WHILE the summer of 1806 was passing in America, carrying
Burr and his insane projects to failure, General Armstrong in Paris
was watching the progress of another adventurer, whose plans were as
dark as those of Burr, but whose genius was of a very different order.
Talleyrand’s mysterious instructions regarding Florida were given to
Armstrong early in September, 1805. Ulm capitulated October 17; the
battle of Trafalgar was fought October 21. Napoleon was thenceforward
master of the Continent, and England of the ocean. December 2 Napoleon
won the decisive battle of Austerlitz, and December 26 he signed the
treaty of Pressburg which humbled Austria.
The wit of man often lagged behind the active movement of the world;
but never had diplomatists a harder task than to keep abreast of
Napoleon. Other men had moments of repose; but Napoleon’s mind seemed
never to rest. His schemes were developed, and swept over Europe like
so many storm-centres. His plans sometimes succeeded and sometimes
failed, but the success or the failure equally implied a greater effort
behind; and while Armstrong and his brother diplomatists speculated
about the Emperor’s motives in pursuing one object, the Emperor was
already devising and using new machinery for gaining another. At the
close of the war with Austria, Armstrong needed to learn whether
Napoleon still wanted money, whether Talleyrand favored the sale of
Florida, whether the treaty of Pressburg had or had not left American
affairs where they were; and none of these questions could be answered
except by Napoleon himself, who was already far advanced in schemes
which no one could fathom, and which largely depended for their success
on the skill with which he could conceal them from Jefferson.
Armstrong could only wait. Through the winter of 1805–1806, while John
Randolph’s opposition delayed Madison’s instructions to the minister at
Paris, Armstrong had nothing to do. The Emperor and Talleyrand returned
to Paris at midnight Jan. 26, 1806. More powerful than ever and more
absolute, Napoleon came back from Vienna rich with the contributions he
had levied in Germany, but angry at the condition into which Marbois
had brought the Treasury of France. Within twelve hours after arriving
at the Tuileries he called a council of his ministers, disgraced
Marbois, and appointed Mollien in his place.
That this revolution in the Cabinet had some bearing upon American
interests was more than likely; for not only was Marbois an honest man
and a warm friend of the United States, but the weight that dragged
him down was nothing less than the weight of Spanish finances. The
story may be shortly told.[264] Napoleon’s wars and repudiation of
every inconvenient debt threw the French mercantile class into general
bankruptcy. In the want of coin to supply the demands of the Emperor
and of the merchants, the Bank of France issued dangerous amounts of
paper money. To support these issues specie had to be obtained; and
the empire which produced specie was Spain. Spain might be forced to
give up her treasures; her arrears of subsidy alone would if paid add
greatly to Marbois’s resources. Yet the treasures of Spain were shut
in Mexico and Peru; they could be brought to Europe only under danger
of capture; and a means by which ten or twenty million Mexican dollars
could run the gauntlet of British cruisers and reach in safety the Bank
of France was a matter of necessity to Marbois.
The ordinary business of the Treasury in discounts and contracts was
conducted through a firm called the “Négociants réunis,” consisting
of three capitalists,--Messrs. Ouvrard, Desprez, and Yanlerberghe.
Ouvrard, the most active of the three, went to Madrid; and by lending
assistance to the sorely pressed Treasury and trade of Spain induced
the Spanish government to give him the privilege of importing bullion
from Mexico at the rate of seventy-five cents on the dollar. The
risk of importation was worth twenty-five per cent on any cargo; but
Ouvrard meant to escape all risk. He had plans of his own, involving
partnership with the British government itself through the Hopes and
Barings of Amsterdam and London; he proposed to draw some five million
dollars from Mexico by giving to the United States government drafts on
South America in settlement of the Spanish spoliations, besides getting
no less than ten million dollars from the United States government for
the Floridas.
The unnamed negotiator who came to Armstrong in September, 1805,
with Talleyrand’s autograph instructions was an agent of Marbois and
Ouvrard, whose errand was doubtless known to the Emperor. Meanwhile the
Treasury, the Bank, and the “Négociants réunis” supported each other by
loans, discounts, and indorsements, largely resting on Spanish bonds,
and made face as well as they could against commercial embarrassments
and Napoleon’s arbitrary calls for great sums of coin; but the
Treasury, being in truth the only solvent member of the partnership,
must ultimately be responsible for the entire loss whenever matters
should come to liquidation.
