THE Eighth Congress had hardly expired, March 3, 1805, amid
the confusion and ill-temper which followed the failure of impeachment,
when President Jefferson and Secretary Madison began to hear the first
mutterings of European disaster. Talleyrand’s letter to Armstrong,
Dec. 21, 1804, arrived with its blunt announcement that Napoleon meant
to oppose every step of Monroe’s negotiation at Madrid, and with its
declaration that West Florida had not been included in the retrocession
of Louisiana to France, but had been refused to France by King Charles.
Jefferson was then at Monticello, and thither the documents from Paris
followed him. He wrote to Madison that Monroe’s case was desperate.
“I consider,” said the President,[45] “that we may anticipate
the effect of his mission. On its failure as to the main object,
I wish he may settle the right of navigating the Mobile, as
everything else may await further peaceable proceedings; but
even then we shall have a difficult question to decide,--to
wit, whether we will let the present crisis in Europe pass away
without a settlement.”
This letter showed that as early as the month of March, 1805, the
President foresaw Monroe’s disasters, and began to speculate upon the
next step to be taken. The attempt to obtain Florida through Spanish
fears had failed; but his first impression was that everything might
go on as before, if the Spaniards would consent to a free navigation
of the Mobile. Madison was still more vague; his first impulse was
to retrace his steps. He wrote to the President a singular letter of
contradictions.
“I cannot entirely despair,” said he, March 27,[46] “that Spain,
notwithstanding the support given by France to her claim to
West Florida, may yield to our proposed arrangement, partly
from its intrinsic value to her, partly from an apprehension
of the interference of Great Britain; and that this latter
consideration may, as soon as France despairs of her pecuniary
object, transfer her weight into our scale. If she [France]
should persist in disavowing her right to sell West Florida
to the United States, and above all can prove it to have been
the mutual understanding with Spain that West Florida was no
part of Louisiana, it will place our claim on very different
ground,--such probably as would not be approved by the world,
and such certainly as would not with that approbation be
maintained by force. If our right be good against Spain at all,
it must be supported by those rigid maxims of technical law
which have little weight in national questions generally, and
none at all when opposed to the principles of universal equity.
The world would decide that France having sold us the territory
of a third party, which she had no right to sell, that party
having even remonstrated against the whole transaction, the
right of the United States was limited to a demand on France to
procure and convey the territory, or to remit _pro tanto_
the price, or to dissolve the bargain altogether.”
For eighteen months every French and Spanish agent in Washington,
Paris, and Madrid had assured Madison, in language varying between
remonstrance and insult, that Spain had not ceded West Florida to
France; the records of the State Department proved that France had
asked for West Florida and had been refused; Jefferson had not ventured
to record a claim to West Florida when he received possession of
Louisiana, and had been obliged to explain, in language which Gallatin
and Randolph thought unsatisfactory, the words of the Mobile Act. In
spite of this, Madison committed himself and government to the claim
that West Florida was a part of Louisiana; he pressed that claim, not
against France, but against Spain; he brought Monroe to a rupture with
the Spanish government on that issue,--yet with these recollections
fresh in his mind, he suddenly told Jefferson that if France could
prove a matter of common notoriety, the world would decide that the
United States had acted without regard to law or equity, while in any
case the claim to West Florida as against Spain was a mistake.
That Madison should have followed a train of reasoning so singular,
was less surprising than that he should have advanced so far without
showing a sign that he was prepared for the next step. Knowing as
early as March, 1805, that his plans were defeated, and that he might
expect a repulse from Spain and France, he selected a new minister to
succeed Pinckney at Madrid. This diplomatist, whose career was to be as
futile if not as noisy as that of his predecessor from South Carolina,
was James Bowdoin of Massachusetts, son of a celebrated governor of
that State. Jefferson wrote privately to him, April 27, announcing the
appointment; and the tone of the letter implied that in the month’s
interval since the arrival of Talleyrand’s manifesto the President’s
pacific views had suffered a change.
“Our relations with that nation are vitally interesting,” he
wrote.[47] “That they should be of a peaceable and friendly
character has been our most earnest desire. Had Spain met us
with the same disposition, our idea was that her existence on
this hemisphere and ours should have rested on the same bottom,
should have swum or sunk together. We want nothing of hers, and
we want no other nation to possess what is hers; but she has met
our advances with jealousy, secret malice, and ill-faith. Our
patience under this unworthy return of disposition is now on its
last trial, and the issue of what is now depending between us
will decide whether our relations with her are to be sincerely
friendly or permanently hostile. I still wish, and would
cherish, the former, but have ceased to expect it.”
