MR. PRESIDENT,--A tax of ten dollars on account of each slave will
give $40,000,000. And in putting the tax at ten dollars I follow the
precedent of the Constitution, which taxes slaves imported at ten
dollars. I do not disguise that on this question I have shared the
doubts of others. Of course, no tax would be tolerable which gave
any sanction to property in man; and it has been feared that a tax
on slaves might be interpreted into such sanction. This fear is not
unnatural to persons shocked by the idea of Slavery. It was early
avowed by Roger Sherman, of Connecticut, whose sensibility is recorded
by Madison in his report of the debates in the Federal Convention.
“He was opposed to a tax on slaves imported, as making the
matter worse, because it implied they were property.”[62]
Again, a few days later, when the same clause of the Constitution was
under discussion, Mr. Sherman repeated his objection, and the following
debate occurred, which seems to exhaust the argument on both sides.
“MR. SHERMAN was against this second part, as acknowledging men
to be property, by taxing them as such under the character of
slaves.
“COLONEL MASON. Not to tax will be equivalent to a bounty on
the importation of slaves.
“MR. GORHAM thought that Mr. Sherman should consider the
duty, _not as implying that slaves are property_, but as a
discouragement to the importation of them.
“MR. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS remarked, that, as the clause now
stands, it implies that the Legislature may tax freemen
imported.
“MR. SHERMAN, in answer to Mr. Gorham, observed, that the
smallness of the duty showed revenue to be the object, not the
discouragement of the importation.
“MR. MADISON thought it wrong to admit in the Constitution the
idea that there could be property in men. The reason of duties
did not hold, as slaves are not, like merchandise, consumed, &c.
“COLONEL MASON, in answer to Mr. Gouverneur Morris. The
provision, as it stands, was necessary for the case of
convicts, in order to prevent the introduction of them.”[63]
After this discussion, the clause as found in the Constitution, laying
“a tax or duty on such importation, not exceeding ten dollars for
each person,” was adopted, _nem. con._ Thus it appears that Sherman,
Morris, Franklin, and Gerry, to say nothing of Madison, all known
for opposition to Slavery, and determination to give it no sanction,
concurred in this proposition. They felt that a tax or duty, thus
arranged, was not a sanction of Slavery.
The same question is now presented to us. Clearly there can be no such
thing as property in man. The whole idea is offensive and odious.
There is no revenue, whatever be its amount, to compensate for this
recognition. Better be poor, better be pinched in means, better forego
much needed supplies, than obtain help through any such sacrifice.
But the same considerations which induced our fathers, with all their
avowed scruples, to sustain such a tax or duty, may properly influence
us.
It is the boast of the Constitution that it knows nobody as a slave.
All are “persons.” But at the same time it does not assume to interfere
with a well-known State institution by which “persons” are degraded to
be property. The condition of the slave is anomalous. He is property by
local law; he is a “person” by the Constitution. But nobody questions
the existence of Slavery. It is a monstrous _fact_, beyond reach in
the States, except through the War Power, and yet none the less a
_fact_, which taxation will only recognize, and not sanction. It is an
intolerable nuisance intrenched in State lines; but we shall not treat
it otherwise than as nuisance, when we tax it. In taxing it we do not
assume its rightfulness; we only assume its undeniable existence as a
_fact_, and nothing else.
If our tax were an encouragement, it would be clearly immoral. But
it is a discouragement. Exemption from taxation is encouragement.
Taxation is discouragement just in proportion to its extent, until, in
the progress of events, it becomes destructive. Regarding the present
question in this light, our course is plain. It is not permissible to
encourage Slavery, while every principle of economy and every sentiment
of justice and humanity urge its discouragement.
But it is said that the Constitution prohibits a capitation tax,
“unless in proportion to the census.” The tax I propose is not a
capitation tax, any more than the tax on auctioneers, or lawyers, or
jugglers, or peddlers, or slaughterers of cattle is a capitation tax.