This was the state of the finances when, Jan. 27, 1806, Napoleon called
Marbois and Ouvrard before him. No one charged criminality on any of
the parties to the affair. In truth one person alone was to blame, and
that person was the Emperor himself; but men who served such masters
were always in the wrong,--and in fact Marbois, Ouvrard, Desprez,
and Vanlerberghe accepted their fate. Marbois was disgraced; while
the three others were obliged to surrender all their property under
the alternative of going to Vincennes, with its memories of the Duc
d’Enghien.
The dismissal of Marbois and the ruin of Ouvrard had no immediate
effect on the Florida negotiation. So far from discouraging Armstrong’s
hopes, they seemed at first likely to bring about some arbitrary
decision, after the Emperor’s well-known style of settling questions in
which he had an interest. In the middle of February Armstrong wrote in
some alarm to Madison:[265]--
“All the points in controversy between his Catholic Majesty and
the United States were submitted on the 14th instant to this
Government by the Spanish ambassador, with an order from his
Court to solicit the immediate interposition of the Emperor and
King. That his Majesty will take upon himself the mediation is
not to be questioned; but the form he may think proper to give
to it is a point equally doubtful and important. Should this
movement on the part of Spain have been spontaneous, growing
merely out of her own policy and feelings, there is reason to
believe that I may be able to prevent any sudden and unfavorable
determination from being taken; but if, on the other hand, it
should have been either dictated or invited by this Cabinet, the
presumption is strong that the decision is already taken, and
will present only the alternative,--submission or hostility. Of
the two conjectures, the latter is the more probable.”
For the moment, while Napoleon was struggling with the confusion of
his finances, he held Florida in reserve as a resource for extremity.
Armstrong was officially or semi-officially told that the Emperor
supposed the whole matter of the Spanish-American dispute to be
regularly before him by consent of both parties.[266] He had another
long interview with his unnamed negotiator, who pressed him to accept
Spanish drafts on South America in payment of the claims for Spanish
spoliations, and who argued with much obstinacy that Florida was well
worth ten million dollars to the United States.
During all this time Armstrong had heard not a word from his
Government. While the minister was listening to these whispers
of imperial policy at Paris, Madison had but begun to write the
long-delayed instructions which were in effect an acceptance of
Talleyrand’s proffered terms. The long-delayed “Two-Million Act”
received the President’s signature Feb. 13, 1806; but not until March
13 did Madison sign the instructions which contained the project of
a convention.[267] This despatch was accompanied by another of March
15, which contained an explanation of the Miranda affair and long
complaints of Yrujo’s conduct. The law prohibiting trade with St.
Domingo, “although it must be understood to have proceeded ... not
from any rightful requisition on the part of France, and still less
from a manner of pressing it which might have justly had a contrary
tendency,” was enclosed in the despatch, with instructions to sound the
French government in the hope of inducing Napoleon to lay aside his
objections to the traffic.
The packet sailed at once; and after a voyage of the usual length
arrived in France in time to bring the despatches, May 1, to
Armstrong’s hands. No apparent change had then taken place in the
Emperor’s plans; but during the three months of labor since his return
from Austria he had succeeded in restoring order to his finances
and was richer than ever before. The Spanish government sent to
Paris a certain Señor Izquierdo as special agent to make a financial
arrangement with Napoleon; and through him much business was done
unknown to the department over which Talleyrand presided. In short
the situation had changed, although no one, even among the Emperor’s
immediate household, knew what had taken place.
In pursuance of the secret memorandum in Talleyrand’s handwriting,
Armstrong, May 1, sent a note to the Foreign Office in the language
of his instructions. Talleyrand acted promptly; May 2 he carried
Armstrong’s note to Napoleon’s closet.[268] Without discussing the
matter the Emperor said: “I have some papers in relation to that
business which you have not seen.” The next day these papers were given
to him. They consisted in maps and charts of the Floridas, with many
arguments to prove their military and naval importance to Spain, and
a formal declaration from Don Carlos IV. that on no account would he
consent to alienate them either by sale or otherwise.
Talleyrand immediately sent for the American minister and told him
what had occurred. Only a few weeks before, with equal appearance of
seriousness, Armstrong had been assured that the whole matter was in
the Emperor’s hands by the request of the Spanish government. May 3
he was suddenly told that King Charles would on no account consent
to alienate Florida. If the first story were true the second must be
false. Armstrong hinted as much. “Though I have not seen the overture
on paper,” said he, “yet I am not the less assured that it had
existence; and if I have not been much deceived, it may at this moment
be found in the portfolio of M. Ouvrard.”
