CHAPTER XV

The Hungnam Redeployment

_Marines Billeted in Hungnam Area--Embarkation of 1st Marine

Division--The Last Ten Days at Hungnam--Marines Arrive at New Assembly

Area--Contributions of Marine Aviation--Losses Sustained by the

Enemy--Results of the Reservoir Campaign_

“Wave and look happy!” These were the first words to greet some of the

weary, unshaven Marines upon arrival in the Hamhung-Hungnam area. They

grinned obligingly in response to the press photographers snapping

pictures of the motor column from the roadside. They were happy indeed

to be back in a world of hot meals and hot baths. They were happy to be

alive.

Marines and attached Army troops found it astonishing as well as

flattering to learn that such expressions as “epic” and “saga” and

“miracle of deliverance” were being applied to the breakout in American

newspapers. The press correspondents in turn were astonished to learn

that never for a moment had the men doubted that they would slug their

way out to the seacoast.

“The running fight of the Marines and two battalions of the Army’s 7th

Infantry Division from Hagaru to Hamhung--40 miles by air but 60 miles

over the icy, twisting mountainous road--was a battle unparalleled in

U. S. military history,” commented _Time_. “It had some aspects of

Bataan, some of Anzio, some of Dunkirk, some of Valley Forge, some of

the ‘Retreat of the 10,000’ (401–400 B. C.) as described in Xenophon’s

_Anabasis_.”

Not until the Marines had fought their way as far as Chinhung-ni, the

weekly newsmagazine continued, did there appear to be much hope that

they would come out as an organized force. Then “for the first time it

looked as if most of the 20,000 [Marines] would get through.”[627]

[627] _Time, the Weekly Newsmagazine_, lvi, no. 25 (18 Dec 50),

(Pacific Edition), 18–19.

By reading contemporary press accounts it is possible to recapture

the mood of the American public upon realization of the disaster

which had overtaken the Eighth Army. “It was defeat--the worst defeat

the United States ever suffered,” reported _Time_ in the issue of 11

December 1950. “The Nation received the fearful news from Korea with a

strange-seeming calmness--the kind of confused, fearful, half-believing

matter-of-factness with which many a man has reacted upon learning that

he has cancer or tuberculosis. The news of Pearl Harbor, nine years ago

to the month, had pealed out like a fire bell. But the numbing facts

of the defeat in Korea seeped into the national consciousness slowly

out of a jumble of headlines, bulletins, and communiques; days passed

before its enormity finally became plain.”[628]

[628] _Time_, lvi, no. 24 (11 Dec 50), (Pacific Edition), 9.

_Newsweek_ called it “America’s worst military licking since Pearl

Harbor. Perhaps it might become the worst military disaster in American

history. Barring a military or diplomatic miracle, the approximately

two-thirds of the U. S. Army that had been thrown into Korea might have

to be evacuated in a new Dunkerque to save them from being lost in a

new Bataan.”[629]

[629] _Newsweek_, xxxvi, no. 24 (11 Dec 50) 11. “Such

quotations,” comments General MacArthur, referring to

the excerpts from _Time_ and _Newsweek_, “certainly

do not reflect the mood of the American public at the

time, but rather the emotional reaction of irresponsible

writers.... Neither [of the two news magazines] had the

slightest access to the basic information and factors

which involved the decisions and operations of our

government and its higher military commanders.... The

unreliability of these nonprofessional estimates of the

situation is indeed eloquently demonstrated by comparing

them with the actual military reports by the commands

involved.” Gen D. MacArthur ltr to MajGen E. W. Snedeker,

17 Oct 56.

The situation in west Korea was depressing enough. But at least the

Eighth Army had a line of retreat left open. It was with apprehension

that the American public stared at front-page maps showing the

“entrapment” of the 1st Marine Division and attached U. S. Army units

and British Marines by Chinese forces. Press releases from Korea did

not encourage much expectation that the encircled troops could save

themselves from destruction by any means other than surrender. In

either event the result would be a military catastrophe without a

parallel in the Nation’s history.

The first gleam of hope was inspired by the news that the Marines

had seized the initiative at Yudam-ni and cut a path through Chinese

blocking the route to Hagaru. Then came the thrilling reports of the

air drops of supplies at Hagaru and the mass evacuation of casualties

by air. Much of the humiliation felt by newspaper readers was wiped

clean by pride as General Smith’s troops fought through to Koto-ri and

Chinhung-ni in sub-zero cold. The air drop of the bridge sections was

a dramatic climax to the realization that what had been a hope was now

a fact--the Chosin Reservoir troops had saved themselves and inflicted

a major defeat on the Chinese Communists in the doing. Testimony of

POWs had left no doubt that the mission of the three CCF corps was the

annihilation of the surrounded United States forces, but the result had

been enemy losses which did not fall far short of annihilation of the

CCF units themselves.

It was in a spirit of prayerful thanksgiving, therefore, that Americans

read about the column of grimy, parka-clad men which came out of the

mountains of northeast Korea on 11 December 1950. They had come out

fighting and they had brought their wounded and most of their equipment

out with them.

_Marines Billeted in Hungnam Area_

As late as 9 December it had been General Smith’s understanding

that the 1st Marine Division would occupy a defensive sector south

and southwest of Hungnam. Then Colonel McAllister at Hungnam was

notified by X Corps that plans for the defense of the Hungnam area

had been changed, so that the Marines were to embark immediately for

redeployment by water to South Korea. General Smith was informed on the

10th, and so promptly was the new plan put into effect that the first

Marine units were already loading out before the last elements of the

Division arrived at Hungnam.[630]

[630] The Division Embarkation Section began revision of

its standby embarkation order on 10 December and the

following day was able to issue Embarkation Order 3-50.

EmbO memo to HistO, subj: Historical Diary, 19 Dec 50.

No changes were necessary in the plans for the reception of Marine

units in the Hungnam area worked out by Colonel Snedeker and Colonel

McAllister on orders of General Smith. On 8 December, Snedeker had

issued detailed instructions which designated defensive sectors for

RCT-1 at Chigyong and for RCT-5 and RCT-7 in the vicinity of Yonpo

Airfield. The 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion was charged with making

such preparations to receive the returning troops as putting up tents,

installing stoves, erecting heads and equipping galleys.[631]

[631] Smith, _Notes_, 1065–1066, 1119; 1stMarDiv memo: “Plan

for receiving 1stMarDiv Units, Hamhung-Hungnam area,”

0800 8 Dec 50.

The Navy, as usual, was ready. On 15 November, it may be recalled,

General Smith had candidly expressed his misgivings about the strategic

outlook to Admiral Morehouse and Captain Sears. Morehouse was chief of

staff to Admiral Joy, ComNavFE, and Sears served in a like capacity

under Admiral Doyle, CTF-90. This frank discussion had not fallen

upon deaf ears; and on the 28th, only a few hours after the first CCF

attacks at Yudam-ni, ComNavFE alerted CTF-90 as to the possible need

for a redeployment operation by sea. The following day Joy advised that

events in the Chosin Reservoir area made it desirable for ships of

TF-90 to be on six hours’ notice either in Korean waters or at Sasebo,

Japan.[632]

[632] Except when otherwise noted, the remainder of this

section is based on the following sources: ComPhibGruOne,

_Action Report, Hungnam_, 1–2, 4–6; Forney _Special

Report_, 5–7; X Corps, _OpnO_ 9, 5 Dec 50; X Corps,

_Special Report on Hungnam Evacuation_, 2–3; X Corps _OI

27_, 9 Dec 50; Gen L. C. Shepherd, Jr., ltr to MajGen E.

W. Snedeker, 25 Oct 56.

CTF-90 commenced planning immediately for either an administrative or

emergency outloading. His OpnO 19-50, issued on the 28th for planning

purposes, provided for half of the amphibious force to conduct

redeployment operations on the east coast under Doyle as ComPhibGruOne,

while the other half had a similar mission on the west coast under

Admiral Thackrey, ComPhibGruThree.

At this time ComPhibGruThree and most of the amphibious units were

in Japanese ports for upkeep and replenishment. All were directed by

Admiral Joy on the 29th to proceed to Sasebo.

