MONROE was singularly unfortunate in diplomacy. His disasters
came not in any ordinary form of occasional defeat or disappointment,
but in waves and torrents of ill-luck. No diplomatist in American
history, except Monroe and Pinkney, ever signed a treaty in flagrant
contradiction to orders, and at the same time submitted to be told
that the opposite party to the contract reserved a right to break it;
but if any other man had taken such a step it would have answered for
a lifetime, and his mortifications would have ended there. No one
could assume that the British ministry would care to do more, pending
the ratification of its own treaty. Fox’s successor, one of the most
liberal Whig noblemen, having imposed on the United States terms which
would have been hard as the result of war, with the addition that even
these terms were conditional on a declaration of hostilities between
the United States and France, the liberal Whigs might be supposed
willing to wait for some new pretext before publicly tearing their own
treaty to pieces.
If Monroe flattered himself that he had for the moment checked British
aggression, he quickly learned his error. The treaty had been signed
barely a week when a new Order in Council appeared, which surpassed any
belligerent measure of the Tories.[291] Beginning with the premise that
Napoleon’s Berlin Decree “would give to his Majesty an unquestionable
right of retaliation, and would warrant his Majesty in enforcing the
same prohibition of all commerce with France which that Power vainly
hopes to effect against the commerce of his Majesty’s subjects,” the
order added that King George felt himself bound “to retort upon them
the evils of their own injustice,” and therefore “ordered that no
vessel shall be permitted to trade from one port to another, both
which ports shall belong to, or be in the possession of, France or
her allies.” In other words the Whig ministers, ignoring their fresh
treaty with the United States and even the note appended to it,
declared that they would not wait for America to resent the Berlin
Decree, but that United States vessels must in future, as a retort for
that decree, be deprived of the right to sail from one European port
to another. The custom had hitherto prevailed among American shippers
of seeking a market according to ruling prices, partly perhaps at
Bilbao or Bordeaux, partly at some other French or Mediterranean port.
Lord Howick’s order of Jan. 7, 1807, which cut short this coasting
privilege, was a blow to American commerce sharper than the famous
decision of Sir William Scott in the case of the “Essex.” Its apparent
effect was to double the cost and risk of neutral commerce, while
incidentally it asserted a right to prohibit such trade altogether.
Unfortunately more remained behind. The new order was not only an act
of violence; it was, according to the Tories, also one of meanness.
On its face it purported to be a measure of retaliation, taken in
order to retort upon France the evils of Napoleon’s injustice. In the
Parliamentary debate four weeks afterward, when the order was attacked,
all parties argued it as a matter of retaliation. The King’s advocate,
Sir John Nicholls, who defended it, took the ground that for the moment
no severer retaliation was needed; while Spencer Perceval and Lord
Castlereagh held that Napoleon’s decree should have been retaliated in
full.
“You might turn the provisions of the French decree against
themselves,” said Perceval;[292] “and as they have said that
no British goods should sail freely on the seas, you might say
that no goods should be carried to France except they first
touched at an English port. They might be forced to be entered
at the custom-house, and a certain entry imposed, which would
contribute to advance the price and give a better sale in the
foreign market to your own commodities.”
Sir John Nicholls replied:[293]--
“It was not denied that some steps in retaliation were
necessary; and the question was how far the steps that had been
taken were adequate.... It was necessary to allow a fair trial
to what ministers had adopted.”
All this seemed clear and frank; it was equivalent to saying that the
rules of international law were henceforth to be laid aside, and that
the doctrine of retaliation was to be the measure of England’s rights.
Yet this was not the form in which Lord Howick addressed President
Jefferson.
“His Majesty,” wrote Lord Howick to Erskine,[294] “with that
forbearance and moderation which have at all times distinguished
his conduct, has determined for the present to confine himself
to the exercise of the power given him by his decided naval
superiority in such a manner only as is authorized by the
acknowledged principles of the law of nations.”
In Parliament the measure was represented as an extra-legal act,
justified by the illegality of the Berlin Decree. In diplomacy it was
represented as an act “authorized by the acknowledged principles of the
law of nations.” The reason of the self-contradiction was evident. Only
a week before this letter was written, the ministers had concluded a
treaty with the United States involving the rights of neutrals, and had
attached to it a note to the effect that if the United States failed to
resist the Berlin Decree England would acquire the right to retaliate,
but had not hinted that retaliation was intended until the case of
acquiescence should happen. As the matter stood, the British government
had no right to retaliate, but was bound to wait for America to act;
and Lord Howick’s order, from that point of view, could not be defended.
