before upholders of Determinism? The whole of it turns out to be little
more than a play upon the words "possible" and "actual." Determinism, he
says, professes that "those parts of the universe already laid down
absolutely appoint and decree (Why 'appoint' and 'decree'? Why not the
impersonal word 'determine?') what the other parts shall be." The future
is determined by the past; and given the past, only one future is
possible. Indeterminism says that "the parts have a certain amount of
loose play on one another, so that the laying down of one of them does
not necessarily determine what the others shall be." Thus, still
following Professor James's exposition, given a special instance, both
sides admit the occurrence of a volition. The Determinist asserts that
no other volition could have occurred. The Indeterminist asserts that
another volition might have occurred, other things remaining the same.
And, asks the Professor, can science tell us which is correct? His reply
is, No. "How can any amount of assurance that something actually
happened give us the least grain of information as to whether another
thing might or might not have happened in its place? Only facts can be
proved by other facts. With things that are possibilities and not
facts, facts have no concern."
The position may be made clearer by taking the Professor's own
illustration. When, he says, I leave this lecture hall I may go home
_via_ Divinity Avenue, or traverse Oxford Street. It is a matter of
chance which route is selected. But assume that by some miracle, after
having walked down Divinity Avenue, ten minutes of time are annihilated,
and reaching the Hall door again Oxford Street is the route selected.
Spectators thus have two alternative universes. One universe with the
Professor walking through Divinity Avenue, the other with him walking
through Oxford Street. If the spectators are Determinists they will
believe only one universe to have been from eternity possible. But, asks
Professor James, looking outwardly at these two universes, can anyone
say which is the accidental and which is the necessary one? "In other
words, either universe _after the fact_ and once there would, to our
means of observation and understanding, appear just as rational as the
other." There is no means by which we can distinguish chance from a
rational necessity. A universe which allows a certain loose play of the
parts is as rational as one which submits to the most rigid determinism.
Before dealing with the above, it is necessary to take another phrase on
which much of the above argument depends. Professor James says that the
stronghold of the Determinist sentiment is antipathy to the idea of
"Chance," and chance is a notion not to be entertained by any sane mind.
And the sting, he says, seems to rest on the assumption that chance is
something positive, and if a thing happens by chance it must needs be
irrational and preposterous. But I am not aware that any scientific
Determinist ever used "chance" as being a positive term at all.
Certainly the last thing the present writer would dream of doing would
be to predicate chance of any portion of the objective universe
whatsoever. The only legitimate use of the word is in reference to _the
state of our knowledge concerning phenomena_. To say that a thing
chanced, or happened by chance, is only saying that we are not aware of
the causes that produced it. We say nothing of the thing itself, we only
express the state of our mind in relation to it.
Professor James says all you mean by "chance" is that a thing is not
guaranteed, it may fall out otherwise. Not guaranteed by our knowledge
about the thing, certainly; in any other sense, his definition seems
invented for the express purpose of bolstering up his hypothesis. For,
he says, a chance thing means that the general system of things has no
hold on it. It appears in relation to other things, but it escapes their
determining influence, and appears as "a free gift." Thus whether he
walked down Divinity Avenue or Oxford Street was a matter of chance; and
the future of the world is full of similar chances--events that may take
one of several forms, either of which is consistent with the whole.
We now have the essence of Professor James's case, and can consider it
in detail. First of all we may note the curiously double sense in which
Professor James uses the word "fact" and the agility with which he skips
from one meaning to another, as it suits his argument. In a broad and
general sense a mental fact is as much a fact as any other fact. A man
riding on horseback is a fact. My vision or conception of a horse with
the head of a man is equally a fact, though nothing like it exists in
nature. We should discriminate between the two by saying that one is a
mental fact strictly relative to a particular mind, the other is an
objective fact relative to all minds normally constituted. Now science
does not deny possibilities as _mental facts_. But it would be a very
queer science indeed that allowed all sorts of possibilities of a given
group of phenomena _under identical conditions_. Like "chance," the
possibilities of the Universe are strictly relative to our knowledge
concerning it. If opposite things appear equally possible, it is only
because we are not sufficiently conversant with the processes to say
which thing is certain. A universe with Professor James walking down
Divinity Avenue appears as orderly and as natural as one with him
parading Oxford Street. But this is because we cannot unravel the
complex conditions that may determine the selection of one route or the
other. Or if it be said in reply, that the walker is unaware of any
choice in the matter, the answer is that there is present the desire to
get away from the lecture hall and arrive at home, and this is strong
enough to make the choice of means to that end unimportant. If the
choice lay between walking down a sunlit street or wading through a mile
of water, five feet deep, while the latter would still remain a
possibility, since it could be done were the inducement to do it strong
enough, there is not much doubt as to what the choice would actually be.
