NOTHING in Jefferson’s life was stranger to modern ideas
of politics than the secrecy which as President he succeeded in
preserving. For two months the people of the United States saw their
representatives go day after day into secret session, but heard not a
whisper of what passed in conclave. Angry as Randolph was, and eager as
the Federalists were to make mischief, they revealed not even to the
senators or the foreign ministers what was passing in the House; and
the public at large, under their democratic government, knew no more
than Frenchmen of their destinies of war and peace. Such a state of
things was contrary to the best traditions of the Republican party: it
could not last, but it could end only in explosion.
When the debate on Smith’s non-importation Resolutions began in the
Senate February 12, the previous struggle which had taken place over
the Spanish policy and the “Two-million Act” was still a secret;
Randolph’s schism was unknown beyond the walls of the Capitol; the
President’s scheme of buying West Florida from France after having, as
he maintained, bought it once already, was kept, as he wished, untold.
The world knew only that some mysterious business was afoot; and when
Senator Samuel Smith’s attack on trade began, the public naturally
supposed it to be in some way connected with the measures so long
discussed in secret session.
The President’s attitude became more and more uneasy. Jefferson
disliked and dreaded the point in dispute with England. The Spanish
policy was his own creation, and he looked upon it with such regard
as men commonly bestow upon unappreciated inventions,--he depended on
its success to retrieve defeats elsewhere; but for the very reason
that he exhausted his personal influence to carry the Spanish policy
against opposition, he left British questions to Congress and his
party. Where England was to be dealt with, Madison took the lead which
Jefferson declined. For many years past Madison had been regarded as
the representative of a policy of commercial restriction against Great
Britain. To revive his influence, his speeches and resolutions of
1794[119] were reprinted in the “National Intelligencer” as a guide
for Congress; his pamphlet against the British doctrines of neutral
trade was made a political text-book; while his friends took the lead
in denouncing England and in calling for retaliation. He himself lost
no chance of pressing his views, even upon political opponents. “I had
considerable conversation with Mr. Madison,” wrote one of them February
13, “on the subjects now most important to the public. His system of
proceeding toward Great Britain is to establish permanent commercial
distinctions between her and other nations,--a retaliating navigation
act, and aggravated duties on articles imported from her.”[120] By
his own choice, and in a manner almost defiant of failure, Madison’s
political fortunes were united with the policy of coercing England
through restrictions of trade.
At first much was said of an embargo. Senator Jackson of Georgia, Dec.
20, 1805, declared with his usual vehemence in favor of this measure.
“Not a nation,” said he, “exists which has West Indian colonies but is
more or less dependent on us, and cannot do without us; they must come
to our terms, or starve. On with your embargo, and in nine months they
must lie at your feet!” John Randolph, sure to oppose whatever Madison
wished, also looked with favor on this course. “I would (if anything)
have laid an embargo,” he said.[121] The embargo party at best was
small, and became smaller when toward the close of December, 1805, news
arrived that Admiral Nelson had fought a great naval battle, October
21, against the combined French and Spanish fleets, off Cape Trafalgar,
ending in a victory so complete as to leave England supreme upon the
ocean. The moral effect of Nelson’s triumph was great. Embargo was the
last step before war, and few Americans cared to risk war with England
under any circumstances; with harbors undefended and without an ally
on the ocean, war was rashness which no one would face. Madison’s more
gentle plan of partial restrictions in trade became the Republican
policy.
Even before Senator Samuel Smith reported his Resolutions, February
5, to the Senate, the British minister Merry wrote to his Government
that the members most opposed to commercial restrictions, despairing
of effectual resistance, would endeavor only to limit the number of
articles to be prohibited, and to postpone the date on which the law
should take effect, in order to send a special mission to England and
negotiate an amicable arrangement. Merry added that a special mission
had been under discussion from the first:--
“But I now learn that it has been, and continues to be, opposed
by the President, who wishes that Mr. Monroe ... should continue
to carry on the negotiation alone. Matters, however, being now
brought to a disagreeable crisis by the clamor of the nation and
the instigation of the Administration, some of the members of
the Senate are, I find, endeavoring to engage the rest of their
body to join them in exercising their constitutional privilege
of advising the President on the occasion; and that their advice
to him will be to suspend any step that can have a hostile
tendency until the experiment has been tried of an extraordinary
mission.”[122]
Merry was exactly informed as to the fate of General Smith’s
Resolutions even before they had been reported to the Senate.
