CHAPTER XI.

THE death of Pitt destroyed all immediate possibility of

drawing England into conspiracy with Burr,--if indeed a possibility

had ever existed. The attempt to obtain money from Spain was equally

hopeless. Except for Madison’s conduct in receiving Miranda and

refusing to receive Yrujo, Dayton would probably have obtained nothing

from Spain; but the information he was able to give Yrujo in regard to

Miranda’s plans and proceedings deserved reward, and Dayton received at

different times sums of money, amounting in all to about three thousand

dollars, from the Spanish treasury. Dayton’s private necessities

required much larger sums.

Burr was also ruined. He could not return to New York, where an

indictment hung over his head. Conspiracy was easier than poverty; but

conspiracy without foreign aid was too wild a scheme for other men to

join. Jefferson might at that moment have stopped Burr’s activity by

sending word privately to him and his friends that their projects must

be dropped; but Jefferson, while closing every other path, left that

of conspiracy open to Burr, who followed it only with much difficulty.

In order to retain any friends or followers he was obliged to deceive

them all, and entangle himself and them in an elaborate network of

falsehood. Dayton alone knew the truth, and helped him to deceive.

April 16, 1806, a few days before the adjournment of Congress, Burr

wrote to Wilkinson a letter implying that Wilkinson had required

certain conditions and an enlargement of the scheme; Burr assured him

that his requirements, which probably concerned aid from Truxton,

Preble, Eaton, and Decatur, had been fully satisfied:--

“The execution of our project is postponed till December. Want

of water in Ohio rendered movement impracticable; other reasons

rendered delay expedient. The association is enlarged, and

comprises all that Wilkinson could wish. Confidence limited

to a few. Though this delay is irksome, it will enable us to

move with more certainty and dignity. Burr will be throughout

the United States this summer. Administration is damned which

Randolph aids. Burr wrote you a long letter last December,

replying to a short one deemed very silly. Nothing has been

heard from the Brigadier since October. Is Cushing and Porter

right? Address Burr at Washington.”[170]

Burr’s letters to Wilkinson were always in cipher, and mysteriously

worded; but in this despatch nothing was unintelligible. Wilkinson

afterward explained that he was himself the “Brigadier,” and the two

names were those of officers under his command.

The same western mail which carried this letter to Wilkinson carried

another to Blennerhassett, inviting him to join in a “speculation,”

which would “not be commenced before December, if ever.” Probably

Burr made many other efforts to obtain money from petty sources; he

certainly exerted himself to delude the Spanish government into lending

him assistance. Hitherto he had left this task to Dayton, his secretary

of state, but May 14, 1806, the Spanish minister wrote to Don Pedro

Cevallos,[171]--

“The principal [Burr] has opened himself to me; and the

communications I have had with him confirm me in the idea,

not only of the probability, but even of the facility, of

his success, under certain circumstances. To insure it, some

pecuniary aid on our part and on that of France is wanted. I

have been careful to be very circumspect in my answers, and

have not compromised myself in any manner; but when I return

to Spain next spring I shall be bearer of the whole plan, with

the details that may be wanted. There will also arrive in Spain

before long, more or less simultaneously with me though by

different ways, two or three very respectable persons, both

from Louisiana and from Kentucky and Tennessee, with the same

object. They all consider the interests of these countries as

united and in conformity with those of Spain and France; but the

principal, or more correctly the principals, here do not wish to

open themselves to the Emperor Napoleon’s minister [Turreau],

as they lack confidence in him. Consequently, it will be proper

either not to communicate the matter at all to that government,

or to do it with the intimation that its representative here

shall not have the least notice of it; for, I repeat, they have

no confidence in him, and this has been a condition imposed on

me in the communications I have received.”

Finding Yrujo obstinate in refusing to advance money, Burr tried to

alarm him by pretending to take up again the scheme of attacking

Florida and Mexico. June 9, 1806, Yrujo wrote another long despatch

on the subject. Burr, he said, had suddenly ceased to visit him as

frequently as usual, and Dayton had explained the coldness as due to

Burr’s belief that the new Administration in England would be more

liberal and zealous than that of Pitt. Dayton added that Burr was

drawing up new instructions for Williamson; that he had even decided

to send Bollman to London to invite co-operation from the British

government in an attack on the Spanish possessions. Dayton professed to

have acted as the protector of Spain from Burr’s unprincipled ambition.

