34. There is one kind of virtues pertaining to the political character,
and another to the man who tends to contemplation, and who, on this
account, is called theoretic, and is now a beholder [of intellectual and
intelligible natures]. And there are also other virtues pertaining to
intellect, so far as it is intellect, and separate from soul. The virtues
indeed of the political character, and which consist in the moderation
of the passions, are characterized by following and being obedient to
the reasoning about that which is becoming in actions. Hence, looking to
an innoxious converse with neighbours, these virtues are denominated,
from the aggregation of fellowship, political. And here prudence indeed
subsists about the reasoning part; fortitude about the irascible
part; temperance in the consent and symphony of the epithymetic[168]
with the reasoning part; and justice, in each of these performing its
proper employment with respect to governing and being governed. But
the virtues of him who proceeds to the contemplative life, consist in
a departure from terrestrial concerns. Hence, also, they are called
purifications, being surveyed in the refraining from corporeal actions,
and avoiding sympathies with the body. For these are the virtues of the
soul elevating itself to true being. The political virtues therefore
adorn the mortal man, and are the forerunners of purifications. For it
is necessary that he who is adorned by the _cathartic_ virtues, should
abstain from doing any thing precedaneously in conjunction with body.
Hence, in these purifications, not to opine with body, but to energize
alone, gives subsistence to _prudence_; which derives its perfection
through energizing intellectually with purity. But not to be similarly
passive with the body, constitutes _temperance_. Not to fear a departure
from body, as into something void, and non-entity, gives subsistence to
_fortitude_. But when reason and intellect are the leaders, and there
is no resistance [from the irrational part], _justice_ is produced. The
disposition therefore, according to the political virtues, is surveyed
in the moderation of the passions; having for its end to live as man
conformable to nature. But the disposition, according to the theoretic
virtues, is beheld in apathy[169], the end of which is a similitude to
God.
Since, however, of purification, one kind consists in purifying, but
another pertains to those that are purified, the cathartic virtues are
surveyed according to both these significations of purification. For
the end of purification is to become pure. But since purification, and
the being purified, are an ablation of every thing foreign, the good
resulting from them will be different from that which purifies; so, that
if that which is purified was good prior to the impurity with which it
is defiled, purification is sufficient. That, however, which remains
after purification, is good, and not purification. The nature of the soul
also was not good [prior to purification], but is that which is able to
partake of good, and is boniform. For if this were not the case, it would
not have become situated in evil. The good therefore of the soul consists
in being united to its generator, but its evil in an association with
things subordinate to itself. Its evil also is twofold; the one arising
from an association with terrestrial natures, but the other from doing
this with an excess of the passions. Hence, all the political virtues
which liberate the soul from one evil, may be denominated virtues, and
are honourable. But the cathartic are more honourable, and liberate it
from evil, so far as it is soul. It is necessary therefore, that the
soul, when purified, should associate with its generator. Hence, the
virtue of it, after its conversion, consists in a scientific knowledge of
[true] being; but this will not be the case, unless conversion precedes.
There is, therefore, another genus of virtues after the cathartic
and political, and which are the virtues of the soul _energizing
intellectually_. And here, indeed, wisdom and prudence consist in the
contemplation of those things which intellect possesses. But _justice_
consists in performing what is appropriate in conformity to, and
energizing according to intellect. _Temperance_ is an inward conversion
of the soul to intellect. And _fortitude_ is apathy, according to a
similitude of that to which the soul looks, and which is naturally
impassive. These virtues also, in the same manner as the others,
alternately follow each other.