“That may be,” replied Talleyrand; “but it is not the less true that
circumstances have produced an entire change in the dispositions of
Spain.” Then, as though to protect himself from the charge of deception
by making a counter-charge against Armstrong, he suddenly hinted that
Armstrong’s own conduct had much to do with alarming the pride of Spain.
“Do you know,” said he, “that Mr. Erving has communicated to the
Prince of Peace the confidential propositions of which you were
made the depositary last summer, and that they were derived from
Mr. Bowdoin, as it would appear for the express purpose of being
so communicated?”
At this unexpected shock, coming instantly after the other, Armstrong
was thunderstruck.
“You may readily imagine my confusion and astonishment at this
discovery,” he continued in his narrative to Madison. “I had
confided the propositions to Mr. Bowdoin under the most solemn
injunctions of secrecy.... Could I believe that a man to whom
his country has committed so high an office could so flagrantly
violate a trust so sacred?”
His anger was diverted from Talleyrand to his colleague; but in spite
of this successful diversion, one might suppose Armstrong capable,
even in anger, of seeing that Talleyrand’s story was not altogether
clear,--that he was trying to distract attention from his own failures.
The more closely Ouvrard’s scheme was brought to light, the more
clearly it seemed to take the form of an intrigue or a job. The
notorious corruption that surrounded Talleyrand explained the favor
shown it by the French Foreign Office; but neither the Emperor of
France nor the King of Spain was ruled in such matters by subordinates,
and Armstrong began to feel the error of making his own Government
the instrument of Ouvrard’s speculations. Too deeply involved to
draw back he took refuge in caution, and said even to the Secretary
of State as little as he could. Above all, he avoided reference to
possible corruption involved in the bargain. His colleague Bowdoin,
whose garrulity had already annoyed him, did not imitate Armstrong’s
reticence, but wrote to the President the facts which Jefferson least
cared to know. The profits on the Louisiana stock, he said,[269] had
stimulated jobbery; fifteen per cent discount on one million seven
hundred and ten thousand dollars had been divided among the individuals
concerned. The two Floridas were offered by Daniel Parker, agent of
the Hopes in Amsterdam, who came with a letter of recommendation from
Labouchere, Sir Francis Baring’s son-in-law, and who held or pretended
to hold powers of transfer from the Prince of Peace. The highest point
to which the propositions could be traced was to one Cazeneau, Parker’s
friend, who lived in Talleyrand’s house. Some time afterward Bowdoin
added[270] that a new negotiator had appeared,--a former private
secretary to Talleyrand,--a M. Dautremont, who came to Skipwith, the
American consul at Paris, and after explaining that the X. Y. Z.
business and the jealousy of the American government had caused much
uneasiness in matters of this delicate nature, suggested that other
means less exposed than money to observation might be devised. He
thought well of land-grants to Talleyrand’s brother, in which Skipwith
might take a share.
With so many different persons and interests involved in the Floridas
and the claims, Armstrong might feel confident that a single rebuff
from the Emperor would not end the matter. After a few weeks Talleyrand
quietly instigated the American minister to renew his request, which
was done by a note of May 25;[271] and May 28 Armstrong received
in reply an official assurance of “his Majesty’s wishes to see the
controversy amicably terminated, and his readiness to lend himself to
that object.” Talleyrand was not only in earnest but in haste; for on
the same day, May 28, he wrote to M. de Vandeul, who was in charge
of the French embassy at Madrid, a cautious letter of instructions.
The United States government, he said,[272] seemed disposed to renew
negotiations with Spain. He ran over the points in dispute, and
sketched the outlines of an arrangement, including the cession of West
Florida.
“You will have, sir, to express no official opinion on this
point,” he said. “I need only tell you, in order that you may
make use of it in your conversations, that this part of the
Floridas must be warmly desired by the Americans, because it
closes the mouths of several rivers which have a great part
of their course within the United States. Under another Power
Florida, so situated, can intercept American commerce; and since
the Province is thinly populated and very accessible by land, it
is to be presumed that the United States would seize the first
pretext for invasion. If Spain is not bent on preserving this
colony, she may listen to the American propositions; and all
that she would have to remark in making this arrangement is that
West Florida, which brings very little revenue to her, would be
a much more valuable possession for the United States.”