From every other point of view the Order was equally indefensible; and
within a year the Whigs were obliged to take the ground that it was
not an act of retaliation at all, but an application of the Rule of
1756. Strange to say, this assertion was probably true. Unlikely as
it seemed that Earl Grey, Lord Holland, and Lord Grenville could be
parties to a transaction so evasive, their own admissions left no doubt
that Napoleon’s Berlin Decree was the pretext, not the cause, of Lord
Howick’s order; that Lord Howick’s true intention was to go one step
further than Pitt in applying the Rule of 1756 against United States
commerce; that he aimed only at cutting off the neutral trade at one
end of the voyage, as Pitt had cut it off at the other.
This criticism of the Whig ministry was made not so much in America
as in England. The Whigs never offered an intelligible defence. Lord
Grenville and Lord Howick argued at much length in Parliament, but
convinced no one that their argument was sound; even the “Edinburgh
Review” was ashamed of the task, and became unintelligible when
it touched upon this party measure.[295] Whether the conduct of
Lord Grenville’s administration was, as a vigorous Tory pamphleteer
said,[296] a piece of chicanery of which an attorney’s clerk would have
been ashamed, was a matter for English historians to decide. In England
at that day none but a few merchants or Republicans believed in the
honor or honesty of the United States government or people; but in this
instance it was not the honor or honesty of Americans that the English
critics denied: it was, on the contrary, the good faith of their own
most distinguished and most trusted noblemen,--Lord Grenville and Lord
Sidmouth, Earl Grey and Lord Holland, Lord Erskine and Lord Lansdowne,
Lord Ellenborough and Earl Fitzwilliam; and in the light of such
conduct and criticism, Americans could not be greatly blamed if they
refused to admit the ground on which these English gentlemen claimed a
better reputation for truth or honesty than they were willing to allow
Napoleon. Robbery against robbery, the English mode of pillage seemed
on the whole less respectable than the French.
The Whigs were liberal by tradition and instinct; well disposed toward
peace and commerce with all nations, they knew that neutral ships alone
could carry British manufactures to a European market. Every impediment
put in the way of neutral commerce was an additional burden on British
produce; every market closed to neutrals was a market closed to
England. From a Whig point of view Lord Howick’s order violated the
rules of political economy and common-sense; not to be defended or
excused, it equalled in violence the aggressions of Pitt, and in bad
faith rivalled the deceptions of Napoleon. Yet this measure was the
last act of a Ministry more liberal than England was destined to see
again for twenty years. Hardly had Lord Grenville made this concession
to Tory prejudice when the old King, nearly blind and on the verge
of insanity, clinging to his prejudices with the persistence of age,
seized the pretext of some small concession to the Roman Catholics and
turned the Whigs out of his councils. March 26, 1807, Lord Grenville
and Lord Howick announced to the two Houses of Parliament their
dismissal from office.
If the friendly Whigs, after imposing on the United States such a
treaty, had thought themselves still obliged to lop off another main
limb of American commerce, which Pitt had spared, the Tories were not
likely to rest until they had put an end to American neutral commerce
altogether. This result was foreshadowed by Spencer Perceval and Lord
Castlereagh in their speeches on Lord Howick’s order, and was the end
to which the legislation and public opinion of England had pointed for
years. The time for negotiation had gone by, and nothing remained for
the United States but a trial of strength.
For this final test Jefferson was ready. Congress had placed in his
hands powers which in his opinion were ample to protect American
interests abroad and at home. On sufficient provocation he could
exclude British ships-of-war from American waters, and if they should
refuse to depart he might enforce the Non-importation Act against
British commerce. His conduct proved that he felt neither fear nor
hesitation. He had never expected a satisfactory treaty from England,
and he had good reason to know that Monroe’s treaty, if Monroe should
succeed in making one, must be worse than none. Early in February,
1807, arrived the despatch from Monroe and Pinkney announcing that the
two envoys had decided to depart from their instructions and to abandon
the impressment ultimatum. Madison replied,[297] February 3, that no
such treaty would be ratified, and that it would be better to let the
negotiation quietly terminate, leaving each party to follow an informal
understanding; but that if such a treaty should have been signed, the
British commissioners should be candidly apprised of the reasons for
not expecting its ratification. That Monroe’s treaty, if he made one,
would be rejected and returned without ratification to the British
government was certain long before it reached America.