The fourth species of the virtues, is that of the paradigms subsisting
in intellect: which are more excellent than the psychical virtues, and
exist as the paradigms of these; the virtues of the soul being the
similitudes of them. And intellect indeed is that in which all things
subsist at once as paradigms. Here, therefore, prudence is science; but
intellect that knows [all things] is wisdom. Temperance is that which is
converted to itself. The proper work of intellect, is the performance
of its appropriate duty, [and this is justice[170].] But fortitude is
sameness, and the abiding with purity in itself, through an abundance
of power. There are therefore four genera of virtues; of which, indeed,
some pertain to intellect, concur with the essence of it, and are
paradigmatic. Others pertain to soul now looking to intellect, and being
filled from it. Others belong to the soul of man, purifying itself, and
becoming purified from the body, and the irrational passions. And others
are the virtues of the soul of man, adorning the man, through giving
measure and bound to the irrational nature, and producing moderation
in the passions. _And he indeed, who has the greater virtues, has also
necessarily the less; but the contrary is not true, that he who has
the less, has also the greater virtues._ Nor will he who possesses the
greater, energize precedaneously according to the less, but only so far
as the necessities of the mortal nature require. The scope also of the
virtues, is, as we have said, generically different in the different
virtues. For the scope of the _political_ virtues, is to give measure
to the passions in their practical energies according to nature.
But the scope of the _cathartic_ virtues, is entirely to obliterate
the remembrance of the passions; and the scope of the rest subsists
analogously to what has been before said. Hence, he who energizes
according to the _practical_ virtues, is a _worthy_ man; but he who
energizes according to the _cathartic_ virtues, is an _angelic man_, or
is also _a good dæmon_. He who energizes according to the _intellectual_
virtues alone is _a God_; but he who energizes according to the
_paradigmatic_ virtues, is _the father of the Gods_. We, therefore, ought
especially to pay attention to the _cathartic_ virtues, since we may
obtain these in the present life. But through these, the ascent is to the
more honourable virtues. Hence, it is requisite to survey to what degree
purification may be extended: for it is a separation from body, and from
the passive motion of the irrational part. But how this may be effected,
and to what extent, must now be unfolded.
In the first place, indeed, it is necessary that he who intends to
acquire this purification, should, as the foundation and basis of it,
know himself to be a soul bound in a foreign thing, and in a different
essence. In the second place, as that which is raised from this
foundation, he should collect himself from the body, and as it were from
different places, so as to be disposed in a manner perfectly impassive
with respect to the body. For he who energizes uninterruptedly according
to sense, though he may not do this with an adhering affection, and the
enjoyment resulting from pleasure, yet, at the same time, his attention
is dissipated about the body, in consequence of becoming through
sense[171] in contact with it. But we are addicted to the pleasures or
pains of sensibles; in conjunction with a promptitude, and converging
sympathy; from which disposition it is requisite to be purified.
_This, however, will be effected by admitting necessary pleasures, and
the sensations of them, merely as remedies, or as a liberation from
pain[172], in order that [the rational part] may not be impeded [in its
energies]._ Pain also must be taken away. But if this is not possible,
it must be mildly diminished. And it will be diminished, if the soul
is not copassive with it. Anger, likewise, must as much as possible be
taken away; and must by no means be premeditated. But if it cannot be
entirely removed, deliberate choice must not be mingled with it, but
the unpremeditated motion must be the impulse of the irrational part.
_That however which is unpremeditated, is imbecile and small._ All fear
likewise must be expelled. For he who is adapted to this purification,
will fear nothing. Here, however, if it should take place, it will be
unpremeditated. Anger therefore and fear must be used for the purpose
of admonition. But the desire of every thing base must be exterminated.
Such a one also, so far as he is a cathartic philosopher, will not
desire meats and drinks [except so far as they are necessary]. Neither
must there be the unpremeditated in natural venereal connexions; _but if
this should take place, it must only be as far as to that precipitate
imagination which energizes in sleep_. In short, the intellectual soul
itself of the purified man must be liberated from all these [corporeal
propensities]. He must likewise endeavour, that what is moved to the
irrational nature of corporeal passions, may be moved without sympathy,
and without animadversion; so that the motions themselves may be
immediately dissolved, through their vicinity to the reasoning power.
This, however, will not take place while the purification is proceeding
to its perfection; but will happen to those in whom reason rules without
opposition. Hence, in these, the inferior part will so venerate reason,
that it will be indignant if it is at all moved, in consequence of not
being quiet when its master is present, and will reprove itself for its
imbecility. These, however, are yet only moderations of the passions,
but at length terminate in apathy. For when copassivity is entirely
exterminated, then apathy is present with him who is purified from this
passivity. For passion becomes moved when reason imparts excitation,
through verging [to the irrational nature].
