1846.
GENERAL TAYLOR ORDERED TO THE RIO GRANDE.--HISTORY OF TEXAN
BOUNDARIES.--ORIGIN OF THE WAR.--MILITARY PREPARATIONS--
COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES.--BATTLES OF PALO ALTO AND
RESACA.--MATAMOROS--TAYLOR'S ADVANCE.--FALL OF MONTEREY.
Whilst Slidell was negotiating, and, in consequence of the anticipated
failure of his effort to be received,--as was clearly indicated by the
conduct of the Mexican government upon his arrival in the
capital,--General Taylor, who had been stationed at Corpus Christi, in
Texas, since the fall of 1845, with a body of regular troops, was
directed, on the 13th of January, 1846, to move his men to the mouth
of the Rio Grande. He, accordingly left his encampment on the 8th of
March, and, on the 25th, reached Point Isabel, having encountered no
serious opposition on the way. The march to the Rio Grande has been
made the subject of complaint by politicians in Mexico and the United
States, who believed that the territory lying between that river and
the Nueces, was not the property of Texas. But inasmuch as Mexico
still continued vehemently to assert her political right over _the
whole of Texas_, the occupation of any part of its soil, south of the
Sabine, by American troops, was in that aspect of the case, quite as
much an infringement of Mexican sovereignty, as the march of our
troops, from the Nueces to the Rio Grande.
As it is important that the reader should understand the original
title to Louisiana, under which the boundary of the Rio Grande, was
claimed, first of all for that state, and, subsequently, for Texas, we
shall relate its history in a summary manner.
Louisiana had been the property of France, and by a secret contract
between that country and Spain in 1762, as well as by treaties between
France, Spain, and England, in the following year, the French dominion
was extinguished on the continent of America. In consequence of the
treaty between this country and England in 1783, the Mississippi
became the western boundary of the United States, from its source to
the thirty-first degree of north latitude, and thence, on the same
parallel, to the St. Mary's. France, it will be remembered, had always
claimed dominion in Louisiana to the Rio Bravo del Norte, or Rio
Grande; by virtue:--
1st. Of the discovery of the Mississippi from near its source to the
ocean.
2d. Of the possession taken, and establishment made by La Salle, at
the bay of Saint Bernard, west of the river Trinity and Colorado, by
authority of Louis XIV. in 1635--notwithstanding the subsequent
destruction of the colony.
3d. Of the charter of Louis XIV. to Crozat in 1712.
4th. Of the historical authority of Du Pratz, Champigny and the Count
de Vergennes.
5th. Of the authority of De Lisle's map, and of the map published in
1762, by Don Thomas Lopez, Geographer to the king of Spain, as well as
of various other maps, atlases, and geographical authorities.
By an article of the secret treaty of San Ildefonso in October, 1800,
Spain retroceded Louisiana to France, but this treaty was not
promulgated until the beginning of 1802. The paragraph of cession is
as follows: "His Catholic majesty engages to retrocede to the French
republic, six months after the full and entire execution of the
conditions and stipulations above recited, relative to his royal
highness the Duke of Parma, the colony and province of Louisiana, with
the same extent that it already has in the hands of Spain, _and that
it had when France possessed it_, and, such as it should be, after the
treaties passed subsequently between Spain and other powers." In 1803,
Bonaparte, the first consul of the French republic, ceded Louisiana to
the United States, as fully, and in the same manner, as it had been
retroceded to France by Spain, under the treaty of San Ildefonso; and,
by virtue of this grant, Messrs. Madison, Monroe, Adams, Clay, Van
Buren, Jackson, and Polk, contended that the original limit of the new
state had been the Rio Grande. However, by the third article of our
treaty with Spain, in 1819, all our pretensions to extend the
territory of Louisiana towards Mexico on the Rio Grande, were
abandoned by adopting the river Sabine as our boundary in that quarter.
