SPEECH IN THE SENATE, ON THE HOUSE BILL FOR THE CONFISCATION OF
PROPERTY AND THE LIBERATION OF SLAVES BELONGING TO REBELS, JUNE 27,
1862.
This speech is a supplement to that of May 19th, on the “Rights
of Sovereignty and Rights of War.” Its occasion is explained in
the Introduction to the latter speech.[82]
* * * * *
The New York _Independent_ published it at length, and thus
characterized it:--
“It is the most complete presentation of the question
that can be found within the same compass, and, like all
Mr. Sumner’s speeches, is distinguished for accuracy
of statement, learning, and sound principle. It is a
defence of the present position of our Government, as
defined by Act of Congress, to which every citizen owes
obedience. In efficacy, that Act will go with our armies,
as they advance, and will clear up the perplexities of
our Generals, and clear their minds of certain political
superstitions by which they have been hampered and
hindered, to the great injury of our military operations.
Let the people of Massachusetts, in particular, exult, as
they observe, in regard to this, as well as most other
leading measures of Congress, how the views of their great
Senator became, step by step, the recognized and settled
policy of the Government; and let them thank God that the
good old Bay State has such a representative, and furnishes
such a leader in this great extremity.”
MR. PRESIDENT,--Too tardily the house of a Rebel General in
Virginia[83] has been taken by the Government, and set apart as a
military hospital for the reception of our soldiers, wounded and maimed
in battle. At least three churches here in Washington have been seized
and occupied for the same purpose. All applaud these acts, which
make the house more historic and the churches more sacred than ever
before. But pray, Sir, under what authority is all this? Not according
to any contract or agreement; not according to any “due process of
law”; not even according to any statute. And yet the language of
the Constitution is positive: “No soldier shall in time of peace be
quartered _in any house_, without the consent of the owner; nor in
time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.” If it be time
of peace now, then is the Constitution violated by quartering soldiers
in these houses without the consent of the owner. If it be time of war
now, then is the Constitution violated by quartering these soldiers
in a manner not prescribed by law,--unless we are ready to admit that
the provisions of the Constitution are entirely inapplicable to what
is done under the military requirements of self-defence, which is a
supreme law, above all other laws or constitutions devised by men. But
if the Constitution, in a case where it is singularly explicit, can
be disregarded without question in the exercise of the Rights of War,
it is vain to invoke its provisions in other cases, where it is less
explicit, in restraint of the Rights of War.
It is true that the Constitution ambiguously provides against certain
forfeitures, as incident to an “attainder of treason”; it also
positively prohibits “_ex post facto_ laws”; and it nobly declares that
“no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.” But nothing in the House bills for the confiscation of
property or the liberation of slaves is obnoxious to either of these
provisions. There is no attainder of treason, no _ex post facto_ law,
and no taking of property without due process of law; for the judicial
proceedings which these bills institute are competent for the purpose.
The House bills are not criminal statutes, nor do they institute
criminal proceedings. Therefore do I assert unhesitatingly that these
bills are above constitutional objection. They are as constitutional
as the Constitution itself. It was once said of a subtile spirit of
criticism, that it would find a heresy in the Lord’s Prayer; and such a
spirit, permit me to say, is needed to find anything unconstitutional
in these bills.
Here I assume, as a cardinal principle of Constitutional Law, that,
whatever may be the condition of slaves in the States and under State
laws, they are, under the Constitution of the United States, _persons_,
and not property; so that, in declaring their emancipation, Congress
is not constrained by any constitutional requirements with regard to
property. Whatever the claims of property, slaves are men; and I but
repeat an unquestionable truth of morals, confirmed by the Declaration
of Independence, when I say that there can be no property in men.
Mr. Winter Davis,[84] of Baltimore, has reminded the country, that
Congress, on the motion of Mr. Clay, once undertook to declare the
freedom of slaves without any “due process of law”; and the present
Congress, by a bill of the last session, setting free slaves actually
employed in the Rebellion,[85] has done the same thing; so that the
principle is completely established.
Even if the bills seemed obnoxious to certain constitutional
provisions,--as they clearly are not,--this objection and every
other objection will disappear, when it is understood that they are
_war measures_, derived from the capacious War Powers of Congress,
applicable only to public enemies, and limited in duration to the
war. Considered in these aspects and with these qualifications, these
bills are only an agency in the prosecution of the war, and the power
to enact them is as clear as the power to raise armies or to levy
taxes. An ancient historian, in words adopted by the greatest modern
publicist, has told us that “war has its laws, no less than peace.”[86]
These words are placed by Grotius at the head of his great work, and
they embody a fundamental principle. The Rights of War are not less
peculiar than the victories of war, which are so widely different from
the victories of peace.
