HUMAN NATURE
There is always a certain disadvantage in approaching human nature
through a theory or in the light of an ideal. If I am doing that, it is
my own fault and by no means the fault of Wells. He has himself
abandoned socialism, in the ordinary sense of the term, because it has
too much of the _à priori_ about it; he has abandoned economics because
it deals with man as a mass-mind; he has come to rest in human nature
itself and he has made his theories subject to human nature.
"All fables, indeed, have their morals; but the innocent enjoy the
story," says Thoreau. Most readers of the novels of Wells, I suppose,
have no notion that a theory of life runs through them and unites them.
And they are right. The force of a work of art does not reside in its
"inner meanings." An admirable work of art will always no doubt possess
"inner meanings" in plenty and the unhappy mind of man will always rout
them out. But to separate the intellectual structure of anything from
the thing itself is just like any other kind of vivisection: you expose
the brain and you kill the dog. A work of art is a moving living whole
that speaks to the moving living whole which is oneself. We are
insensibly modified by reading as by other experience. We come to feel
differently, see differently, act differently. Without doubt Wells has
altered the air we breathe and has made a conscious fact in many minds
the excellence that resides in certain types of men and modes of living
and the odiousness that resides in others. Socialism, like everything
else which changes the world, comes as a thief in the night.
Still, it is plain that Wells himself began with doctrine foremost;
richness of experience has led him only after many years to get the
horse before the cart. From the first he was aware of a point of
view--it was the point of view, writ large, of his own self-made career,
growing gradually more and more coherent. Throughout his romances, down
to the very end, his chief interest was theoretical rather than human.
Only this can account for the violent wrenching of life and character in
them to suit the requirements of a predetermined idea. The Food of the
Gods, for example, is so far the essential fact of the book that bears
its name that the characters in this book are merely employed to give
the Food a recognizable human setting. Throughout his romances, indeed,
men exist for inventions, not inventions for men.
Yet the "human interest," as it is called, was there from the outset,
side by side with this main theoretic interest in the scientific and
socialistic possibilities of life. The series of novels began almost as
early as the series of romances. Two "streams of tendency" run side by
side throughout the earlier writings of Wells--streams of tendency which
meet fully for the first time in _Tono-Bungay_, and have formed a single
main current in the novels subsequent to that. On the one hand was the
stream of constructive theory, not yet brought into contact with human
nature, on the other the stream of "human interest," not yet brought
into contact with constructive theory. Mr. Hoopdriver, of _The Wheels of
Chance,_ and Kipps, are typical of this earlier fiction, specimens of
muddled humanity as such, one might say, quite unmitigated by the train
of thought, the possibility of doing something _with_ muddled humanity,
which was growing more and more urgent in the romances.
In _Tono-Bungay_, as I have said, one sees the union of these two trains
of interest, muddled humanity being represented in Uncle Ponderevo,
constructive theory in George Ponderevo. And in all the subsequent
novels this fusion continues. The background in each case is the static
world of muddle from which Wells is always pushing off into the open sea
of possibilities, the foreground being occupied by a series of men and
women who represent this dynamic forward movement. And the philosophy of
Wells has finally come to port in human nature.
"Few modern socialists," he says somewhere, "present their faith as a
complete panacea, and most are now setting to work in earnest upon those
long-shirked preliminary problems of human interaction through which the
vital problem of a collective head and brain can alone be approached."
And elsewhere he says: "Our real perplexities are altogether
psychological. There are no valid arguments against a great-spirited
socialism but this, that people will not. Indolence, greed, meanness of
spirit, the aggressiveness of authority, and above all jealousy,
jealousy from pride and vanity, jealousy for what we esteem our
possessions, jealousy for those upon whom we have set the heavy fetters
of our love, a jealousy of criticism and association, these are the real
obstacles to those brave large reconstructions, those profitable
abnegations and brotherly feats of generosity that will yet turn human
life--of which our individual fives are but the momentary parts--into a
glad, beautiful and triumphant coöperation all round this sunlit world."