On that point, as on the inflexibility of England, no doubt could
exist. President Jefferson and Secretary Madison were as determined, in
case of necessity, to attack British manufactures as Spencer Perceval
and George Rose were bent upon cutting off American trade; but although
the Americans fully meant to use commercial weapons against British
aggression, they earnestly wished for a good working arrangement under
which, without a treaty, peace and commerce could be secure. So far
from challenging a rupture, they were anxious only to encourage cordial
relations. Throughout the winter of 1806–1807 Jefferson made of his
attachment to England a foundation for all his policy at home and
abroad. Congress, under the security of Fox’s friendship, left foreign
affairs alone, and quarrelled only about domestic matters; while
General Turreau’s temper was made more irritable by the attentions
lavished upon David Montague Erskine, the new British minister, who,
Nov. 4, 1806, put an end to the adventures of Merry at Washington, and
began the easy task of winning popularity.
The winter of 1805–1806 had been favorable to Turreau, who saw France
control American policy toward Spain and St. Domingo; while a stringent
Act of Congress prohibiting the importation of British manufactures
brought within his sight the chief object of French diplomacy in
America,--a war between the United States and England. The winter of
1806–1807 promised to undo this good work, and even to bring the United
States to the verge of war with France. The first measure recommended
by the President and adopted by Congress--the suspension of the
Non-importation Act--annoyed Turreau. Monroe’s treaty was signed in
London December 1; at Washington Turreau wrote, December 12,[298] soon
after Congress met,--
“If I am to judge by the talk and countenances of the great
people, this Congress will be more favorable to England than
the last was; and already its leader, under the President’s own
invitation, shows a benevolent disposition toward the British
government. I had the honor to see Mr. Jefferson the evening
before Congress met, and to say to him, on the subject of
Spanish differences, that probably all the negotiations entered
into by the Government with that Power, as well as with England,
would succeed. ‘Really,’ replied the President, ‘I have reason
to think that the English are going to make an arrangement with
us, and that it would be already done if Mr. Fox’s death had
not interrupted negotiation. Perhaps we shall even obtain,’ he
added, ‘the right to extend our maritime jurisdiction, and to
carry it as far as the effect of the Gulf Stream makes itself
felt,--which would be very advantageous both to belligerents and
to neutrals.’”
To persons who knew that Jefferson was then angry with Napoleon for
his faithless conduct in preventing the new Florida negotiation, this
assurance of English friendship gave a measure of the President’s
diplomacy. He was willing to irritate and alarm the French minister,
and he succeeded. Turreau took refuge in speculations and sharp
criticisms:--
“I know not whether to attribute this first effect of pronounced
favor in regard to England to the last despatches of the two
envoys negotiating at London, or to the first overtures of
Mr. Erskine, who arrived here a few days ago, and with whom
they seem already infatuated (_très engoué_); ... or,
finally, whether it may not be the result of some hints from
Alexander,--for whom the Federal government, and particularly
Mr. Jefferson, have an admiration which borders on delirium. And
your Excellency may recall that last spring the President talked
of making overtures to the Russian sovereign relative to a plan
of unarmed maritime confederation, which was then his great
object, and which, as he assured me in our last interview, he
has not given up,--making, as his custom is, a grand eulogium of
Alexander and his savages.”
Madison, even in prosperous times never a favorite with General
Turreau, managed as usual to draw upon himself the chief weight of
diplomatic suspicion and wrath.
“The unexpected change in the views of the Federal government,”
continued Turreau, “is such that the secretary’s bearing toward
me is deranged by it. Not that he has renounced his system of
attentions (_prévenances_) toward the minister of France,
whom he does not love, and whom, as I have unfortunately good
reason to know, he distrusts; not that he has weakened his
protestations, reiterated to satiety, of personal attachment
to the interests of France, and of the Government’s constant
wish to maintain and strengthen the friendly relations which
unite it with that Power,--but the Secretary of State has
forgotten that at the beginning of this year [1806], and
particularly after the event of Austerlitz, the only subject
of our private conversations was complaint of England, and the
fixed resolution of the Federal government to stop the course of
her wrongs either by repression or reprisals. He has forgotten
that the steps taken by the Executive to obtain from Congress
the famous Non-importation Bill, now suspended, were so marked
and ill-concealed that John Randolph called attention to them,
and flung severe, or rather humiliating, taunts at the agents
of ministerial influence. Now Mr. Madison no longer talks to
me about England; he tries to keep out of our conversations
whatever relates to that Power, and far from making complaints
of her, the Federal government ‘has to congratulate itself
that the ministry of Mr. Fox, though unfortunately too short,
has nevertheless sufficed to bring the Cabinet of St. James to
moderate sentiments.’”
