MR. PRESIDENT,--The question presented in this resolution has a
practical value to-day, when, here in Washington, we are shocked
by efforts of slave-hunters, coming from an adjoining State, to
carry off human beings as slaves. This is menaced on a large scale.
Whole hecatombs are to be sacrificed. A Philadelphia paper of this
morning, “The Press,” which I find on my table, contains, under the
telegraphic head, an account of certain proceedings instituted by
persons called Commissioners, who have undertaken gravely to decide,
that, in a case of human freedom, “it was discretionary with them to
allow cross-examination as to identity and ownership.” According to
these wise Daniels, a person may be doomed to Slavery, even without
any cross-examination of witnesses against him. The statement of this
assumption shows the outrage which offends justice and common sense,
and, I am happy to believe, the Constitution also, even if it be
assumed that anybody now can be treated as a slave in the District.
The much discussed clause of the Constitution bearing on this question
provides that “no person held to service or labor _in one State_, under
the laws thereof, _escaping into another_, shall, in consequence of any
law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor.”
It will be observed that this is limited to escape _from one State into
another State_. Nothing is said of escape into Territories, or into
the District of Columbia. If made applicable to Territories or the
District, it is only by inference and deduction, and not by virtue of
any express words.
Notwithstanding this omission in the Constitution, the Act of 1793,
providing for the surrender of fugitives from service, was made
applicable to escape into Territories, and this questionable precedent
was followed in the terrible Act of 1850. But neither of these Acts
was made applicable to escape into the District of Columbia. While
Slavery prevailed in the District, it was difficult to raise a question
with regard to the surrender of fugitive slaves. But since Freedom has
happily become the law here, the case is materially changed. Slaves at
last are beginning to have rights. And the question arises, whether,
in the absence of express power in the Constitution, and also in the
absence of express words in any statute, commissioners can undertake
to surrender men into Slavery. Even if there were express words in
the statute, we should be obliged to find express words also in the
Constitution, which is the source of the power. But there are no words
applicable to this pretension either in statute or Constitution.
Sir, I have always understood, that, in the interpretation of statutes,
and especially of the Constitution, every word is to be interpreted in
favor of life and liberty,--_in favorem vitæ ac libertatis_. Indeed,
one of the received maxims of the Common Law says strongly, “Impious
and cruel is he to be adjudged who does not favor Liberty.”[59] If
these maxims are not entirely rejected, it is impossible to find,
either in statute or Constitution, any power to gratify the hunters now
thronging this District in quest of human prey. It is _casus omissus_
in our texts legislative or constitutional, and no commissioner, in the
plenitude of petty power, can undertake to supply words which do not
appear in statute or Constitution. It is for them only to administer
the law as it is, and not to make it, especially against Freedom.
They are not greater than the Constitution; and they should know that
human freedom, in the estimation of every civilized jurisprudence, is
priceless.
The question which I now raise, if I may employ the language of
lawyers, is proper for the courts. A court in Washington, properly
inspired, could not hesitate in its conclusion. It would deny any such
offensive prerogative, unless sanctioned by clear and positive words.
In the absence of such words, it would rejoice to set aside the whole
pretension. It would not hesitate or halt, but it would do it gladly,
generously, justly, and make a new precedent by which civilization
should be advanced. Yet this is too much to expect from the courts of
Washington, whose sense of justice has been enfeebled by the atmosphere
of Slavery.
This pretension is aggravated by the fact that many of these hunters
are notoriously disloyal. Sir, it is hard that our Constitution should
be violated, and men hurried into Slavery, at the trumpery process of
such offensive characters. I think the Committee will find a remedy.
On motion of Mr. Grimes, the resolution was amended by
substituting the Committee on the Judiciary for the Committee
on the District of Columbia, and then agreed to.