ComPhibGruOne had just completed the opening of Hungnam as a major

resupply port and was preparing to withdraw to Japan with the remaining

amphibious force. On 30 November, however, the deteriorating situation

of ground forces in Korea made it necessary for all units of TF-90 to

be in Korean waters. The emergency appeared to be more critical on

the west coast, and two-thirds of the smaller amphibious ships were

allotted to the Inchon area while the transports were divided equally

between Inchon and Hungnam.

The first week of December was devoted to planning and preparing for a

redeployment of X Corps by sea which appeared more likely every day.

Mine sweeping operations were resumed at Hungnam to enlarge the swept

anchorage area and provide swept channels for gunfire support ships.

X Corps OpnO 9-50, issued on 5 December, provided for the defense of

the Hungnam area by setting up a perimeter with a final defense line

about seven miles in radius. Pie-shaped sectors of fairly equal area,

converging on the harbor, were assigned to the following major units

from east to west--1st ROK Corps (less one division at Songjin), 7th

Infantry Division, 3d Infantry Division (with the 1st KMC Regiment(-)),

and the 1st Marine Division. The Marine sector included Yonpo Airfield.

On 8 December a conference held on board the _Mount McKinley_ by

ComNavFE and CTF-90 was attended by Vice Admiral Struble, Com7thFlt,

Rear Admiral John M. Higgins, ComCruDivFive, and Lieutenant General

Shepherd, CG FMFPac.

General Shepherd was present as “Representative of Commander Naval

Forces, Far East, on matters relating to the Marine Corps and for

consultation and advice in connection with the contemplated amphibious

operation now being planned.”[633]

[633] ComNavFE endorsement on CG FMFPac ser 8432, 6 Dec 50.

“Although it was not necessary for me to exercise my

command functions,” commented General Shepherd, “I had

been orally directed to do so by both Admirals Radford

and Joy if I considered it expedient. As I recall,

I was directed to take charge of the naval phase of

the evacuation of Hungnam as Representative of the

Commander, Naval Forces, Far East. In compliance with

these instructions I exercised close overall supervision

of this phase of the operation and made suggestions to

both Admiral Doyle and General Almond relative to the

embarkation and evacuation of the Marine Forces from

Hungnam.” Shepherd ltr, 25 Oct 56.

General Almond was directed on the 9th to redeploy to South Korea and

to report to the commanding general of the Eighth Army after assembling

in the Ulsan-Pusan-Masan area. He was to release the 1st ROK Corps as

soon as possible to the ROK Army in the Samchok area. An assembly area

in the vicinity of Masan, widely separated from the other units of X

Corps, was specified for the 1st Marine Division.

CTF-90 was assigned the following missions:

(1) Provide water lift for and conduct redeployment operations of

UN forces in Korea as directed;

(2) Control all air and naval gunfire support in designated

embarkation areas;

(3) Protect shipping en route to debarkation ports;

(4) Be responsible for naval blockade and gunfire support of

friendly units East Coast of Korea, including Pusan;

(5) Be prepared to conduct small-scale redeployment operations,

including ROK forces and UN prisoners of war;

(6) Coordinate withdrawal operations with CG X Corps and other

commands as appropriate;

(7) Support and cover redeployment operations in the Hungnam or

other designated Korean embarkation area.

No such large-scale sea lift of combined Army, Navy, Air Force, and

Marine elements, not to mention the ROK units, had been attempted since

Okinawa. The time was so short, moreover, that action could not wait on

detailed planning and organization. In any event the job had to be done.

An enormous fleet of shipping must be assembled from every available

source in the Far East. More than 100,000 troops must be embarked,

and it was estimated at first that 25,000 Korean refugees must be

evacuated, though this figure had to be nearly quadrupled. Mountains

of supplies and thousands of vehicles must be outloaded from a

comparatively small port. While these activities were in progress, the

perimeter must be protected with naval gunfire and aircraft against

an enemy credited by X Corps G-2 estimates with the capabilities of

launching an attack of six to eight depleted divisions against the

Hamhung-Hungnam area.

It was aptly dubbed “an amphibious landing in reverse,” since the

plan called for the methodical shrinking of the perimeter, under

cover of air strikes and naval gunfire, until the last platoon of the

ground forces had embarked. Then would come the grand finale of the

demolitions.

_Embarkation of 1st Marine Division_

The Wonsan evacuation was instructive as a rehearsal for the Hungnam

redeployment. From 2 to 10 December, Lieutenant Colonel Crowe’s 1st

Shore Party Battalion had charge of the outloading while sharing the

defense of the harbor with a battalion from the 3d Infantry Division

and two KMC battalions. Another Marine outfit, Company A of the 1st

Amphibian Truck Battalion, speeded up the operation by making hundreds

of round trips between docks and ships with DUKWs.[634]

[634] The sources of this section, unless otherwise stated, are

as follows: Forney, _Special Report, 8–18_; _MCB Study_,

II-C-114–115; ComPhibGruOne _Action Report, Hungnam_,

5–10, 25; 1stMAW _HD, Dec 50_, 1–2; Smith, _Notes_,

120–1123; Maj R. W. Shutts, _Report on Amphibious

Withdrawal of the U. S. X Corps from Hungnam, Korea_,

1–9; MGCIS-1 _HD, Dec 50_; X Corps _OpnO 10_, 11 Dec 50;

1stMarDiv _EmbO 3-50_, 11 Dec 50; Shepherd ltr, 25 Oct

56; LtGen W. H. Tunner, USAF, ltr to MajGen Snedeker, 8

Dec 56.

Air cover and naval gunfire from supporting ships of TE-90.21 was so

effective that Wonsan had no enemy interference worth mentioning.

Covering missions continued to be fired until the last friendly troops

withdrew, and operations were completed without the necessity of

destroying UN supplies and equipment. Altogether, 3834 troops, 7009

Korean civilians, 1146 vehicles, and 10,013 bulk tons of cargo had

been outloaded when the operation was completed on 10 December. One

detachment of Shore Party troops sailed for Pusan with the DUKWs in

preparation for unloading the 1st Marine Division upon its arrival at

that port.

The Hungnam evacuation plan, as outlined in X Corps OpnO 10-50, issued

on 11 December, provided for the immediate embarkation of the 1st

Marine Division and the 3d ROK Division. A smaller perimeter than

the original concept was to be defended meanwhile by the 7th and 3d

Infantry Divisions, with the latter having the final responsibility.

Major units were to withdraw gradually by side-slipping until only

reinforced platoons remained as covering forces holding strong points.

Plans called for naval gunfire and air support to be stepped up as the

perimeter contracted.

CTF-90 assumed control of all naval functions on 10 December after

approving loading plans made at a conference of Navy officers

and representatives of X Corps. Colonel Forney, Deputy Chief of

Staff, X Corps, was appointed Corps evacuation control officer with

responsibility for the operation of the Hungnam port and was assigned

a small staff. Major Richard W. Shutts, of General Shepherd’s party,

was placed in charge of the Operations Section. Two more former TTUPac

Marines on the X Corps staff were assigned sections--Major Charles

P. Weiland, the Loading Section; and Major Jack R. Munday, the Navy

Liaison Section. Lieutenant Colonel Harry E. Moisell, USA, headed the

Movement Section, and Captain William C. Cool, USA, the Rations Section.

Lieutenant Colonel Charles E. Warren served as Colonel Forney’s

executive officer until he was incapacitated by pneumonia and relieved

by Lieutenant Colonel Crowe.

The 2d Engineer Special Brigade, USA, was responsible for operation

of the dock facilities, traffic control in the dock areas, and for

furnishing Japanese stevedores, winch operators, cargo handling

equipment, and dunnage. A reinforced company from the 1st Shore Party

Battalion worked the LST and small craft beaches while controlling the

lighterage for ships loading in the stream.

It was decided on 11 December that 1st Marine Division staging to

assembly areas should commence immediately. Loading had to be expedited

so that ships could be used for a second and even third turn-around.

Embarkation Order 3-50, issued by the Division on the 11th, assigned

vehicle and cargo assembly areas to units, and an embarkation control

office was set up in the dock area.

As compensation for the cramped confines of the Hungnam harbor, the

tidal range was less than a foot as compared to the maximum of 31

feet at Inchon. And though the docks had space for only seven ships,

Major Weiland planned to double-berth four additional ships and load

them from the outboard side. In addition, 11 LSTs could be handled

simultaneously--seven at GREEN Beach One, and the others at GREEN Beach

Two.