According to lexicographers, a capitation tax is a poll tax, a tax on
each individual. Now this tax makes no pretension to be a poll tax,
or a tax on each individual. It is a tax on a person who claims the
service or labor of another for life, proportioned to the extent of his
claim. In other words, _it is a tax on a claim of property_; and when I
tax this claim, surely I do not recognize its morality, nor do I accord
to it any sanction.
If it be said, that at one time I insist the slave shall have all the
rights of “persons” under the Constitution, while I now insist that his
master shall pay a tax on his claim of property, I reply, that there
is no inconsistency, but perfect harmony. By an unquestionable rule
of interpretation, applicable to the Constitution, every word must
be construed _in favor of Liberty_, so as most to promote Liberty.
According to this rule, every presumption is in favor of Liberty. But,
while insisting upon every such presumption, it does not follow that
the counter claim shall not be taxed. Indeed, the same principle which
inclines in favor of the slave must incline also to tax the claim
of his master, so long as this claim exists in fact. Freedom is to
be enlarged in every way possible, whether by encouraging the slave
or discouraging the master. Therefore do I say fearlessly, that the
slave, whenever he appears within the national jurisdiction or before
national tribunals, is entitled to all the rights of “persons”; but the
master, who asserts this odious property, cannot claim any immunity for
it on this account. The indulgence is all for the slave, and not at
all for the master. For the slave Congress must do everything in its
power; for the master Congress must have nothing but disapprobation and
discouragement.
These are reasons that influence me, and I present them now in order
to influence those who hesitate to impose this tax, on the old idea of
Roger Sherman, that it will be a recognition of property in man. Of
course, where Senators have no such scruple, the argument for this tax
is unanswerable.
It is easy to levy.
It is profitable.
And so far as it exerts an influence, it must be a discouragement to an
offensive wrong, which is the parent of our present troubles, and the
occasion of all this taxation. It would be strange, if Slavery, after
causing our national calamity, should escape from all its consequences.
It would be strange, if Slavery, which has played the tyrant thus far
in our history, should now, like the tyrant, be so far indulged as to
escape burdens of all kinds. It shall not be by my vote.
Subsequently Mr. Sumner modified his amendment, by accepting
a substitute drawn by Mr. Simmons, of Rhode Island, in behalf
of the Finance Committee, who suggested, that “the section,
as presented by the Senator from Massachusetts, might leave
the slave liable to be sold to pay the tax, and that conflicts
about as much with the Senator’s notions as he could well have
drawn any provision to do so.” Mr. Sumner had no anxiety on
this head, and said at once:--
Perhaps the Senator and myself start from different points. I do not
think the United States can own a slave. I cannot doubt, that, if a
slave should be seized under process of the United States, he would be
taken to Freedom, and not to Slavery, for the simple reason that the
nation cannot own a slave. Therefore any special provision for this
emergency is superfluous. I rest in the conviction, that, when a slave
passes into the hands of the United States, he at once becomes free.
Mr. Sumner added, that the proposition he had presented was “in
the plainest form and fewest words,” and on this account had
merits of its own.
Mr. Collamer hoped Mr. Sumner would accept the substitute,
and thought “ten dollars a head on all ages and conditions an
unreasonable tax.”
The substitute accepted by Mr. Sumner was as follows.