The Mexican authorities upon this subject are either silent or
doubtful. No light is to be gathered from the geographical researches
of Humboldt, whose elucidations of New Spain are in many respects the
fullest and most satisfactory. In the year 1835, Stephen Austin
published a map of Texas, representing the Nueces as the western
confine,--and in 1836, General Almonte the former minister from
Mexico to the United States, published a memoir upon Texas in which,
whilst describing the Texan department of Bejar, he says--"That
notwithstanding it has been hitherto believed that the Rio de las
Nueces is the dividing line of Coahuila and Texas, inasmuch as it is
always thus represented on maps, I am informed by the government of
the state, that geographers have been in error upon this subject; and
that the true line should commence at the mouth of the river Aransaso,
and follow it to its source; thence, it should continue by a straight
line until it strikes the junction of the rivers Medina and San
Antonio, and then, pursuing the east bank of the Medina to its head
waters, it should terminate on the confines of Chihuahua."[67]
The true origin of the Mexican war was not this march of Taylor and
his troops from the Nueces to the Rio Grande, through the debatable
land. The American and Mexican troops were brought face to face by the
act, and _hostilities_ were the natural result after the exciting
annoyances upon the part of the Mexican government which followed the
union of Texas with our confederacy. Besides this, General Paredes,
the usurping president, had already declared in Mexico, on the _18th
of April, 1846_, in a letter addressed to the commanding officer on
the northern frontier, that he supposed him at the head of a valiant
army on the theatre of action;--and that it was indispensable to
commence hostilities, _the Mexicans themselves taking the initiative_!
We believe that our nation and its rulers earnestly desired honorable
peace, though they did not shun the alternative of war. It was
impossible to permit a conterminous neighbor who owed us large sums of
money, and was hostile to the newly adopted state, to select unopposed
her mode and moment of attack. Mexico would neither resign her
pretensions upon Texas, negotiate, receive our minister, nor remain at
peace. She would neither declare war, nor cultivate friendship, and
the result was, that when the armies approached each other, but little
time was lost in resorting to the cannon and the sword.
As soon as General Taylor reached the Rio Grande he left a command at
the mouth of the river, and taking post opposite Matamoros erected a
fort, the guns of which bore directly upon the city. The Mexicans,
whose artillery might have been brought to play upon the works, from
the opposite side of the river, made no hostile demonstration against
the left bank for some time, nor did they interrupt the construction
of the fort. Reinforcements, however, were constantly arriving in
the city. Ampudia and Arista were there. Interviews were held between
the Mexican authorities and our officers, in which the latter were
ordered to retire from the soil it was alleged they were usurping. But
as this was a diplomatic, and not a military question, General Taylor
resolved to continue in position, though his forces were perhaps
inadequate to contend with the augmenting numbers of the foe. He
examined the country thoroughly by his scouting parties and pushed his
reconnoissances, on the left bank, from Point Isabel to some distance
beyond his encampment opposite Matamoros. Whilst engaged in this
service, some of his officers and men were captured or killed by the
_ranchero_ cavalry of the enemy; and, on the 24th of April, Captain
Thornton who had been sent to observe the country above the encampment
with sixty-three dragoons, fell into an ambuscade, out of which they
endeavored to cut their way, but were forced to surrender with a loss
of sixteen killed and wounded. This was the first blood spilled in
actual conflict.
[Illustration: MATAMOROS.]
Meanwhile, in the United States, the news of Taylor's supposed danger,
greatly exaggerated by rumor, was spread far and wide. An actual war
had, perhaps, not been seriously apprehended. Taylor had been
expressly commanded to refrain from aggression. It was supposed that
the mere presence of our troops on the frontier would preserve Texas
from invasion, and that negotiations would ultimately terminate the
dispute. This is the only ground upon which we can reasonably account
for the apparent carelessness of our government in not placing a force
upon the Rio Grande, adequate to encounter all the opposing array.
Congress was in session when the news reached Washington. The
president immediately announced the fact, and, on the 13th of May,
1846, ten millions of dollars were appropriated to carry on the war,
and fifty thousand volunteers were ordered to be raised. An "ARMY OF
THE WEST" was directed to be formed under the command of Kearney, at
fort Leavenworth, on the Missouri, which was to cross the country to
the Pacific, after capturing New Mexico. An "ARMY OF THE CENTRE,"
under General Wool, was to assemble at San Antonio de Bejar whence it
was to march upon Coahuila and Chihuahua, and, whilst the heart and
the west of Mexico were penetrated by these officers, it was designed
that Taylor should make war on the northern and eastern states of the
Mexican republic. In addition to these orders to the army, the naval
forces, under Commodores Stockton and Sloat in the Pacific, and
Commodore Conner, in the Gulf of Mexico, were commanded to co-operate
with our land forces, to harass the enemy, and to aid, with all their
power, in the subjugation and capture of Mexican property and territory.