Inevitably then he sees the world as divided roughly into two worlds,
and human nature as of two general kinds. There is the static world, the
normal, ordinary world which is on the whole satisfied with itself,
together with the great mass of men who compose and sanction it; and
there is the ever-advancing better world, pushing through this outworn
husk in the minds and wills of creative humanity. In one of his essays
he has figured this opposition as between what he calls the Normal
Social Life and the Great State. And in one of those _dégagé_
touch-and-go sketches in which he so often sums up the history of
humankind, he has presented the Normal Social Life as a "common
atmosphere of cows, hens, dung, toil, ploughing, economy, and domestic
intimacy," an immemorial state of being which implies on the part of men
and women a perpetual acquiescence--a satisfied or hopeless consent--to
the end of time. But as against this normal conception of life he points
out that modern circumstances have developed in men, through machinery,
the division of labor, etc., a "surplus life" which does not fit into
the Normal scheme at all, and that humanity has returned "from a closely
tethered to a migratory existence." And he observes: "The history of the
immediate future will, I am convinced, be very largely the history of
the conflict of the needs of this new population with the institutions,
the boundaries, the laws, prejudices, and deep-rooted traditions
established during the home-keeping, localized era of mankind's career."
Two conceptions of life, two general types of character, two ethical
standards are here set in opposition, and this opposition is maintained
throughout the novels of Wells. Thus on the title-page of _The New
Machiavelli_ appears the following quotation from Professor James: "It
suffices for our immediate purpose that tender-minded and tough-minded
people ... do both exist." In _A Modern Utopia_ this division appears
typically in the two men from our world who play off against one
another, the botanist and the narrator of the story. The
"tender-mindedness" of the botanist is exhibited in the fact that he
cares nothing for a better world if it is to deprive him of the muddled,
inferior and sentimental attachments of his accustomed life, and prefers
them to the austerer, braver prospect that is offered him.
"Tough-mindedness," on the other hand, is above all the state of living,
not in one's attachments, habits, possessions, not in the rut of least
resistance, but in the sense of one's constructive and coöperative
relationship to the whole sum of things, in being "a conscious part of
that web of effort and perplexity which wraps about our globe." And
indeed the constant theme of the novels of Wells might be described as
tough-mindedness with lapses.
For the heroes of Wells do lapse: they pay that tribute to "human
nature" and the overwhelming anti-social forces in the world and in man
himself. They fall, as a rule, from "virtue" to the service of secret
and personal ends. _Cherchez la femme_. Mr. Lewisham, insufficiently
prepared and made to feel that society does not want him, has to give up
his disinterested ambitions in science and scramble for money to support
a wife whom instinct has urged him, however imprudently, to marry.
George Ponderevo gives up science and is forced into abetting his
uncle's patent medicine enterprise for the same reason. For the same
reason, too, Capes takes to commercial play-writing to support Ann
Veronica; and to stand behind the extravagance of Marjorie, Trafford,
having discovered in his researches an immensely valuable method of
making artificial india-rubber which he is going to make public for the
use of society, is persuaded to compromise his honor as a scientist and
monopolize his discovery for private gain. In _Tono-Bungay_ the
enterprise is a swindling patent medicine, which many business men would
refuse to have anything to do with; but in _Marriage_ the proposition
belongs to what is called "legitimate business," and it may be well to
quote a passage to show the subtlety and, at the same time, from this
point of view, the very substantial nature of temptation and sin:
Solomonson had consulted Trafford about this matter at
Vevey, and had heard with infinite astonishment that
Trafford had already roughly prepared and was proposing to
complete and publish, unpatented and absolutely unprotected,
first a smashing demonstration of the unsoundness of
Behren's claim and then a lucid exposition of just what had
to be done and what could be done to make an india-rubber
absolutely indistinguishable from the natural product. The
business man could not believe his ears.
"My dear chap, positively--you mustn't!" Solomonson had
screamed.... "Don't you see all you are throwing away?"
"I suppose it's our quality to throw such things away,"
said Trafford.... "When men dropped that idea of concealing
knowledge, alchemist gave place to chemist, and all that is
worth having in modern life, all that makes it better and
safer and more hopeful than the ancient life began."
