classes of servants, was favored with specific instructions from the
Apostles: and then, how should we account for the selection? In no other
way, can I conceive, than, on the ground, that his lot is so peculiarly
hard--so much harder than that of persons under other forms of
servitude--that he needs, whilst they do not, Apostolic counsel and
advice to keep him just, and patient, and submissive. Let me be spared
from the sin of reducing a brother man to such a lot. Your doctrine,
therefore, that the Apostles addressed slaves only, and not servants in
general, would not, were its correctness admitted, lift you out of all
the difficulties in your argument.
Again, does it necessarily follow from this admission, that the relation
of slaveholder and slave is sinless? Was the despotism of the Roman
government sinless? I do not ask whether the _abuses_ of civil
government, in that instance, were sinless. But, I ask, was a
government, despotic in its constitution, depriving all its subjects of
political power, and extending absolute control over their property and
persons--was such a government, independently of the consideration of
its _abuses_, (if indeed we may speak of the abuses of what is in itself
an _abuse_,) sinless? I am aware, that Prof. Hodge says, that it was so:
and, when he classes despotism and slavery with _adiaphora_, "things
indifferent;" and allows no more moral character to them than to a table
or a broomstick, I trust no good man envies his optics. May I not hope
that you, Mr. Smylie, perceive a difference between despotism and an
"indifferent thing." May I not hope, that you will, both as a Republican
and a Christian, take the ground, that despotism has a moral character,
and a bad one? When our fathers prayed, and toiled, and bled, to obtain
for themselves and their children the right of self-government, and to
effect their liberation from a power, which, in the extent and rigor of
its despotism, is no more to be compared to the Roman government, than
the "little finger" to the "loins," I doubt not, that they felt that
despotism had a moral, and a very bad moral character. And so would
Prof. Hodge have felt, had he stood by their side, instead of being one
of their ungrateful sons. I say ungrateful--for, who more so, than he
who publishes doctrines that disparage the holy cause in which they were
embarked, and exhibits them, as contending for straws, rather than for
principles? Tell me, how long will this Republic endure after our people
shall have imbibed the doctrine, that the _nature_ of civil government
is an indifferent thing: and that the poet was right when he said,
"For forms of government let _fools_ contest?"
This, however, is but one of many doctrines of ruinous tendency to the
cause of civil liberty, advanced by pro-slavery writers to sustain their
system of oppression.
It would surely be superfluous to go into proofs, that the Roman
government was vicious and wicked in its constitution and nature.
Nevertheless, the Apostle enjoined submission to it, and taught its
subjects how to demean themselves under it. Here, then, we have an
instance, in which we cannot argue the sinlessness of a relation, from
the fact of Apostolic injunctions on those standing in it. Take another
instance. The Chaldeans went to a foreign land, and enslaved its
people--as members of your guilty partnership have done for some of the
slaves you now own, and for the ancestors of others. And God destroyed
the Chaldeans expressly "for all their evil that they had done in Zion."
But, wicked as they were, for having instituted this relation between
themselves and the Jews, God, nevertheless, tells the Jews to submit to
it. He tells them, "Serve the King of Babylon." He even says, "seek the
peace of the city, whither I have caused you to be carried away
captives, and pray unto the Lord for it; for, in the peace thereof,
shall ye have peace." Here then, we have another instance, in addition
to that of the Roman despot and his subjects, in which the Holy Spirit
prescribed regulations for wicked relations. You will, at least, allow,
that the relation established by the Chaldeans between themselves and
the captive Jews, was wicked. But, you will perhaps say, that this is
not a relation coming within the contemplation of your rule. Your rule
speaks of a civil relation, and also of the existing relations of life.