Immediately after Thornton's surrender, General Taylor, availing
himself of authority with which he had been invested to call upon the
governors of Louisiana and Texas for military aid, demanded four
regiments of volunteers from each state, for the country in the
neighborhood of the Rio Grande was alive with belligerant Mexicans. He
then visited the fortifications opposite Matamoros, and finding the
garrison but scantly supplied with provisions, hastened back to Point
Isabel with a formidable escort, and obtaining the requisite rations,
commenced his march back to Matamoros and the fort on the 7th of May.
But, in the interval, General Arista, had crossed the Rio Grande with
his forces, and on the 8th, our General encountered him, drawn up in
battle array at Palo Alto and ready to dispute his passage along the
road. A sharp engagement ensued between the two armies from two
o'clock in the afternoon until nearly dark, when the Mexicans withdrew
from the action for the night. Our total force in this affair,
according to official reports, was two thousand two hundred and
eighty-eight, while that of Mexico, according to the admission of the
officers, amounted to six thousand regulars with a large and probably
undisciplined force drawn, at random, from the country.
The night of the 8th was passed with some anxiety in the American camp,
for the fierce conflict of the day induced many prudent officers to
believe it best either to return to Point Isabel or await reinforcements
before again giving battle to the enemy. General Taylor heard and
weighed the opinions of his most reliable officers, but, after due
reflection, determined to advance. The condition of the fort opposite
Matamoros demanded his urgent aid. The moral effect of a retreat would
be great, at the commencement of a war, both on Mexico and our own
troops; and, moreover, he had perfect confidence in the disciplined
regulars who sustained so nobly the brunt of the first battle.
Accordingly the troops were advanced early on the 9th, for they found,
at day dawn, that the Mexicans had abandoned Palo Alto for a stronger
position nearer the centre of action and interest at Matamoros. After
advancing cautiously, in readiness for immediate battle, our men came
up with the Mexicans, in the Resaca de la Palma, or as it is properly
called La Resaca del Guerrero,--the "Ravine of the Warrior," which
afforded them a natural defence against our approach along the road.
The ravine, curved across the highway and was flanked by masses of
prickly plants aloes, and undergrowth, matted into impenetrable
thickets, known in Mexico as _chapparal_. The action was begun by the
infantry in skirmishes with the foe, and after the centre of the
position on the road had been severely harassed and damaged by our
flying artillery, a gallant charge of the dragoons broke the Mexican
lines and opened a pathway to Matamoros. The engagement lasted a short
time after this combined movement of artillery and cavalry, but,
before night fall the enemy was in full flight to the river and our
garrison at the fort joyously relieved. In the interval, this position
had been bombarded and cannonaded by the Mexicans from the opposite
side of the river, and its commanding officer slain. In memory of his
valiant defence, the place has been honored with the name of Fort Brown.
After General Taylor had occupied Matamoros on the 18th of May,--and
he was only prevented from capturing it and all the Mexican forces and
ammunition on the night of the 9th by the want of a ponton train,
which he had vainly demanded,--he established his base line for future
operations in the interior, along the Rio Grande, extending several
hundred miles near that stream. His task of organizing, accepting, or
rejecting the multitudes of recruits who flocked to his standard, was
not only oppressive but difficult, for he found it hard to disappoint
the patriotic fervor of hundreds who were anxious to engage in the
war. The Quatermaster's department, too, was one of incessant toil and
anxiety; because, called unexpectedly and for the first time into
active service in the field, it was comparatively unprepared to answer
the multitude of requisitions that were daily made upon it by the
government, the general officers, and the recruits. The whole material
of a campaign was to be rapidly created. Money was to be raised;
steamers bought; ships chartered; wagons built and transported; levies
brought to the field of action; munitions of war and provisions
distributed over the whole vast territory which it was designed to
occupy! Whilst these things were going on, the country, at home, was
ripe, and most eager for action.
Nor was our government inattentive to the internal politics of Mexico.