Jefferson had the faculty, peculiar to certain temperaments, of seeing
what he wished to see, and of believing what he willed to believe.
Few other Americans could have seriously talked of the Spanish empire
in America as swimming or sinking with that of the United States; but
Jefferson, for the moment, thought that the earthen pot of Spanish
dominion could trust itself to float safely under charge of the iron
energy of American democracy. He could gravely say in regard to Spain,
“we want nothing of hers,” when for eighteen months he had exhausted
every resource, short of force, to gain Baton Rouge, Mobile, and
Pensacola, not to speak of East Florida and Texas. He charged that
Spain met his advances with jealousy, secret malice, and ill-faith,
after his ministers had intrigued with Napoleon for nearly two years,
in the constant hope of depriving her of her property. Dec. 13, 1804,
he wrote to General Heath: “With Spain we shall always be bickering,
but never at war till we seek it;”[48] and six months later he wrote
to Bowdoin that her secret malice and ill faith were leading to
permanently hostile relations. He had not much further to go; for if he
meant to maintain his authority among rulers, the war that would never
come till he sought it must be sought.
As Monroe’s overthrow became more and more evident, the President
grew uneasy, and turned restlessly from one device to another. In
the first days of August Monroe’s despatches arrived, announcing
that he had left Madrid, and that all his offers had been rejected by
Spain. Madison was in Philadelphia, where his wife was detained by
a long and troublesome lameness. The President was at Monticello. A
brisk interchange of letters took place, marking from day to day the
fluctuations of feeling peculiar to the characters of the two men. One
question alone was to be decided,--should they seize this moment to
break with Napoleon?
Madison’s first reflections reached no result. He shrank from admitting
that the government stood between war and humiliation more dangerous
than war.
“The business at Madrid,” he said, August 2,[49] “has had
an awkward termination, and if nothing, as may be expected,
particularly in the absence of the Emperor, should alleviate
it at Paris, involves some serious questions. After the parade
of a mission extraordinary, a refusal of all our overtures
in a haughty tone without any offer of other terms, and a
perseverance in withdrawing a stipulated provision for claims
admitted to be just, without _ex post facto_ conditions
manifestly unreasonable and inadmissible, form a strong appeal
to the honor and sensibility of this country.”
The conclusion drawn from this somewhat mild review was not such as
Monroe, Armstrong, or Livingston had recommended.
“I find that, as was apprehended from the tenor of former
communications,” continued the secretary, “the military
_status quo_ in the controverted districts, the navigation
of the rivers running through West Florida, and the spoliations
subsequent to the convention of 1802 have never had a place in
the discussions. Bowdoin may perhaps be instructed, consistently
with what has passed, to propose a suspension of the territorial
questions, the deposit, and the French spoliations, on condition
that those points be yielded, with an incorporation of the
convention of 1802 with a provision for subsequent claims. This
is the utmost within the Executive purview. If this experiment
should fail, the question with the Legislature must be whether
or not resort is to be had to force, to what extent, and in what
mode. Perhaps the instructions to Bowdoin would be improved
by including the idea of transferring the sequel of business
hither. This would have the appearance of an advance on the part
of Spain, the more so as it would be attended with a new mission
to this country, and would be most convenient for us also, if
not made by Spain a pretext for delay.”
Madison, after enduring one “refusal of all our overtures in a haughty
tone,” suggested that another be invited. The slightly patronizing air
which characterized Jefferson’s attitude toward Madison, but which
he never betrayed toward Gallatin, was explained by this want of
directness in Madison’s nature, and by the habitual slowness of his
decisions. The action suggested by Madison threw the control of events
into the hands of France. This at least was the opinion of Jefferson,
whose mind was wrought by the news from Pinckney to a state of steadily
growing alarm.
“I think the _status quo_, if not already proposed, should
be immediately offered through Bowdoin,” wrote Jefferson, August
4, before receiving Madison’s letter of August 2.[50] “Should it
even be refused, the refusal to settle a limit is not of itself
a sufficient cause of war, nor is the withholding a ratification
worthy of such a redress. Yet these acts show a purpose, both
in Spain and France, against which we ought to provide before
the conclusion of a peace. I think, therefore, we should take
into consideration whether we ought not immediately to propose
to England an eventual treaty of alliance, to come into force
whenever (within ---- years) a war shall take place with Spain
or France.”