Pray, Sir, where in the Constitution is any limitation of the War
Powers? Let Senators who would limit them mention a single section,
line, or phrase, which even hints at any limitation. If it be
constitutional to make war, to set armies in the field, to launch
navies, to occupy fields and houses, to bombard cities, to kill in
battle,--all without trial by jury, or any process of law, or judicial
proceeding of any kind,--it is equally constitutional, as a war
measure, to confiscate the property of the enemy and to liberate his
slaves. Nor can it be doubted on principle, that, if the latter be
unconstitutional, then are all other acts of war unconstitutional. You
may condemn confiscation and liberation as impolitic, but you cannot
condemn them as unconstitutional, unless, in the same breath, you
condemn all other agencies of war, and resolve our present proceeding
into the process of a criminal court, guarded at each step by the
technicalities of the Common Law.
Sir, I speak frankly, according to my convictions, claiming nothing
for myself which I do not freely accord to others. In this discussion
there is no need of sharp words or of personal allusions; nor can
anything be gained by misstatement of the position of another. It is
easy to say that Senators who insist upon the War Powers of Congress
are indifferent to the Constitution; but I do not admit that any
Senator is more anxious for the Constitution than myself. The War
Powers are derived from the Constitution, but, when once set in motion,
are without any restraint from the Constitution; so that what is done
in pursuance of them is at the same time _under_ the Constitution
and _outside_ the Constitution. It is under the Constitution in its
beginning and origin; it is outside the Constitution in the latitude
with which it is conducted; but, whether under the Constitution or
outside the Constitution, all that is done in pursuance of the War
Powers is constitutional. It is easy to cry out against it; it is easy,
by misapplication of the Constitution, to call it in question; but it
is only by such misapplication, or by senseless cry, that its complete
constitutionality can for a moment be drawn into doubt.
The language of the Constitution is plain and ample. It confers upon
Congress all the specific powers incident to war, and then further
authorizes it “to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into execution the foregoing powers.” Here are the precise
words:--
“The Congress shall have power … to declare war, grant letters
of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures
on land and water; to raise and support armies; … to provide
and maintain a navy; to make rules for the government and
regulation of the land and naval forces; to provide for calling
forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress
insurrections, and repel invasions; … _to make all laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution
the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this
Constitution_ in the Government of the United States, or in any
department _or officer thereof_.”
Can language be clearer? Other parts of the Constitution may be open
to question; but here is no room for question. The text is full and
unequivocal. The powers are enumerated. Without stopping to consider
them in detail, it will be seen that the most important are exclusively
incident to a state of war, and not to a state of peace. A declaration
of war is of course war, and “all laws necessary and proper for
carrying into execution” this declaration are called into being by the
war. Rules concerning captures on land and water are from necessity
dormant, till aroused by war; but when aroused, they are, like other
War Powers, without check from those constitutional provisions which,
just so long as peace prevails, are the boast of the citizen.
The War Powers conferred upon Congress by the Constitution were well
known; they had been conferred upon Congress by the earlier Articles of
Confederation. The language of the latter was full and explicit with
regard to captures.
“The United States in Congress assembled shall have the
sole and exclusive right and power of determining on peace
and war, … of establishing rules for deciding in all cases
_what captures on land or water shall be legal_, and in what
manner prizes taken by land or naval forces in the service
of the United States shall be divided or appropriated, … and
establishing courts for receiving and determining finally
_appeals in all cases of captures_.”[87]
The language subsequently employed in the Constitution is identical in
substance. It is evident that the framers of the Constitution had the
Articles of Confederation in mind, when they vested in Congress power
to “make rules concerning captures on land and water.”
The bills now under consideration are obviously founded on the War
Powers. The first section of the first bill begins as follows.
“That all the estate and property, money, stocks, credits,
and effects of the persons hereafter named in this section
are hereby forfeited to the Government of the United States,
_and are declared lawful subjects of seizure, and of prize and
capture, wherever found, for the indemnity of the United States
against the expenses of suppressing the present Rebellion_.”