It perceived at once that there was no hope of effecting a peace with
the administration of Paredes, whose bitter hostility was of course,
not mitigated by the first successes of our arms. Santa Anna, it will
be recollected had left Mexico after the amnesty in 1845, and it was
known there was open hostility between him and Paredes who had
contributed so greatly to his downfall. Information was, moreover,
received from reliable sources in Washington, that a desire prevailed
in the republic to recall the banished chief and to seat him once more
in the presidential chair; and, at the same time, there was cause to
believe that if he again obtained supreme power he would not be averse
to accommodate matters upon a satisfactory basis between the
countries. Orders were, accordingly issued to Commodore Conner, who
commanded the home squadron in the gulf, to offer no impediment if
Santa Anna approached the coast with a design of entering Mexico. The
exiled president was duly apprised of these facts, and when the
revolution actually occurred in his favor in the following summer and
his rival fell from power, he availed himself of the order to pass the
lines of the blockading squadron at Vera Cruz.
After General Taylor had completely made his preparations to advance
into the interior along his base on the Rio Grande, he moved forward
gradually, capturing and garrisoning all the important posts along the
river. At length the main body of the army, under Worth and Taylor
reached the neighborhood of Monterey, the capital of the state of New
Leon, situated at the foot of the Sierra Madre on a plain, but in a
position which would enable it to make a stout resistance, especially
as it was understood that the Mexican army had gathered itself up in
this stronghold, which was the key of the northern provinces and on
the main highway to the interior, in order to strike a death blow at
the invaders. On the 5th of September, the divisions concentrated at
Marin, and on the 9th they advanced to the Walnut Springs, which
afterwards became, for so long a period, the headquarters of the
gallant "ARMY OF OCCUPATION."
Reconnoissances of the adjacent country were immediately made and it
was resolved to attack the city by a bold movement towards its
southern side that would cut off its communications through the gap in
the mountains by which the road led to Saltillo. Accordingly General
Worth was detached on this difficult but honorable service with a
strong and reliable corps, and, after excessive toil, hard fighting
and wonderful endurance upon the part of our men, the desired object
was successfully gained. An unfinished and fortified edifice called
the Bishop's Palace, on the summit of a steep hill was stormed and
taken, and thus an important vantage ground, commanding the city by a
plunging shot, was secured.
Meanwhile, General Taylor seeking to withdraw or distract the enemy
from his designs on the southern and western sides of the city, made a
movement under General Butler, of Kentucky, upon its northern front.
What was probably designed only as a feint soon became a severe and
deadly conflict. Our men,--especially the volunteers,--eager to flesh
their swords in the first conflict with which the war indulged them,
rushed into the city, which seems to have been amply prepared, in that
quarter, with barricades, forts, loop-holes, and every means of
defence suitable for the narrow streets and flat roofed and parapeted
houses of a Spanish town. After the first deadly onset there was, of
course, no intention or desire to abandon the conflict, fatal as its
prosecution might ultimately become. On they fought from street to
street, and house to house, and yard to yard, until night closed over
the dying and the dead. On the second day a different system of
approach was adopted. Instead of risking life in the street which was
raked from end to end by artillery, or rendered untenable by the
hidden marksmen who shot our men from behind the walls of the house
tops, our forces were thrown into the dwellings, and breaking onward
through walls and enclosures, gradually mined their way towards the
plaza or great square of Monterey.
Thus, both divisions under the eyes of Worth, Butler and Taylor,
successfully performed their assigned tasks, until it became evident
to the Mexicans that their town must fall, and, that if finally taken
by the sword, it would be given up to utter destruction and pillage. A
capitulation was therefore proposed by Ampudia who stipulated for the
withdrawal of his forces and an armistice. Our force was in no
condition to seize, hold, and support a large body of prisoners of
war, nor was it prepared immediately to follow up the victory by
penetrating the interior. General Taylor, who was resolved not to shed
a single drop of needless blood in the campaign, granted the terms;
and, thus, this strong position, garrisoned by nearly ten thousand
troops, sustained by more than forty pieces of artillery, yielded to
our army of seven thousand, unsupported by a battering train and
winning the day by hard fighting alone. The attack began on the 21st
of September, continued during the two following days, and the
garrison capitulated on the 24th. This capitulation and armistice were
assented to by our commander after mature consultation and approval of
his principal officers. The Mexicans informed him, that Paredes had
been deposed,--that Santa Anna was in power, and that peace would soon
be made; but the authorities, at home, eager for fresh victories, or
pandering to public and political taste, did not approve and confirm
an act, for which General Taylor has, nevertheless received, as he
truly merits, the just applause of impartial history.
[Footnote 67: Memorias para la historia de la Guerra de Tejas, vol.
ii, p. 543.]