But, the relation in question, being substantially that of slaveholder
and slave, is, according to your own showing, a civil relation. Perhaps
you will say, it is not an "existing relation of life." But what do you
mean by "an existing relation of life?" Do you mean, that it is a
relation approved of God? If you do, and insist that the relation of
slaveholder and slave is "an existing relation of life," then you are
guilty of begging the great question between us. Your rule, therefore,
can mean nothing more than this--that any relation is rightful, for
which the Bible prescribes regulations. But the relation referred to
between the Chaldeans and Jews, proves the falsity of the rule. Again,
when a man compels me to go with him, is not the compelled relation
between him and me a sinful one? And the relation of robber and robbed,
which a man institutes between himself and me, is not this also sinful?
But, the Bible has prescribed regulations for the relations in both
these cases. In the one, it requires me to "go with him twain;" and, in
the other, to endure patiently even farther spoliation and, "let him
have (my) cloak also." In these cases, also, do we see the falsity of
your rule--and none the less clearly, because the relations in question
are of brief duration.
Before concluding my remarks on this topic, let me say, that your
doctrine, that God has prescribed no rules for the behaviour of persons
in any other than the just relations of life, reflects no honor on His
compassion. Why, even we "cut-throat" abolitionists are not so
hard-hearted as to overlook the subjects of a relation, because it is
wicked. Pitying, as we do, our poor colored brethren, who are forced
into a wicked relation, which, by its very nature and terms, and not by
its _abuses_, as you would say, has robbed them of their all--even we
would, nevertheless, tell them to "resist not evil"--to be obedient unto
their own masters"--not purloining, but showing all good fidelity." We
would tell them, as God told the captive Jews, to "seek the peace of
those, whither they are carried away captives, and to pray unto the
Lord" for them: and our hope of their emancipation is not, as it is most
slanderously and wickedly reported to be, in their deluging the South
with blood: but, it is, to use again those sweet words of inspiration,
that "in the peace thereof they shall have peace." We do not communicate
with the slave; but, if we did, we would teach him, that our hope of his
liberation is grounded largely in his patience, and that, if he would
have us drop his cause from our hands, he has but to take it into his
own, and attempt to accomplish by violence, that which we seek to effect
through the power of truth and love on the understanding and heart of
his master.
Having disposed of your reasons in favor of the rightfulness of the
relation of slaveholder and slave, I will offer a few reasons for
believing that it is not rightful.
1st. My strongest reason is, that the great and comprehensive
principles, and the whole genius and spirit of Christianity, are opposed
to slavery.
2d. In the case of Pharoah and his Jewish slaves, God manifested his
abhorrence of the relation of slavery. The fact that the slavery in this
case was political, instead of domestic, and, therefore, of a milder
type than that of Southern slavery, does not forbid my reasoning from
the one form to the other. Indeed, if I may receive your declaration on
this point, for the truth, I need not admit that the type of the slavery
in question is milder than that of Southern slavery;--for you say, that
"their (the Jews) condition was that of the most abject bondage or
slavery." But the supposition that it is milder, being allowed to be
correct, would only prove, that God's abhorrence of Southern bondage as
much exceeds that which he expressed of Egyptian bondage, as the one
system is more full than the other of oppression and cruelty.
We learn from the Bible, that it was not because of the _abuses_ of the
Egyptian system of bondage, but, because of its sinful nature, that God
required its abolition. He did not command Pharaoh to cease from the
_abuses_ of the system, and to correct his administration of it, but to
cease from the system itself. "I have heard," says God, "the groaning of
the children of Israel, whom the Egyptians keep in bondage;"--not whom
the Egyptians, availing themselves of their absolute power, compel to
make brick without straw, and seek to waste and exterminate by the
murder of their infant children;--but simply "whom the Egyptians keep in
bondage." These hardships and outrages were but the leaves and branches.
The root of the abomination was the bondage itself, the assertion of
absolute and slaveholding power by "a new king over Egypt, which knew
not Joseph." In the next verse God says: "I will rid you"--not only from
the burdens and abuses, as you would say, of bondage,--but "out of their
(the Egyptians) bondage" itself--out of the relation in which the
Egyptians oppressively and wickedly hold you.