Marine units awaiting shipping remained on a standby basis, ready to

begin loading at once upon assignment of space by the embarkation

officer. The Division rear CP at Hungnam had become the only CP with

General Smith’s arrival; and on the 11th General Craig, the ADC,

returned from emergency leave.

General MacArthur flew to Yonpo Airfield on the 11th for a brief

conference with General Almond and approved the X Corps plan. A date of

27 December was set for Corps units to pass under the control of the

Eighth Army in South Korea.

The outloading of the 1st Marine Division was making good progress on

the 12th when General Smith visited the docks on a tour of inspection.

That evening he and General Shepherd attended a dinner at the Corps CP

in honor of General Almond’s 58th birthday. The Army was represented

by Major Generals Barr, Soule, and Clark L. Ruffner, X Corps Chief of

Staff.

By the following day the 5th and 7th Marines were ready to sail.

Embarkation officers loaded their ships by sight, planning as they went

along. Not knowing in advance what type of ship might be assigned,

they found that carefully calculated stowage diagrams were out of the

question. Under these circumstances, amphibious training and experience

were invaluable.

Space in the tent city established by X Corps to the rear of the LST

beaches had been made available to Marine units awaiting embarkation.

Most of them, however, moved directly from their bivouac areas to the

beach.

While the Marines were outloading, the two Army divisions defending

the perimeter had only minor patrol actions. Their artillery supplied

most of the interdiction fires at the outset, with naval gunfire giving

the deep support. Vigorous air support by Navy, Air Force, and Marine

planes also did much to discourage any hostile intentions the enemy may

have had.

MGCIS-1, the ground control intercept squadron at Yonpo, stopped

directing the high altitude fighters on 11 December and passed over to

the USS _Mount McKinley_ the task of keeping the perimeter clear of

any enemy planes. Over-all control of air still remained ashore with

MTACS-2.

At 1500 on the 13th General Smith went aboard the USS _Bayfield_ and

opened the Division CP. As his last duty on shore, he attended memorial

services held by the Division at the Hungnam Cemetery. While the

commanding general paid his tribute to the honored dead, Chinese POWs

were making preparations for the interment of the last bodies brought

down from Chinhung-ni.

The Marine loading was completed on the 14th. At a conference that

day with CTF-90 on board the _Mount McKinley_, General Smith inquired

as to the possibility of having the ships carrying the Marines unload

at Masan instead of Pusan, thus saving a 40-mile movement by truck.

Admiral Doyle pointed out that this procedure was not feasible

because of the lack of lighterage facilities at Masan. The additional

turn-around time, moreover, would have delayed the evacuation of

remaining Corps units.

The 14th was also the day when Marine air strikes from Yonpo ended

with the departure of the last of the Wing’s land-based fighters for

Japan. Shortly after midnight the Air Defense Section of MTACS-2

passed control of all air in the Hungnam area to the Navy’s Tactical

Air Control Squadron One of TF-90 aboard the USS _Mount McKinley_. The

Marine squadron then set up a standby TACC aboard an LST until the

final withdrawal on 24 December.

At 1030 on 15 December, as the _Bayfield_ sailed, the curtain went

down on one of the most memorable campaigns in the 175-year history of

the Marine Corps. A total of 22,215 Marines had embarked in shipping

consisting of an APA, an AKA, 3 APs, 13 LSTs, 3 LSDs, and 7 commercial

cargo ships.

The Yonpo airlift continued, however, until 17 December when the

field was closed and a temporary airstrip nearer the harbor was

made available to twin-engine R4D’s for the final phase of the air

evacuation. The only Marine units left in Hungnam were a reinforced

Shore Party company, an ANGLICO group and one and a half companies (88

LVTs) of the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion. They passed under the

operational control of X Corps to assist in the outloading of Army

units. Also, Colonel Boeker C. Batterton, commanding MAG-12, had moved

to Hungnam for the final evacuation of his air group from Yonpo and to

arrange for loading its heavy equipment and remaining personnel aboard

SS _Towanda Victory_. Then on 18 December he flew his command post to

Itami.[635]

[635] LtGen T. J. Cushman Comments, n. d.; MAG-12 _WD, Dec 50_.

_The Last Ten Days at Hungnam_

With ten days remaining for the embarkation of the two Army divisions,

the problem of Korean refugees threatened to disrupt the schedule. But

CTF-90 contrived somehow to find the shipping, and the homeless Koreans

were willing to put up with any hardships to escape from Communist

domination. It became standard practice to embark at least 5000 on

an LST, not counting children in arms, and no less than 12,000 human

sardines found standing room on one commercial cargo ship.[636]

[636] Unless otherwise stated, the sources for this section are

the same as for the last.

The most fragile link in the complex chain of operations was

represented by the two 390-ton diesel electric tugs. No others were

available, nor were spare parts to be had, yet both tugs had clocked

more than 5000 running hours since the last overhaul. Thus it seemed

almost a miracle that neither broke down for more than three hours in

all, and repairs were made with materials at hand.

On the 18th, when the last ROKs sailed for Samchok, the 7th Infantry

Division was in the midst of its outloading. By 20 December all troops

of this unit had embarked, according to schedule. Responsibility for

the defense of Hungnam then passed to Admiral Doyle as General Almond

and his staff joined CTF-90 on board the flagship _Mount McKinley_.

General Soule’s 3d Division now manned the shore defenses alone.[637]

[637] VAdm J. H. Doyle ltr, 5 Oct 56.

When the perimeter contracted to the immediate vicinity of Hungnam,

following the evacuation of Hamhung and Yonpo Airfield, two cruisers,

seven destroyers, and three rocket-firing craft covered the entire

front from their assigned positions in mine-swept lanes. A total of

nearly 34,000 shells and 12,800 rockets was fired by these support

ships, with the battleship _Missouri_ contributing 162 16-inch rounds

at the finish of the bombardment. About 800 more 8-inch shells and

12,800 more 5-inch shells were expended at Hungnam than during the

naval gunfire preparation for the Inchon landing.

Seven embarkation sites were employed (see Map 30). From left to right

they were designated as PINK Beach, BLUE Beach, GREEN One and Two

Beaches, and YELLOW One, Two, and Three Beaches. The 7th RCT, holding

the left sector, was to embark from PINK Beach. BLUE and GREEN One

Beaches were assigned to the 65th RCT in the center, while the 15th RCT

had GREEN Two and the three YELLOW Beaches.

H-hour had been set at 1100 on the 24th, and seven LSTs were beached at

0800 to receive 3d Infantry Division troops. Soon the three regiments

were reduced to as many battalions which acted as covering forces while

the other troops fell back to assigned beaches. All withdrawals were

conducted methodically along specified routes by units using marking

panels. Then the battalions themselves pulled out, leaving only seven

reinforced platoons manning strong points. The Hungnam redeployment

came to an end when these platoons boarded an LST after a search for

stragglers. Air and naval gunfire support had made it an uneventful

finish except for the accidental explosion of an ammunition dump on

PINK Beach, resulting in two men killed and 21 wounded.

All beaches were clear by 1436 on Sunday afternoon, the 24th, with Able

and Baker Companies of the Amtrac Battalion sticking it out to the end.

Marines of these units provided fires to cover the flanks of the last

withdrawals and manned 37 LVTs evacuating Army troops from PINK Beach.

With the exception of three LVTs lost in the ammunition dump explosion

on that beach, all LVTs and LVT(A)s were safely reembarked on LSDs at

the finish of the operation.[638]

[638] 1stAmphTracBn _HD, Dec 50_, 5.

Remarkably few supplies had to be left behind for lack of shipping

space. Among them were 400 tons of frozen dynamite and 500

thousand-pound bombs. They added to the tumult of an awe-inspiring

demolitions scene. The entire Hungnam waterfront seemed to be blown

sky-high in one volcanic eruption of flame, smoke, and rubble which

left a huge black mushroom cloud hovering over the ruins.

The chill, misty dawn of Christmas Day found the _Mount McKinley_ about

to sail for Ulsan with CTF-90 and Generals Almond and Shepherd after

an eminently successful operation. It had been pretty much the Navy’s

show, in the absence of enemy interference, and the final statistics

were staggering--105,000 military personnel, 91,000 Korean refugees,

17,500 vehicles, and 350,000 measurement tons of cargo loaded out in

193 shiploads by 109 ships.