"My dear fellow," said Solomonson, "I know, I know. But to
give away the synthesis of rubber! To just shove it out of
the window into the street!"... Everything that had made
Trafford up to the day of his marriage was antagonistic to
such strategic reservations. The servant of science has as
such no concern with personal consequences; his business is
the steady relentless clarification of knowledge. The human
affairs he changes, the wealth he makes or destroys, are no
concern of his; once these things weigh with him, become
primary, he has lost his honor as a scientific man.
"But you _must_ think of consequences," Solomonson had
cried during those intermittent talks at Vevey. "Here you
are, shying this cheap synthetic rubber of yours into the
world--for it's bound to be cheap! anyone can see
that--like a bomb into a market-place. What's the good of
saying you don't care about the market-place, that _your_
business is just to make bombs and drop them out of the
window? You smash up things just the same. Why! you'll ruin
hundreds and thousands of people, people living on rubber
shares, people working in plantations, old, inadaptable
workers in rubber works...."
"I believe we can do the stuff at tenpence a pound," said
Solomonson, leaning back in his chair at last.... "So soon,
that is, as we deal in quantity. Tenpence! We can lower the
price and spread the market, sixpence by sixpence. In the
end--there won't be any more plantations. Have to grow
tea."
There we have Eve and the apple brought up to date, sin being the choice
of a private and individual good at the expense of the general good. The
honor of a doctor or a scientist consists in not concealing and
monopolizing discoveries. But why should the line be drawn at doctors
and scientists? There is the crux of socialist ethics.
By this type of compromise the actual New Republicans fall short of
their Utopian selves, the Samurai. But compromise is well within the
philosophy of Wells. "The individual case," he says in _First and Last
Things_, "is almost always complicated by the fact that the existing
social and economic system is based upon conditions that the growing
collective intelligence condemns as unjust and undesirable, and that the
constructive spirit in men now seeks to supersede. We have to live in a
provisional state while we dream of and work for a better one." And
elsewhere: "All socialists everywhere are like expeditionary soldiers
far ahead of the main advance. The organized State that should own and
administer their possessions for the general good has not arrived to
take them over; and in the meanwhile they must act like its anticipatory
agents according to their lights and make things ready for its coming."
But if the New Republican is justified in compromising himself for the
means of subsistence, how much more in the matter of love! "All for
love, and the world well lost" might be written over several of Wells's
novels. But, in reality, is the world lost at all under these
conditions? On the contrary, it is gained, and the more unconsciously
the better, in babies. Love belongs to the future and the species with
more finality than the greatest constructive work of the present, and
the heroines of Wells are inordinately fond of babies. When Schopenhauer
analyzed the metaphysics of love he showed that natural selection is a
quite inevitable thing seeking its own. In Wells love is equally
irresistible and direct. Whenever it appears in his books it makes
itself unmistakably known, and, having done so, it cuts its way straight
to its consummation, through every obstacle of sentiment, affection,
custom, and conventionality. It is as ruthless as the Last Judgment, and
like the Last Judgment it occurs only once.
Why then does it appear promiscuous? The answer to this question refers
one back to the underlying contention of Wells that there are two kinds
of human beings and two corresponding ethics, and that in the end the
New Republican who has become aware of himself cannot consort with the
Normal Social breed. But in actual life this standard becomes entangled
with many complexities. Just as, in a world of commercial competition,
it is the lot of most of those who try to give themselves
whole-heartedly to disinterested work that they place themselves at such
a disadvantage as ultimately to have to make a choice between work and
love, so the pressure of society and the quality of human nature itself
create entanglements of every kind. It is the nature of life that one
grows only gradually to the secure sense of a personal aim, and that
meanwhile day by day one has given hostages to fortune. To wake up and
find oneself suddenly the master of a purpose is without doubt, in the
majority of cases, to find oneself mortgaged beyond hope to the existing
fact. The writer who sets out to make his way temporarily and as a
stepping-stone by journalism finds himself in middle age with ample
means to write what he wishes to write only to find also that he has
become for good and all--a journalist! And so it is with lovers. Only in
the degree to which free will remains a perpetual and present faith can
"love and fine thinking" remain themselves; free of their attachments,
free of their obligations, and mortgages, and discounts. That is the
quality of a decent marriage, and the end of a marriage that is not
decent.