They were three in number; but only the third, which recommended
non-importation, was drawn by Smith. The first and second, the work
of Senator Adams of Massachusetts, were not wholly welcome either to
the Administration or to the minority. The first declared the British
seizures “an unprovoked aggression,” a “violation of neutral rights,”
and an “encroachment upon national independence.” The second requested
the President to “demand and insist upon” indemnity, and to make some
arrangement about impressments. The first Resolution, although fatal to
future Federalist consistency, was unanimously adopted by the Senate,
February 12, almost without debate,--even Timothy Pickering recording
his opinion that the British government had encroached upon national
independence. The second Resolution was criticised as an attempt at
dictation to the Executive, which would give just cause of offence to
the President. By this argument the Senate was induced to strike out
the words “and insist;” but although the Resolution, thus altered, was
weak, seven Republican senators voted against it as too strong.
The reason of this halting movement had been explained by Merry to
Lord Mulgrave nearly two weeks before. The Senate stumbled over the
important personality of James Monroe. The next Presidential election,
some three years distant, warped the national policy in regard to a
foreign encroachment. Senator Samuel Smith, ambitious to distinguish
himself in diplomacy, having failed to obtain the mission to Paris,
wished the dignity of a special envoy to London, and was supported by
Wilson Cary Nicholas. The friends of Madison were willing to depress
Monroe, whom John Randolph was trying to elevate. Even Mrs. Madison, in
the excitement of electioneering, allowed herself to talk in general
society very slightingly of Monroe;[123] and there were reasons which
made interference from Mrs. Madison peculiarly irritating to Monroe’s
friends.[124] Dr. Logan, the senator from Pennsylvania, while helping
Madison to satisfy Napoleon in regard to St. Domingo, was prominent in
suggesting that it would be well to set Monroe gently aside.[125] This
coalition of Madison, Smith, Logan, and Wilson Cary Nicholas was so
strong as to control the Senate.
The second Resolution was adopted Feb. 14, 1806; and a week afterward,
General Smith and Dr. Mitchill were appointed a committee to carry the
two Resolutions to the White House. Two years later, in response to
Monroe’s complaints, President Jefferson explained how these senators
managed to impose on the Executive a policy of their own.
“After delivering the Resolutions,” said Jefferson[126] in an
aggrieved tone, “the committee entered into free conversation,
and observed that although the Senate could not in form
recommend any extraordinary mission, yet that as individuals
there was but one sentiment among them on the measure, and they
pressed it. I was so much averse to it, and gave them so hard
an answer, that they felt it and spoke of it. But it did not
end here. The members of the other House took up the subject
and set upon me individually, and these the best friends to you
as well as myself, and represented the responsibility which a
failure to obtain redress would throw on us both, pursuing a
conduct in opposition to the opinion of nearly every member of
the Legislature. I found it necessary at length to yield my own
opinion to the general sense of the national council, and it
really seemed to produce a jubilee among them.”
Jefferson saw his most devoted followers waver in their allegiance, and
was reduced to temporize in order to avoid worse evils. General Smith
in the Senate seemed interested in embarrassing him. If Smith could not
be minister to England, he was bent upon becoming minister to France.
Armstrong had challenged attack by his management of American claims
before the French commission, and had written to the French government
an indiscreet letter against a certain claim made by a firm of Nicklin
& Griffith, of Philadelphia. When the President nominated him as
special minister, with Bowdoin, to conduct the new Florida negotiation,
a strong opposition appeared in the Senate, at the head of which was
General Smith. March 17 the vote was taken; the Senate was equally
divided, fifteen to fifteen, and Vice-President Clinton’s voice alone
saved Armstrong from rejection. Had the Senate been left to follow out
its own aims, the President’s authority might perhaps have been shaken,
and a period of faction might have followed; but fortunately for the
President and for the Secretary of State, among the enemies with whom
they had to deal was one whose temper passed the bounds of common-sense.
Until the month of March, 1806, Randolph’s opposition was confined
to Spanish affairs in secret session. The House was even slower than
the Senate to take up the matter of British relations. Dec. 4, 1805,
the subject was referred to the Committee of Ways and Means. Jan. 17,
1806, another message was sent to the same committee; but day after
day passed without bringing a report from Randolph, until Smilie of
Pennsylvania moved to discharge the Committee of Ways and Means in
order to bring the subject before the House in Committee of the Whole.