[Illustration: HUNGNAM DOCKS AND BEACHES

MAP-30

]

“With naval, air and surface units effectively isolating the beachhead,

we were able to take our time and get everything out,” commented

Admiral Joy on 26 December. “Admiral Doyle has turned in another

brilliant performance. We never, never contemplated a Dunkirk--not even

faintly.”[639]

[639] CinCFE Special Communique, 26 Dec 50, with attached

report from Gen Almond and a Navy announcement in _New

York Times_, 27 Dec 50.

_Marines Arrive at New Assembly Area_

While the remaining X Corps units completed outloading at Hungnam, the

Marines were landing at Pusan and proceeding by motor march to their

new assembly area in the vicinity of Masan. General Craig, the ADC, had

gone ahead with the advance party from Hungnam and made arrangements

for the reception of the Division.[640]

[640] Smith, _Notes_, 1126. A detailed account of the arrival

of the 1st Marine Division at Pusan and Masan will be

found in the first chapter of Volume IV of this series.

News from the front in West Korea was not encouraging as the Eighth

Army planned further withdrawals, for G-2 reports indicated that the

advancing Chinese were about to launch a great new offensive shortly.

Despite the persistent rumors that all Korea might be evacuated by UN

forces, General MacArthur insisted in his special communique of 26

December that operations “were skilfully conducted without loss of

cohesion and with all units remaining intact....

In its broad implications I consider that these operations,

initiated on 24 November and carried through to this [Hungnam]

redeployment, have served a very significant purpose--possibly in

general result the most significant and fortunate of any conducted

during the course of the Korean campaign.

The might of a major military nation was suddenly and without

warning thrown against this relatively small United Nations Command

but without attaining a decision.

Due to intervening circumstances beyond our power to control or

even detect, we did not achieve the United Nations objective.

But at a casualty cost less than that experienced in a comparable

period of defensive fighting on the Pusan perimeter, we exposed

before too late secret political and military decisions of

enormous scope and threw off balance enemy preparations aimed at

surreptitiously massing the power capable of destroying our forces

with one mighty extended blow.”[641]

[641] CinCFE Special Communique, 26 Dec 50.

Questions as to the proper evaluation of the Eighth Army withdrawal

turned into a controversy during coming months with political as well

as military implications. Press representatives, military critics

and soldiers of other nations, while crediting MacArthur with a

great victory at Inchon, were for the most part of the opinion that

the Eighth Army withdrawal of November and December was a costly

reverse.[642]

[642] General MacArthur’s comments are as follows: “This,

again, is a non-professional estimate belied by the

facts and the viewpoints of all senior commanders

present.... It was the purpose of Red China to overwhelm

and annihilate, through a ‘sneak’ attack, the Eighth

Army and X Corps by the heavy assault of overwhelming

forces of a new power, not heretofore committed to war,

against which it knew or rightly surmised there would be

no retaliation. This plan was foiled by our anticipatory

advance which uncovered the enemy’s plot before he had

assembled all of his forces, and by our prompt strategic

withdrawal before he could inflict a crippling blow of a

‘Pearl Harbor’ nature.... This was undoubtedly one of the

most successful strategic retreats in history, comparable

with and markedly similar to Wellington’s great Peninsula

withdrawal. Had the initiative action not been taken

and an inert position of adequate defense assumed, I

have no slightest doubt that the Eighth Army and the X

Corps both would have been annihilated. As it was, both

were preserved with practically undiminished potential

for further action. I have always regarded this action,

considering the apparently unsurmountable difficulties

and overwhelming odds, as the most successful and

satisfying I have ever commanded.” MacArthur ltr, 17 Oct

56.

Marine officers in Korea had no first-hand knowledge of EUSAK

operations. It was obvious, however, that an Eighth Army retirement

south of the 38th Parallel had made it desirable if not actually

necessary for X Corps to withdraw from northeast Korea, even though

General Almond held that a Hamhung-Hungnam perimeter could be defended

throughout the winter.

_Contributions of Marine Aviation_

The close coordination of aviation with the ground forces in the Chosin

campaign was due in large measure to the assignment of additional

pilots to the 1st Marine Division as forward air controllers. They had

been plucked from 1st Marine Aircraft Wing squadrons barely in time to

join their battalions before embarking at Inchon. Increasing the number

of FACs to two per battalion did much to bring air support down to the

company level when needed.[643]

[643] Air Officer _SAR_, 4.

Air units frequently had to rely upon charts with place names, grid

coordinates, and scales different from those in the hands of the ground

troops. Here the Marine system of the man on the ground talking the

pilot onto the target by reference to visual land marks paid off.

Cloudy, stormy weather was common. Three night fighter pilots were

lost because of icing, disorientation, and insufficient radio aids

to navigation. Two VMF-212 land-based pilots saved themselves from

destruction only by landing on the _Badoeng Strait_ with their last

drops of gas.

With the approach of winter and cold weather, aircraft on the landing

strips had to be run up every two hours at night to keep the oil warm

enough for early morning takeoffs. Ordnance efficiency dropped. Planes

skidded on icy runways. Once, after a six inch snow, 80 men and ten

trucks worked all night to clear and sand a 150-foot strip down the

runway at Yonpo.[644]

[644] The material in this section is derived from: MAG-12

_SAR_, annex C, 10; VMF-214 _SAR_, annex F, 23; 1stMAW

_SAR_, annex J, appendix S (VMF-323), 4, 9, 11; 1stMAW

_SAR_, 5–7; Maj H. D. Kuokka Comments, n. d.

As early as mid-November it once took hours of scraping and chipping

on the _Badoeng Strait_ to clear three inches of glazed ice and snow

off the decks, catapults, arresting wires, and barriers. Planes which

stood the night on the flight deck had to be taken below to the hangar

deck to thaw out. On another occasion VMF-214 had to cancel all flight

operations because 68-knot winds, heavy seas, and freezing temperatures

covered the _Sicily’s_ flight deck and aircraft with a persistent coat

of ice.

One pilot of VMF-323 had to return shortly after takeoff because water

vapor froze in his oil breather tube in flight. With the back pressure

throwing oil all over his windshield and billowing black vapor and

smoke out of his cowl, he landed only to have the front of his Corsair

burst into flames when the escaped oil dripped on the hot exhaust

stacks. Quick work by the deck crews extinguished the fire.

A hazard as great as being shot down was a crash landing or bail-out

at sea, where the water was cold enough to kill a man in 20 minutes.

Survival clothing and equipment was so bulky that pilots could barely

get into their cockpits.

Maintenance and servicing problems ashore, complicated by dirt, dust,

and the scarcity of parts, kept mechanics working to the point of

exhaustion. Insufficient trucks forced the ground crews to refuel and

arm planes by hand, often from rusting fuel drums. Two destructive

crashes, one fatal, were attributed to accumulated water in gasoline.

Aboard ship until mid-November, VMF-214 was able to keep 91 per cent

of its planes operative. When suddenly deployed ashore to Wonsan, its

aircraft availability dropped to 82 per cent and at Yonpo to 67 per

cent. Once back at sea again in December, it jumped up to 90 per cent.

Basic difference in close air support doctrine between the Navy and

Marines and Air Force were resolved by close and friendly liaison

between the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing and the Fifth Air Force commands;

by a Marine aviator attached to the Joint Eighth Army-Fifth Air Force

Operations Center at Seoul; and by indoctrination of non-Marine

units of the X Corps in the Marine-Navy style of close air support.

Difficulties in inter-service communications slowed Fifth Air Force

operations orders to carrier squadrons, both Navy and Marine. Messages

were routed via FEAF and ComNavFe in Tokyo and arrived hours late.

Ashore, even MAG-12 during the first two weeks at Wonsan received

its Fifth Air Force mission orders six to 36 hours late. A direct

radio teletype between 1st MAW and 5thAF headquarters alleviated the

situation. And when the CG 1st MAW received full control of the air

over the X Corps area on 1 December, these problems were eased.