Neither Jefferson nor Madison took direct notice of Napoleon’s conduct
in regard to Florida, but they led Turreau to think that England was
their favorite; and Turreau’s dislike of America and Americans became
in consequence more decided. He hoped for Burr’s success in order to
relieve the pressure upon him:[299]--
“It seems to me that Burr’s success cannot be contrary to the
interests of France, although I am convinced that England will
favor him,--doubtless with other hopes; but if we had to-day
the Floridas, the importance of which I have felt it my duty to
recall to you, I think I can guarantee that New Orleans would
be ours if we only showed a wish for it. All reports, and I have
had such, both official and positive, agree as to the regrets
expressed by the great majority of inhabitants at not living
under French rule.”
In the middle of February, at a moment when Americans expected daily
the arrival of a British treaty marked by generous concessions,
Napoleon’s Berlin Decree reached the United States. Commerce was
instantly paralyzed, and merchants, Congressmen, Cabinet, and President
turned to Turreau anxiously inquiring what was meant by this blockade
of the British Islands by a Power which could not keep so much as a
frigate at sea. Turreau could give them no answer. “Your Excellency
will readily believe,” he wrote home,[300] “that this circumstance
does not put us in a better position here.” The influence of France
in the United States was never lower than at the moment when England
turned Lord Grenville and Lord Erskine out of power, in order to
install Spencer Perceval and Lord Eldon at the head of a Tory reaction.
Jefferson’s objections to a British treaty would have had no weight
with the Senate if the treaty had been tolerable; the Berlin Decree
and the Emperor’s conduct in regard to Florida would have reconciled
Madison to almost any British alliance. Turreau was so well aware of
the danger that he exerted himself in remonstrances and semi-threats,
and told[301] one member of the Cabinet after another that “at a
moment when Europe, leagued together against the maritime tyranny
of England, was laboring to throw off the yoke of that Power and to
secure for all navigating nations freedom of commerce and the seas,” it
was particularly improper for the United States to accept any treaty
which did not expressly secure all disputed points, and that no treaty
would be observed by England unless made under the auspices and by the
guaranty of Napoleon.
In view of the recent fate that had overtaken Powers like Switzerland
and Venice, which had put themselves under the auspices of Napoleon,
this argument produced no conviction. Turreau might better have left
to the English the task of repairing Napoleon’s mistakes; but these
mistakes had accumulated until it depended upon England alone whether
the United States should join her in the war. Not only had the Emperor
offended Jefferson and Madison by his peremptory stoppage of the
Florida purchase,--he had also declared war upon American commerce in a
decree which Jefferson and Madison could not but suspect to be in some
mysterious way connected with his sudden change of front toward Spain
and Florida; while in the face of these difficulties he left his own
minister at Washington in such discredit that Turreau was reduced to
beg sixty thousand dollars from the American Treasury to meet consular
expenditures at a moment when he should have been pressing complaints
about the frigate “Impétueux,” destroyed by the English within American
jurisdiction, and when he should have been threatening the most fatal
consequences if President Jefferson should sign any treaty whatever
with England.[302]
In this temper all parties waited for the news from England, which
could not long be delayed; until March 3, 1807, the last day of the
session, a rumor reached the Capitol that a messenger had arrived at
the British legation with a copy of the treaty negotiated by Pinkney
and Monroe. The news was true. No sooner did Erskine receive the treaty
than he hurried with it to Madison, “in hopes that he would be induced
to persuade the President either to detain the Senate, which he has
the power by the Constitution to do, or to give them notice that he
should convene them again.” Unlike Merry, Erskine was anxious for a
reconciliation between England and America; he tried honestly and
over-zealously to bring the two governments into accord, but he found
Madison not nearly so earnest as himself:
“The first question he asked was, what had been determined on
the point of impressment of seamen, claimed as British, out of
American ships; and when I informed him that I had not perceived
anything that directly referred to that question in any of the
Articles of the copy of the treaty which I had received, he
expressed the greatest astonishment and disappointment....