God sends many messages to Pharaoh. In no one of them does He reprove
him for the abuses of the relation into which he had forced the Jews. In
no one of them is he called on to correct the evils which had grown out
of that relation. But, in every one, does God go to the root of the
evil, and command Pharaoh, "let my people go"--"let my people go, that
they may serve me." The abolitionist is reproachfully called an
"ultraist" and "an immediatist." It seems that God was both, when
dealing with this royal slaveholder:--for He commanded Pharaoh, not to
mitigate the bondage of the Israelites, but to deliver them from it--and
that, too, immediately. The system of slavery is wicked in God's sight,
and, therefore, did He require of Pharaoh its immediate abandonment. The
phrase, "let my people go, that they may serve me," shows most
strikingly one feature of resemblance between Egyptian and American
slavery. Egyptian slavery did not allow its subjects to serve God,
neither does American. The Egyptian master stood between his slave and
their God: and how strikingly and awfully true is it, that the American
master occupies the like position! Not only is the theory of slavery,
the world over, in the face of God's declaration; "all souls are mine:"
but American slaveholders have brought its practical character to
respond so fully to its theory--they have succeeded, so well, in
excluding the light and knowledge of God from the minds of their
slaves--that they laugh at His claim to "all souls."
3d. Paul, in one of his letters to the Corinthian Church, tells
servants--say slaves, to suit your views--if they may be free, to prefer
freedom to bondage. But if it be the duty of slaves to prefer freedom to
bondage, how clearly is it the correlative duty of the master to grant
it to him! You interpret the Apostle's language, in this case, as I do;
and it is not a little surprising, that, with your interpretation of it,
you can still advocate slavery. You admit, that Paul says--I use your
own words--"a state of freedom, on the whole, is the best." Now, it
seems to me, that this admission leaves you without excuse, for
defending slavery. You have virtually yielded the ground. And this
admission is especially fatal to your strenuous endeavors to class the
relation of master and slave with the confessedly proper relations of
life, and to show that, like these, it is approved of God. Would Paul
say to the child, "a state of freedom" from parental government "on the
whole is the best?" Would he say to the wife, "a state of freedom from
your conjugal bonds" on the whole is the best? Would he say to the child
and wife, in respect to this freedom, "use it rather?" Would he be thus
guilty of attempting to annihilate the family relation?
Does any one wonder, that the Apostle did not use stronger language, in
advising to a choice and enjoyment of freedom? It is similar to that
which a pious, intelligent, and prudent abolitionist would now use under
the like circumstances. Paul was endeavoring to make the slave contented
with his hard lot, and to show him how unimportant is personal liberty,
compared with liberation from spiritual bondage: and this explains why
it is, that he spoke so briefly and moderately of the advantages of
liberty. His advice to the slave to accept the boon of freedom, was a
purely incidental remark: and we cannot infer from it, how great stress
he would have laid on the evils of slavery, and on the blessings of
liberty, in a discourse treating directly and mainly of those subjects.
What I have previously said, however, shows that it would, probably,
have been in vain, and worse than in vain, for him to have come out, on
any occasion whatever, with an exposition of the evils of slavery.
On the thirty-second page of your book, you say, "Masters cannot,
according to the command of Christ, render to their slaves that which is
just and equal, if you abolish the relation; for, then they will cease
to be masters." Abolish any of the relations for which regulations are
provided "in the New Testament, and, in effect, you abolish some of the
laws of Christ." But, we have just seen that Paul was in favor of
abolishing the relation of master and slave; which, as you insist, is a
relation for which regulations are provided in the New Testament. It is,
therefore, irresistibly deduced from your own premises, that he was in
favor of abolishing "the laws of Christ." It would require but little,
if any, extension of your doctrine, to make it wrong to remove all the
graven images out of a nation. For, in that event, the law of God
against bowing down to them would have nothing left to act upon. It
would thenceforth be inoperative.