Actual control of air support for the scattered ground units

demonstrated close cooperation between the Navy and Marine Corps. This

was evident from the time the Navy’s Tactical Air Control Squadron One

on the USS _Mount McKinley_ passed control to the Air Defense Section

of MTACS-2 at Hamhung to the time that control returned to the ship in

the Hungnam evacuation.

When the Marines had control, the ship stood by as an emergency TACC

and acted as a radar reporting station for MTACS-2. When control

was passed back afloat, the Air Defense Section of MTACS-2 stood

by as a standby TACC aboard an LST until the last man was pulled

off the beach. Furthermore, three officers from MGCIS-1 went aboard

_Mount McKinley_ to help out as Air Defense controllers. They were

experienced. All through the Wonsan-Chosin campaign, the MGCIS had

directed the defensive fighter patrols, circling Wonsan and Yonpo, to

check all unidentified aircraft before the latter got close enough to

do any damage, MGCIS-1 also steered lost planes to base in bad weather,

occasionally vectored them into the GCA radar-controlled landing

pattern, and even assisted MTACCS-2 in directing air support planes to

FACs.[645]

[645] MGCIS-1 _HD Dec 50_, 2; MTACS-2 _HD Dec 50_, 7.

Tactical air support in the X Corps zone was directed to the ground

units by the Air Support Section of MTACS-2. From 26 October to 11

December, 3703 sorties in 1053 missions were controlled by the TACPs

of Marine, Army, and ROK units. Close air support missions accounted

for 599 of the total (468 for 1st Marine Division, 8 for 3d Infantry

Division, 56 for 7th Infantry Division, and 67 for ROKs). The remaining

454 missions were search and attack.[646]

[646] The remainder of this section, unless otherwise noted, is

based upon Smith, _Notes_, 1149–1161, 1222.

When FAC communications failed from valley to valley, aircraft became

radio relays and controllers. This was highlighted by the airborne

TADC, orbiting over the road from Hagaru.

Approximately half of the Marine air missions were in support of

non-Marine ground units. The ROK and the U. S. Army units were not as

well supplied with experienced FACs as the 1st Marine Division. In

these areas four Air Force “Mosquitos” (AT-6 “Texan” training planes)

were assigned to X Corps to assist in the control of air support.[647]

[647] 1stMAW _HDs, Oct-Dec 50_.

When shore-based Marine air support was about to cease with the closing

of Yonpo air field, VMF-214 and VMF-212 quickly moved their operations

aboard carrier; and during the final phases of the Hungnam evacuation,

almost half of the Marine tactical air strength was operating from

carrier bases. VMF-214 flew back aboard _Sicily_ on 7 December without

missing a mission and VMF-212, which had moved to Itami on 4 December

to draw and test a new complement of carrier Corsairs, was aboard the

USS _Bataan_ eight days later. When the month ended, still another

squadron, VMF-312, was polishing up its carrier landing technique for

seaborne duty.[648]

[648] VMF-312 _HD, Dec 50_, 2.

The outcome of the Hagaru withdrawal owed much to air-dropped supplies

and to casualty evacuations by General Tunner’s Combat Cargo Command

(CCC). Assisting Combat Cargo in Marine support were the Wing’s R4D

twin engine transports and TBM World War II type torpedo bombers,

both of which were flown largely by the field-desk pilots on the Wing

and Group staffs. Most of the Marines’ share of the heavy airlifting,

however, was done by the four engine R5D transports of Colonel Dean C.

Roberts’ VMR-152. Early in October this squadron had been temporarily

shifted from the trans-Pacific airlift of the Navy’s Fleet Logistics

Air Wing to support the Marines in the Wonsan campaign. In Korea its

operations were controlled by the Combat Cargo Command, which committed

an average of five Marine R5D’s a day into the CCC airlift. In such

missions these transports supported all UN units from Pyongyang to

Yonpo and points north. Marine transports not committed by the CCC

for general UN support in Korea were available for Wing use. From 1

November until Christmas, VMR-152 safely carried five million pounds of

supplies to the front and evacuated more than 4000 casualties.[649]

[649] ComNavFE msg to CinCPacFlt, 0858 1 Oct 50; CinCPacFlt msg

to ComNavFE, 2245 2 Oct 50; CG 1stMAW msg to CO VMR-152,

0620 12 Oct 50; VMF-152 _SAR_, 6; Col R. R. Yeaman

Comments, 19 Sep 56 and 6 Nov 56. By 25 December when

VMR-152 returned to Navy control it had flown 729,790

miles in Korean lifts and carried 8,068,800 pounds of

cargo, 234,000 pounds of mail and 11,314 passengers,

including 4276 casualties.

The Chosin Reservoir campaign opened two new chapters in Marine

aviation history. The first was the use of the airborne TADC to control

the air support of the division column between Hagaru and Chinhung-ni.

The second was the appearance of VMF-311, the first Marine jet squadron

to fly in combat. Beginning on 10 December the newly arrived squadron

flew interdiction missions for four days from Yonpo. Then it moved to

Pusan to operate for the remainder of the month with 5th Air Force jets

streaking up the long peninsula to cover the withdrawal of the Eighth

Army.[650]

[650] 1stMAW _SAR_, annex K, appendix F (VMF-311), 2; VMF-311

_HD, Dec 50_.

Appreciation for the assistance given by Marine aviation to Marine

ground forces was expressed in a letter of 20 December from General

Smith to General Harris, the Commanding General of the 1st Marine Air

Wing. The Division Commander said:

Without your support our task would have been infinitely more

difficult and more costly. During the long reaches of the night and

in the snow storms many a Marine prayed for the coming of day or

clearing weather when he knew he would again hear the welcome roar

of your planes as they dealt out destruction to the enemy. Even the

presence of a night heckler was reassuring.

Never in its history has Marine Aviation given more convincing

proof of its indispensable value to the ground Marines. A bond of

understanding has been established that will never be broken.[651]

[651] MajGen O. P. Smith ltr to MajGen F. Harris, 20 Dec 50.

The story of air support in the Chosin Reservoir campaign would not

be complete without a summary of the results of VMO-6. Marines took a

proprietary interest in Major Gottschalk’s squadron, which had put

into effect the helicopter techniques worked out at Quantico by the

experimental squadron, HMX-1. Some of these techniques were having

their first test in combat, for the development of rotary-wing aircraft

in 1950 was at a pioneer stage comparable to that of fixed-wing

aircraft in the first year of World War I. On 28 October, VMO-6 had a

strength of 25 officers, 95 enlisted men, ten light fixed-wing aircraft

(eight OY-2s, two L5Gs) and nine HO3S-1 helicopters. From that date

until 15 December the squadron made 1544 flights for a total of 1624.8

hours. The principal missions were as follows:

Reconnaissance--OYs, 393; helicopters, 64; Transportation--OYs,

130; helicopters, 421; Evacuation--OYs, 29; helicopters, 191;

Liaison--OYs, 35; helicopters, 90; Artillery spot--OYs, 39;

helicopters, 0; Utility--OYs, 26; helicopters, 60; Rescue--OYs, 0;

helicopters, 11.[652]

[652] VMO-6 _SAR_, 20; LtCol V. J. Gottschalk, _Transcript of

Informal Remarks at HQMC_, 17 May 51.

But statistics can give no idea of the most significant achievement

of VMO-6 in the Reservoir campaign. For during the most critical

period the only physical contact between units separated by enemy

action was provided by the OYs and helicopters. The importance of this

contribution can hardly be overestimated.

_Losses Sustained by the Enemy_

Marine losses in northeast Korea, as reported to the Secretary of

the Navy, included a total of 4418 battle casualties from 26 October

to 15 December 1950--604 KIA, 114 DOW, 192 MIA, and 3508 WIA. The

7313 non-battle casualties consisted largely of minor frostbite and

indigestion cases who were soon restored to active duty.[653] Eight

Marine pilots were KIA or died of wounds, four were MIA, and three

were wounded. General Smith estimated that a third of the non-battle

casualties were returned to duty during the operation.[654]

[653] Smith, _Notes_, 1146–1149. See Appendix E for a

day-by-day accounting of Marine casualties.

[654] Smith ltr, 21 Oct 56.