It is no business of mine to justify the sexual ethics of Wells. But
there is a difference between a fact and an intention, and what I have
just said serves to explain the intention. Consider, in the light of it,
a few of his characters, both in and out of marriage. Ann Veronica from
the first frankly owns that she is not in love with Manning, but every
kind of social hypnotism is brought into motion to work on her ignorance
of life and to confuse her sense of free-will. George Ponderevo simply
outgrows Marion; but you cannot expect him not to grow, and who is
responsible for the limited, furtive, second-hand world in which Marion
has lived and which has irrevocably moulded her? Margaret's world, too,
is a second-hand world, though on a socially higher plane: she lives in
a pale dream of philanthropy and Italian art, shocked beyond any mutual
understanding by everything that really belongs in the first-hand world
of her husband. These characters meet and pass one another like moving
scales; they never stand on quite the same plane. And then the
inevitable always occurs. For, just as the Children of the Food cannot
consort with the little folk they promise to supersede, so it appears to
be a fixed part of the programme of Wells that New Republicans can only
love other New Republicans with success.
He implies this indeed in _A Modern Utopia_:
"A man under the Rule who loves a woman who does not follow
it, must either leave the Samurai to marry her, or induce
her to accept what is called the Woman's Rule, which, while
it exempts her from the severer qualifications and
disciplines, brings her regimen into a working harmony with
his."
"Suppose she breaks the Rule afterwards?"
"He must leave either her or the order."
"There is matter for a novel or so in that."
"There has been matter for hundreds."
Wells has written six himself. _Love and Mr. Lewisham, Ann Veronica,
Tono-Bungay, The New Machiavelli, Marriage, The Passionate Friends_, are
all variations on this theme. In one of these alone life's double motive
succeeds in establishing itself, and it is for this reason that
_Marriage_, to my thinking the weakest of his novels from an artistic
point of view, is the most important concrete presentation of the
philosophy of Wells. It is an inferior book, but it gives one the sense
of a problem solved. By passing through a necessary yet feasible
discipline, Trafford and Marjorie bridge over the gap between haphazard
human nature and the better nature of socialism, and become Samurai in
fact.
These entanglements of the actual world would be an overwhelming
obstacle to a socialism less vigorous than that of Wells. But obstacles
give edge to things, and for a man who loves order no one could have
pictured disorder with more relish than he. Only a pure theorist could
regret the artistic zest with which he portrays our muddled world.
Running amuck was a constant theme in his early writings; his comets ran
amuck, and so did Mr. Bessel, and there is no more relished wanton scene
than that of the Invisible Man running amuck through the Surrey
villages. Intentionally or not, this relish in disorder reinforces the
prime fact about his view of order. He abhors the kind of order which is
often ignorantly confounded with the socialist aim, the order which
classifies and standardizes. He desires a collective consciousness only
through the exercise of a universally unimpeded free will, and he would
rather have no collectiveness at all than one that implies the sacrifice
of this free will. He wishes to work only on the most genuine human
stuff. This was the basis of his break with the Fabian Society; it is
the basis of his dislike of bureaucratic methods which deprive people of
beer when they want beer. It defines his notion of the true method of
socialism as first of all an education of the human will toward
voluntary right discipline.
His appeal, then, is a personal one. He has proved this indeed by his
repudiation of all attempts to embody in practice his proposed order of
voluntary nobility, the Samurai. Certain groups of young people actually
organized themselves upon the Rule that he had outlined, and it was this
that led him to see how entirely his ideal had been personal and
artistic rather than practical. Anyone at all familiar with religious
history and psychology will see how inevitably any such group would tend
to emphasize the Rule and the organization rather than the socially
constructive spirit for which the whole was framed, and how the
organization would itself separate from the collective life of the world
and become a new sect among the many sects. It was the same instinct
that led Emerson, Transcendental communist as he was, to look askance at
Brook Farm. It has been the want of an equal tact in eminent religious
minds that has made society a warfare of sect and opinion.