Randolph was ill and absent when the House, Jan. 29, 1806, decided to
take the matter from his hands.
On the same day Andrew Gregg, a member from Pennsylvania, moved a
Resolution forbidding the importation of all goods the growth or
product or manufacture of Great Britain. Still the House left the
subject without decision or discussion. February 10 Joseph Nicholson
introduced another Resolution, which came probably from Gallatin.
Gregg’s non importation measure would cost the Treasury five million
dollars a year, and Gallatin preferred a less sweeping prohibition.
Even Senator Smith’s scheme was too strong for Nicholson, who pointed
out that coarse woollens, Jamaica rum, Birmingham hardware, and salt
were necessities with which America could not supply herself, nor could
any nation except England supply her. Nicholson’s Resolution prohibited
only such British goods as might be replaced by other nations than
England, or might be produced at home,--manufactures of leather, tin,
brass, hemp, flax, silk; high-priced woollens; woollen hosiery; glass,
silver, and plated ware, paper, pictures, prints,--a formidable list of
articles, which if not, like Jamaica rum, necessary to America, were
essentials to civilized existence.
Other Resolutions were introduced, but those of Gregg and Nicholson
by common consent maintained pre-eminence; and between the policies
marked by them as complete or partial non-importation Congress had
to decide. Although the subject was before the House, the month of
February passed without debate. Not until March 5, 1806, did Gregg call
up his Resolution. In doing so, he made a speech studiously moderate.
He seemed disinclined to defend the carrying-trade, and abstained from
treating the British seizures as cause for war, but rather threw the
weight of his argument on the manifest outrage of impressments; yet
even this he treated as though it were a question of unfriendly fiscal
regulation.
“I have no apprehension whatever of a war,” he said, “Great
Britain is too well versed in the business of calculation, and
too well acquainted with her own interest, to persevere in this
lawless system at the hazard of losing customers whose annual
purchases of her manufactures and other merchandise exceeds, I
believe, thirty millions of dollars.”
Gregg would not endanger peace, but he would say to Great Britain,--
“in this mild and moderate, though manly and firm, language:
‘You have insulted the dignity of our country by impressing
our seamen and compelling them to fight your battles against
a Power with whom we are at peace; you have plundered us of
much property by that predatory war which you authorize to be
carried on against our commerce. To these injuries, insults,
and oppression we will submit no longer.... If you persist in
your hostile measures, if you absolutely refuse acceding to
any propositions of compromise, we must slacken those bonds of
friendship by which we have been connected. You must not expect
hereafter to find us in your market purchasing your manufactures
to so large an amount.’ This is their vulnerable part; by
attacking them in their warehouses and workshops, we can reach
their vitals.”
If Pitt should retaliate, Gregg would go further; he would confiscate
all the private property belonging to British subjects on which
he could lay his hands, treaty stipulations to the contrary
notwithstanding.
The Pennsylvanian contented himself with pacific measures, and his
oratory had the merit of consistency with his party doctrines and
principles; but the democracy of Massachusetts, which would never
understand or obey the theories of Virginia and Pennsylvania, could
not rest content with Gregg’s Quaker ideas.
“After the course we are now taking,” said Crowninshield,
“should Britain persist in her captures and in her oppressive
treatment of our seamen, and refuse to give them up, I would not
hesitate to meet her in war. But, as I observed before, I do not
believe Great Britain will go to war. Our trade is too valuable
to her. She knows, too, that in such an event she will lose
her eastern provinces; the States of Vermont and Massachusetts
will ask no other assistance than their own militia to take
Canada and Nova Scotia. Some of her West Indian islands will
also fall. She knows also other things. Her subjects own sixteen
millions of the old public debt of the United States, eight
millions of the Louisiana stock, and three or four millions bank
stock, and have private debts to the amount of ten or twelve
millions,--amounting in the whole to nearly forty millions of
dollars. Will Great Britain, by going to war, risk her provinces
and this large amount of property? I think she will not put so
much to hazard.”