35. Every thing which is situated somewhere, is there situated according
to its own nature, and not preternaturally. For body, therefore, which
subsists in matter and bulk, to be somewhere, is to be in place. Hence,
for the body of the world, which is material and has bulk, to be every
where, is to be extended with interval, and to subsist in the place
of interval. But a subsistence in place, is not at all present with
the intelligible world, nor, in short, with that which is immaterial,
and essentially incorporeal, because it is without bulk, and without
interval; so that the ubiquity of an incorporeal nature is not local.
Hence, neither will one part of it be here, but another there; for if
this were the case, it would not be out of place, nor without interval;
but wherever it is, the whole of it is there. Nor is it indeed in this,
but not in another place; for thus it would be comprehended by one place,
but separated from another. Nor is it remote from this thing, but near
to that; in the same manner as remoteness and nearness are asserted of
things which are adapted to be in place, according to the measures of
intervals. Hence, the sensible is present, indeed, with the intelligible
world, according to interval, but [a truly] incorporeal nature is
present with the world impartibly, and unaccompanied by interval. The
impartible, likewise, when it is in that which has interval, is wholly
in every part of it, being one and the same in number [in every part of
it]. That which is impartible, therefore, and without multitude, becomes
extended into magnitude, and multiplied, when intimately connected
with that which is naturally multitudinous, and endued with magnitude;
and thus the latter receives the former in such a way as it is adapted
to receive it, and not such as the former truly is. But that which is
partible and multitudinous, is received by that which is naturally
impartible and without multitude, impartibly and non-multitudinously, and
after this manner is present with it; _i.e._ the impartible is present
impartibly, without plurality, and without a subsistence in place,
conformably to its own nature, with that which is partible, and which is
naturally multitudinous, and exists in place. But that which is partible,
multiplied, and in place, is present with the impartible essence,
partibly, multitudinously, and locally. Hence, it is necessary, in the
survey of these natures, to preserve and not confound the peculiarities
of each; or rather, we should not imagine or opine of that which is
incorporeal, such properties as pertain to bodies, or any thing of the
like kind. For no one would ascribe to bodies the peculiarities of a
genuinely incorporeal essence. For all of us are familiar with bodies;
but the knowledge of incorporeal natures is attainable by us with great
difficulty; because, through not being able to behold them intuitively,
we are involved in doubt about their nature; and this takes place as long
as we are under the dominion of imagination.
Thus, therefore, you should say, If that which is in place, is out of,
or has departed from itself, through having proceeded into bulk, that
which is intelligible is not in place, and is in itself, because it
has not proceeded into corporeal extension. Hence, if the former is an
image, the latter is an archetype. And the former, indeed, derives its
being through the intelligible; but the latter subsists in [and through]
itself. For every [physical] image is the image of intellect. It is also
requisite that, calling to mind the peculiarities of both these, we
should not wonder at the discrepance which takes place in their congress
with each other; if, in short, it is proper on this occasion to use the
word congress. For we are not now surveying the congress of bodies, but
of things which are entirely distinct from each other, according to
peculiarity of hypostasis. Hence, also, this congress is different from
every thing which is usually surveyed in things essentially the same.
Neither, therefore, is it temperament, or mixture, or conjunction, or
apposition, but subsists in a way different from all these; appearing,
indeed, in all the mutual participations of consubstantial natures, in
whatever way this may be effected; but transcending every thing that
falls under the apprehension of sense. Hence, an intelligible essence is
wholly present without interval, with all the parts of that which has
interval, though they should happen to be infinite in number. Nor is
it present distributed into parts, giving a part to a part; nor being
multiplied, does it multitudinously impart itself to multitude; but it
is wholly present with the parts of that which is extended into bulk,
and with each individual of the multitude, and all the bulk impartibly,
and without plurality, and as numerically one. But it pertains to those
natures to enjoy it partibly, and in a distributed manner, whose power is
dissipated into different parts. And to these it frequently happens, that
through a defect of their own nature, they counterfeit an intelligible
essence; so that doubts arise respecting that essence, which appears to
have passed from its own nature into theirs.