Vandeul was intimate with G. W. Erving, the American _chargé_
at Madrid; and with friendly zeal he entered into the negotiation.
Taking Talleyrand’s despatch and Armstrong’s note, a copy of which was
inclosed for his guidance, he went to the Prince of Peace, with whom he
had a long conversation June 18, 1806.
“To tell your Excellency the truth,” he wrote the next day to
Talleyrand,[273] “I ought to inform you that the Prince of Peace
appears to me to hold pronounced opinions excessively opposed
to the conciliatory views which I should have wished to find in
him. Nevertheless I did my best to bring him to less passionate
ideas, and asked him whether he did not think it a matter of
general interest that the old relations should be restored
between Spain and the United States, even admitting (for this is
one of the Prince’s allegations) that they were only suspended
for the moment as to official forms. He answered me that this
state of things was in no way prejudicial to the interests of
the two countries; that commerce continued between them under
the safeguard of reciprocal good faith; and that this mode of
existence might last a long time without disquieting Spain.”
Vandeul was obliged to urge the Emperor’s wish for a reconciliation
and the advance made by Armstrong at Paris. Thereupon Godoy suddenly
changed his tone. “At bottom,” said he, “we are quite ready to see
where they want to come out; you may assure your Court of that.”
Vandeul thanked him, and added that he hoped the Prince would be
pleased to have the matter negotiated at Paris. “Well, granted again!”
answered Godoy; “I see no inconvenience in consenting to that.” “Your
Excellency authorizes me to inform M. de Talleyrand by my first
despatch?” “By your first despatch.”
Greatly pleased at his success, Vandeul immediately wrote to
Talleyrand. A few days afterward he returned to the Prince of Peace,
and in a long interview undertook to dispose of the whole subject.[274]
Godoy objected chiefly that as yet no official representation had
been made on which the Government of Spain could act. Vandeul urged
that Armstrong’s note and Talleyrand’s instructions were sufficient
proof that the Americans had changed their tone and system. In his
earnestness he insisted upon expressing his opinion on all the points
in dispute, including the cession of West Florida.
“Then the Prince gave way entirely to the accession that I
asked; and in a manner that I found not only open, but even
friendly, told me to renew to you what he had previously
authorized me to write to you, and to add that ministerial
measures should decidedly be taken for a suitable expression of
the intentions of the Spanish Court both to your Highness and to
the American ministers, with views of conciliation and definite
arrangement, in the dispute with the United States.”
Vandeul was convinced that the Prince spoke the truth, and he hurried
to tell Erving. The American _chargé_, though far from friendly
to Spain, believed that Godoy was honest; and he hastened to notify
Armstrong. Armstrong had no doubt that all was well, and lost no time
in consulting Talleyrand, who had every motive to feel sure of success.
The Spanish imbroglio seemed on the verge of a friendly settlement.
Suddenly occurred one of the scenes of melodrama to which the Emperor’s
servants were accustomed. When Talleyrand brought Vandeul’s despatch to
his master, Napoleon broke into a passion. Rebuking Talleyrand sharply
for having pressed the matter in its first stages, he threatened to
degrade and punish Vandeul; and he ordered Talleyrand not only to
reprimand his subordinate in the severest manner, but himself to meddle
no more with the subject.[275] His orders were instantly followed
with the blind obedience which marked the Emperor’s service. Vandeul
was still congratulating himself on his success, and waiting for a
letter of approval from Paris, when a despatch arrived which shivered
his diplomatic triumph. Without a word of explanation, Talleyrand
administered the reproof he had been ordered to give. Vandeul was told
that he had gone altogether beyond his instructions:[276]--
“To cause the negotiations of these two Governments to be
opened under his Majesty’s eyes would be to associate him in
all their quarrels and to render him more or less responsible
for the results. He will see with pleasure the return of a
good understanding between the two countries; but they alone
can judge what means of reconciliation suit their respective
interests.”
