the District of Columbia that have reported on the subject. In a report
of the committee on the District, Jan. 11, 1837, by their chairman, Mr.
Powell of Virginia, there is the following declaration "The Congress of
the United States, has by the constitution exclusive jurisdiction over
the District, and has power upon this subject, (_slavery_) as upon all
other subjects of legislation, to exercise _unlimited discretion_."
Reps. of Comms. 2d Session, 19th Cong. v. I. No. 43. In February, 1829,
the committee on the District, Mr. Alexander of Virginia, Chairman, in
their report pursuant to Mr. Miner's resolutions, recognize a contingent
abolition proceeding upon the consent of the people. In December, 1831,
the committee on the District, Mr. Doddridge of Virginia, Chairman,
reported, "That until the adjoining states act on the subject (slavery)
it would be (not _unconstitutional_ but) unwise and impolitic, if not
unjust, for Congress to interfere." In April, 1836, a special committee
on abolition memorials reported the following resolutions by their
Chairman, Mr. Pinckney of South Carolina: "Resolved, that Congress
possesses no constitutional authority to interfere in any way with the
institution of slavery in any of the states of this confederacy."
"Resolved, That Congress _ought not to interfere_ in any way with
slavery in the District of Columbia." "Ought not to interfere,"
carefully avoiding the phraseology of the first resolution, and thus in
effect conceding the constitutional power. In a widely circulated
"Address to the electors of the Charleston District," Mr. Pinckney is
thus denounced by his own constituents: "He has proposed a resolution
which is received by the plain common sense of the whole country as a
concession that Congress has authority to abolish slavery in the
District of Columbia."
3. It has been conceded by the _citizens of the District_. A petition
for the gradual abolition of slavery in the District, signed by nearly
eleven hundred of its citizens, was presented to Congress, March 24,
1837. Among the signers to this petition, were Chief Justice Cranch,
Judge Van Ness, Judge Morsel, Prof. J.M. Staughton, Rev. Dr. Balch, Rev.
Dr. Keith, John M. Munroe, and a large number of the most influential
inhabitants of the District. Mr. Dickson, of New York, asserted on the
floor of Congress in 1835, that the signers of this petition owned more
than half of the property in the District. The accuracy of this
statement has never been questioned.
This power has been conceded by _grand juries of the District_. The
grand jury of the county of Alexandria, at the March term 1802,
presented the domestic slave trade as a grievance, and said, "We
consider these grievances demanding _legislative_ redress." Jan. 19,
1829, Mr. Alexander, of Virginia, presented a representation of the
grand jury in the city of Washington, remonstrating against "any measure
for the abolition of slavery within said District, unless accompanied by
measures for the removal of the emancipated from the same;" thus, not
only conceding the power to emancipate slaves, but affirming an
additional power, that of _excluding them when free_. See Journal H.R.
1828-9, p. 174.
4. This power has been conceded _by State Legislatures_. In 1828 the
Legislature of Pennsylvania instructed their Senators in Congress "to
procure, if practicable, the passage of a law to abolish slavery in the
District of Columbia." Jan. 28, 1829, the House of Assembly of New York
passed a resolution, that their "Senators in Congress be instructed to
make every possible exertion to effect the passage of a law for the
abolition of Slavery in the District of Columbia." In February, 1837,
the Senate of Massachusetts "Resolved, That Congress having exclusive
legislation in the District of Columbia, possess the right to abolish
slavery and the slave trade therein, and that the early exercise of such
right is demanded by the enlightened sentiment of the civilized world,
by the principles of the revolution, and by humanity." The House of
Representatives passed the following resolution at the same session:
"Resolved, That Congress having exclusive legislation in the District of
Columbia, possess the right to abolish slavery in said District, and
that its exercise should only be restrained by a regard to the public
good."
November 1, 1837, the Legislature of Vermont, "Resolved, that Congress
have the full power by the constitution to abolish slavery and the slave
trade in the District of Columbia, and in the territories." The
Legislature of Vermont passed in substance the same resolution, at its
session in 1836.