Three days later he wrote again, and his alarm had increased:[51]--
“The papers now enclosed to you confirm me in the opinion of the
expediency of a treaty with England, but make the offer of the
_status quo_ [to Spain] more doubtful; the correspondence
will probably throw light on that question. From the papers
already received I infer a confident reliance on the part
of Spain on the omnipotence of Bonaparte, but a desire of
procrastination till peace in Europe shall leave us without an
ally.”
Ten days more passed; the whole mortification became evident; the
President’s anger and alarm rose to feverishness.[52] He wrote to
Madison, August 17,--
“I am anxious to receive opinions respecting our procedure with
Spain, as should negotiations with England be advisable they
should not be postponed a day unnecessarily, that we may lay
their result before Congress before they rise next spring. Were
the question only about the bounds of Louisiana, I should be
for delay. Were it only for spoliations, just as this is as a
cause of war, we might consider if no other expedient were more
eligible for us. But I do not view peace as within our choice. I
consider the cavalier conduct of Spain as evidence that France
is to settle with us for her,--and the language of France
confirms it,--and that if she can keep us insulated till peace,
she means to enforce by arms her will, to which she foresees we
will not truckle, and therefore does not venture on the mandate
now. We should not permit ourselves to be found off our guard
and friendless.”
The President’s plan presented difficulties which Madison could not
fail to see. That Jefferson should wish Pitt to fight the battles
of the United States was natural; but Pitt was little in the habit
of doing gratuitous favors, and might reasonably ask what price he
was to receive for conquering the Floridas and Texas for the United
States. Madison’s comments on the President’s proposed British treaty
pointed out this objection. Madison agreed that the Executive should
take provisional measures, on which Congress might act.[53] “An
eventual alliance with Great Britain, if attainable from her without
inadmissible conditions, would be for us the best of all possible
measures; but I do not see the least chance of laying her under
obligations to be called into force at our will without correspondent
obligations on our part.” Objection to the President’s plan was easy;
but when the secretary came to a plan of his own, he could suggest
nothing more vigorous than to renew a moderate degree of coquetry with
Merry, which would have the side advantage of alarming France and
Spain, “from whom the growing communication with Great Britain would
not be concealed.”
Such a weapon was no doubt as effective against Napoleon as heelless
slippers against Pitt; but the President thought the situation to have
passed beyond such tactics. Madison’s proposed coquetry with Merry met
with less favor in Jefferson’s eyes than his own proposed one-sided
alliance with England had met in the eyes of Madison. Upon a treaty of
alliance with England the President was for the moment bent, and he
met Madison’s objections by arguments that showed lively traits of the
writer’s sanguine temper. He complained that Madison had misconceived
the nature of the proposed British treaty. England should stipulate not
to make peace without securing West Florida and the spoliation claims
to America, while American co-operation in the war would be sufficient
inducement to her for making this contract.[54]
“Another motive much more powerful would indubitably induce
England to go much further. Whatever ill humor may at times have
been expressed against us by individuals of that country, the
first wish of every Englishman’s heart is to see us once more
fighting by their sides against France; nor could the King or
his ministers do an act so popular as to enter into an alliance
with us. The nation would not weigh the consideration by grains
and scruples; they would consider it as the price and pledge of
an indissoluble friendship. I think it possible that for such
a provisional treaty they would give us their general guaranty
of Louisiana and the Floridas. At any rate we might try them; a
failure would not make our situation worse. If such a one could
be obtained, we might await our own convenience for calling up
the _casus fœderis_. I think it important that England
should receive an overture as early as possible, as it might
prevent her listening to terms of peace.”
If Jefferson was right in thinking that every Englishman’s heart
yearned toward America, he was unfortunate in delaying his offer
of indissoluble friendship until the moment when Sir William Scott
delivered his opinion in the case of the “Essex.” Madison’s scheme was
equally unpromising, because he had made a personal enemy of Merry, on
whom the success of Madison’s tactics depended. Each of the two high
authorities felt the weakness of the other, and the secretary even went
so far as to hint, in courteous language, that the President’s idea was
unpractical:--
“The more I reflect on the papers from Madrid, the more I feel
the value of some eventual security for the active friendship
of Great Britain, but the more I see at the same time the
difficulty of obtaining it without a like security to her of
ours. If she is to be _bound_, we must be _so too_,
either to the same thing,--that is to join her in the war,--or
to do what she will accept as equivalent to such an obligation.