When Crowninshield sat down, John Randolph took the floor. In
Randolph’s long career of oratorical triumphs, no such moment had
offered itself before, or was to occur again. Still in Virginian eyes
the truest and ablest Republican in Congress, the representative of
power and principle, the man of the future, Randolph stood with the
halo of youth, courage, and genius round his head,--a sort of Virginian
Saint Michael, almost terrible in his contempt for whatever seemed to
him base or untrue. He began by saying that he entered on the subject
“manacled, handcuffed, and tongue-tied;” his lips were sealed; he could
but “hobble over the subject as well as his fettered limbs and palsied
tongue would enable him to do it;” and with this preamble he fell upon
Gregg and Crowninshield:[127]--
“It is mere waste of time to reason with such persons; they
do not deserve anything like serious refutation. The proper
arguments for such statesmen are a strait-waistcoat, a dark
room, water-gruel, and depletion.”
The proposed confiscation of British property called out a sneer at
Crowninshield:--
“God help you if these are your ways and means for carrying on
war! if your finances are in the hands of such a chancellor of
the exchequer! Because a man can take an observation and keep a
log-book and a reckoning, can navigate a cock-boat to the West
Indies or the East, shall he aspire to navigate the great vessel
of State, to stand at the helm of public councils? _Ne sutor
ultra crepidam!_”
Again and again he turned aside to express contempt for the Northern
democrats:--
“Shall this great mammoth of the American forest leave his
native element and plunge into the water in a mad contest with
the shark? Let him stay on shore, and not be excited by the
muscles and periwinkles on the strand!”
On the point of policy Randolph took ground which, if not warlike, was
at least consistent,--the ground which all Southern Republicans of the
Jefferson school would have taken, if shame had not withheld them.
Even if determined in the end to submit, the President and Secretary
wished to keep up the form of resistance. Randolph declared that the
form was absurd; he would do nothing to protect “this mushroom, this
fungus of war,”--a carrying-trade which at the first moment of peace
would no longer exist:--
“I will never consent to go to war for that which I cannot
protect. I deem it no sacrifice of dignity to say to the
Leviathan of the deep: We are unable to contend with you in your
own element; but if you come within our actual limits, we will
shed our last drop of blood in their defence.”
Had Randolph contented himself with taking this position, he could
not have been overthrown, for he carried with him the secret sympathy
of the Southern Republicans; but he had not the self-control that
was needed in the face of an opponent so pliant and conciliatory
as Jefferson. Randolph took rare pleasure in making enemies, while
Jefferson never made one enemy except to gain two friends. Not
satisfied with attacking Crowninshield and Gregg, Randolph gave full
play to his anger against the whole House, and even assailed the
Executive:--
“I have before protested, and I again protest, against secret,
irresponsible, overruling influence. The first question I
asked when I saw the gentleman’s Resolution was, Is this a
measure of the Cabinet? Not of an open declared Cabinet, but
of an invisible, inscrutable, unconstitutional Cabinet,
without responsibility, unknown to the Constitution. I speak of
back-stairs influence,--of men who bring messages to this House,
which, although they do not appear on the Journals, govern its
decisions. Sir, the first question that I asked on the subject
of British relations was, What is the opinion of the Cabinet;
what measures will they recommend to Congress?--well knowing
that whatever measures we might take they must execute them, and
therefore that we should have their opinion on the subject. My
answer was (and from a Cabinet minister too), ‘_There is no
longer any Cabinet!_’”
Though forbidden to mention what had occurred in secret session,
“manacled, handcuffed, and tongue-tied” as he was, Randolph dragged the
Spanish secret to light:--
“Like true political quacks, you deal only in handbills and
nostrums. Sir, I blush to see the record of our proceedings;
they resemble nothing but the advertisements of patent
medicines. Here you have ‘the worm-destroying lozenges;’ there
‘Church’s cough-drops;’ and to crown the whole, ‘Sloan’s
vegetable specific,’--an infallible remedy for all nervous
disorders and vertigoes of brainsick politicians.... And where
are you going to send your political panacea, resolutions and
handbills excepted; your sole arcanum of government, your King
Cure-all? To Madrid? No! you are not such quacks as not to know
where the shoe pinches. To Paris! You know at least where the
disease lies, and there you apply your remedy. When the nation
anxiously demands the result of your deliberations, you hang
your head and blush to tell. You are afraid to tell!”