4th. Another reason for believing, that the Apostles did not approve of
the slavery modification of servitude, is found in Paul's injunction;
"Remember them that are in bonds as bound with them." I admit, that it
is probable that others as well as slaves, are referred to in this
injunction: but it certainly is not probable, that others, to the
exclusion of slaves, are referred to. But, even on the supposition that
slaves are not referred to, but those only who are tenants of prisons,
let me ask you which you would rather be--a slave or a prisoner, as Paul
probably was when he wrote this injunction?--and whether your own
description of the wretched condition of the Roman slave, does not
prepare you to agree with me, that if the Apostle could ask sympathy for
the prisoner, who, with all his deprivations, has still the protection
of law, it is not much more due to the poor slave, who has no protection
whatever against lawless tyranny and caprice!
But to proceed, if slaves are the only, or even a part of the persons
referred to in the injunction, then you will observe, that the Apostle
does not call for the exercise of sympathy towards those who are said to
be suffering what you call the _abuses_ of slavery; but towards those
who are so unhappy as to be but the subjects of it--towards those who
are "in bonds." The bare relation of a slave is itself so grievous, as
to call for compassion towards those who bear it. Now, if this relation
were to be classed with the approved relations of life, why should the
Apostle have undertaken to awaken compassion for persons, simply because
they were the subject, of it? He never asked for sympathy for persons,
simply because they were parties to the relations of husband and wife,
parent and child. It may be worthy of notice, that the injunction under
consideration is found in Paul's letter to the Jewish Christians. This
attempt to awaken pity in behalf of the slave, and to produce abhorrence
of slavery, was made upon these, and not upon the Gentile Christians;
because, perhaps, that they, who had always possessed the Oracles of
God, could bear it; and they who had just come up out of the mire of
heathenism, could not. If this explanation be just, it enforces my
argument for ascribing to causes, other than the alleged sinfulness of
the institution, the Apostle's omission to utter specific rebukes of
slavery.
5th. Another reason for believing that the slavery modification of
servitude should not be classed with the confessedly proper relations
with which you class it, is the conclusive one, that it interferes with,
and tends to subvert, and does actually subvert, these relations. The
Apostles prescribe duties, which are necessary to sustain these
relations, and make them fruitful sources of happiness to the parties to
them. Among these duties are the following: "Wives, submit yourselves to
your own husbands, as it is fit in the Lord"--"Children, obey your
parents"--"Husbands, dwell with them" (your wives). But slavery, where
it does not make obedience to these commands utterly impossible,
conditions it on the permission of usurpers, who have presumed to step
between the laws of God and those on whom they are intended to bear.
Slavery, not the law of God, practically determines whether husbands
shall dwell with their wives: and an amount of anguish, which God alone
can compute, testifies that slavery has thus determined, times without
number, that husbands shall not dwell with their wives. A distinguished
gentleman, who has been much at the South, is spending a little time in
my family. He told me but this day, that he had frequently known the air
filled with shrieks of anguish for a whole mile around the spot, where,
under the hammer of the auctioneer, the members of a family were
undergoing an endless separation from each other. It was but last week,
that a poor fugitive reached a family, in which God's commands, "Hide
the outcasts, betray not him that wandereth"--"Hide not thyself from thy
own flesh"--are not a dead letter. The heaviest burden of his heart is,
that he has not seen his wife for five years, and does not expect to see
her again: his master, in Virginia, having sold him to a Georgian, and
his wife to an inhabitant of the District of Columbia. Whilst the law of
God requires wives to "submit themselves to their husbands, as it is fit
in the Lord;" the law of slavery commands them, under the most terrific
penalties, to submit to every conceivable form of violence, and the most
loathsome pollution, "as it is fit" in the eyes of slaveholders--no
small proportion of whom are, as a most natural fruit of slavery,
abandoned to brutality and lust. The laws of South Carolina and Georgia
make it an offence punishable with death, "if any slave shall presume to