The Senator must be very hardy who denies the power of Congress, in the
exercise of belligerent rights, to pass such a bill; and he must be
equally hardy, when he insists that belligerent rights are impaired by
any limitations of the Constitution.
If the enemies against whom we now wage war were not our own
fellow-citizens, if they were aliens unhappily fastened for the time on
our territory, there would be no fine-spun question of constitutional
immunity. Such immunities are essentially municipal in character; but
a public enemy can claim nothing merely municipal. The immunities he
enjoys are such only as are conceded by the Rights of War,--nor more,
nor less. As a public enemy, he seeks to subvert our Government, its
laws and its Constitution; and in this warfare he proceeds according to
the Rights of War, indifferent to any mere local law. But if the war on
our part were in accordance with mere local law, and in subordination
to provisions of the Constitution devised for peace, it is evident that
the National Government would be unable to cope with its enemy. It
would enter into battle with hands tied behind the back. Of course, in
warfare with people of another country Senators would not require any
such self-sacrifice.
But the Rights of War are fixed, whether against alien enemies
or against enemies whose hostility is aggravated by the guilt of
rebellion, with this single difference, that against rebel enemies
these rights would seem to be more complete and unsparing. Show me any
Right of War which may be employed against alien enemies, and now, in
the name of the Constitution, I insist upon its employment against
rebels arrayed as enemies. Because enemies are also rebels, they are
not on this account any the less enemies. Because rebels are also
enemies, they are not on this account any the less rebels. The double
character which they bear increases their liabilities, subjecting them
to all the penalties of war enhanced by those personal responsibilities
which every partaker in rebellion necessarily assumes.
And yet, Sir, the Constitution is cited as a limitation upon these
rights. As well cite the Constitution on the field of battle to check
the bayonet charge of our armies, or at the bombardment of a fortress
to stay the fiery rain of shells; or, to adopt the examples with which
I began, as well cite the Constitution to prevent the occupation of
churches here in Washington as hospitals for our soldiers, or to
save the house of General Lee in Virginia from similar dedication.
The Constitution is entirely inapplicable. Sacred and inviolable,
the Constitution is made for friends who acknowledge it, and not
for enemies who disavow it; and it is made for a state of peace,
and not for the fearful exigencies of war, treading down within its
sphere all rights except the Rights of War. Born of violence, and
looking to violence for victory, war discards all limitations except
such as are supplied by the Rights of War. Once begun, war is a law
unto itself,--or, in other words, it has a law of its own, which
is part of itself. And just in proportion as you seek to moderate
it by constitutional limitations do you take from war something of
its efficiency. In vain do you equip our soldiers with the best of
weapons, or send into the field the most powerful batteries, the latest
invention of consummate science, if you direct them all in full career
to stand still for an indictment, or other “due process of law,” or, at
least, for the reading of the Riot Act. Undertaking to limit the Rights
of War by the Constitution, where are you to stop? If the Constitution
can interfere with one, it can interfere with all. If the Constitution
can wrest from Government the weapons of confiscation and liberation,
there is no other weapon in the whole arsenal of war which it may not
take also.
Sir, the Constitution is guilty of no such absurdity. It was made
by practical men, familiar with public law, who, seeing clearly the
difference between peace and war, established powers accordingly. While
circumscribing the Peace Powers with constitutional checks, they left
untouched the War Powers. They declared, that, in the administration
of the Peace Powers, all should be able to invoke the Constitution as
a constant safeguard. But in bestowing upon the Government War Powers
without limitation, they embodied in the Constitution all the Rights of
War as completely as if those rights had been severally set down and
enumerated; and among the first of these is the right to disregard the
Rights of Peace. In saying this I fail in no sympathy with peace, which
I seek and reverence always, but simply exhibit war in some of its
essential conditions. Sir, an alien enemy is not admitted even to sue
in your courts.
There is a saying of Antiquity, already quoted in this debate, _Silent
leges inter arma_,--“The laws are silent in the midst of arms.”[88]
Handed down from distant ages, and repeated by successive generations,
this saying may be accepted as the embodied result and very essence of
human experience. Had it not been true, it would have been forgotten,
or at least ceased to be repeated. But it declares a truth to which
every war practically testifies, while it is founded in reason and the
nature of things, confirmed by centuries as attesting witnesses. The
Constitution itself is only a human law; nor can it claim to speak in
time of war, and within the sphere of war, more than any other human
law.