What can we offer to her? A mutual guaranty, unless so shaped
as to involve us pretty certainly in her war, would not be
satisfactory. To offer commercial regulations or concessions
on points in the law of nations as a certain payment for aids
which might never be received or required, would be a bargain
liable to obvious objections of the most serious kind. Unless,
therefore, some arrangement which has not occurred to me can be
devised, I see no other course than such an one as is suggested
in my last letter.”[55]
In this state of things, the remaining members of the Cabinet were
asked for their opinions; and in the course of a few days the President
received written papers from Gallatin and Robert Smith. Gallatin
was annoyed at the results of Jefferson’s diplomacy. Emphatically a
Northern man, he cared little for Florida; and a war with Spain would
have been in his eyes a Southern war. He made no concealment of his
opinion that the whole negotiation rested on a blunder; and he told
Madison as much, with a bluntness which the secretary could scarcely
have relished.
“The demands from Spain were too hard,” said he,[56] “to have
expected, even independent of French interference, any success
from the negotiation. It could only be hoped that the tone
assumed by our negotiators might not be such as to render a
relinquishment or suspension of some of our claims productive
of some loss of reputation. If we are safe on that ground, it
may be eligible to wait for a better opportunity before we again
run the risk of lowering the national importance by pretensions
which our strength may not at this moment permit us to support.
If from the manner in which the negotiation has been conducted
that effect has already been produced, how to save character
without endangering peace will be a serious and difficult
question.”
These words were written before he had seen Monroe’s despatches. When
the whole correspondence was put into his hands he read it, and in
returning it to Madison made the dry comment that the business had not
ended quite so badly as he had previously supposed.[57] The phrase bore
a double meaning, for even Madison must have admitted that the business
could not have ended much worse.
Gallatin sent to the President a remarkable paper,[58] in substance
an argument for peace, and in tenor a criticism of the grounds which
Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, Livingston, and Pinckney had thought
proper to take in their dispute with Spain. Gallatin held that, owing
to the “unpardonable oversight or indifference” of Livingston and
Monroe in failing to insist on a boundary to Louisiana, the United
States government was debarred from holding Spain responsible for the
inevitable consequences of its own fault. Neither Spain’s qualified
refusal to ratify the claims convention of 1802 nor her rejection of
the French spoliation claims would justify war. As a matter of abstract
justice, war was not to be defended; as a matter of policy, it could
not be recommended. The expense and loss would exceed the value of
Florida; the political result would entangle America in alliance with
England; and, “in fine, a subversion of all our hopes must be the
natural consequence.” Renewal of negotiation was the proper step, with
the Sabine and Perdido as boundaries and a temporary arrangement under
the _status quo_, acceptance of the Spanish condition precedent
to ratifying the claims convention, and insistence against the new
spoliations which French and Spanish privateers were daily making
on American commerce in the West Indies. Pending the result of this
negotiation Congress might spend some money on the militia, and might
appropriate a million dollars annually to build ships of the line.
In effect, Gallatin threw his influence on the side of Madison
against the President’s semi-warlike views. The opinion of Robert
Smith did not weaken the force of Gallatin’s reasoning. Already a
perceptible division existed in the Cabinet between the Treasury
and the Navy. Hardly three months before the Spanish embarrassment,
Gallatin had spoken to the President in strong terms of Robert Smith’s
administration, and had added,[59]--
“On this subject,--the expense of the Navy greater than
the object seemed to require, and a merely nominal
accountability,--I have, for the sake of preserving perfect
harmony in your councils, however grating to my feelings, been
almost uniformly silent.”