“Dayton told me[172] he had observed to Burr that although

he (Burr) was assuredly the principal, yet a plan of this

nature ought to be put in deliberation in the cabinet council

which certain chiefs are to hold in New Orleans in the month

of December next, and that for his own part he thought this

idea unjust and impolitic; to which Burr answered that they

would always be able to alter the plan as circumstances should

require, and that in fact this point, or at least the direction

to be given to it, would be determined in New Orleans. Dayton

told me that he would oppose with all his strength measures of

this nature, and that he knew General Wilkinson, who was to be a

member of the Congress, would make the same opposition; and that

in order to drive the idea of such a temptation out of Burr’s

head, and of other people’s also, it would be well for us to

reinforce our garrisons at Pensacola and Mobile, and that then

the circumstance of our respectable condition of defence might

be used as a weighty argument for abandoning such a project.

After holding this conference with me, Dayton returned to his

residence; and before starting, wrote me a note to say that the

night before Burr had read him the instructions to be given to

Bollman, and that they were of the tenor indicated to me.”

Godoy and Cevallos were hardly so imbecile as to pay for creating at

New Orleans a new American empire more dangerous to Spanish possessions

than the peaceful republic over which Jefferson presided at Washington.

Don Pedro Cevallos read Yrujo’s despatches with great interest. At

first he even hinted that if the United States were bent on forcing

a war with Spain, these adventurers, in case of actual hostilities,

might be made useful;[173] but this suggestion was accompanied by

many warnings to Yrujo not to commit himself or to contribute money,

and at last by a flat announcement that the King would not in any way

encourage Burr’s designs.[174]

The conspirators were in a worse position as regarded England. By a

fatal stroke of ill-luck, Merry’s despatch of Nov. 25, 1805, written

to be read in secrecy by the Tory Lord Mulgrave, was received at the

Foreign Office Feb. 2, 1806, ten days after Pitt’s death, and was

probably opened by Charles James Fox,--almost the last man in England

to whom Merry would have willingly shown it. The only answer received

by Merry reached Washington about June 1, 1806, and consisted in the

dry announcement that his Majesty had been pleased to listen favorably

to Mr. Merry’s request for a recall, and had appointed the Hon. David

Montague Erskine as his successor.

Merry complained piteously that he had never suggested a wish to be

recalled, that he had indeed the strongest desire to remain, and felt

himself greatly aggrieved at his treatment; but Fox was remorseless,

and Merry could only prepare for Erskine’s arrival. Smarting under this

sudden reproof, Merry held his parting interview with Burr. Doubtless

it was as little cheerful on one side as on the other; but Merry did

not think himself required to give an immediate or a minute account of

it to Fox. He waited until Erskine’s arrival, and then, in one of his

last despatches, Nov. 2, 1806, after Burr had begun his operations in

the West, Merry wrote,[175]--

“I saw this gentleman [Burr] for the last time at this place

[Washington] in the month of June last, when he made particular

inquiry whether I had received any answer from my Government to

the propositions he had requested me to transmit to them, and

lamented exceedingly that I had not, because he, and the persons

connected with him at New Orleans, would now, though very

reluctantly, be under the necessity of addressing themselves

to the French and Spanish governments. He added, however, that

the disposition of the inhabitants of the Western country, and

particularly Louisiana, to separate themselves from the American

Union was so strong that the attempt might be made with every

prospect of success without any foreign assistance whatever; and

his last words to me were that, with or without such support, it

certainly would be made very shortly.”

After receiving this rebuff from England, Burr and Dayton needed

singular impudence to threaten Yrujo with the terror of Charles

James Fox; but impudence had become their only resource. Every step

taken thenceforward by the conspirators was taken by means of a new

imposture; until at last they became petty swindlers who lived from

day to day by cheating each other. How flagrant their imposture was,

has been partly shown in their attempt to deceive Yrujo; but their

treatment of Wilkinson was far more dishonest.