The note which was delivered in to the American commissioners,
previous to the signature of the treaty, by Lords Holland
and Auckland, relative to Bonaparte’s decree of November 21,
particularly attracted his attention; and he observed that
the note itself would have prevented, he was convinced, the
ratification of the treaty, even if all the Articles of it had
been satisfactory, and all the points settled upon the terms
that had been required by their commissioners.”[303]
At ten o’clock the same night the two Houses of Congress, when ready
to adjourn, sent a joint committee to wait upon the President, who
was unwell, and unable to go as usual to the Capitol. Dr. Mitchill,
the senator from New York, a member of this committee, asked the
President whether there would be a call of the Senate to consider the
treaty.[304] “Certainly not,” replied Jefferson; and he added that “the
only way he could account for our ministers having signed such a treaty
under such circumstances was by supposing that in the first panic of
the French imperial decree they had supposed a war to be inevitable,
and that America must make common cause with England. He should,
however, continue amicable relations with England, and continue the
suspension of the Non-importation Act.”
The senators received this rebuff with ill-concealed annoyance.
Jefferson’s act in refusing to consult them about a matter so
important as a British treaty--and one which from the first had been
their own rather than the President’s scheme--was another instance of
the boldness which sometimes contradicted the theory that Jefferson
was a timid man. To ordinary minds it seemed clear that the President
needed support; that he could not afford single-handed to defy England
and France; that the circle of foreign enemies was narrowing about
him; and that to suppress of his own will a treaty on which peace and
war might depend, exposed him to responsibilities under which he might
be crushed. Although the treaty was not yet published, enough had
been said to make senators extremely curious about its contents; and
they were not pleased to learn that the President meant to tell them
nothing, and cared too little for their opinion to ask it. Of all the
senators the most formidable intriguer was Samuel Smith of Maryland,
who wrote the next day confidentially to Wilson Cary Nicholas a letter
full of the fresh impressions which gave life to Smith’s private
language:[305]
“A copy of the treaty arrived last evening. The President is
angry with it, and to Dr. Mitchill and Mr. Adams (who carried
the last message) expressed his anger in strong, very strong
terms, telling in broad language the cause of his wrath. He
requested the doctor to tell the senators his objections. If
the doctor repeated correctly, then I must be permitted to
think there was not a little of the heightening. He said the
President was at present determined to send the original back
the moment it shall be received, without submitting it to the
Senate. He was sick, it is true,--vexed and worried; he may
think better of it, for Madison (expecting less than he had)
differs with him as to calling the Senate, and R[obert] S[mith]
concurs in opinion with M[adison].... I stopped here, and I have
seen the President and Mr. M[adison]. It seems the impressment
of seamen was a _sine qua non_ in the instructions. The
P[resident] speaks positively that, without full and formal
satisfaction shall be made thereupon, he will return the treaty
without consulting the Senate; and yet he admits the treaty,
so far as to all the other points, might be acceptable,--nay,
that there are but few exceptions to it in his mind. I fancy
the merchants would be perfectly pleased therewith. If then in
all other points it would please, will the responsibility not
be very great on him should he send it back without consulting
the Senate? M[adison] in answer to this query said, ‘But if he
is determined not to accept, even should the Senate advise,
why call the Senate together?’ I could give no answer to this
question. If by his unusual conduct the British continue or
increase their depredations (which he cannot prevent), what
will be the outcry? _You_ may advise him. He stumped us by
his positive manner.... Will not M[onroe] and P[inkney] both
conceive themselves insulted, and return to make war on the
Administration? The whole subject ought, I conceive, to have
been treated as one of great delicacy.”