Smith’s present views tended to confirm Gallatin in his irritation,
and to reconcile Jefferson to abandoning his energetic schemes. The
Secretary of the Navy said that throughout these negotiations Spain had
presumed much on American predilection for peace, and on the want of
means to annoy her either by land or by water. He urged the necessity
of working on her fears, and advised that Congress be recommended to
provide additional gunboats, to put all the frigates in commission, and
to build twelve seventy-fours. With these means he was disposed to take
a commanding attitude; and if Spain were supported by France, to make
an alliance with England.[60]
Gallatin and Robert Smith agreed only on one point,--that the affair
had been mismanaged. Both secretaries held that America had made
pretensions which she had not strength at the moment to support. Rather
than “again run the risk of lowering national importance,” Gallatin
preferred to submit to the consequent loss of reputation, and return
to a true peace-policy. Robert Smith wished to maintain a high tone,
and to arm. All Jefferson’s instincts were with Gallatin; but the path
that Gallatin proposed was hard and mortifying, and although he made it
as little abrupt as possible, he could not prevent it from seeming what
it was,--a severe humiliation to the President. Not without some inward
struggle could a President of the United States bow his neck to such a
yoke as Spain and France imposed.
At that moment, the middle of September, arrived Armstrong’s
letter advising the military occupation of Texas and a cessation
of intercourse with Spain. His plan was the first well-considered
suggestion yet made for carrying out the policy hitherto pursued; and
although contrary to Gallatin’s advice, it agreed so well with the
President’s views that he caught at it with the relief of a man unable
to solve his own problem, who hears another explain what to himself is
inexplicable. Jefferson seized Armstrong’s idea, and uniting it with
his own, announced the result to Madison as the true solution of the
difficulty:[61]--
“Supposing a previous alliance with England to guard us in the
worst event, I should propose that Congress should pass acts
(1) authorizing the Executive to suspend intercourse with Spain
at discretion; (2) to dislodge the new establishments of Spain
between the Mississippi and Bravo; (3) to appoint commissioners
to examine and ascertain all claims for spoliation.”
Here at length was a plan,--uncertain, indeed, because dependent on
British help, but still a scheme of action which could be discussed.
The President appointed October 4 as the day on which the Cabinet
should reunite at Washington to consider his project, but Madison
replied that he could not return so soon; and in order that the Cabinet
should know his views, he explained at some length the course he
advised, which differed widely from that of the President.
“With respect to Great Britain,” he said,[62] “I think we
ought to go as far into an understanding on the subject of an
eventual coalition in the war as will not preclude us from an
intermediate adjustment, if attainable, with Spain. I see not,
however, much chance that she will positively bind herself not
to make peace, while we refuse to bind ourselves positively to
make war,--unless, indeed, some positive advantage were yielded
on our part in lieu of an engagement to enter into the war. No
such advantage as yet occurs as would be admissible to us and
satisfactory to her.”
In regard to England, therefore, Madison had nothing to propose except
negotiation without end. Having settled this point, he went on:--
“At Paris I think Armstrong ought to receive instructions to
extinguish in the French government every hope of turning our
controversy with Spain into a French job, public or private;
to leave them under apprehensions of an eventual connection
between the United States and Great Britain; and to take
advantage of any change in the French Cabinet favorable to our
objects with Spain.”
To leave Bonaparte “under apprehensions” was to be the object
of Madison’s diplomacy at Paris,--a task which several European
governments were then employing half a million armed men to accomplish,
hitherto without success, but which Madison hoped to effect by
civilities to Merry.
After this decision, nothing remained but to mark out a line of
conduct in regard to Spain. In the course of the summer Bowdoin, the
new minister, had sailed; but on arriving in Spain, and learning the
failure of Monroe’s negotiation, he went to Paris and London without
visiting Madrid.
“As to Spain herself,” continued Madison, “one question is,
whether Bowdoin ought to proceed or not to Madrid. My opinion
is that his trip to Great Britain was fortunate, and that
the effect of it will be aided by his keeping aloof until
occurrences shall invite him to Spain.... The nicest question,
however, is whether any, or what, steps should be taken for
a communication with the Spanish government on the points
not embraced by the late negotiation. On this question my
reflections disapprove of any step whatever other than such as
may fall within the path to be marked out for Armstrong, or
as may be within the sphere of Claiborne’s intercourse with
the Marquis of Casa Calvo. Perhaps the last may be the best
opportunity of all for conveying to Spain the impressions we
wish, without committing the government in any respect more
than may be advisable. In general it seems to me proper that
Claiborne should hold a pretty strong language in all cases, and
particularly that he should go every length the law will warrant
against Morales and his project of selling lands. If Congress
should be not indisposed, proceedings may be authorized that
will be perfectly effectual on that as well as other points; but
before their meeting there will be time to consider more fully
what ought to be suggested for their consideration.”