Toward the end of July, 1806, Burr had accomplished all that could be

done in the East, and prepared to begin his campaign to New Orleans.

By strenuous efforts money had been raised to set the subordinate

adventurers in motion. Among these were Erick Bollman, famous for an

attempt to rescue Lafayette from confinement at Olmütz; a French

officer named De Pestre, or Dupiester; Samuel Swartwout, a younger

brother of Robert; and finally young Peter V. Ogden, a nephew of

Dayton. The time had come when each actor must take his place, and must

receive orders as to the _rôle_ he was to play.

Of all Burr’s intimates, Wilkinson was not only the most important, but

also the most doubtful. He had hung back and had made conditions. Since

October, 1805, nothing had been heard from him, and his last letter had

contained objections “deemed very silly.” At last a letter, dated May

13, arrived. This letter never saw the light; afterward, at the trial,

Wilkinson challenged its production, and accused Burr of falsehood in

asserting that it had been destroyed at Wilkinson’s request or with his

knowledge. Only one conclusion might be taken as certain in regard to

its contents,--they did not suit the situation of Dayton and Burr.

Dayton’s reply was dated July 24, 1806, and was sent by his nephew,

Peter V. Ogden, to Wilkinson.

“It is now well ascertained that you are to be displaced in next

session,” wrote Dayton, working on his old friend’s pride and

fears. “Jefferson will affect to yield reluctantly to the public

sentiment, but yield he will. Prepare yourself, therefore,

for it. You know the rest. You are not a man to despair, or

even despond, especially when such prospects offer in another

quarter. Are you ready? Are your numerous associates ready?

Wealth and glory! Louisiana and Mexico!”

Together with this exhortation from Dayton, Burr sent a cipher

despatch, afterward famous as the key to the whole conspiracy.

Published at different times with varying versions, as suited

Wilkinson’s momentary objects, the correct reading probably ran very

nearly as follows:--

“July 29, 1806. Your letter, postmarked 13th May, is received.

At length I have obtained funds, and have actually commenced.

The Eastern detachments, from different points and under

different pretences, will rendezvous on the Ohio 1st of

November. Everything internal and external favors our views.

Naval protection of England is secured. Truxton is going to

Jamaica to arrange with the admiral on that station. It will

meet us at the Mississippi. England, a navy of the United

States, are ready to join, and final orders are given to my

friends and followers. It will be a host of choice spirits.

Wilkinson shall be second to Burr only; Wilkinson shall

dictate the rank and promotion of his officers. Burr will

proceed westward 1st August, never to return. With him goes

his daughter; the husband will follow in October, with a corps

of worthies. Send forthwith an intelligent and confidential

friend with whom Burr may confer; he shall return immediately

with further interesting details; this is essential to concert

and harmony of movement. Send a list of all persons known to

Wilkinson west of the mountains who could be useful, with a note

delineating their characters. By your messenger send me four or

five commissions of your officers, which you can borrow under

any pretence you please; they shall be returned faithfully.

Already are orders given to the contractor to forward six

months’ provisions to points Wilkinson may name; this shall

not be used until the last moment, and then under proper

injunctions. Our object, my dear friend, is brought to a point

so long desired. Burr guarantees the result with his life and

honor, with the lives and honor and the fortunes of hundreds,

the best blood of our country. Burr’s plan of operation is to

move down rapidly from the Falls, on the 15th of November, with

the first five hundred or a thousand men, in light boats now

constructing for that purpose; to be at Natchez between the 5th

and 15th of December, there to meet you; there to determine

whether it will be expedient in the first instance to seize on

or pass by Baton Rouge. On receipt of this, send Burr an answer.