A few days afterward came another and sharper reprimand:[277]--
“In demanding that the negotiation should take place at Paris,
in making overtures to the United States minister while he has
not even received instructions from his Government, in leading
the Prince of Peace to believe that everything would be done
under the mediation of France,--you exceed the instructions
marked out for you; and such is the effect of one false step,
that it inevitably draws others after it before the system
which has been forsaken can be resumed. That Spain and the
United States should seek a reconciliation is to be desired;
but leave to them the opening of negotiation, and take only
such steps as are marked out for you,--such are his Majesty’s
orders. The United States and Spain will communicate their
intentions to each other. You cannot charge yourself with the
always embarrassing functions of an intermediary without being
formally authorized to do it; for the Government alone can know
whether this step is consistent with its interests of the moment
and with the general plan it has formed for itself.”
That the words of this despatch were taken from the Emperor’s lips
is more than likely. Talleyrand’s notes always repeated as nearly as
possible the exact expressions of his master; and the expressions of
this note were Napoleonic even in their confusion of facts and ideas.
Above all, the concluding sentence, which was probably as mysterious to
Talleyrand as to the Americans, marked the proceeding with the peculiar
stamp of Napoleon’s mind. No one but himself should judge whether the
cession of Florida was “consistent with his interests of the moment
and with the general plan he had formed for himself.” Probably for
the first time, July 12, 1806, Talleyrand learned that Napoleon had
a general plan which was inconsistent with complete reconciliation
between Spain and the United States; yet he could no longer doubt that
the same general plan had controlled the Emperor’s conduct at least as
far back as May 1. From this reticence he might infer that his own fall
approached. Another proof that his credit waned came in a form more
gracious, but not less convincing. Napoleon conferred on him an Italian
principality. The Ex-Bishop of Autun became Prince of Benevento.
Had Armstrong been allowed to know every detail of this transaction,
he could not have penetrated Napoleon’s secret; but for weeks he was
kept in dense ignorance. Aware that the Prince of Peace had consented
to negotiate, informed that Izquierdo had received powers and was
authorized to proceed, Armstrong still found an invisible barrier
across his path,--frivolous difficulties of form and unmeaning
references to Madrid,--which no effort of his could remove. At a hint
from Talleyrand he went to Marshal Duroc, a man of high character and
abilities, who stood as near as the nearest to the Emperor, and who was
conducting with Izquierdo the Spanish negotiations which Napoleon had
taken from Talleyrand. Duroc seemed well disposed toward America; and
through him Armstrong succeeded in putting into Napoleon’s hands the
project of a treaty between the United States and Spain. After reading
it attentively, the Emperor quietly returned it, without a word.
Foiled again by this impenetrable mystery, Armstrong dreamed of forcing
the Emperor’s hand. He could at least, by an official note, compel
Talleyrand and Izquierdo either to act or to explain their inaction;
but from this step he was dissuaded by Talleyrand and Duroc, who
reasoned that precipitancy might do harm, but could do no good.
Meanwhile Talleyrand wrote a despatch[278] to Turreau at Washington;
and if Turreau understood its meaning, his insight was clearer than
that of the Prince of Benevento himself. The tone of this instruction
varied between a caress and a threat; but the threat came last, and was
most significant:--
“His Majesty would be pained to remark that the United States,
to whose prosperity France has at all times contributed,--that
Spain, in whom she takes a like interest,--should revive in
America quarrels that are beginning to slumber in Europe.
The United States, which owe their fortune to commerce, are
interested in peace; they have reason to wish it with their
neighbors; and if, comparing their force with that of a colony,
they can promise themselves success at first, they can also
bear in mind (_reconnaître_) that the colonies are not
alone, and that Europe has always gone to their aid. Take care,
sir, to maintain the United States in the views of conciliation
with which the news of the events of the last campaign may have
inspired them. A sense of their true interests would suffice
to make them true to this disposition, even though they had
not bound themselves to it by the demand they have made on his
Majesty the Emperor to intervene in their discussions with
Spain, and to employ his good offices for the re-establishment
of a perfect harmony between the two Powers. His Majesty,
without putting himself forward as mediator in circumstances
where other interests, which directly concern his empire, ought
to fix his whole attention, will regard whatever the United
States and Spain may do toward a reconciliation as an evidence
of friendship toward himself.”
Sept. 25, 1806, the Emperor returned to Germany to begin a war with
Prussia which was to lead him far. His departure put an end to
whatever hopes Armstrong still cherished, while it left the United
States in a mortifying attitude. After having been defied by Spain,
Jefferson found himself deluded by France. No imagination could
conceive the purpose for which Napoleon meant to use the United States
government; but that he had some scheme, to which President Jefferson
must be made subservient, was clear. Armstrong tried in vain to
penetrate the mystery. Whatever it might be, it was as yet hidden in
the recesses of Napoleon’s mind.