Enemy losses for the same period were estimated at a total of

37,500--15,000 killed and 7500 wounded by Marine ground forces, plus

10,000 killed and 5000 wounded by Marine air. Not much reliance can

be placed in such figures as a rule, but fortunately we have enemy

testimony as to heavy losses sustained by the Chinese Communists. This

evidence goes far toward explaining why they did not interfere with the

Hungnam redeployment.

Contrary to expectations, Chinese military critiques have been candid

in admitting failures and unsparing in self-criticism. Among captured

documents are summaries of the operations of the three CCF armies

encountered by the Marines in the Chosin Reservoir area. These major

units, representing at least 11 and probably 12 divisions, were as

follows:

20th CCF Army--58th, 59th, and 60th Divisions, with the 89th

Division of the 30th Army attached;

26th CCF Army--76th, 77th, and 78th Division, with probably the

94th Division of 32d Army attached;

27th CCF Army--79th, 80th, and 81st Divisions, with the 70th

Division of 24th Army attached.[655]

[655] A CCF army consisted of three or four divisions and

therefore might be considered generally the equivalent of

a U. S. corps. This account of CCF units and movements is

derived from the _MCB Study_, II-C-116–125, which in turn

is based on an analysis of CCF prisoner interrogations

and captured enemy documents. The Board, consisting

of senior officers, was given the mission in 1951 of

preparing “an evaluation of the influence of Marine Corps

forces on the course of the Korean War, 4 Aug 50–15 Dec

50.”

All three armies were major units of the 9th Army Group of the 3d

CCF Field Army. In mid-October the leading elements of the 4th CCF

Field Army had crossed the Yalu to oppose the U. S. Eighth Army. The

operations of X Corps in northeast Korea being considered a threat to

the left flank, the 42d Army was detached with a mission of providing

flank protection, pending relief by units of the 3d CCF Field Army.

Three divisions, the 124th, 125th, and 126th were represented. While

the last hovered on the left flank of the 4th Field Army, the 124th was

hard hit near Sudong during the first week of November by RCT-7 of the

1st Marine Division.

In order to cover the withdrawal of the remnants, the 125th Division

moved south of Hagaru from the Fusen Reservoir area. Both CCF divisions

then fell back to Yudam-ni, where they were relieved by units of the

20th Army, 3d Field Army. This ended the operations of the 4th Field

Army in northeast Korea.

Shortly after the appearance of the 20th Army in the Yudam-ni area, the

27th Army moved into positions north of the Chosin Reservoir. Thus the

enemy had available eight divisions for the attacks of 27–28 November

on the Marines in the Yudam-ni area and the three 7th Infantry Division

battalions east of the Chosin Reservoir. If it may be assumed that

these CCF divisions averaged 7500 men each, or three-fourths of full

strength, the enemy had a total of 60,000 men in assault or reserve.

The Chinese, as we know, failed to accomplish their basic mission,

which prisoners agreed was the destruction of the 1st Marine Division.

In every instance the efforts of the first night were the most

formidable, with enemy effectiveness declining sharply after a second

or third attack. The explanation seems to be that the 12 divisions

were sent into northeast Korea with supplies which would have been

sufficient only if the first attempts had succeeded. The following

comment by the 26th Army supports this conclusion:

A shortage of transportation and escort personnel makes it

impossible to accomplish the mission of supplying the troops.

As a result, our soldiers frequently starve. From now on, the

organization of our rear service units should be improved.[656]

[656] Translations of CCF documents referred to in this section

are found in HQ 500th Military Intelligence Group,

Document 204141, “Compilation of Battle Experiences

Reported by Various Armies in their Operation Against

U. S. Forces in Korea.” Among the units covered are the

20th, 26th, and 27th Armies.

The troops were hungry. They ate cold food, and some had only a few

potatoes in two days. They were unable to maintain the physical

strength for combat; the wounded personnel could not be evacuated....

The fire power of our entire army was basically inadequate. When we

used our guns there were no shells and sometimes the shells were duds.

The enemy’s tactical rigidity and tendency to repeat costly errors are

charged by the 20th Army to inferior communications:

Our signal communication was not up to standard. For example, it

took more than two days to receive instructions from higher level

units. Rapid changes of the enemy’s situation and the slow motion

of our signal communication caused us to lose our opportunities

in combat and made the instructions of the high level units

ineffective....

We succeeded in the separation and encirclement of the enemy, but

we failed to annihilate the enemy one by one. The units failed

to carry out the orders of the higher echelon. For example, the

failure to annihilate the enemy at Yut’an-ni [Yudam-ni] made it

impossible to annihilate the enemy at Hakalwu-ri [Hagaru]. The

higher level units’ refusal of the lower level units’ suggestion of

rapidly starting the combat and exterminating the enemy one by one

gave the enemy a chance to break out from the encirclement.

One of the most striking instances of the tactical inflexibility

which stultified Chinese efforts was found at Hagaru. With only a

depleted Marine Infantry battalion and service troops available to

defend a perimeter four miles in circumference, the enemy needed mere

daylight observation to ascertain and avoid the most strongly defended

positions. Yet these were just the positions chosen for the attack,

not only on the first night but also the second occasion 48 hours later.

“The [CCF] tactics were mechanical,” commented the 27th Army.

“We underestimated the enemy so we distributed the strength, and

consequently the higher echelons were overdispersed while the lower

echelon units were overconcentrated. During one movement, the distance

between the three leading divisions was very long, while the formations

of the battalions, companies, and units of lower levels were too close,

and the troops were unable to deploy. Furthermore, reconnaissance was

not conducted strictly; we walked into the enemy fire net and suffered

heavy casualties.”

Summing up the reasons why the Marines at Yudam-ni were not

“exterminated promptly,” the 27th Army concludes that it was “because

our troops encountered unfavorable conditions during the missions

and the troops suffered too many casualties.” This would seem to be

another way of saying that the Chinese failed to destroy the 1st Marine

Division because they themselves were nearly destroyed in the attempt.

At any rate, evidence from the enemy documents points overwhelmingly to

crippling losses both from Marine fire power and non-battle casualties

chargeable to lack of equipment and supplies.

The 20th Army had a hundred deaths from tetanus caused by improper care

of wounds. Hundreds of other soldiers were incapacitated by typhus or

ailments of malnutrition and indigestion.

More than 90 per cent of the 26th Army suffered from frostbite. The

27th Army complained of 10,000 non-combat casualties alone out of a

strength of four divisions:

The troops did not have enough food, they did not have enough

houses to live in, they could not stand the bitter cold, which was

the reason for the excessive non-combat reduction in personnel

(more than 10 thousand persons), the weapons were not used

effectively. When the fighters bivouacked in snow-covered ground

during combat, their feet, socks, and hands were frozen together in

one ice ball; they could not unscrew the caps on the hand grenades;

the fuses would not ignite; the hands were not supple; the mortar

tubes shrank on account of the cold; 70 per cent of the shells

failed to detonate; skin from the hands was stuck on the shells and

the mortar tubes.

Testimony as to the effects of Marine fire power is also given by the

26th Army:

The coordination between the enemy infantry, tanks, artillery, and

airplanes is surprisingly close. Besides using heavy weapons for

the depth, the enemy carries with him automatic light firearms

which, coordinated with rockets, launchers, and recoilless guns are

disposed at the front line. The characteristic of their employment

is to stay quietly under cover and open fire suddenly when we come

to between 70 and 100 meters from them, making it difficult for our

troops to deploy and thus inflicting casualties upon us.

The 20th and 27th Armies appear to have been bled white by the losses

of the first week. Early in December, units of the 26th Army appeared

on the east side of the MSR between Hagaru and Koto-ri, and this unit

furnished most of the opposition from 6 to 11 December.

Seven divisions in all were identified by the 1st Marine Division; and

since the taking of prisoners was not a matter of top priority with

men fighting for existence, it is likely that other CCF units were

encountered. The CCF 9th Army Group, according to a prisoner questioned

on 7 December, included a total of 12 divisions. This POW gave the

following statement:

Missions of the four (4) armies in 9th Group are to annihilate the

1st Division which is considered to be the best division in the

U. S. After annihilating the 1st Marine Division they are to move

south and take Hamhung.[657]

[657] 1stMarDiv PIR 47, encl. 1. The four armies referred to by

the POW were the 20th, 26th, 27th, and 30th. Actually the

30th Army did not exist, as one of its divisions had been

attached to each of the other three armies.