Having brought the government face to face with the government of
Spain, in the belief that Spain and France must yield to a peremptory
demand,--finding that Spain not only refused every concession, but
renewed depredations on American commerce and took an attitude of
indifference to threats or entreaties,--Madison proposed no more
vigorous measure than to “go every length the law will warrant” against
certain Spanish land-grants.
Such a course pleased no one, and threatened to create new dangers.
Monroe and Armstrong urged that a supposed devotion to peace on the
part of the President weighed heavily against him with Spain and
France. Jefferson approved their proposed aggressive policy, as he
wrote to Madison, chiefly because it would “correct the dangerous error
that we are a people whom no injuries can provoke to war.”[63] He
shrank from war, except under the shield of England, and yet he feared
England for an ally even more than Spain for an enemy. His perplexity
ended in helplessness. The Cabinet meeting was held October 4; but he
reported to Madison that nothing came of it:[64]
“The only questions which press on the Executive for decision
are whether we shall enter into a provisional alliance with
England, to come into force only in the event that _during the
present war_ we become engaged in war _with France_,
leaving the declaration of the _casus fœderis_ ultimately
with us; whether we shall send away Yrujo, Casa Calvo, Morales;
whether we shall instruct Bowdoin not to go to Madrid till
further orders. But we are all of the opinion that the first of
these questions is too important and too difficult to be decided
but on the fullest consideration, in which your aid and counsel
should be waited for.”
Again Madison wrote back his opinion. More than six months had elapsed
since the President, March 23, despaired of Monroe’s mission; every
alternative had been repeatedly discussed; every advice had been taken.
Congress would soon meet; something must be decided,--in reality delay
was itself a decision; yet the President and Secretary of State seemed
no nearer a result than they had been six months before. Meanwhile the
European packets brought news that put a different face on the problem.
Sir William Scott’s decision in the case of the “Essex” arrived;
seizures of American ships by England began; Pitt’s great coalition
with Russia and Austria against Napoleon took the field, and August 27
Napoleon broke up the camp at Boulogne and began his long-intended
movement across the Rhine. Upon Madison’s mind this European convulsion
acted as an additional reason for doing nothing:[65]--
“Considering the probability of an extension of the war against
France, and the influence that may have on her temper toward the
United States, the uncertainty of effecting with England such
a shape for an arrangement as alone would be admissible, and
the possible effects elsewhere of abortive overtures to her, I
think it very questionable whether a little delay may not be
expedient, especially as in the mean time the English pulse will
be somewhat felt by the discussions now on foot by Mr. Monroe.”
Accordingly the Secretary advised that Morales, Casa Calvo, and Yrujo
should be ordered out of the country, while Bowdoin should remain in
England,--and so left it.
Madison’s measures and conduct toward Europe showed the habit of
avoiding the heart of every issue, in order to fret its extremities.
This mark of Madison’s character as a diplomatist led him into his
chief difficulties at home and abroad; but the Spanish imbroglio of
1805 first brought the weakness into public notoriety, and he recovered
from the subsequent revelation only after years of misfortune. The
same habit of mind made him favor commercial restrictions as a means
of coercion. So he disregarded Armstrong’s idea of seizing Texas, but
warmly approved of his passing suggestion as to an embargo:[66]--
“The efficacy of an embargo cannot be doubted. Indeed, if a
commercial weapon can be properly shaped for the Executive hand,
it is more and more apparent to me that it can force all the
nations having colonies in this quarter of the globe to respect
our rights.”
This mental trait was closely connected with Madison’s good
qualities,--it sprang from the same source as his caution, his respect
for law, his instinctive sense of the dangers that threatened the
Union, his curious mixture of radical and conservative tastes; but
whatever its merits or defects, it led to a strange delusion when it
caused him to believe that a man like Napoleon could be forced by a
mere pin-prick to do Jefferson’s will.
Jefferson himself was weary of indecision. He had rested his wish
for an English alliance on the belief that Napoleon meant to make
peace in Europe in order to attack America; and this idea, never very
reasonable, could have no weight after Napoleon had plunged into a
general European war. No sooner did he receive Madison’s letter of
October 16, than he again changed his plan.