No sooner had the Emperor left Paris than the American minister,
September 30, wrote a note of inquiry to Izquierdo, who replied in
substance that his powers had been suspended or recalled. Nothing
remained but for Armstrong to inform the President of all the facts
connected with the failure of his negotiation, and then to wait at
Paris, with what patience he could command, for the moment when
Napoleon should consent to reveal the meaning of these mysterious
manœuvres. Yet in diplomacy as in war, nations were commonly lost
when they allowed Napoleon to take the initiative, and to choose his
own time and place for attack. The United States government had every
reason to be on its guard.
Napoleon reached the battle-field of Jena Oct. 14, 1806, and crushed
the Prussian army. October 27 the conquering French battalions made
a triumphal entry into Berlin. November 25,--the day so frequently
occurring in the story of Burr’s conspiracy, when Jefferson received
General Wilkinson’s despatch, and when Wilkinson himself reached New
Orleans,--the Emperor Napoleon left Berlin for Poland and Russia.
Before leaving Berlin he signed a paper destined to become famous
throughout the world under the name of the Berlin Decree. This
extraordinary mandate, bearing the date of Nov. 21, 1806, began
by charging that England disregarded the law of nations. She made
non-combatants prisoners of war; confiscated private property;
blockaded unfortified harbors and mouths of rivers, and considered
places as blockaded though she had not a single ship before them,--even
whole coasts and empires. This monstrous abuse of the right of blockade
had no other object than to raise the commerce and industry of England
on the ruin of the commerce and industry of the Continent, and gave
a natural right to use against her the same weapons and methods of
warfare. Therefore, until England should recognize and correct these
violations of law, it was decreed--(1) That the British Isles were in a
state of blockade; (2) That all intercourse with them was prohibited;
(3) That every Englishman found within French authority was a prisoner
of war; (4) That all British property, private as well as public, was
prize of war; (5) That all merchandise coming from England was prize of
war; (6) That half the product of such confiscations should be employed
to indemnify merchants whose property had been captured by British
cruisers; (7) That no ship coming from England or her colonies should
be admitted into any port; (8) That every vessel trying to elude this
rule by means of false papers should be confiscated.
This decree, which cut the roots of neutral rights and of American
commerce with Europe, was published at Paris in the “Moniteur” of Dec.
5, 1806. At the same time news arrived that Hamburg, and nearly all
the north coast of Germany along the German Ocean and the Baltic, had
fallen into Napoleon’s hands, or was certain soon to become his prey.
When Armstrong, watching with keen interest the rapid progress of
French arms, took up the “Moniteur” which contained the Berlin Decree,
he might well have started to his feet with the cry that at last he
understood what the Emperor would be at. A part of the enigma which had
perplexed diplomacy was explained, and what was not yet revealed might
vaguely be divined.
December 10 Armstrong wrote to Decrès, the Minister of Marine, to ask
of him, in Talleyrand’s absence, an explanation of the decree. For
some days no answer was received. “Much is said here,” he wrote to
Madison, “of qualifications which are to be given to the _arrêté_
of November 20 [21], and which would indeed make it very harmless; but
these are rather to be hoped for than believed in.” When Decrès’ reply
arrived, dated December 24, it went far to confirm Armstrong’s fears,
by avoiding decisive and official explanation.[279]
“I consider the imperial decree of the 21st of November last,”
wrote Decrès, “as thus far conveying no modification of the
regulations at present observed in France with regard to neutral
navigators, nor consequently of the convention of Sept. 30,
1800, with the United States of America; ... but it will be
proper that your Excellency should communicate with the Minister
of Exterior Relations as to what concerns the correspondence
of citizens of the United States with England.... It will
not escape General Armstrong that my answers cannot have the
development which they would receive from the Minister of
Exterior Relations, and that it is naturally to him that he
ought to address himself for these explanations, which I am very
happy to give him, because he wishes them, but upon which I have
much less positive information than the Prince of Benevento.”
With this explanation, such as it was, Armstrong was obliged to content
himself; and the year 1806 closed, leaving President Jefferson at
the mercy of battles soon to be fought in the most distant corner of
Germany, where the Emperor Alexander of Russia was gathering his forces
for a conflict more terrible than Europe had yet seen.