In another letter, written the same day, General Smith rehearsed the
story in a few words, which proved that Smith had a full share of the
shrewdness that was lacking in Jefferson. He saw the future as clearly
as politicians often saw what philosophers overlooked; but his jealousy
of Jefferson appeared in every word:[306]--
“The Senate, agreeably to the first construction (given by
General Washington and his Administration, of which Jefferson
was one,--given, too, immediately after the knowledge of what
was the intention of the convention that framed it), did
_unanimously_ advise the President to negotiate a treaty
with Great Britain. The Senate agreed to his nomination of the
negotiators. A treaty was effected. It arrives. It is well known
that he was _coerced_ by the Senate to the measure; and he
refuses to submit it to their approbation. What a responsibility
he takes! By sending it back he disgraces his ministers,
_and Monroe is one_. Monroe and Pinkney come home, and in
justification publish the treaty. It may appear good to the
eyes of all unprejudiced men,--I suspect it will. By a refusal
to accede to it the British continue their depredations, to the
amount perhaps of their whole system of ‘You shall not trade
in time of war where you are refused in time of peace;’ the
impressment is carried to an excess bounded only by their power;
immense losses are sustained; a general outcry will ensue; all
will say, ‘If Monroe’s treaty had succeeded, those losses would
not have happened; why was it refused?’ Jealousy of Monroe,
and unreasonable antipathy by Jefferson and Madison to Great
Britain!--this will be said, this will be believed. And Monroe
will be brought forward; new parties will arise, and those
adverse politically will be brought together by interest....
Shall we put all to jeopardy because we have not got all we
ask? Will we go to war? No! What will we do to coerce? More
non-importation. Will Congress under such circumstances consent
to continue their non-importation? I suspect not; I cannot
believe they will. Then where shall we be? J. Randolph will take
his stand and ask, ‘Shall we hazard everything for a set of men
who, etc.? What, put the landed interest to such inconvenience!
The fair merchant is satisfied; the country is flourishing,’
etc. But I have not time to make a speech. Monroe will be called
a martyr, and the martyr will be the President. And why? Because
he has done right, and his opponent has advised wrong. The
people care little or nothing about the seamen.”
The more closely the subject was studied the more clearly it
appeared that Monroe had to all appearance knowingly embarrassed the
Administration by signing a treaty in contravention of the President’s
orders; but Jefferson added unnecessarily to his embarrassment
by refusing the treaty before he read it. Tacit abandonment of
impressments was the utmost concession that the President could
hope from England, and even this he must probably fight for; yet he
refused to consult the Senate on the merits of Monroe’s treaty for a
reason which would have caused the withholding of every treaty ever
made with England. That the public should be satisfied with this
imperious treatment was an extravagant demand. No act of Jefferson’s
administration exposed him to more misinterpretation, or more
stimulated a belief in his hatred of England and of commerce, than his
refusal to lay Monroe’s treaty before the Senate.
Perhaps the President would have been less decided had he known at
first how faulty the treaty was. Not until it had been studied for
weeks did all its faults become evident; and not until it was read in
the light of Lord Howick’s Order in Council did its character admit of
no more doubt. When news of this order reached Washington, about ten
days after the treaty, Madison wrote to Erskine a letter[307] which
showed an effort to treat the new restriction of neutral trade as
though it might have some shadow of legality in the background, and as
though it were not directed solely against America; but the truth soon
became too evident for such mild treatment, and Madison was obliged ten
days afterward to interrupt his study of Monroe’s treaty in order to
tell Erskine that the operation of the new order “would be a proceeding
as ruinous to our commerce as contrary to our essential rights.”[308]
To Monroe the President wrote with the utmost forbearance and
kindness.[309] Instead of reproaching, Jefferson soothed the irritation
of his old friend, contradicted newspaper reports which were calculated
to wound Monroe’s feelings, and pressed upon him the government of
New Orleans Territory: “It is the second office in the United States
in importance, and I am still in hopes you will accept it; it is
impossible to let you stay at home while the public has so much need
of talents.” I regard to the treaty he said little; but what he did
say was more severe than any criticism yet made to others. “depend
on it, my dear Sir, that it will be considered as a hard treaty when
it is known. The British commissioners appear to have screwed every
Article as far as it would bear,--to have taken everything and yielded
nothing.” He urged Monroe, if nothing better could be got, “to back out
of the negotiation” as well as he could, letting it die insensibly,
and substituting some informal agreement until a more yielding temper
should rise. Next the President wrote privately to Bowdoin, his
wandering minister to Spain, to whom Armstrong had shut the doors of
the legation at Paris for betraying its secrets, and who in return was
abusing Armstrong with recriminations. If a quarrel should arise with
England, it might at least be made to bring Florida again within reach.
“I have but little expectation,” wrote the President to
Bowdoin,[310] “that the British government will retire from
their habitual wrongs in the impressment of our seamen, and
am certain that without that we will never tie up our hands
by treaty from the right of passing a non-importation or
non-intercourse Act to make it her interest to become just.