“SEC.--_And be it further enacted_, That an annual tax of
five dollars shall be paid by every person or persons,
corporation, or society, for and on account of the service
or labor of every other person between the ages of ten and
sixty-five years, whose service or labor, for a term of
years or for life, is claimed to be owned by such first
mentioned person or persons, corporation, or society,
whether in a fiduciary capacity or otherwise, under and by
virtue of the laws or customs of any State; and said annual
tax shall be levied and collected of the person or persons,
corporation, or society, making such claim, and of their
goods, chattels, or lands, as is herein before provided;
but in no case shall the person or persons whose service or
labor is so claimed, or their service or labor, be sold for
the purpose of collecting said tax: _Provided_, That this
tax shall not apply to service due to parents.”[64]
Mr. Sherman, of Ohio, took the lead in answer to Mr. Sumner,
and in opposition to his amendment. After insisting that slaves
are “persons,” and that, if the amendment be adopted, “they
will be the only persons taxed under this bill,” he said:--
“If the Senator had made his argument yesterday, when
we proposed to tax cotton, a production which goes into
manufactures, what he has said would apply with great
force. Cotton is a production of slave labor solely.… All
his arguments apply to cotton as a subject of taxation; but
he convinced a majority of the Senate yesterday that it was
not expedient to tax cotton; and now he proposes to tax
slaves, and how?… With all our immense resources, we cannot
now collect it, except from the loyal people who live in
the Border States, who now recognize our flag and are
subject to our law. I am not willing to select them as the
first to bear a heavy and peculiar taxation. I believe that
the true course is to insist upon the tax on cotton.”[65]
The special points of Mr. Sherman’s opposition appear in Mr.
Sumner’s reply.
MR. PRESIDENT,--I will make one remark in reply to the Senator from
Ohio. He objects to my proposition as in the nature of a direct tax, or
poll tax. How is this? Has not the Senator voted to tax auctioneers,
lawyers, jugglers, and slaughterers of cattle, all being classes of
persons in the community?
MR. SHERMAN. To tax their employments.
MR. SUMNER. And I propose to tax the employment of the
slave-master,--that is all. It is the business of the slave-master to
make the slave work. This is his high vocation. In other words, his
business consists in using the service and labor of another. And to
this class of persons he belongs. Is it not plain? Can there be any
doubt? Look at it. He is an auctioneer of human rights, a broker of
human labor, a juggler of human sufferings and human sympathies,--I
might say a slaughterer of human hopes; and, Sir, if the Senator from
Ohio can tax auctioneer, broker, juggler, or slaughterer of cattle,
I am at a loss to understand why he cannot tax the peculiar form of
these vocations all concurring in the slave-master. He is swift to
tax the less, but hesitates to tax the greater. He can tax the petty
employment, which is not immoral or cruel; but he will not tax the
larger multiform employment, in which immorality and cruelty commingle.
But the Senator says it is a capitation or poll tax. Not, Sir, in the
sense of the Constitution. On this I stand. It is simply a tax on a
productive claim of property, or, to borrow the language of the Senator
a moment ago, on an “employment.” It is nothing but that.
The Senator thinks it improper to tax slave-masters, especially when we
have cotton for taxation; and he almost chides me, because yesterday
I was against the cotton tax, which in his judgment is most proper.
Sir, I am at a loss to find the parallel between the two cases implied
in supposing that one can be a substitute for the other. They are
unlike in every respect. Slaves and cotton belong to the same section
of country, precisely as alligators and cotton; and that is all the
parallel between them. Cotton is an agricultural product, entering into
commerce and manufactures, while the manufactures made from it are
important to all classes, but especially the poor. The question of its
taxation involves considerations of economy and policy utterly unlike
those arising on the motion to tax the claim of the slave-master. It
is difficult to see how the two taxes can be confounded. One is a tax
on an agricultural product; the other is a tax on an odious claim.
The Senator will not say that it is an acceptable claim under the
Constitution. Even if there, it is disguised under ambiguous words.
Indeed, he knows well that it is offensive and repugnant to the
conscience of good people. Shall not such a claim be taxed? Shall such
a claim be permitted to go scot-free? Shall we run about the country,
seeking class after class to visit with oppressive taxation, and,
under the lead of the Senator, excuse this largest and most offensive
class of all? I am at a loss to understand on what ground of principle
the Senator can proceed, when he proposes this special immunity. If
I use strong terms in describing slave-masters, it is because the
very language of the bill suggests them, and they are in essential
conformity with truth.
I believe I have answered the two objections made by the Senator from
Ohio. If he made any other, it has escaped my recollection.