As to the reason why the Chinese took no advantage of the Hungnam

redeployment, there seems little doubt that the 9th Army Group was too

riddled by battle and non-battle casualties to make the effort. This is

not a matter of opinion. Following the Hungnam redeployment, as the U.

S. Eighth Army braced itself to meet a new CCF offensive, UN and FECOM

G-2 officers were naturally concerned as to whether the remaining 9th

Army Group troops in northeast Korea would be available to strengthen

the CCF 4th Field Army. It was estimated that only two weeks would

be required to move these troops to West Korea, where they had the

capability of reinforcing the CCF attack against the Eighth Army.

Efforts to locate the 9th Army Group were unavailing for nearly three

months. Then a prisoner from the 77th Division of the 26th Army was

captured by U. S. Eighth Army troops on 18 March 1951. During the

following week POW interrogations established that three divisions of

the 26th Army were in contact with Eighth Army units northeast of Seoul.

“The only conclusion to be drawn,” comments the _Marine Corps Board

Study_, “based on information collected by 1stMarDiv and X Corps,

and that by UN and FEC, is that all corps of 9th Army Group had been

rendered militarily ineffective in the Chosin Reservoir operation and

required a considerable period of time for replacement, re-equipment,

and reorganization.”[658]

[658] _MCB Study_, II-C-125.

Thus it appears that the Marines not only saved themselves in the

Chosin Reservoir fights; they also saved U. S. Eighth Army from being

assailed by reinforcements from northeast Korea in the CCF offensive

which exploded on the last night of 1950.

_Results of the Reservoir Campaign_

There could be no doubt, after taking into account the CCF mission,

that the 9th Army Group, 3d Field Army, had sustained a reverse in

northeast Korea which amounted to a disaster. On the other hand, it

might have been asked whether a retrograde movement such as the Marine

breakout, even though aggressively and successfully executed, could be

termed a victory.

This question involves issues too complex for a clearcut positive

answer, but it would be hard to improve upon the analysis of results in

the _Marine Corps Board Study_:

Although the operations of this phase constitute a withdrawal,

despite the fact that CG 1stMarDiv characterized them as “an attack

in a new direction,” the withdrawal was executed in the face of

overwhelming odds and conducted in such a manner that, contrary to

the usual withdrawal, some very important tactical results were

achieved. These may be summarized as follows:

1. Extricated 1stMarDiv from a trap sprung by overwhelming enemy

ground forces by skilful employment of integrated ground and air

action which enabled the Division to come through with all operable

equipment, with wounded properly evacuated and with tactical

integrity.

2. Outfought and outlasted at least seven CCF divisions under

conditions of terrain and weather chosen by the enemy and reputedly

to his liking. Although frostbite took a heavy toll of the Division

it hit CCF units far harder, perhaps decisively.

3. In the process of accomplishing “2” above, rendered militarily

non-effective a large part of 9th CCF Army Group. Those units not

contacted by 1stMarDiv were fixed in the Chosin Reservoir area for

possible employment against the Division and consequently suffered

from the ravages of sub-zero cold and heavy air attacks.

4. As a direct result of “3” above, enabled X Corps to evacuate

Hungnam without enemy interference and, consequently, as a combat

effective unit with all personnel and serviceable equipment.

Pressure on X Corps by 9th CCF Army Group during the seaward

evacuation of the Corps, a most difficult operation, would

undoubtedly have altered the result.[659]

[659] Quotations in this section, except when otherwise noted,

are from the _MCB Study_, II-C-125–127.

Improvisations in tactics were now and then made necessary by unusual

conditions of terrain, weather or enemy action. But on the whole the

Marines saved themselves in the Reservoir campaign by the application

of sound military tactics. In the doing they demonstrated repeatedly

that the rear makes as good a front as any other for the militarily

skilled and stout-hearted, and that a unit is not beaten merely because

it is surrounded by a more numerous enemy.

Inevitably the Marine campaign has been compared to that classic of all

military breakouts--the march of the immortal Ten Thousand which is

the subject of Xenophon’s _Anabasis_. Stranded in the hostile Persian

Empire in the year 401 B. C., these Greek mercenaries cut their way to

safety through Asiatic hordes. The following description of the tactics

used by Xenophon and his lieutenant Cherisophus to overcome road blocks

in mountain country will have a familiar ring to Marine veterans of the

Reservoir:

The enemy, by keeping up a continuous battle and occupying in

advance every narrow place, obstructed passage after passage.

Accordingly, whenever the van was obstructed, Xenophon, from

behind, made a dash up the hills and broke the barricade, and freed

the vanguard by endeavoring to get above the obstructing enemy.

Whenever the rear was the point attacked, Cherisophus, in the same

way, made a detour, and by endeavoring to mount higher than the

barricaders, freed the passage for the rear rank; and in this way,

turn and turn about, they rescued each other, and paid unflinching

attention to their mutual needs.[660]

[660] Xenophon, _The Anabasis of Cyrus_, Henry C. Dakyns,

trans., in F. R. B. Godolphin, _The Greek Historians_, (2

vols., New York, 1942), II, 297–298.

Spears and arrows have been superseded by bazookas and machine

guns, but the basic infantry tactics of the Reservoir breakout were

essentially those which served Xenophon and the Ten Thousand more

than 33 centuries ago. Organization, combat, training, spirit, and

discipline enabled the Marines, like the Hellenes before them, to

overcome numerical odds and fight their way over Asiatic mountain roads

to the sea.

The over-all strategic effects of the Reservoir campaign, as summarized

by the Marine Corps Board Study, were as follows:

1. Played a prominent part ... in enabling X Corps, a considerable

segment of the total UN forces in Korea, to be withdrawn from

Hungnam as a combat effective force available for employment

with the Eighth Army in South Korea at a time when that Army was

retreating and was in critical need of a reinforcement.

2. Were largely responsible for preventing reinforcement of CCF

forces on Eighth Army front by 12 divisions during a period when

such reinforcement might have meant to Eighth Army the difference

between maintaining a foothold in Korea or forced evacuation

therefrom, by being instrumental in rendering 9th CCF Army

Group, a force of three corps of four divisions each, militarily

noneffective for a minimum period of three months.

That the breakout of the 1st Marine Division had affected American

political and military policy at the highest levels was the assertion

of an editorial in _Time_. Referring to what it termed the “Great

Debate,” in December 1950, as to whether American forces should be

withdrawn from Korea, the news-magazine commented:

When the Marines fought their way down to Hungnam through the

“unconquerable Chinese hordes,” and embarked for Pusan with their

equipment, their wounded, and their prisoners, the war in Asia

took on a different look. The news stories, pictures and newsreels

of the Hungnam action contributed more to forming U. S. policy

than all the words in the “Great Debate.” The nation--and the

revitalized Eighth Army--now knows that U. S. fighting men will

stay in Korea until a better place and a better opportunity is

found to punish Communist aggression.[661]

[661] _Time_, lvii, no. 9 (26 Feb 51).

General Douglas MacArthur as CINCUNC, in his 11th report of operations

of UN forces in Korea, submitted the following to the United Nations

Organization regarding the Chosin Reservoir operation:

In this epic action, the Marine Division and attached elements

of the 7th Infantry Division marched and fought over 60 miles in

bitter cold along a narrow, tortuous, ice-covered road against

opposition of from six to eight Chinese Communist Force divisions

which suffered staggering losses. Success was due in no small part

to the unprecedented extent and effectiveness of air support. The

basic element, however, was the high quality of soldierly courage

displayed by the personnel of the ground units who maintained their

integrity in the face of continuous attacks by numerically superior

forces, consistently held their positions until their wounded

had been evacuated, and doggedly refused to abandon supplies and

equipment to the enemy.

United Nations Air Forces threw the bulk of their effort into close

support of ground forces cutting their way through overwhelming

numbers of Chinese Communists. The toll of the enemy taken by

the United Nations aircraft contributed in large measure to the

successful move of our forces from the Chosin Reservoir to the

Hamhung area despite the tremendous odds against them. Air support

provided by the United States Marine Air Force and Naval Aircraft

in this beleaguered area, described as magnificent by the ground

force commanders, represented one of the greatest concentrations of

tactical air operations in history.[662]

[662] Gen Douglas MacArthur, CinCUNC _11th Report of the

Operations in Korea of United Nations Forces_, 31 Jan

51. See Appendix H for transcript of Presidential Unit

Citation awarded to the 1stMarDiv and the Distinguished

Unit Citation awarded to the 1stMAW.