Draw on Burr for all expenses, etc. The people of the country

to which we are going are prepared to receive us; their agents,

now with Burr, say that if we will protect their religion, and

will not subject them to a foreign Power, that in three weeks

all will be settled. The gods invite us to glory and fortune;

it remains to be seen whether we deserve the boon. The bearer

of this goes express to you. He is a man of inviolable honor

and perfect discretion, formed to execute rather than project,

capable of relating facts with fidelity, and incapable of

relating them otherwise; he is thoroughly informed of the plans

and intentions of Burr, and will disclose to you as far as you

require, and no further. He has imbibed a reverence for your

character, and may be embarrassed in your presence; put him at

ease, and he will satisfy you.”

Had Burr and Dayton not felt strong reason to doubt Wilkinson’s course,

they would not have invented a tissue of falsehoods such as these

letters contained. So far as concerned Wilkinson’s future conduct, no

one could deny that this gross deception set him free from any ties

that might have previously bound him to Dayton or Burr.

Furnished with these and other letters almost equally compromising,

Ogden and Swartwout, at the end of July, started on their way.

Swartwout was directed to see Adair in Kentucky, and to deliver to him

despatches, the contents of which have never been made known, but were

doubtless identical with the letters to Wilkinson. At the same time

Erick Bollman started by sea with similar despatches for New Orleans.

Early in August Burr followed, taking with him his daughter Mrs.

Allston, and his chief of staff Colonel De Pestre. After crossing the

mountains he threw aside ordinary caution. At Canonsburg, about fifteen

miles beyond Pittsburg, he stopped at the house of an old friend,

Colonel Morgan, and there so freely asserted the imbecility of the

Federal government and the certainty of a speedy separation of the

Western States from the Eastern, that Morgan thought himself bound to

give President Jefferson a warning.

The conversation at Canonsburg took place in the afternoon and evening

of August 22. A few days afterward Burr arrived at Blennerhassett’s

island, where he found the owner waiting with enthusiasm to receive

him. Of all the eager dupes with whom Burr had to deal, this

intelligent and accomplished Irish gentleman was the most simple.

After wasting half his property on his island, he discovered that

he had left himself not more than thirty or forty thousand dollars

to live upon; and this small property was invested in funds which

produced so little as to leave him always embarrassed. He wished

ardently to make his fortune by some bold speculation; and Burr had no

more pressing necessity than to obtain the funds which Blennerhassett

burned to invest. Burr said to Blennerhassett in effect what he said to

Wilkinson; but Blennerhassett was less able than Wilkinson to detect

falsehood. The actual speculation which was to make Blennerhassett’s

fortune seemed certain of success. Burr had invented more than one

way of getting money; and among his various expedients none was more

ingenious than that of buying a certain Spanish claim, known as the

Bastrop grant, covering an immense district on the Red River, and

supposed to be owned in part by one Lynch in Kentucky. Burr had

undertaken to buy Lynch’s interest for forty thousand dollars, of which

only four thousand or five thousand dollars need be paid in money;

and he persuaded Blennerhassett that on the most moderate estimate,

they could reap from it the profit of a million. Blennerhassett was

assured that before the end of the year Louisiana would be independent,

with Burr for its ruler, under the protection of England. Wilkinson

and the United States army were pledged to accept the revolution and

to support Burr. Tennessee was secured; and though Kentucky and Ohio

were doubtful, they would end by following Tennessee. The government

at Washington would fall to pieces, and the new empire under a

stronger government, would rise at once to power. Then Bastrop’s

grant would take character; its actual cheapness was due to doubts as

to its validity: but the moment its validity was decided by the new

government, all whose members would be interested in it, the value of

the grant would become enormous; emigration would be directed to the

spot, and Blennerhassett’s fortune would be vast. He would, meanwhile,

go at once as minister to England, with Erick Bollman for secretary of

legation.[176]

In an incredibly short time Blennerhasset’s head was turned. Unluckily

for him, his wife’s head was turned even more easily than his own; and

the charms of Theodosia Allston, who became a guest at the island,

dazzled the eyes of both. Before Burr had been two days in the house,

Blennerhassett was so enthusiastic a supporter of the scheme that he

set himself to work, under Burr’s eye, to publish a series of essays in

order to show the State of Ohio that disunion was an infallible cure

for all its natural or acquired ills. The first of these essays was

quickly finished, taken to Marietta, and printed in the “Ohio Gazette”

of September 4 under the signature “Querist.”