May 30, 1836, a committee of the Pennsylvania Legislature reported the
following resolution: "Resolved, That Congress does possess the
constitutional power, and it is expedient to abolish slavery and the
slave trade within the District of Columbia."
In January, 1836, the Legislature of South Carolina "Resolved, That we
should consider the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia as
a violation of the rights of the citizens of that District derived from
the _implied_ conditions on which that territory was ceded to the
General Government." Instead of denying the constitutional power, they
virtually admit its existence, by striving to smother it under an
_implication_. In February, 1836, the Legislature of North Carolina
"Resolved, That, although by the Constitution all legislative power over
the District of Columbia is vested in the Congress of the United States,
yet we would deprecate any legislative action on the part of that body
towards liberating the slaves of that District, as a breach of faith
towards those States by whom the territory was originally ceded, and
will regard such interference as the first step towards a general
emancipation of the slaves of the South." Here is a full concession of
the _power_, February 2, 1836, the Virginia Legislature passed
unanimously the following resolution: "Resolved, by the General Assembly
of Virginia, that the following article be proposed to the several
states of this Union, and to Congress, as an amendment of the
Constitution of the United States: 'The powers of Congress shall not be
so construed as to authorize the passage of any law for the emancipation
of slaves in the District of Columbia, without the consent of the
individual proprietors thereof, unless by the sanction of the
Legislatures of Virginia and Maryland, and under such conditions as they
shall by law prescribe.'"
Fifty years after the formation of the United States constitution the
states are solemnly called upon by the Virginia Legislature, to amend
that instrument by a clause asserting that, in the grant to Congress of
"exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever" over the District, the
"case" of slavery is not included!! What could have dictated such a
resolution but the conviction that the power to abolish slavery is an
irresistible interference from the constitution _as it is_. The fact
that the same legislature passed afterward a resolution, though by no
means unanimously, that Congress does not possess the power, abates not
a tittle of the testimony in the first resolution. March 23d, 1824, "Mr.
Brown presented the resolutions of the General Assembly of Ohio,
recommending to Congress the consideration of a system for the gradual
emancipation of persons of color held in servitude in the United
States." On the same day, "Mr. Noble, of Indiana, communicated a
resolution from the legislature of that state, respecting the gradual
emancipation of slaves within the United States." Journal of the United
States Senate, for 1824-5, p. 231.
The Ohio and Indiana resolutions, by taking for granted the _general_
power of Congress over the subject of slavery, do virtually assert its
_special_ power within its _exclusive_ jurisdiction.
5. The power of Congress to abolish slavery in the District, has been
conceded by bodies of citizens in the slave states. The petition of
eleven hundred citizens of the District of Columbia, in 1827, has been
already mentioned. "March 5, 1830, Mr. Washington presented a memorial
of inhabitants of the county of Frederick, in the state of Maryland,
praying that provision may be made for the gradual abolition of slavery
in the District of Columbia." Journal H.R. 1829-30, p. 358.
March 30, 1828. Mr. A.H. Shepperd, of North Carolina, presented a
memorial of citizens of that state, "praying Congress to take measures
fur the entire abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia."
Journal H.R. 1829-30, p. 379.
January 14, 1822. Mr. Rhea, of Tennessee, presented a memorial of
citizens of that state, praying "that provision may be made, whereby all
slaves which may hereafter be born in the District of Columbia, shall be
free at a certain period of their lives." Journal H.R. 1821-22, p. 142.
December 13, 1824. Mr. Saunders of North Carolina, presented a memorial
of citizens of that state, praying "that measures may be taken for the
gradual abolition of slavery in the United States." Journal H.R.
1824-25, p. 27.
December 16, 1828. "Mr. Barnard presented the memorial of the American
Convention for promoting the abolition of slavery, held in Baltimore,
praying that slavery may be abolished in the District of Columbia."
Journal U.S. Senate, 1828-29, p. 24.