The complete reply therefore to Professor James's illustration is that
from the standpoint of mere possibility, bearing in mind the proper
significance of possibility, opposite alternatives may be equally real.
We can, that is, conceive conditions under which a certain thing may
occur, and we can conceive another set of conditions under which exactly
the opposite may occur. And either alternative presents us with a
universe that is equally "rational," because in either case we vary the
co-operating conditions in order to produce the imagined consequence.
But given a complete knowledge of all the co-operating conditions, and
not only do two views of the universe cease to be equally rational, but
one of them ceases to be even conceivable. For let us note that the
resultant of any calculation is no more and no less than a synthesis of
the factors that are included in the calculation. If we do not
understand the factors included in a given synthesis it will be a matter
of "chance" what the resultant may be. But if we do understand the
nature of the factors, and the consequence of their synthesis,
possibility and actuality become convertible terms. Finally, whether a
man on leaving a lecture hall turns to the right or the left appears,
under ordinary conditions, equally rational and natural only because we
are aware that it may be a matter of indifference which direction he
takes, and in that case his action will be governed by the simple
desire to get away, or to get to a particular spot. It is a simple
deduction from experience presented by Professor James in a needlessly
confusing manner.
The next, and practically the only example cited by Professor James to
prove that this world is a world of "chances," is concerned with a
question of morals. We constantly, he says, have occasion to make
"judgments of regret." In illustration of this, he cites the case of a
particularly brutal murder, and adds, "We feel that, although a perfect
mechanical fit to the rest of the universe, it is a bad moral fit, and
that something else would really have been better in its place." But
"calling a thing bad means, if it means anything at all, that the thing
ought not to be, that something else ought to be in its stead." If
Determinism denies this it is defining the universe as a place "in which
what ought to be is impossible," and this lands us in pessimism, or if
we are to escape pessimism we can only do so by abandoning the judgment
of regret. But if our regrets are necessitated nothing else can be in
their place, and the universe is what it was before--a place in which
what ought to be appears impossible. Murder and treachery cannot be good
without regret being bad, regret cannot be good without murder and
treachery being bad. As both, however, are foredoomed, something must be
fatally wrong and absurd in the world.
Now, I must confess all this seems a deal of bother concerning a fairly
simple matter. Indeed, Professor James seems to be engaged in raising a
dust and then complaining of the murkiness of the atmosphere. Coming
from a writer of less standing I might, in view of what has been said
elsewhere in this essay, have left the reply to the careful reader's
understanding of the subject. But from so eminent a psychologist as
William James, silence might well be construed as deterministic
inability to reply to the position laid down.
In the first place, I may be pardoned for again reminding the reader
that, in this connection, "ought" stands upon precisely the same level
as "possible." Whether we say that a man ought to do a certain thing, or
that it is possible for him to do a certain thing, we are making
identical statements, for no one would dream of saying that a man ought
to do that which it is impossible for him to perform. When we say that
murder and treachery ought not to be, we do not imply--if we use
language properly--that these are not as much part of the cosmic order,
and as much the expression of co-operating conditions, as are kindness
and loyalty. It is saying no more than that in our judgment human nature
may be so trained and conditioned as to practise neither murder nor
treachery. We are expressing a judgment as to what our ideal of human
nature is, and our ideal of what human nature should be is based upon
what experience has taught us concerning its possibilities. Man's
"judgment of regret" is justifiable and admirable, not because he
recognizes that the past could have been different from what it was, but
because it furnishes him with the requisite experience for a better
direction of action in the future, and because the feeling of regret is
itself one of the determining conditions that will decide conduct in
the future.
"The question," says Professor James, "is of things, not of eulogistic
names for them." With this I cordially agree; but in that case what are
we to make of the following:--
"The only consistent way of representing ... a world whose parts
may affect one another through their conduct being either good
or bad is the indeterminate way. What interest, zest, or
excitement can there be in achieving the right way, unless we
are enabled to feel that the wrong way is also a possible and a
natural way--nay, more, a menacing and an imminent way? And what
sense can there be in condemning ourselves for taking the wrong
way, unless we need have done nothing of the sort, unless the
right way was open to us as well? I cannot understand the
willingness to act, no matter how we feel, without the belief
that acts are really good or bad. I cannot understand the belief
that an act is bad, without regret at its happening. I cannot
understand regret without the admission of real genuine
possibilities in the world."
