would commit no wrong or violence. He accomplished this with so
good grace, that he brought the chiefs Sicatuna and Sigala before the
commander. These chiefs drew blood with our men, and made a lasting
peace. But none of these exploits was important, because they found
it all tiresome and inconvenient to continue of one mind.
Already was the season well advanced, and our commander was anxious
about the affairs of Nueva España. He desired to give a good account
there of his expedition, and feared lest, by the delay, they might
doubt his success or care. He was right in correcting this wrong,
because, although no doubts arise where confidence is, yet all
the kingdom was in great suspense; for the patache "San Lúcas,"
which sailed with our fleet, had scarcely gone two hundred leguas
from Puerto de la Navidad, when it maliciously separated from the
others. After pillaging those islands, it returned to Nueva España,
and said that a storm had separated them, and that, without doubt, all
the rest of the fleet was lost. For that reason, then, the commander,
to allay the fears caused in Nueva España by the delay, called a
council, according to his custom. There he proposed the questions
that had arisen concerning that matter, which he himself had already
considered. He besought all to counsel him in this as to what would
be best for their convenience, honor, and reputation, and as to what
means should be taken to fulfil all their commission. The strongest
reason that he adduced was the discovery of the return passage to
Nueva España; and he said that that had been the most potent reason
for the construction of that fleet. In short, the unanimous reply,
given through the mouth of Father Urdaneta, was that it was very proper
to ascertain correctly the return passage, since by it, the kingdoms
of Nueva España and even of España, would be strung together, as they
say. The flagship "San Pedro" was selected for the voyage, as being,
in their opinion, the strongest and best able to resist so new and
unknown seas, as were supposed to exist on the return trip. Meanwhile,
the almiranta "San Pablo" and the patache "San Juan" were to stay among
the islands, although it was judged better to go to the island of Sugbú
[Cebú], where the Spaniards had been several times already, and where
they were known. Also they believed that, if they should experience
any difficulty, they would be justified in making war there, because
of the treachery that its inhabitants had shown to Captain Hernando de
Magallanes--whom they had killed treacherously with many of his men,
at a banquet, where they had been invited in good faith. Besides that,
those Indians had offered themselves for the service of the king of
España, and many were baptized, in the time of the said captain,
who afterward apostatized. This was a very strong and sufficient
foundation, upon which father Fray Andrés de Urdaneta and the others
based the right to make war, in case that the Indians refused to
receive them peacefully, as was their pretense. All approved this
opinion. However, I must note here the strongest reason that they ought
to have alleged, unless they must have neglected and passed it by as
being so well known, in order to find others more constraining. When I
read the various opinions of the doctors regarding our right to make
war on the western Indians, although they are somewhat sufficient,
that which has most real power to quiet the conscience--while those
who opposed it can only be esteemed as rash--is the concession of
Alexander VI which is, in brief, as follows.
[Here follows the portion of the bull of Alexander VI of May 4, 1493,
included in _Et tu tanti negotii ... auctoritate et jurisdictione
facimus, constituimus et deputamus_.] [22]
Since, then, the supreme pontiff says that he can give, and does
really give them, he would be rash who could have any scruples about
the right of our kings to possess these provinces, and the right of
the conquistadors therein to make war, since the latter did it by
order of their kings. For who doubts that the supreme pontiff, who
never was known to be tyrannical or unjust, had not well considered
his powers in order to make this concession? The reasons that could
influence his Holiness are not unknown, but they are rather for the
schools than for this place. The above has been given with the end
of quieting the consciences of the conquistadors, and of sealing the
mouths of the ignorant, since whatever scruples do or can arise in this
matter are settled so completely by Alexander VI's brief. The soldier
has no call to judge or investigate the justification of the war,
as the doctors unanimously agree. It is sufficient that he consider
it as not manifestly unjust, and that he consider his king--as we
all do ours--as so Catholic and so good, that he will war upon no
one without a very just reason. For the justification of a king in
matters of conscience, the declaration of the first rule is sufficient,
namely, the certain knowledge of the Roman pontiff.
Hence, according to the above, the opinions rendered by Father
Urdaneta in two grave councils seem very apropos. But for soldiers,
it is better to take our stand upon this conclusive argument namely,
that those islands belong to our Catholic sovereigns of Castilla and
León, by concession of the pope, and by the reasons that influenced him
therein. Accordingly, the Spaniards may make port wherever they wish,
may request provisions in exchange for their money, may establish
towns and cities, erect redoubts as if in their own land, and make
war on whomever opposes them, as they are unjustly prohibited [by
such opposition] from doing what is right.