This may bring on a war of commercial restrictions. To show,
however, the sincerity of our desire for conciliation, I have
suspended the Non-importation Act. This state of things should
be understood at Paris, and every effort used on your part to
accommodate our differences with Spain under the auspices of
France, with whom it is all important that we should stand in
terms of the strictest cordiality. In fact we are to depend
on her and Russia for the establishment of neutral rights by
the treaty, of peace, among which should be that of taking no
persons by a belligerent out of a neutral ship, unless they be
the soldiers of an enemy. Never did a nation act toward another
with more perfidy and injustice than Spain has constantly
practised against us; and if we have kept our hands off of her
till now, it has been purely out of respect to France, and
from the value we set on the friendship of France. We expect,
therefore, from the friendship of the Emperor that he will
either compel Spain to do us justice or abandon her to us. We
ask but one month to be in possession of the city of Mexico.”
In reality Jefferson needed somewhat more than a month to be
in possession of Mexico, although the Spaniards might without
much difficulty have reached New Orleans in less time. Had the
Federalist press been able to print the letter to Bowdoin, with its
semi-admissions of intent to wage a commercial war against England in
dependence upon Napoleon in order to gain the Floridas, the scandal
would have been as great as that caused by the famous letters to
Mazzei and Paine; but in truth this flighty talk had no influence or
importance, and the time was close at hand when Jefferson was to become
helpless. Between the will of England and France on one side and the
fixed theories of Virginia and Pennsylvania on the other, Jefferson’s
freedom of action disappeared.
Madison, who rarely accepted either horn of a dilemma with much
rapidity, labored over new instructions to Monroe which were to make
the treaty tolerable, and called Gallatin and General Smith to his aid,
with no other result than to uncover new and insuperable difficulties.
April 20 he wrote to Jefferson at Monticello:[311]--
“The shape to be given to the instructions to our commissioners
becomes more and more perplexing. I begin to suspect that it may
eventually be necessary to limit the treaty to the subject of
impressments, leaving the colonial trade, with other objects,
to their own course and to the influence which our reserved
power over our imports may have on that course. In practice
the colonial trade and everything else would probably be more
favored than they are by the Articles forwarded, or would be by
any remodifications to be expected. The case of impressments
is more urgent. Something seems essential to be done, nor is
anything likely to be done without carrying fresh matter in
the negotiation. I am preparing an overture to disuse British
seamen, in the form of an ultimatum, graduated from an exception
of those who have been two years in our navigation to no
exception at all other than such as have been naturalized.”
A few days later news arrived that the Whigs had been driven from
office, and a high Tory ministry had come into power. Madison was more
than ever perplexed, but did not throw aside his treaty.
“A late arrival from London,” he wrote again,[312] April 24,
“presents a very unexpected scene at St. James’s. Should the
revolution stated actually take place in the Cabinet, it will
subject our affairs there to new calculations. On one hand the
principles and dispositions of the new Ministry portend the most
unfriendly course. On the other hand, their feeble and tottering
situation and the force of their ousted rivals, who will
probably be more explicit in maintaining the value of a good
understanding with this country, cannot fail to inspire caution.
It may happen also that the new Cabinet will be less averse to
a _tabula rasa_ for a new adjustment than those who formed
the instrument to be superseded.”
Jefferson’s reply to these suggestions showed no anxiety except the
haunting fear of a treaty,--a fear which to Monroe’s eyes could have
no foundation. “I am more and more convinced,” the President wrote
April 21,[313] “that our best course is to let the negotiation take a
friendly nap;” and May 1 he added:[314] “I know few of the characters
of the new British Administration. The few I know are true Pittites and
anti-American. From them we have nothing to hope but that they will
readily let us back out.” In view of George Canning’s character and
antecedents and of Spencer Perceval’s speeches, Jefferson’s desire to
be allowed to back out of his treaty was superfluous. That Canning and
Perceval would make any effort to hold him to his bargain was quite
unlikely, but that they would let him back out was still more so. They
had in view more expeditious ways of ejecting him.
Nevertheless Madison was allowed to perfect his new instructions to
Monroe and Pinkney. May 20 they were signed and sent. Before they
reached London a British frigate had answered them in tones which left
little chance for discussion.