Eliminate from this all that is matter of common agreement between
Determinists and Indeterminists, and what have we left but sheer verbal
confusion? The pleasurable feeling that results from a sense of
achievement is real no matter what are the lines on which the universe
is constructed. One might as reasonably ask, Why feel a greater
interest in a first-class orchestral performance, than in the harmonic
outrages of a hurdy-gurdy, since both are, from the physical side,
vibratory phenomena? And is it not clear, to repeat a truth already
emphasized, that a most important factor in our condemning ourselves for
doing a wrong action is the fact that we have done so. It is one of the
determining conditions of doing better actions in future. Of course,
Professor James cannot understand the belief that an act is bad, without
regret at its happening. Neither can anyone else, for the simple reason
that one involves the other. The statement is as much a truism as is the
one that we can have no willingness to act unless we believe that acts
are either good or bad. Equally true is it that regret implies real
possibilities in the world--not always, though, for we may regret death
or the radiation into extra terrestrial space of solar energy without
believing that the prevention of either is possible. But our
possibilities in relation to conduct do not, as the argument implies,
relate to the past, but to the future. Indeed, the sense of possibility
would be morally worthless were it otherwise.
Finally, and this brings me to what is one of the cardinal weaknesses of
so much of the writing on psychology, Professor James's argument is
vitiated by non-recognition of the fact that regret and satisfaction,
praise and blame, with most of the cardinal moral qualities, are
_social_ in their origin and application. They represent the reaction of
our social feelings against anti-social conduct, or their expression of
satisfaction at conduct of an opposite character. They are consequently
the creations, not of an indwelling "will," but of an outdwelling social
relationship. They are not impressed by the "ego" upon the world, they
are impressed by the world upon the ego. Character is not something that
each individual brings ready fashioned to the service of society; it is
something that society itself creates. It has been fashioned by
countless generations of social evolution, and, in the main, that
evolution has of necessity placed due emphasis upon those intellectual
and moral qualities on which social welfare depends.
VI.
THE NATURE AND IMPLICATIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY.
If Hume was not right in asserting that a few intelligible definitions
would put an end to the Free-Will controversy, his error lay in assuming
a greater receptivity of mind than most people possess. For it may
safely be asserted that once the legitimate meanings of the terms
employed are acknowledged, and they are properly applied to the matter
in dispute, it may be shown that the opponents of Determinism have been
beating the air. The Determinism they attack is not the Determinism that
is either professed or defended. The consequences they forecast follow
only from a distorted, and often meaningless, use of the terms employed.
Instead of the Determinist denying the moral and mental value of certain
qualities of which the Indeterminist announces himself the champion, he
admits their value, gives them a definite meaning, and proves that it is
only by an assumption of the truth of the cardinal principle of
Determinism that they have any reality. This has already been shown to
be true in the case of Freedom, Choice, Deliberation, etc.; it remains
to pursue the same method with such conceptions as praise and blame or
punishment and reward, and responsibility.
The charge is, again, that Determinism robs praise and blame and
responsibility of all meaning, and reduces them to mere verbal
expressions which some may mistake for the equivalents of reality, but
which clearer thinkers will estimate at their true worth. What is the
use of praising or blaming if each one does what heredity, constitution,
and environment compels? Why punish a man for being what he is? Why hold
him responsible for the expressions of a character provided for him, and
for the influence of an environment which he had no part in forming? So
the string of questions run on. None of them, it may safely be said,
would ever be asked if all properly realized the precise meaning and
application of the terms employed. For as with the previous terms
examined, it is an acceptance of Indeterminism that would rob these
words of all value. Rationally conceived they are not only consonant
with Determinism, but each of them implies it.
Of the four terms mentioned above--Praise, Blame, Punishment, and
Responsibility, the cardinal and governing one is the last. It will be
well, therefore, to endeavour to fix this with some degree of clearness.
To commence with we may note that in contra-distinction to "freedom"
where the testimony of consciousness is illegitimately invoked, a
consciousness of responsibility is essential to its existence. A person
in whom it was manifestly impossible to arouse such a consciousness
would be unhesitatingly declared to be irresponsible. There is here,
consequently, both the fact of responsibility and our consciousness of
it that calls for explanation. And both require for an adequate
explanation a larger area than is offered by mere individual psychology.
Indeed, so long as we restrict ourselves to the individual we cannot
understand either the fact or the consciousness of responsibility. By
limiting themselves in this manner some Determinists have been led to
deny responsibility altogether. The individual, they have said, does not
create either his own organism or its environment, and consequently all
reasonable basis for responsibility disappears. To which there is the
effective reply that the datum for responsibility is found in the nature
of the organism and in the possibility of its being affected by certain
social forces, and not in the absolute origination of its own impulses
and actions. It is playing right into the hands of the Indeterminist to
deny so large and so important a social phenomenon as responsibility.
And to the Indeterminist attack, that if action is the expression of
heredity, organism, and environment, there is no room for
responsibility, there is the effective reply that it is precisely
because the individual's actions are the expression of all the forces
brought to bear upon him that he may be accounted responsible. The
Determinist has often been too ready to take the meanings and
implications of words from his opponent, instead of checking the sense
in which they were used.