“The probability of an extensive war on the continent of
Europe, strengthening every day for some time past, is now
almost certain,” he wrote October 23 to Madison.[67] “This
gives us our great desideratum, time. In truth it places us
quite at our ease. We are certain of one year of campaigning
at least, and one other year of negotiation for their peace
arrangements. Should we be now forced into war, it is become
much more questionable than it was whether we should not pursue
it unembarrassed by any alliance, and free to retire from it
whenever we can obtain our separate terms. It gives us time,
too, to make another effort for peaceable settlement. Where
should this be done? Not at Madrid, certainly. At Paris! through
Armstrong, or Armstrong and Monroe as negotiators, France as
the mediator, the price of the Floridas as the means. We need
not care who gets that, and an enlargement of the sum we had
thought of may be the bait to France, while the Guadalupe as the
western boundary may be the soother of Spain; providing for our
spoliated citizens in some effectual way. We may announce to
France that determined not to ask justice of Spain again, yet
desirous of making one other effort to preserve peace, we are
willing to see whether her interposition can obtain it on terms
which we think just; that no delay, however, can be admitted;
and that in the mean time should Spain attempt to change the
_status quo_, we shall repel force by force, without
undertaking other active hostilities till we see what may be the
issue of her interference.”
A similar letter was sent on the same day to Gallatin; and the next day
Jefferson wrote to Robert Smith, suggesting the same idea, with some
characteristic additions.[68]
Jefferson’s idea that Napoleon would require two years of war seemed
reasonable; for how could Jefferson know that Ulm had already
surrendered, that Austerlitz would be fought within six weeks, and
that peace would be restored before the new year, with the Emperor
Napoleon more terrible than ever? In truth Jefferson only reverted
to his policy of peace which he had seemed to abandon, but to which
he really clung even when most earnest for a British alliance. His
conduct in that sense was at least consistent. So much could hardly
be said for Madison, even though the President apparently yielded
to the secretary’s advice. Of all the points on which Madison, and
Monroe in obedience to his orders, had most strongly insisted, even to
the extent of offending Talleyrand, the strongest was that under no
circumstances should the Florida negotiation be turned into a bribe
to France. As late as September 30, in writing the opinion intended
to guide the Cabinet, Madison asked authority “to extinguish in the
French government every hope of turning our controversy with Spain
into a French job, public or private.”[69] The President’s suggestion
of October 23 avowedly turned the controversy with Spain into a French
job, which must inevitably become private as well as public.
Madison made no protest. He soon returned to Washington, and there,
Nov. 12, 1805, a Cabinel meeting was held, whose proceedings were
recorded by the President in a memorandum, probably written at the
moment. This memorandum closed a record, unusually complete, of
an episode illustrating better than any other the peculiarities of
Jefferson and Madison, and the traits of character most commonly
alleged as their faults.[70]
“_1805, Nov. 12._ Present, the four secretaries; subject,
Spanish affairs.--The extension of the war in Europe leaving us
without danger of a sudden peace, depriving us of the chance
of an ally, I proposed we should address ourselves to France,
informing her it was a last effort at amicable settlement with
Spain, and offer to her, or through her, (1) A sum of money for
the rights of Spain east of Iberville, say the Floridas; (2) To
cede the part of Louisiana from the Rio Bravo to the Guadalupe;
(3) Spain to pay within a certain time spoliations under her
own flag, agreed to by the convention (which we guess to be
a hundred vessels, worth two millions), and those subsequent
(worth as much more), and to hypothecate to us for those
payments the country from Guadalupe to Rio Bravo. Armstrong
to be employed. The first was to be the exciting motive with
France, to whom Spain is in arrears for subsidies, and who will
be glad also to secure us from going into the scale of England;
the second, the soothing motive with Spain, which France would
press _bonâ fide_, because she claimed to the Rio Bravo;
the third, to quiet our merchants. It was agreed to unanimously,
and the sum to be offered fixed not to exceed five million
dollars. Mr. Gallatin did not like purchasing Florida under
an apprehension of war, lest we should be thought in fact to
purchase peace. We thought this overweighed by taking advantage
of an opportunity which might not occur again of getting a
country essential to our peace and to the security of the
commerce of the Mississippi. It was agreed that Yrujo should be
sounded through Dallas whether he is not going away, and if not,
he should be made to understand that his presence at Washington
will not be agreeable, and that his departure is expected. Casa
Calvo, Morales, and all the Spanish officers at New Orleans are
to be desired to depart, with a discretion to Claiborne to let
any friendly ones remain who will resign and become citizens, as
also women receiving pensions to remain if they choose.”