How vain, then, to adduce against confiscation and liberation, as
war measures, an objection derived from the Constitution! and how
vain, also, to offer a penal statute, under the Peace Powers of the
Constitution, as a war measure! War is war. Better arrest it at once,
if it is to be war on the one side and peace on the other,--if our
enemies are to employ against us all the Rights of War, while we employ
against them only the Rights of Peace. Penal statutes are good for
peace, when laws prevail; but in the midst of war, and against enemies,
when laws are proverbially silent, they are absurd. What enemy now
arrayed in arms can be indicted, or, if indicted, convicted, under the
most stringent of penal statutes? Not Jefferson Davis himself. Why,
then, painfully construct legislative verbiage? Why new penalties for
treason, which, from the nature of the case, cannot be enforced in this
hour of need? Why not see things as they are, and do what the moment
requires? The War Powers of Congress are ample; but in time of war a
mere penal statute against a public enemy is not so much as a pop-gun.
* * * * *
There are Senators who claim these vast War Powers for the
President, and deny them to Congress. The President, it is said, as
commander-in-chief, may seize, confiscate, and liberate under the
Rights of War, but Congress cannot direct these things to be done.
Pray, Sir, where is the limitation upon Congress? Read the text of the
Constitution, and you will find its powers vast as all the requirements
of war. There is nothing that may be done anywhere under the Rights of
War, which may not be done by Congress. I do not mean to question the
powers of the President in his sphere, or of any military commander
within his department; but I claim for Congress all that belongs to
any Government in the exercise of the Rights of War. And when I speak
of Congress, let it be understood that I mean _an Act of Congress_,
passed, according to the requirements of the Constitution, by both
Houses, and approved by the President. It seems strange to claim for
the President alone, in the exercise of his single will, War Powers
alleged to be denied to the President in association with Congress.
If he can wield these powers alone, surely he can wield them in
association with Congress; nor will their efficacy be impaired, when it
is known that they proceed from this associate will, rather than from
his single will alone. The Government of the United States appears most
completely in an Act of Congress. Therefore war is declared, armies are
raised, rules concerning captures are made, and all articles of war
regulating the conduct of war are established by Act of Congress. It
is by Act of Congress that the War Powers are all put in motion. When
once put in motion, the President must execute them. But he is only the
instrument of Congress, under the Constitution.
It is true, the President is commander-in-chief; but it is for Congress
to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution his
powers, so that, according to the very words of the Constitution, his
powers depend upon Congress, which may limit or enlarge them at its own
pleasure. Thus, whether you regard Congress or regard the President,
you will find that Congress is the arbiter and regulator of the War
Powers.
Of the pretension that all these enormous powers belong to the
President, and not to Congress, I try to speak calmly and within
bounds. I mean always to be parliamentary. But a pretension so
irrational and unconstitutional, so absurd and tyrannical, is not
entitled to respect. The Senator from Ohio [Mr. WADE], in indignant
words worthy of the Senate, has branded it as slavish, and handed it
over to judgment. Born in ignorance, and pernicious in consequences,
it ought to be received most sternly, and, just in proportion as it
obtains acceptance, with execration. Such a pretension would change
the National Government from a government of law to that of a military
dictator. It would degrade our proud Constitutional Republic, where
each department has its appointed place, to one of those short-lived,
vulgar despotisms appearing occasionally as a warning to mankind. That
this pretension should be put forward in the name of the Constitution
is only another illustration of the effrontery with which the
Constitution is made responsible for the ignorance, the conceit, and
the passions of men. Sir, in the name of the Constitution, which I
have sworn to support, and which, according to my ability, I mean to
maintain, I protest against this new-fangled effort to foist into it a
pretension abhorrent to liberty, reason, and common sense.
* * * * *
At the risk of repetition, but for the sake of clearness, I repeat the
propositions on which I confidently rest.
1. Rights of Sovereignty are derived from the Constitution, and can be
exercised only in conformity with the requirements of the Constitution;
so that all penal statutes punishing treason must carefully comply with
these requirements. This is the case of the bill introduced by the
Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. CLARK].
2. Rights of War are under the Constitution in their origin, but
outside the Constitution in their execution. In other words, the
Constitution confers Rights of War, but sets no limits to them; so
that statutes to enforce them are not mere penal statutes, restricted
by the Constitution. But these rights belong to a state of war, and
necessarily cease with the war. This is the case of the House bill
under discussion.