September 2, before the “Querist” appeared, Burr continued his journey

down the river to Cincinnati, where he arrived September 4, and

remained a few days with Senator Smith, talking freely about the

impotence of the government, the rights and wrongs of the Western

people, and their inducements to set up a separate empire. September 10

he crossed the river to Lexington in Kentucky, and shortly afterward

went to Nashville in Tennessee.

Owing chiefly to the friendship of Andrew Jackson, the town of

Nashville was strongly attached to Burr, and was supposed to favor

the disunion scheme. Tennessee was the only State which Burr always

claimed positively as his own. Whether he had better grounds for his

confidence in Jackson than for his faith in Wilkinson and Daniel Clark

might be doubted; but Tennessee was at least vehement in hatred of the

Spaniards. The Spaniards were pressing close against Wilkinson’s little

force at Natchitoches, and Burr made use of the threatened war in order

to cover his own scheme. September 27 a public dinner was given to

him at Nashville, and Jackson offered as a toast the old sentiment of

1798: “Millions for defence; not a cent for tribute.” A few days later

Burr returned to Kentucky; and within a week suddenly appeared in the

newspaper at Nashville a strange proclamation signed “Andrew Jackson,

Major-General Second Division,” and dated Oct. 4, 1806, in which the

brigade commanders were ordered to place their brigades at once on

such a footing as would enable them on the shortest notice to supply

their quotas “when the government and constituted authorities of our

country” should require them to march. This unauthorized step was

commonly supposed to be taken in the interest of Burr’s conspiracy, and

compromised Jackson gravely in the eyes of the Government at Washington.

Meanwhile Theodosia Allston and her husband had been left in charge of

the Blennerhassetts, while Blennerhassett himself behaved as though

he were a village school-boy playing the part of chieftain in an

imaginary feudal castle. He went about the country raising recruits

and buying supplies, chattering to every young and active man he met

about the expedition which was to make their fortunes. He confided in

his gardener, a simple, straightforward fellow named Peter Taylor,

“that Colonel Burr would be king of Mexico, and that Mrs. Allston

would be queen of Mexico whenever Colonel Burr died.” He added that

Burr “had a great many friends in the Spanish territory; two thousand

Roman Catholic priests were enlisted in his corps; that those priests

and the societies which belonged to them were a strong party; that

the Spaniards, like the French, had got tired of their government

and wanted to swap it; that the British were also friends to this

expedition; and that he was the very man who was to go to England on

this piece of business for Colonel Burr.” When at the subsequent trial

Taylor told this tale, the world was incredulous, and insisted upon

disbelieving his story; but Blennerhassett’s papers proved the extent

of his delusion. By common consent the Blennerhassetts and Allstons

agreed that Theodosia was to inherit the empire from her father; but

doubts existed whether Allston could take the crown as Theodosia’s

husband. “I will win it by a better title,” he cried,--“by my deeds

in council and in field!”[177] Mrs. Blennerhassett was impatient to

exchange her solitary island for the court of her young empress;

and Blennerhassett longed to set sail as minister for England with

Erick Bollman for secretary of legation. Under the influence of this

intoxication, Blennerhassett offered to advance money to the extent of

all his property for Burr’s use if Allston would give him a written and

sealed guaranty to a certain amount; which Allston did.[178]

Leaving his wife at the island, while fifteen boats were building at

Marietta and kilns for baking bread were constructed on the island

itself, Blennerhassett went with the Allstons down the river to

Lexington, and there rejoined Burr on his return from Nashville, about

October 1. No time had been lost. The boats building at Marietta would

carry about five hundred men; others to be built elsewhere would carry

five hundred more. Recruiting went rapidly forward. Finally, the

purchase-money for Lynch’s interest in Bastrop’s grant, about four

or five thousand dollars, was paid; and Blennerhassett congratulated

himself on owning a share in four hundred thousand acres of land in the

heart of Louisiana.