6. Distinguished statesmen and jurists in the slaveholding states, have
conceded the power of Congress to abolish slavery in the District. The
testimony of Messrs. Doddridge, Powell, and Alexander, of Virginia,
Chief Justice Cranch, and Judges Morsell and Van Ness, of the District,
has already been given. In the debate in Congress on the memorial of the
Society of Friends, in 1790, Mr. Madison, in speaking of the territories
of the United States, explicitly declared, from his own knowledge of the
views of the members of the convention that framed the constitution, as
well as from the obvious import of its terms, that in the territories
"Congress have certainly the power to regulate the subject of slavery."
Congress can have no more power over the territories than that of
"exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever," consequently, according
to Mr. Madison, "it has certainly the power to regulate the subject of
slavery in the" _District_. In March, 1816, John Randolph introduced a
resolution for putting a stop to the domestic slave trade within the
District. December 12, 1827, Mr. Barney, of Maryland, presented a
memorial for abolition in the District, and moved that it be printed.
Mr. McDuffie, of South Carolina, objected to the printing, but
"expressly admitted the right of Congress to grant to the people of the
District any measures which they might deem necessary to free themselves
from the deplorable evil."--(See letter of Mr. Claiborne, of
Mississippi, to his constituents, published in the Washington Globe, May
9, 1836.) The sentiments of Henry Clay on the subject are well known. In
a speech before the U.S. Senate, in 1836, he declared the power of
Congress to abolish slavery in the District "unquestionable." Messrs.
Blair, of Tennessee, Chilton, Lyon, and Richard M. Johnson, of Kentucky,
A.H. Shepperd, of North Carolina, Messrs. Armstrong and Smyth, of
Virginia, Messrs. Dorsey, Archer, and Barney, of Maryland, and Johns, of
Delaware, with numerous others from slave states, have asserted the
power of Congress to abolish slavery in the District. In the speech of
Mr. Smyth, of Virginia, on the Missouri question, January 28, 1820, he
says on this point: "If the future freedom of the blacks is your real
object, and not a mere pretence, why do you not begin _here_? Within the
ten miles square, you have _undoubted power_ to exercise exclusive
legislation. _Produce a bill to emancipate the slaves in the District of
Columbia_, or, if you prefer it, to emancipate those born hereafter."
To this may be added the testimony of the present Vice President of the
United States, Hon. Richard M. Johnson, of Kentucky. In a speech before
the United States' Senate, February 1, 1820, (National Intelligencer,
April 29, 1820,) he says: "Congress has the express power stipulated by
the Constitution, to exercise exclusive legislation over this District
of ten miles square. Here slavery is sanctioned by law. In the District
of Columbia, containing a population of 30,000 souls, and probably as
many slaves as the whole territory of Missouri, THE POWER OF PROVIDING
FOR THEIR EMANCIPATION RESTS WITH CONGRESS ALONE. Why, then, let me ask,
Mr. President, why all this sensibility--this commiseration--this
heart-rending sympathy for the slaves of Missouri, and this cold
insensibility, this eternal apathy, towards the slaves in the District
of Columbia?"
It is quite unnecessary to add, that the most distinguished northern
statesmen of both political parties, have always affirmed the power of
Congress to abolish slavery in the District. President Van Buren in his
letter of March 6, 1836, to a committee of gentlemen in North Carolina,
says, "I would not, from the light now before me, feel myself safe in
pronouncing that Congress does not possess the power of abolishing
slavery in the District of Columbia." This declaration of the President
is consistent with his avowed sentiments touching the Missouri question,
on which he coincided with such men as Daniel D. Tompkins, De Witt
Clinton, and others, whose names are a host.[A] It is consistent also,
with his recommendation in his late message on the 5th of last month, in
which, speaking of the District, he strongly urges upon Congress "a
thorough and careful revision of its local government," speaks of the
"entire dependence" of the people of the District "upon Congress,"
recommends that a "uniform system of local government" be adopted, and
adds, that "although it was selected as the seat of the General
Government, the site of its public edifices, the depository of its
archives, and the residence of officers intrusted with large amounts of
public property, and the management of public business, yet it never has
been subjected to, or received, that _special_ and _comprehensive_
legislation which these circumstances peculiarly demanded."