Randolph next attacked Madison. He took up the secretary’s late
pamphlet and overwhelmed its argument with contempt. He declared that
France was the real enemy of America; that England was acting under
the dictates of necessity; that the situation of Europe had completely
changed since 1793, and that England occupied the place which France
then held: “she is the sole bulwark of the human race against universal
dominion,--no thanks to her for it!” As for a policy, he proposed to
abandon commerce and to amputate mercantile interests:--
“I can readily tell gentlemen what I will not do. I will not
propitiate any foreign nation with money. I will not launch into
a naval war with Great Britain.... I will send her money on
no pretext whatever; much less on pretence of buying Labrador
or Botany Bay, when my real object was to secure limits which
she formally acknowledged at the Peace of 1783. I go further:
I would, if anything, have laid an embargo; this would have
got our own property home, and our adversary’s into our power.
If there is any wisdom left among us, the first step toward
hostility will always be an embargo. In six months all your
mercantile megrims would vanish. As to us, although it would cut
deep, we can stand it.”
Before closing this desultory harangue, the orator once more turned to
taunt the President:--
“Until I came into the House this morning, I had been
stretched on a sick bed; but when I behold the affairs of
this nation--instead of being where I hoped, and the people
believed they were, in the hands of responsible men--committed
to Tom, Dick, and Harry, to the refuse of the retail trade of
politics, I do feel, I cannot help feeling, the most deep and
serious concern.... I know, sir, that we may say, and do say,
that we are independent (would it were true!), as free to give
a direction to the Executive as to receive it from him; but
do what you will, foreign relations, every measure short of
war, and even the course of hostilities, depends upon him. He
stands at the helm, and must guide the vessel of State. You
give him money to buy Florida, and he purchases Louisiana. You
may furnish means; the application of those means rests with
him. Let not the master and mate go below when the ship is in
distress, and throw the responsibility upon the cook and the
cabin-boy! I said so when your doors were shut; I scorn to say
less now they are open. Gentlemen may say what they please; they
may put an insignificant individual to the ban of the republic:
I shall not alter my course.”
That such a speech from a man so necessary to the Government should
throw consternation among the majority, was a matter of course. No such
event had ever happened in Congress as the public rebellion of a great
party leader. The Federalists had quarrelled as bitterly, but had made
no such scandal. Yet serious as Randolph’s defection might be, it would
have done little harm had it not been that in denouncing the course
taken by Jefferson and Madison he had much secret sympathy. Nay, as
regarded Gregg’s Resolution, he expressed the feelings of the President
himself and of the Cabinet. The so-called resistance to England, like
the resistance to Spain, was a sham, and all parties agreed with
Randolph in opposing serious retaliation.
Nothing was needed but that Randolph should keep his temper in order
to win a triumph. Napoleon could be trusted to give Jefferson no more
provinces at any price, for within a few days after Randolph’s outbreak
news arrived that the battle of Austerlitz had been fought, and the
Treaty of Pressburg signed. Jefferson himself could be trusted to
prevent Gregg’s Resolution from passing, for the news that Pitt was
dead and Fox in power arrived almost at the same moment with that of
Austerlitz. The entire situation had changed; an entirely new policy
must be invented, and this could hardly fail to follow Randolph’s
ideas. He had only to wait; but meanwhile he was consumed by a fever
of rage and arrogance. Thinking that the time had come to destroy
the Secretary of State, he set himself vigorously to the task. Day
after day he occupied the floor, attacking Madison with more and more
virulence. He insisted that “the business from first to last had been
managed in the most imbecile manner.”
“I do not speak of the negotiator [Monroe]--God forbid!--but
of those who drew the instruction of the man who negotiated.
We bought Louisiana from France under the terms of the Treaty
of San Ildefonso. According to the Executive understanding,
that country extended to the Perdido and the River Bravo.
We immediately legislated on our first claim and passed a
law erecting the bay and shores of the Mobile into a revenue
district.
What was the fact? That we were legislating without information.
We had never been told that Laussat had been directed to receive
the country only to the Iberville and the Lakes. We consequently
legislated in error, for want of Executive information. This was
the beginning.”[128]
At length, April 7, Randolph committed his last and fatal blunder by
going formally into opposition.
“I came here,” he said, “prepared to co-operate with the
Government in all its measures. I told them so. But I soon
found there was no choice left, and that to co-operate in them
would be to destroy the national character. I found I might
co-operate, or be an honest man. I have therefore opposed, and
will oppose them.”