The general sense of responsibility--omitting all secondary meanings--is
that of accountability, to be able to reply to a charge, or to be able
to answer a claim made upon us. This at once gives us the essential
characteristic of responsibility, and also stamps it as a phenomenon of
social ethics. A man living on a desert island would not be responsible,
unless we assume his responsibility to deity; and even here we have the
essential social fact--relation to a person--reintroduced. It is our
relations to others, that and the influence of our actions upon others,
combined with the possibility of our natures being affected by the
praise or censure of the social body to which we belong, which sets up
the fact of responsibility. Conduct creates a social reaction, good or
bad, agreeable or disagreeable, and the reacting judgment of society
awakens in each of us a consciousness of responsibility, more or less
acute, and more or less drastic, to society at large. The individual
sees himself in the social mirror. His nature is fashioned by the social
medium, his personal life becomes an expression of the social life. Just
as the social conscience, in the shape of a legal tribunal, judges each
for actions that are past, so the larger social conscience, as expressed
in a thousand and one different forms, customs, and associations, judges
us for those desires and dispositions that may result in action in the
future. Responsibility as a phenomenon of social psychology is obvious,
educative, inescapable, and admirable. Responsibility as a phenomenon of
individual psychology, whether from the Determinist or Indeterminist
point of view, is positively meaningless.
Taking, then, responsibility as a fact of social life, with its true
significance of accountability, let us see its meaning on deterministic
lines. For the sake of clearness we will first take legal responsibility
as illustrating the matter. In law a man is accounted guilty provided he
knows the law he is breaking, and also that he is capable of
appreciating the consequences of his actions. A further consideration of
no mean importance is that the consequences attending the infringement
of the law are assumed to be sufficiently serious to counterbalance the
inducements to break the regulation. And as all citizens are assumed to
know the law, we may confine our attention to the last two aspects.
What, then, is meant by ability to appreciate consequences? There can be
no other meaning than the capacity to create an ideal presentment of the
penalties attaching to certain actions. Every promise of reward or
threat of punishment assumes this, and assumes also that provided the
ideal presentment is strong enough, certain general results will follow.
It is on this principle alone that punishments are proportioned to
offences, and that certain revisions of penalties take place from time
to time. Negatively the same thing is shown by the fact that young
children, idiots, and lunatics are not legally held responsible for
their actions. The ground here is that the power to represent ideally
the full consequences of actions is absent, or operates in an abnormal
manner. Moreover, the whole line of proof to establish insanity in a
court of law is that a person is not amenable to certain desires and
impulses in the same manner as are normally constituted people.
Substantially the same thing is seen if we take the fact of
responsibility in non-legal matters. A very young child, incapable of
ideally representing consequences, is not considered a responsible
being. An older child has a limited responsibility in certain simple
matters. As it grows older, and growth brings with it the power of more
fully appreciating the consequence of actions, its responsibility
increases in the home, in the school, in business, social, religious,
and political circles it is held accountable for its conduct, in
proportion as the power of estimating the consequences of actions is
assumed. In other words, we assume not that there is at any stage an
autonomous or self-directing "will" in operation, but that a particular
quality of motive will operate at certain stages of mental development,
and the whole of the educative process, in the home, the school, and in
society, aims at making these motives effective. That is, the whole fact
of responsibility assumes as a datum the very condition that the
Indeterminist regards as destroying responsibility altogether. He argues
that if action is the expression of character, responsibility is a
farce. But it is precisely because action is the expression of character
that responsibility exists. When the law, or when society, calls a man
to account for something he has done, it does not deny that had he
possessed a different character he would have acted differently. It does
not assert that at the time of action he could have helped doing what he
did. Both may be admitted. What it does say is that having a character
of such and such a kind certain things are bound to follow. But
inasmuch as that character may be modified by social opinion or social
coercion, inasmuch as it will respond to certain influences brought to
bear upon it, it is a responsible character, and so may be held
accountable for its actions.
There is, therefore, nothing incompatible between Determinism and
Responsibility. The incompatibility lies between Indeterminism and
Responsibility. What meaning can we attach to it, on what ground can we
call a person to account, if our calling him to account is not one of
the considerations that will affect his conduct? Grant that a
consciousness of responsibility decides how a person shall act, and the
principle of Determinism is admitted. Deny that a consciousness of
responsibility determines action, and the phrase loses all meaning and
value. The difficulty arises, as has been said, by ignoring the fact
that responsibility is of social origin, and in looking for an
explanation in individual psychology. It would, of course, be absurd to
make man responsible for being what he is, but so long as he is amenable
to the pressure of normal social forces he is responsible or accountable
for what he may be. Whatever his character be, so long as it has the
capacity of being affected by social pressure, it is a responsible
character. And this is the sole condition that makes responsibility
intelligible.