36. Truly-existing being is neither great nor small, for magnitude
and parvitude are properly the peculiarities of bulk. But true being
transcends both magnitude and parvitude; and is above the greatest, and
above the least; and is numerically one and the same, though it is found
to be simultaneously participated by every thing that is greatest, and
every thing that is least. You must not, therefore, conceive of it as
something which is greatest; as you will then be dubious how, being that
which is greatest, it is present with the smallest masses, without being
diminished or contracted. Nor must you conceive of it as something which
is least; since you will thus again be dubious how, being that which is
least, it is present with the greatest masses, without being multiplied
or increased, or without receiving addition. But at one and the same time
receiving into the greatest magnitude that which transcends the greatest
bulk, and into the least magnitude that which transcends the least[173],
you will be able to conceive how the same thing, abiding in itself,
may be simultaneously seen in any casual magnitude, and in infinite
multitudes and corporeal masses. For according to its own peculiarity,
it is present with the magnitude of the world impartibly and without
magnitude. It also antecedes the bulk of the world, and comprehends every
part of it, in its own impartibility; just as, _vice versa_, the world,
by its multitude of parts, is multifariously present, as far as it is
able, with truly-existing being, yet cannot comprehend it, neither with
the whole of its bulk, nor the whole of its power; but meets with it in
all its parts as that which is infinite, and cannot be passed beyond;
and this both in other respects, and because truly-existing being is
entirely free from all corporeal extension.
37. That which is greater in bulk, is less in power, when compared, not
with things of a similar kind, but with those that are of a different
species, or of a different essence. For bulk is, as it were, the
departure of a thing from itself, and a division of power into the
smallest parts. Hence, that which transcends in power, is foreign from
all bulk. For power proceeding into itself, is filled with itself, and,
by corroborating itself, obtains its proper strength; on which account,
body proceeding into bulk through a diminution of power, is as much
remote from truly-incorporeal being, as that which truly exists is from
being exhausted by bulk; for the latter abides in the magnitude of the
same power, through an exemption from bulk. As, therefore, truly-existing
being is, with reference to a corporeal mass, without magnitude and
without bulk; thus also, that which is corporeal is, with reference
to truly-existing being, imbecile and powerless. For that which is
greatest by magnitude of power, is exempt from all bulk; so that the
world existing every where, and, as it is said, meeting with real being
which is truly every where, is not able to comprehend the magnitude of
its power. It meets, however, with true being, which is not partibly
present with it, but is present without magnitude, and without any
definite limitation. The presence, therefore, of truly-existing being
with the world, is not local, but assimilative, so far as it is possible
for body to be assimilated to that which is incorporeal, and for that
which is incorporeal to be surveyed in a body assimilated to it. Hence,
an incorporeal nature is not present with body, so far as it is not
possible for that which is material to be assimilated to a perfectly
immaterial nature; and it is present, so far as a corporeal can be
assimilated to an incorporeal essence. Nevertheless, this is not effected
through reception; since, if it were, each would be corrupted. For the
material, indeed, in receiving the immaterial nature, would be corrupted,
through being changed into it; and the immaterial essence would become
material. Assimilations, therefore, and participations of powers, and
the deficiency of power, proceed into things which are thus different
in essence from each other, into each other. The world, therefore, is
very far from possessing the power of real being; and real being is very
remote from the imbecility of a material nature. But that which subsists
between these, assimilating and being assimilated, and conjoining
the extremes to each other, becomes the cause of deception about the
extremes, in consequence of applying, through the assimilation, the one
to the other.