strike a white person." By the laws of Maryland and Kentucky, it is
enacted "if any negro, mulatto, or Indian, bond or free, shall, at any
time, lift his or her hand in opposition to any person, not being a
negro or Indian, he or she shall, in the first-mentioned State, suffer
the penalty of cropped ears; and, in the other, thirty-nine lashes on
his or her bare back, well laid on, by order of the justice." In
Louisiana there is a law--for the enactment of which, slavery is, of
course, responsible--in these words: "Free people of color ought never
to insult or strike white people, nor presume to conceive themselves
equal to the whites: but, on the contrary, they ought _to yield to them
on every occasion_, and never speak or answer them but with respect,
under the penalty of imprisonment, according to the nature of the
offence." The following extract of a letter, written to me from the
South, by a gentleman who still resides there, serves to show how true
it is, that "on every occasion," the colored person must yield to the
white, and, especially, if the white be clothed with the authority of an
ambassador of Christ. "A negro was executed in Autauga Co., not long
since, for the murder of his master. The latter, it seems, attempted to
violate the wife of his slave in his presence, when the negro enraged,
smote the wretch to the ground. And this master--this brute--this
fiend--was a preacher of the gospel, in regular standing!" In a former
part of this communication, I said enough to show, that slavery prevents
children from complying with the command to obey their parents. But, in
reply to what I have said of these outrages on the rights of husbands
and wives, parents and children, you maintain, that they are no part of
the system of slavery. Slaveholders, however, being themselves judges,
they are a part of it, or, at least, are necessary to uphold it; else
they would not by deliberate, solemn legislation, authorize them. But,
be this as it may, it is abundantly proven, that slavery is, essentially
and inevitably, at war with the sacred rights of the family state. Let
me say, then, in conclusion under this head, that in whatever other
company you put slavery, place it not in that of the just relations of
husband and wife, parent and child. They can no more company with each
other, than can fire with water. Their natures are not only totally
opposite to, but destructive of, each other.
6th. The laws, to which you refer on the sixty-eighth page of your book,
tend to prove, and, so far as your admission of the necessity of them
goes, do prove, that the relation of slaveholder and slave does not
deserve a place, in the class of innocent and proper relations. You
there say, that the writings of "such great and good men as Wesley,
Edwards, Porteus, Paley, Horsley, Scott, Clark, Wilberforce, Sharp,
Clarkson, Fox, Johnson, and a host of as good if not equally great, men
of later date," have made it necessary for the safety of the institution
of slavery, to pass laws, forbidding millions of our countrymen to read.
You should have, also, mentioned the horrid sanctions of these
laws--stripes, imprisonment, and death. Now, these laws disable the
persons on whom they bear, from fulfilling God's commandments, and,
especially, His commandment to "search the Scriptures." They are,
therefore, wicked. What then, in its moral character, must be a
relation, which, to sustain it, requires the aid of wicked laws?--and,
how entirely out of place must it be, when you class it with those just
relations of life, that, certainly, require none of the support, which,
you admit, is indispensable to the preservation of the relation of
slaveholder and slave! It is true, that you attempt to justify the
enactment of the laws in question, by the occasions which you say led to
it. But, every law forbidding what God requires, is a wicked law--under
whatever pretexts, or for whatever purposes, it may have been enacted.
Let the occasions which lead to a wicked measure be what they may, the
wickedness of the measure is still sufficient to condemn it.
In the case before us, we see how differently different persons are
affected by the same fact. Whilst the stand taken against slavery by
Wesley, Edwards, and the other choice spirits you enumerate, serves but
to inspire you with concern for its safety, it would, of itself, and
without knowing their reasons for it, be well nigh enough to destroy my
confidence in the institution. Let me ask you, Sir, whether it would not
be more reasonable for those, who are so industriously engaged in
insulating the system of American slavery, and shrouding it with
darkness, to find less fault with the bright and burning light which the
writings of the wisest and best men pour upon it, and more with the
system which "hateth the light, neither cometh to the light."