[Footnote A: Mr. Van Buren, when a member of the Senate of New-York,
voted for the following preamble and resolutions, which passed
unanimously:--Jan. 28th, 1820. "Whereas, the inhibiting the further
extension of slavery in the United States, is a subject of deep concern
to the people of this state: and whereas, we consider slavery as an evil
much to be deplored, and that _every constitutional barrier should be
interposed to prevent its further extension_: and that the constitution
of the United States _clearly gives congress the right_ to require new
states, not comprised within the original boundary of the United States,
to _make the prohibition of slavery_ a condition of their admission into
the Union: Therefore,
"Resolved, That our Senators be instructed, and our members of Congress
be requested, to oppose the admission as a state into the Union, of any
territory not comprised as aforesaid, without making _the prohibition of
slavery_ therein an indispensable condition of admission." ]
The tenor of Senator Tallmadge's speech on the right of petition, in the
last Congress, and of Mr. Webster's on the reception of abolition
memorials, may be taken as universal exponents of the sentiments of
northern statesmen as to the power of Congress to abolish slavery in the
District of Columbia.
After presenting this array of evidence, _direct testimony_ to show that
the power of Congress to abolish slavery in the District, has always
till recently been _universally conceded_, is perhaps quite superfluous.
We subjoin; however, the following:
The Vice-President of the United States in his speech on the Missouri
question, quoted above, after contending that the restriction of slavery
in Missouri would be unconstitutional, adds, "But I am at a loss to
conceive why gentlemen should arouse all their sympathies upon this
occasion, when they permit them to lie dormant upon the same subject, in
relation to other sections of country, in which THEIR POWER COULD NOT BE
QUESTIONED." Then follows immediately the assertion of congressional
power to abolish slavery in the District, as already quoted. In the
speech of Mr. Smyth, of Va., also quoted above, he declares the power of
Congress to abolish slavery in the District to be "UNDOUBTED."
Mr. Sutherland, of Pennsylvania, in a speech in the House of
Representatives, on the motion to print Mr. Pinckney's Report, is thus
reported in the Washington Globe, of May 9th, '36. "He replied to the
remark that the report conceded that Congress had a right to legislate
upon the subject in the District of Columbia, and said that SUCH A RIGHT
HAD NEVER BEEN, TILL RECENTLY, DENIED."
The American Quarterly Review, published at Philadelphia, with a large
circulation and list of contributors in the slave states, holds the
following language in the September No. 1833, p. 55: "Under this
'exclusive jurisdiction,' granted by the constitution, Congress has
power to abolish slavery and the slave trade in the District of
Columbia. It would hardly be necessary to state this as a distinct
proposition, had it not been occasionally questioned. The truth of the
assertion, however, is too obvious to admit of argument--and we believe
HAS NEVER BEEN DISPUTED BY PERSONS WHO ARE FAMILIAR WITH THE
CONSTITUTION."
Finally--an explicit, and unexpected admission, that an "_over-whelming
majority_" of the _present_ Congress concede the power to abolish
slavery in the District, has just been made by a member of Congress from
South Carolina, in a letter published in the Charleston Mercury of Dec.
27, well known as the mouth-piece of Mr. Calhoun. The following is an
extract:
"The time has arrived when we must have new guarantees under the
constitution, or the union must be dissolved. _Our views of the
constitution are not those of the majority. An overwhelming majority
think that by the constitution, Congress may abolish slavery in the
District of Columbia--may abolish the slave trade between the States;
that is, it may prohibit their being carried out of the State in which
they are--and prohibit it in all the territories, Florida among them.
They think_, NOT WITHOUT STRONG REASONS, _that the power of Congress
extends to all of these subjects_."
In another letter, the same correspondent says:
"_The fact is, it is vain to attempt_, AS THE CONSTITUTION IS NOW, _to
keep the question of slavery out of the halls of Congress_,--until, by
some decisive action, WE COMPEL SILENCE, or _alter the constitution_,
agitation and insult is our eternal fate in the confederacy."
OBJECTIONS TO THE FOREGOING CONCLUSIONS CONSIDERED.