3. All rebels are criminals, liable to punishment according to penal
statutes; and in all proceedings against them, as such, they are
surrounded by the safeguards of the Constitution.
4. Rebels in arms are public enemies, who can claim no safeguard from
the Constitution; and they may be pursued and conquered according to
the Rights of War.
5. Rights of War may be enforced by Act of Congress, which is the
highest form of the national will.
If these conclusions needed the support of authority, they would find
it in John Quincy Adams. His words have been often quoted, without
perhaps fully considering the great weight to which they are entitled.
At an early day, when Minister at London, while Slavery prevailed in
the Government, in the discharge of official duties, under instructions
from the President, he claimed compensation for slaves liberated by
the British armies, arguing against any such liberation under the
Rights of War. In conversation with the British Prime-Minister, as
reported by himself, after saying that proclamations inviting slaves
to desert from their masters had been issued by British officers, he
added: “_We_ considered them as deviations from the usages of war.”[89]
Afterwards, as Secretary of State under Mr. Monroe, of Virginia, he
made a similar statement.[90] A full knowledge of his convictions on
this occasion might, perhaps, disclose the repugnance, or, to borrow
his own words on another occasion, “the bitterness of soul,” with
which he discharged his duty. It is known, by avowals afterwards made,
that on at least one occasion he acted as Secretary of State contrary
to his convictions. “It was utterly against my judgment and wishes, but
I was obliged to submit, and I prepared the requisite despatches.”[91]
Such was his open declaration in the House of Representatives with
regard to an important negotiation. So that it is easy to see how on
this other occasion he may have represented the Government and not
himself. But, whatever his actions at that time, it is beyond question,
that afterwards, in his glorious career as Representative, when larger
experience and still maturer years had added to his great authority,
and he was called in Congress to express himself on his personal
responsibility, we find him reconsidering his earlier diplomatic
arguments, and, in the face of the world, defiantly claiming not only
for Congress, but for the President, and every military commander
within his department, full power to emancipate slaves under the
Rights of War. If these words had been hastily uttered, or, if once
uttered, had been afterwards abandoned, or if they could in any way be
associated with the passions or ardors of controversy, as his earlier
words were clearly associated with the duties of advocacy, they might
be entitled to less consideration. But they are among the later and
most memorable utterances of our great master of the Law of Nations,
made under circumstances of peculiar solemnity, and repeated after
intervals of time.[92]
…
The representatives of Slavery broke forth in characteristic outrage
upon the venerable orator, but nobody answered him. And these words
have stood ever since as a landmark of public law. You cannot deny
the power of Congress to liberate the slaves, without removing this
landmark. Vain work! It is not less firm than the Constitution itself.
* * * * *
Thus do I vindicate for Congress all the Rights of War. If, assuming
the powers of Congress, any further question be raised as to the extent
of these rights, I reply, briefly, that there is no right, according to
received authorities, against a hostile sovereign or prince, embracing,
of course, confiscation of property, real as well as personal, which
may not in our discretion be exercised against a rebel enemy; and
the reason is obvious. Whatever the mitigations of the Rights of War
introduced by modern civilization, under which private property in
certain cases is exempt from confiscation, _this rule does not apply
to cases where there is a direct personal responsibility for the war_.
And here is the precise difference between the responsibility of the
sovereign or prince and the responsibility of the private citizen:
the private citizen is excused; but the sovereign or prince is always
held responsible to the full extent of his property, real as well as
personal. Now every rebel who has voluntarily become a public enemy
has assumed a _personal responsibility_, for which, according to
acknowledged principles of public law, especially if he has taken high
office in the rebel government, he is liable to the full extent of his
property, real as well as personal. Every citizen who voluntarily aids
in armed rebellion is a hostile sovereign or prince. A generous lenity
may interfere to limit his liability, but on principles of public law
he is in the very condition of Shylock, when his cruelty was arrested
by the righteous judge:--
“If thou dost shed
One drop of Christian blood, thy lands and goods
Are by the laws of Venice _confiscate_
Unto the State of Venice.”
Such, Sir, is the extent of powers which may be exercised by Congress.
Of course, it is for Congress to determine the degree of severity or
lenity it will adopt. In claiming these powers to the full extent, I
yield to no Senator in that spirit of clemency which, next to justice,
is the grace and ornament of success.