To communicate with his friends in New York and Philadelphia, Burr

sent De Pestre October 25, with directions to report the movements

of the Western conspirators to the Marquis of Casa Yrujo, as well as

to Swartwout and Dayton. Burr gave De Pestre to understand that one

object of his mission was to blind the Spanish minister in regard to

the schemes against Mexico and Florida; in reality De Pestre’s mission

was probably for the purpose of raising money. Yrujo was already well

informed from other sources. November 10, before De Pestre’s arrival,

the Marquis wrote to his Government that some five hundred men were

collecting on the upper Ohio to move down the river in squads:[179]--

“Colonel Burr will go down with them under pretext of

establishing them on a great land-purchase he is supposed to

have made. In passing Cincinnati they expect to get possession

of five thousand stand of arms which the government deposited

there at the time of its differences with us about the

navigation of the Mississippi. After thus dropping the mask,

this armed troop will follow down the course of the Mississippi.

Colonel Burr will stop at Natchez, where he will wait until

the Assembly of New Orleans has met, which will happen at

once; and in this meeting (_junta_) they will declare

the independence of the Western States, and will invite Burr

meanwhile to place himself at the head of their government. He

will accept the offer, will descend to New Orleans, and will set

to work, clothed in a character which the people will have given

him. I understand that Colonel Burr has already written the

declaration of independence, and that it is couched in the same

terms that the States adopted in theirs against Great Britain.

This circumstance is the more notable inasmuch as the actual

President was the person who drew it up in 1776. When Burr made

the project of acting in agreement with England and seizing the

Floridas, he expected to master them with troops that should

accompany him from Baton Rouge. Although I am assured that this

project is abandoned, and that on the contrary he wishes to live

on good terms with Spain, I have written to Governor Folch of

West Florida to be on his guard; and although I am persuaded

that by means of Governor Folch’s connection with General

Wilkinson, he must be perfectly informed of the state of things

and of Burr’s intentions, I shall write to-day or to-morrow

another letter to the Governor of Baton Rouge to be on the

alert.”

Yrujo believed that Wilkinson, the General in command of the American

army, then supposed to be on the point of attacking the Spanish force

in his front, was secretly and regularly communicating with the Spanish

Governor of West Florida.

Burr was engaged in deceiving every one; but his attempt to deceive

Yrujo, if seriously meant, was the least comprehensible of all his

manœuvres. December 4 the Spanish minister wrote to his Government

another despatch which betrayed his perplexity at Burr’s conduct:--

“I am positively assured,” he said, “that from one day to

another will embark from New York for New Orleans, to join

Colonel Burr in Louisiana, three of his intimate friends,

depositaries of his whole confidence; namely, Mr. Swartwout,

lately marshal of the district of New York, a certain Dr. Erwin,

and the famous Colonel Smith, the same who was implicated in the

business of Miranda, and whose son went out as an aide-de-camp

of that adventurer. Accordingly I wrote to the governors of

both Floridas and to the Viceroy of Mexico, giving them a

general idea of this affair, and recommending them to watch the

movements of Colonel Burr and of his adventurers. This is an

excess of precaution, since by this time they must not only know

through the New Orleans and Natchez newspapers of the projects

attributed to Colonel Burr, but also through the confidential

channel of the No. 13 of the Marquis of Casa Calvo’s cipher with

the Prince of Peace, who is one of the conspirators, and who is

to contribute very efficaciously to the execution of the scheme

in case it shall be carried into effect.”

The person designated as No. 13 in the cipher used between Casa Calvo

and Godoy was the general-in-chief of the American forces, Wilkinson.

The Marquis’s despatch next mentioned the arrival of De Pestre, who

appeared about November 27 at Yrujo’s house:--

“About a week ago a former French officer came to see me,

one of Burr’s partisans, who came from Kentucky in search of

various articles for the execution of his undertaking....

This officer handed me a letter from Colonel Burr, in which,

after recommending him to me, the writer said simply that as

this person had lately visited those States, he could give me

information about them worthy of my curiosity. The date of this

letter was Lexington, October 25.”