We now proceed to notice briefly the main arguments that have been
employed in Congress and elsewhere against the power of Congress to
abolish slavery in the District. One of the most plausible, is that "the
conditions on which Maryland and Virginia ceded the District to the
United States, would be violated, if Congress should abolish slavery
there." The reply to this is, that Congress had no power to _accept_ a
cession coupled with conditions restricting the power given it by the
constitution. Nothing short of a convention of the states, and an
alteration of the constitution, abridging its grant of power, could have
empowered Congress to accept a territory on any other conditions than
that of exercising "exclusive legislation, in all cases whatsoever,"
over it.
To show the futility of the objection, here follow the acts of cession.
The cession of Maryland was made in November, 1788, and is as follows:
"An act to cede to Congress a district of ten miles square in this state
for the seat of the government of the United States."
"Be it enacted, by the General Assembly of Maryland, that the
representatives of this state in the House of Representatives of the
Congress of the United States, appointed to assemble at New-York, on the
first Wednesday of March next, be, and they are hereby authorized and
required on the behalf of this state, to cede to the Congress of the
United States, any district in this state, not exceeding ten miles
square, which the Congress may fix upon, and accept for the seat of
government of the United States." Laws of Maryland, vol. 2, chap. 46.
The cession from Virginia was made by act of the Legislature of that
State on the 3d of December, 1788, in the following words:
"Be it enacted by the General Assembly, That a tract of country, not
exceeding ten miles square, or any lesser quantity, to be located within
the limits of the State, and in any part thereof, as Congress may, by
law, direct, shall be, and the same is hereby for ever ceded and
relinquished to the Congress and Government of the United States, in
full and absolute right, and exclusive jurisdiction, as well of soil, as
of persons residing or to reside thereon, pursuant to the tenor and
effect of the eighth section of the first article of the government of
the constitution of the United States."
But were there no provisos to these acts? The Maryland act had _none_.
That part of the District therefore, which includes the cities of
Washington and Georgetown, can lay claim to nothing with which to ward
off the power of Congress. The Virginia act had this proviso: "Sect. 2.
Provided, that nothing herein contained, shall be construed to vest in
the United States any right of property in the _soil_, or to affect the
rights of individuals _therein_, otherwise than the same shall or may be
transferred by such individuals to the United States."
This specification touching the soil was merely definitive and
explanatory of that clause in the act of cession, "_full and absolute
right._" Instead of restraining the power of Congress on _slavery_ and
other subjects, it even gives it wider scope; for exceptions to _parts_
of a rule, give double confirmation to those parts not embraced in the
exceptions. If it was the _design_ of the proviso to restrict
congressional action on the subject of _slavery_, why is the _soil
alone_ specified? As legal instruments are not paragons of economy in
words, might not "John Doe," out of his abundance, and without spoiling
his style, have afforded an additional word--at least a hint--that
slavery was _meant_, though nothing was _said_ about it? The subject
must have been too "delicate," even for the most distant allusion! The
mystery of silence is solved!!
But again, Maryland and Virginia, in their acts of cession, declare them
to be "in pursuance of" that clause of the constitution which gives to
Congress "exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over" the ten
miles square--thus, instead of _restricting_ that clause, both States
gave an express and decided confirmation of it. Now, their acts of
cession either accorded with that clause of the constitution, or they
conflicted with it. If they conflicted with it, _accepting_ the cessions
was a violation of the constitution. If they accorded, the objector has
already had his answer. The fact that Congress accepted the cessions,
proves that in its view their _terms_ did not conflict with the
constitutional grant of "power to exercise exclusive legislation in all
cases whatsoever over such District." The inquiry whether these acts of
cession were consistent or inconsistent with the United States
constitution, is totally irrelevant to the question at issue. What saith
the CONSTITUTION? That is the question. Not, what saith Virginia, or
Maryland, or--equally to the point--John Bull! If Maryland and Virginia
had been the authorized interpreters of the constitution for the Union,
these acts of cession could hardly have been magnified more than they
were by Messrs. Garland and Wise in the last Congress. A true
understanding of the constitution can be had, forsooth, only by holding
it up in the light of Maryland and Virginia legislation!
We are told, again, that those States would not have ceded the District
if they had supposed the constitution gave Congress power to abolish
slavery in it.