When one tries to focus the nature of his appeal one recalls a passage
in one of his books where he sums up the ordinary mind of the world and
the function which all socialism bears to this mind:
It is like a very distended human mind; it is without a
clear aim; it does not know except in the very vaguest terms
what it wants to do; it has impulses, it has fancies; it
begins and forgets. In addition, it is afflicted with a
division within itself that is strictly analogous to that
strange mental disorder which is known to psychologists as
multiple personality. It has no clear conception of the
whole of itself, it goes about forgetting its proper name
and address. Part of it thinks of itself as one great thing,
as, let us say, Germany; another thinks of itself as
Catholicism, another as the white race, or Judæa. At times
one might deem the whole confusion not so much a mind as
incurable dementia--a chaos of mental elements, haunted by
invincible and mutually incoherent fixed ideas.... In its
essence the socialistic movement amounts to this: it is an
attempt in this warring chaos of a collective mind to pull
itself together, to develop and establish a governing idea
of itself. It is the development of the collective
self-consciousness of humanity.
Certainly the road to this can only be through a common understanding.
The willing and unwilling servitudes of men, the institutions of society
that place love and work in opposition to one another, the shibboleths
of party, the aggressive jingoisms of separate peoples, the immemorial
conspiracy by which men have upheld the existing fact, these things do
spring from the want of imagination, the want of energetic faith, the
want of mutual understanding. To this inner and personal problem Wells
has applied himself. Can life be ventilated, can the mass of men be
awakened to a sense of those laws of social gravitation and the
transmutation of energy by which life is proved a myriad-minded
organism, can the ever-growing sum of human experience and discovery
clear up the dark places within society and within man? Among those who
have set themselves to the secular solution of these questions--and I am
aware of the limits of any secular solution--there are few as effective
as Wells.
Consider him in relation to a single concrete issue, the issue of
militarism:
Expenditure upon preparation for war falls, roughly, into
two classes: there is expenditure upon things that have a
diminishing value, things that grow old-fashioned and wear
out, such as fortifications, ships, guns, and ammunition,
and expenditure upon things that have a permanent and even
growing value, such as organized technical research,
military and naval experiment, and the education and
increase of a highly trained class of war experts.
And in _The Common Sense of Warfare_ he urges a lavish expenditure on
"education and training, upon laboratories and experimental stations,
upon chemical and physical research and all that makes knowledge and
leading." Separate the principle involved here from the issue it is
involved in, get the intention clear of the fact, and you find that he
is saying just the better sort of things that Matthew Arnold said.
Militarism granted, are you going to do military things or are you going
to make military things a stepping-stone toward the clarification of
thought, the training of men, the development of race-imagination?
Militarism has been to a large extent the impetus that has made the
Germans and the Japanese the trained, synthetic peoples they are. And
these very qualities are themselves in the end hostile to militarism.
Militarism considered in this sense is precisely what the General Strike
is in the idea of M. Georges Sorel: a myth, a thing that never comes to
pass, but which trains the general will by presenting it with a concrete
image toward which the will readily directs itself. Kipling, in the eyes
of the New Machiavelli, at least made the nation aware of what comes.
All along o' dirtiness, all along o' mess, All along o'
doing things rather more or less.
There is in this no defence of militarism. Granting the facts of
society, there is a way that accepts and secures them as they are and
another way of turning them into the service of the future, and a people
that has trained itself with reference to a particular issue has
virtually trained itself for all issues.
But no one, I think, has measured the difficulties of real progress more
keenly than Wells has come to measure them. The further he has
penetrated into human nature the more alive he has become to these
difficulties. _The New Machiavelli_ is a modern _Rasselas_ that has no
happy valley in the end, and Remington passes from party to party,
penetrating inward from ideas to the better stuff of mankind, hoping to
embody his "white passion of statecraft," and in the end demonstrating
to himself the futility of all groups and parties alike.
And as with parties, so with men. Consider that scene in _The Passionate
Friends_ where Stratton tries to explain in writing to his father what
he has been experiencing and why he must go away. He writes page after
page without expressing himself and at last, certain that he and his
father cannot come into touch, sends off a perfunctory note and receives
a perfunctory reply. "There are times," he adds, "when the
inexpressiveness of life comes near to overwhelming me, when it seems to
me we are all asleep or entranced, and but a little way above the still
cows who stand munching slowly in a field.... Why couldn't we and why
didn't we talk together!"
That is the burden of his latest novel. By this touchstone he has come
to measure the possibility of that openness of mind, that mutual
understanding, that ventilation of life and thought through which alone
the Great State can exist.