De Pestre gave to Yrujo the assurance that all was going well with the

undertaking; but the special message he was charged to deliver seemed

to be the following:--

“He also told me, on the part of the Colonel, that I should

soon hear that he meant to attack Mexico, but that I was not

to believe such rumors; that on the contrary his plans were

limited to the emancipation of the Western States, and that it

was necessary to circulate this rumor in order to hide the true

design of his armaments and of the assemblages of men which

could no longer be kept secret; that Upper and Lower Louisiana,

the States of Tennessee and Ohio, stood ready and ripe for

his plans, but that the State of Kentucky was much divided;

and as this is the most important in numbers and population,

an armed force must be procured strong enough to control the

party there which should be disposed to offer resistance. He

added, on Burr’s part, that as soon as the revolution should be

complete, he should treat with Spain in regard to boundaries,

and would conclude this affair to the entire satisfaction of

Spain; meanwhile he wished me to write to the Governor of West

Florida to diminish the burdens on Americans who navigate the

Mobile River, and ask him, when the explosion should take place,

to stop the courier or couriers who might be despatched by the

friends of Government from New Orleans.”

Burr’s message caused Yrujo to warn all the Spanish officials in

Florida, Texas, and Mexico that “although No. 13 seems to have acted

in good faith hitherto, his fidelity could not be depended upon if he

had a greater interest in violating it, and that therefore they must be

cautious in listening to him and be very vigilant in regard to events

that would probably happen in their neighborhood.” De Pestre’s mission

made Yrujo more suspicious than ever, and he spared no precaution to

render impossible the success of any attack on Florida or Mexico.

After De Pestre had visited New York, he returned to Philadelphia, and

December 13 again called upon Yrujo.

“He told me,” reported Yrujo,[180] “that he had seen Mr.

Swartwout in New York, whom he had informed of Burr’s wish that

he, as well as Dr. Erwin, Colonel Smith, and Captain Lewis,

who was captain of the merchant ship ‘Emperor’ and brother of

the captain of Miranda’s vessel the ‘Leander,’ should set out

as soon as possible for New Orleans. Likewise he instructed

him, on the part of the colonel, that the youths enlisted to

serve as officers should set out as soon as possible for their

posts. These, my informant told me, are different. Some two or

three of them, the quickest and keenest, go to Washington to

observe the movements of Government, to keep their friends in

good disposition, and to despatch expresses with news of any

important disposition or occurrence. Three go to Norfolk to

make some despatch of provisions. A good number of them will go

direct to Charleston to take command as officers, and see to

the embarkation of the numerous recruits whom Colonel Burr’s

son-in-law has raised in South Carolina. He himself will then

have returned there from Kentucky, and will embark with them for

New Orleans. The rest will embark directly for that city from

New York.”

Yrujo could not see the feebleness of the conspiracy. So far as he

knew, the story might be true; and although he had been both forewarned

and forearmed, he could not but feel uneasy lest Burr should make a

sudden attack on West Florida or Texas. The Spanish minister was able

to protect Spanish interests if they were attacked; but he would have

preferred to prevent an attack, and this could be done by the United

States government alone. The indifference of President Jefferson

to Burr’s movements astounded many persons besides Yrujo. “It is

astonishing,” wrote Merry in November,[181] “that the Government here

should have remained so long in ignorance of the intended design as

even not to know with certainty at this moment the object of the

preparations which they have learned are now making.” Merry would have

been still more astonished had he been told that the President was by

no means ignorant of Burr’s object; and Yrujo might well be perplexed

to see that ignorant or not, the President had taken no measure for

the defence of New Orleans, and that the time had passed when any

measure could be taken. The city was in Wilkinson’s hands. Even of the

five small gunboats which were meant to be stationed at the mouth of

the Mississippi, only one was actually there. That Burr and Wilkinson

should meet resistance at New Orleans was not to be imagined. Yrujo saw

no chance of checking them except in Ohio and Kentucky.

History of the United States of America, Volume 3 (of 9) · 第 11 / 19 章