Such tactics, in the face of a man so supple as President Jefferson,
invited failure. With every weapon of offence in his hand, and with the
assurance of triumph, Randolph threw his chances away and found himself
within a few weeks delivered to the mercy of Secretary Madison and the
Northern democrats. Jefferson’s strong qualities were called into play
by Randolph’s method of attack. Jefferson was not apt to be violent,
nor was he despotic in temper; but he was, within certain limits, very
tenacious of his purpose, and he had to a certain degree the habits of
a paternal despot. Randolph’s sudden assault, carrying with it some
twenty-five or thirty of the ablest and best Republicans in Congress,
greatly alarmed the President, who set himself quietly and earnestly
to the task of restoring order to his shattered columns. The Northern
democrats were easily held firm, for they hated Randolph and had little
love for Virginia. As for the rebellious cohort of “old Republicans,”
Jefferson exhausted his resources in coaxing them to desert their
leader.
March 13 the House laid Gregg’s Resolution aside; Nicholson’s was
then taken up, adopted March 17, and sent to a special committee
to be framed as a Bill. Meanwhile the President busily conciliated
opposition; and his first thought was of Monroe in London, certain to
become the centre of intrigue. March 16 Jefferson wrote to warn his old
friend against the danger of making common cause with Randolph. The
task was difficult, because it was necessary at the same time to break
the news that Monroe must submit to the implied censure of a special
mission.
“Some of your new friends,” wrote Jefferson,[129] “are attacking
your old ones, out of friendship for you, but in a way to render
you great injury.... Mr. Nicholson’s Resolutions will be passed
this week, probably by a majority of one hundred Republicans
against fifteen Republicans and twenty-seven Federalists. When
passed, I shall join Mr. Pinkney of Maryland as your associate
for settling our differences with Great Britain. He will depart
on a fortnight’s notice, and will be authorized to take your
place whenever you think yourself obliged to return.”
Two days later he wrote again.[130] In the interval Nicholson’s
Resolution had been adopted by a vote of eighty-seven to thirty-five,
and Randolph’s minority of Republican members had been reduced, beyond
the President’s hope, to a mere half-dozen grumblers.
“Mr. R. withdrew before the question was put,” wrote Jefferson.
“I have never seen a House of Representatives more solidly
united in doing what they believe to be the best for the public
interest. There can be no better proof than the fact that so
eminent a leader should at once, and almost unanimously, be
abandoned.”
At the same moment Randolph wrote to Monroe that the Republican party
was broken in pieces, and that the “old Republicans” were united in the
support of Monroe against Madison for the Presidency.[131] Randolph
complained bitterly of the atmosphere of intrigue which surrounded the
Administration; but as regarded him at least, Jefferson’s retort was
plausible that he had never found fault with intrigue so long as he had
a share in it. After challenging the contest with Madison, he had only
himself to blame if the President, who was a master of intrigue, used
the weapon freely to defend his favorite and himself.
To detach Randolph’s friends from their leader was an object which the
President pursued with zeal and success. He was a little disposed to
overawe Monroe; but he was glad to conciliate Joseph Nicholson, next
to Randolph the most formidable “old Republican” in public life.
Nicholson was torn by conflicting sympathies; he loved Randolph, and
he did not love Madison. On the other hand he was attached to Gallatin
by marriage and respect. A poor man, with a large family, Nicholson
found the life of a Congressman unprofitable; and when he was offered a
seat on the Bench as Judge of the Sixth Maryland Circuit, he accepted
the appointment. April 9, 1806, his letter of resignation was read to
the House, and the democrats knew that Randolph had lost his strongest
friend.
The Speaker remained to be dealt with. To overawe Macon was impossible;
to buy him was out of the question; to crush him was only a last
resort; no other resource was left than to coax him.
“Some enemy, whom we know not, is sowing tares between us,”
wrote the President to the Speaker, at the moment when he was
warning Monroe and Nicholson escaped to the bench.[132] “Between
you and myself nothing but opportunities of explanation can be
necessary to defeat these endeavors. At least, on my part, my
confidence in you is so unqualified that nothing further is
necessary for my satisfaction.”
Jefferson never was more sincere than in making this advance to a
friend from whom the course of events threatened to part him: but
unfortunately the point of doubt was not so much Jefferson’s confidence
in Macon as it was Macon’s confidence in Jefferson. At bottom remained
the unpleasant thought that Jefferson had ceased to be either a
Virginian or a Republican; had chosen other friends and advisers than
Macon, other objects and ambitions than Macon pursued.