* * * * *
Mr. President, these are the principles on which we must act.
Announcing them and reducing them to practice, Congress will enlarge
its accumulating claims to public gratitude.
The present Congress has already done much beyond any other Congress
in our history. Measures, which for long years seemed attainable
only to the most sanguine hope, have triumphed. Emancipation in the
National Capital; freedom in all the National Territories; the offer
of ransom to help emancipation in the States; the recognition of Hayti
and Liberia; the treaty with Great Britain for the suppression of
the slave-trade; the prohibition of the return of fugitive slaves by
military officers; homesteads for actual settlers on the public lands;
a Pacific railroad; endowments of agricultural colleges out of the
public lands: such are some of the achievements by which the present
Congress is already historic. There have been victories of war, won
on hard-fought fields, but none comparable to the victories of peace.
Besides these measures of unmixed beneficence, the present Congress has
created an immense army and a considerable navy, and has provided the
means for all our gigantic expenditures by a tax, which in itself is an
epoch.
Thus, in the prosecution of the war, Congress has exercised two great
powers,--first, to raise armies, and, secondly, to tax. Both bear
directly upon loyal fellow-citizens everywhere throughout the country.
Sons, brothers, and husbands are taken from happy homes and from the
concerns of business, leaving vacant places, never, perhaps, to be
filled again, and hurried away to wage a fearful war. But beyond this
unequalled draft upon the loyal men of the country, summoning them to
the hazards of battle, there is another unequalled draft upon the loyal
property of the country, presenting a combined draft without precedent
upon men and upon property. If you would find a parallel to the armies
raised, you must go back to the forces marshalled under Napoleon in the
indulgence of unbridled ambition. If you would find a parallel to the
tax, you must go further back, to that early day of which the Gospel,
in its simple narrative, speaks: “And it came to pass in those days
that there went out a decree from Cæsar Augustus, that _all the world_
should be taxed.” A similar decree is about to go out from you,--not,
indeed, to tax all the world, but to tax a large and generous people:
vast, it may be, even for the world. There have been taxes here before;
and in other countries there have been taxes as enormous: but there
has been no such tax here before; and in no other country has any such
tax been levied at once, without the preparation and education of
long-continued taxation.
* * * * *
Confiscation and liberation are other War Powers of Congress, incident
to the general grant of such powers, which it remains for us to employ.
So important are they, that without them I fear all the rest will be in
vain. Yes, Sir, in vain do we gather mighty armies, and in vain do we
tax our people, unless we are ready to grasp these other means, through
which the war can be carried to the homes of the Rebellion: I mean
especially the criminal homes of the authors and leaders of all this
wickedness. By the confiscation of property, the large Rebel estates,
where treason laid its eggs, will be broken up, while by the liberation
of slaves the Rebels will be deprived of an invaluable ally, whether in
labor or in battle. But I confess frankly that I look with more hope
and confidence to liberation than to confiscation. To give freedom is
nobler than to take property, and on this occasion it cannot fail to
be more efficacious, for in this way the rear-guard of the Rebellion
will be changed into the advance-guard of the Union. There is in
confiscation, unless when directed against the criminal authors of the
Rebellion, a harshness inconsistent with that mercy which it is always
a sacred duty to cultivate, and which should be manifest in proportion
to our triumphs, “mightiest in the mightiest.” But liberation is not
harsh, and it is certain, if properly conducted, to carry with it the
smiles of a benignant Providence.
The war began in Slavery, and it can end only with the end of Slavery.
It was set in motion and organized by the Slave Oligarchy, and it
cannot die except with this accursed Oligarchy. Therefore, for the
sake of peace, and to restore the Union, every power should be enlisted
by which Slavery, which is the soul of the war, can be reached. Are
you in earnest? Then strike at Slavery. Liberation is usually known as
a charity; but while none the less a charity, comprehending all other
charities, it is now, in the course of events, _a necessity of war_.
Through liberation alone can we obtain that complete triumph, bringing
with it assured tranquillity, without which the war will stop merely to
break forth anew, and peace will be nothing but an uneasy truce. Among
all the powers of Congress incident to our unparalleled condition,
there is none so far-reaching, as there is none so beneficent,--there
is none so potent to beat down rebellion, as there is none other
by which peace can be made truly secure. Powerful and beautiful
prerogative! The language of Chatham is not misapplied, when I call it
the “master feather of the eagle’s wing.”