38. Truly-existing being is said to be many things, not by a subsistence
in different places, nor in the measures of bulk, nor by coacervation,
nor by the circumscriptions or comprehensions[174] of divisible parts,
but by a difference which is immaterial, without bulk, and without
plurality, and which is divided according to multitude. Hence, also,
it is one; not as one body, nor as in one place; nor as one bulk; nor
as one which is many things; because it is different so far as it is
one, and its difference is both divided and united. For its difference
is not externally acquired, nor adscititious, nor obtained through the
participation of something else, but it is many things from itself. For,
remaining one, it energizes with all energies, because, through sameness,
it constitutes all difference; not being surveyed in the difference of
one thing with respect to another, as is the case in bodies. For, on
the contrary, in these, unity subsists in difference; because diversity
has in them a precedaneous existence; but the unity which they contain
is externally and adscititiously derived. For in truly existing being,
indeed, unity and sameness precede; but difference is generated,
from this unity being energetic. _Hence, true being is multiplied in
impartibility; but body is united in multitude and bulk._ The former
also is established in itself, subsisting in itself according to unity;
but the latter is never in itself, because it receives its hypostasis in
an extension of existence. The former, therefore, is an all-energetic
one; but the latter is an united multitude. Hence, it is requisite to
explore how the former is one and different; and again, how the latter is
multitude and one. Nor must we transfer the peculiarities of the one to
those which pertain to the other.
39. It is not proper to think that the multitude of souls was generated
on account of the multitude of bodies; but it is necessary to admit
that, prior to bodies, there were many souls, and one soul [the cause
of the many]. Nor does the one and whole soul prevent the subsistence
in it of many souls; nor do the multitude of souls distribute by
division the one soul into themselves. For they are distinct from, but
are not abscinded from the soul, which ranks as a whole; nor do they
distribute into minute parts this whole soul into themselves. They are
also present with each other without confusion; nor do they produce the
whole soul by coacervation. For they are not separated from each other
by any boundaries; nor, again, are they confused with each other; just
as neither are many sciences confused in one soul [by which they are
possessed]. For these sciences do not subsist in the soul like bodies,
as things of a different essence from it; but they are certain energies
of the soul. For the nature of soul possesses an infinite power. Every
thing also that occurs in it is soul; and all souls are [in a certain
respect] one; and again, the soul which ranks as a whole, is different
from all the rest. For as bodies, though divided to infinity, do not
end in that which is incorporeal, but alone receive a difference of
segments according to bulk; thus also soul, being a vital form, may
be conceived to consist of forms _ad infinitum_. For it possesses
specific differences, and the whole of it subsists together with, or
without these. For, if there is in the soul that which is as it were a
part divided from the rest of the parts, yet, at the same time that
there is difference, the sameness remains. If, however, in bodies, in
which difference predominates over sameness, nothing incorporeal when
it accedes cuts off the union, but all the parts remain essentially
united, and are divided by qualities and other forms; what ought we to
assert and conceive of a specific incorporeal life, in which sameness
is more prevalent than difference; to which nothing foreign to form is
subjected, and from which the union of bodies is derived? Nor does body,
when it becomes connected with soul, cut off its union, though it is an
impediment to its energies in many respects. But the sameness of soul
produces and discovers all things through itself, through its specific
energy, which proceeds to infinity; since any part of it whatever is
capable of effecting all things, when it is liberated and purified from
a conjunction with bodies; just as any part of seed possesses the power
of the whole seed. As, however, seed, when it is united with matter,
predominates over it, according to each of the productive principles
which the seeds contain; and all the seed, its power being collected into
one, possesses the whole of its power in each of the parts; thus also,
in the immaterial soul, that which may be conceived as a part, has the
power of the whole soul. But that part of it which verges to matter, is
vanquished, indeed, by the form to which it verges, and yet is adapted to
associate with immaterial form, though it is connected with matter, when
withdrawing itself from a material nature, it is converted to itself.
Since, however, through verging to matter, it becomes in want of all
things, and suffers an emptiness of its proper power; but when it is
elevated to intellect, is found to possess a plenitude of all its powers;
hence those who first obtained a knowledge of this plenitude of the soul,
very properly indicated its emptiness by calling it _poverty_, and its
fulness by denominating it _satiety_.