Even Randolph was treated with delicacy. Jefferson would gladly have
won him back, had Randolph admitted a hope that he would accept
Madison’s candidacy; but on that point no compromise could be
conceived. Madison’s fate was trembling in the balance. Sacrifice of
Madison was impossible to the President, and nothing short of sacrifice
would satisfy Randolph. The “old Republican” schism must therefore
be left to itself; the schismatics were too honest and respectable
to be dealt with. The President exhausted his power when he won back
the wavering, fixed Gallatin in allegiance to Madison, and carried
Nicholson out of the arena; but although gentle and forbearing in
regard to these honest, and as he thought, misguided men, Jefferson did
not think it necessary to show equal deference to the merely selfish
interests which had made use of this moment of confusion in order to
exact terms from the Government. He showed that he could punish, by
making an example of General and Senator Samuel Smith.
Robert Smith in the Cabinet was so near to his brother Samuel in the
Senate that Jefferson could no longer trust his secrets to the Cabinet
itself. After crushing in the House Randolph’s opposition to the
Spanish policy, and after yielding to Smith and the Senate in regard
to a special English mission, the President was required to make
certain appointments, one of which was that of a new minister to aid
and succeed Monroe in London, whence it was supposed that Monroe wished
to return. General Smith’s wider plan assumed that Monroe was on his
way home, and would be succeeded by a regular minister, assisted, for
commercial negotiations, by a special envoy. The special envoy was
to be himself; the permanent minister was to be his brother-in-law
Wilson Cary Nicholas. He had even written to assure Nicholas of the
appointment, when his project was defeated by the secret and unexpected
interference of the President.
April 1, 1806, Samuel Smith wrote to his brother-in-law an account of
his hopes and disappointment:[133]
“Monroe had written that he would leave Great Britain in
November; therefore a mission of two,--one to remain as
minister, the other a merchant of some distinction and of
general information to go as envoy extraordinary,--was
desired by all; and here, this proposal generally--I may say
universally--meant S. S. Two only exceptions: As Monroe will
remain until the whole business shall be settled, many wish
now an able merchant to join him; in either case to make a
commercial treaty with Great Britain. To such a treaty there is
a rooted aversion in the mind of the President and Mr. Madison.
I ought to apologize for leading you into error. I still do
believe that you were originally intended for London. A good
Federalist is to succeed Monroe, and has been privately written
to by the President without the knowledge of any of his Cabinet;
they appeared astonished when he mentioned what he had done.”
The good Federalist thus put over Smith’s head was William Pinkney,
a prominent lawyer of Smith’s city of Baltimore. Such a step without
consulting the Smiths, and against their personal interests, was a
strong measure on the part of Jefferson, quite out of keeping with his
ordinary practice. Offence of tried friends in order to conciliate
Federalists was little to his taste; but General Smith’s conduct
had become so factious as to warrant reproof. Smith was reduced to
submission. He had not shared in Randolph’s bitterness against the
Spanish policy, but he had attempted to make use of the old Republican
schism for his personal objects; and after Randolph’s overthrow, Smith
could no longer venture upon open opposition. Though beaten by only
one vote in his attack on Armstrong’s nomination, Smith felt that his
defeat was made final by the collapse of Randolph’s rebellion. He
admitted to Nicholas that no effective resistance could be made to
the Florida purchase, and that nothing remained but obedience to the
President’s will:--
“The question was simply, Buy or fight! Both Houses by great
majorities said, Buy! The manner of buying appears a little
disagreeable. Politicians will believe it perfectly honest to
induce France ‘by money’ to coerce Spain to sell that which she
has absolutely declared was her own property, and from which she
would not part. Mr. Randolph expects that this public explosion
of our views and plans will render abortive this negotiation,
and make the Executive and poor little Madison unpopular.
Against this last he vents his spleen. However, he spares
nobody, and by this conduct has compelled _all_ to rally
round the Executive for _their own preservation_. From the
Potomac north and east, the members adhere to the President;
south they fall daily from their allegiance.”
Thus, after four months of confusion, victory declared itself on the
President’s side.[134] Randolph’s violence, even more than Jefferson’s
dexterity, was fatal to the old Republican uprising. As early as April
1 discipline was restored, with Madison stronger than ever before. The
few remaining days of the session only confirmed the result.