Rear Admiral James H. Doyle attributed the successful evacuation at

Hungnam in large measure to the Marine breakout. Writing to General

Smith several months later, he asserted that he had “filled in what has

been a neglected page in the story of the Hungnam redeployment. It is

simply this: that the destruction of enemy forces wrought by the First

Marine Division on the march down the hill was a major factor in the

successful withdrawal; and that the destruction was so complete the

enemy was unable to exert serious pressure at any time on the shrinking

perimeter. To my mind, as I told you at Hungnam, the performance of

the First Marine Division on that march constitutes one of the most

glorious chapters in Marine Corps history.”[663]

[663] RAdm T. H. Doyle ltr to MajGen O. P. Smith, 2 Mar 51.

Letters of commendation were received by the 1st Marine Division from

General Cates, CMC, General Shepherd, Admiral Joy, General Collins,

Chief of Staff, USA, General Almond, and many other high-ranking

military leaders. But for depth of feeling, for sincerity and emotion,

there was no message which appealed more to the officers and men of

the Division than the concluding paragraph of this tribute from the

commanding general who had guided their destinies with unswerving

courage and who had come out with them, Major General Oliver P. Smith:

The performance of officers and men in this operation was

magnificent. Rarely have all hands in a division participated so

intimately in the combat phases of an operation. Every Marine

can be justly proud of his participation. In Korea, Tokyo and

Washington there is full appreciation of the remarkable feat of the

division. With the knowledge of the determination, professional

competence, heroism, devotion to duty, and self-sacrifice displayed

by officers and men of this division, my feeling is one of humble

pride. No division commander has ever been privileged to command a

finer body of men.[664]

[664] 1stMarDiv memo 238-50, 19 Dec 50.

APPENDIX A

Glossary of Technical Terms and Abbreviations

ADC--Assistant Division Commander.

AdmO--Administrative Order.

AF--Air Force.

AGC--Amphibious Force Flagship.

AH--Hospital Ship.

AirDelPlat--Air Delivery Platoon.

AirO--Air Officer.

AirSptSec--Air Support Section.

AKA--Assault Cargo Ship.

AKL--Cargo, Ship, Light.

AM--Minesweeper.

AmphTracBn--Amphibian Tractor Battalion.

AmphTrkBn--Amphibian Truck Battalion.

AMS--Auxiliary Motor Minesweeper.

ANGLICO--Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company.

AP--Transport.

APA--Assault Transport.

APD--High Speed Transport.

ARG--Internal Combustion Engine Repair Ship.

ARL--Landing Craft Repair Ship.

ArmdAmphBn--Armored Amphibian Battalion.

ARS--Salvage Vessel.

AT--Antitank.

ATF--Ocean Tug, Fleet.

AutoMaintCo--Automotive Maintenance Company.

AutoSupCo--Automotive Supply Company.

BB--Battleship.

BLT--Battalion Landing Team.

Bn--Battalion.

Btry--Battery.

BuMed--Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.

C-47--Douglas Transport (same as R4D).

CA--Heavy Cruiser.

CCF--Chinese Communist Forces.

CG--Commanding General.

CIC--Counter Intelligence Corps, USA.

CinCFE--Commander in Chief, Far East.

CinCPacFlt--Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet.

CinCUNC--Commander in Chief, United Nations Command.

CL--Light Cruiser.

CO--Commanding Officer.

Co--Company.

ComFltAirWing--Commander Fleet Air Wing.

ComNavFE--Commander Naval Forces Far East.

ComPacFlt--Commander Pacific Fleet.

ComPhibGruOne--Commander Amphibious Group One.

ComSeventhFlt--Commander Seventh Fleet.

ComUNBlockandCortFor--Commander United Nations Blockade and Escort Force.

CP--Command Post.

CR--Command Report.

C/S--Chief of Staff.

CSG--Combat Service Group.

CSUSA--Chief of Staff, U. S. Army.

CTF--Commander Task Force.

CTG--Commander Task Group.

CVE--Escort Aircraft Carrier.

CVL--Light Aircraft Carrier.

DD--Destroyer.

DDR--Radar Picket Destroyer.

DE--Destroyer Escort.

Det--Detachment.

DMS--High Speed Minesweeper.

DOW--Died of Wounds.

EmbO--Embarkation Order.

EmbO--Embarkation Officer.

EngrBn--Engineer Battalion.

EUSAK--Eighth U. S. Army in Korea.

FABn--Field Artillery Battalion (USA).

FAC--Forward Air Controller.

FEAF--Far East Air Force.

FECOM--Far East Command.

F4U--Chance-Vought “Corsair” Fighter-Bomber.

FMFPac--Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.

FO--Forward Observer.

FragOrder--Fragmentary Order.

Fum&BathPlat--Fumigation and Bath Platoon.

GHQ--General Headquarters.

Gru--Group.

H&SCo--Headquarters and Service Company.

HD--Historical Diary.

Hedron--Headquarters Squadron.

HMS--Her Majesty’s Ship.

HMAS--Her Majesty’s Australian Ship.

HMCS--Her Majesty’s Canadian Ship.

HMNZS--Her Majesty’s New Zealand Ship.

HO3S--Sikorsky Helicopter.

HQBn--Headquarters Battalion.

HQMC--Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps.

InfDiv--Infantry Division (USA).

Interv--Interview.

ISUM--Intelligence Summary.

JANIS--Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Studies.

JCS--Joint Chiefs of Staff.

JMS--Japanese Minesweeper.

JSPOG--Joint Strategic Planning and Operations Group.

JTF--Joint Task Force.

KIA--Killed in Action.

KMC--Korean Marine Corps.

Ln--Liaison.

LSD--Landing Ship, Dock.

LSM--Landing Ship, Medium.

LSMR--Landing Ship, Medium-Rocket.

LST--Landing Ship, Tank.

LSTH--Landing Ship, Tank--Casualty Evacuation.

LSU--Landing Ship, Utility.

Ltr--Letter.

LVT--Landing Vehicle, Tracked.

MAG--Marine Aircraft Group.

MAW--Marine Aircraft Wing.

MS--Manuscript.

MedBn--Medical Battalion.

MedAmbCo--Medical Ambulance Company, USA.

MIA--Missing in Action.

MISD--Military Intelligence Service Detachment (USA).

MP--Military Police.

MRO--Movement Report Office.

msg--Message.

MSR--Main Supply Route.

MSTS--Military Sea Transport Service.

MTACS--Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron.

MTBn--Motor Transport Battalion.

NavBchGru--Naval Beach Group.

NavFE--Naval Forces Far East.

NCO--Noncommissioned Officer.

NK--North Korea(n).

NKPA--North Korean Peoples Army.

N.d.--Date not given.

N.t.--Time not given.

O--Officer; Order.

OCMH--Office of the Chief of Military History (USA).

OI--Operation Instruction.

OpnO--Operation Order.

OpnPlan--Operation Plan.

OrdBn--Ordnance Battalion.

OY--Consolidated-Vultee Light Observation Plane.

PCEC--Escort Amphibious Control Vessel.

PF--Frigate.

PhibGru--Amphibious Group.

PIR--Periodic Intelligence Report.

PLA--People’s Liberation Army.

Plat--Platoon.

POL--Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants.

POR--Periodic Operation Report.

POW--Prisoner of War.

QMPetDistCo--Quartermaster Petroleum Distribution Company (USA).

QMSubsistSupCo--Quartermaster Subsistence Supply Company (USA).

R4D--Douglas Transport (Navy and Marine designation of C-47).

RCT--Regimental Combat Team.

Recon--Reconnaissance.

Reinf--Reinforced.

RktBn--Rocket Battalion.

RM--Royal Marines.

ROK--Republic of Korea.

R & O File--Records and Orders File.

ROKA--Republic of Korea Army.

ROKN--Republic of Korea Navy.

SAC--Supporting Arms Coordinator.

SAR--Special Action Report.

SCAJAP--Shipping Control Authority, Japan.

SecDef--Secretary of Defense.

ServBn--Service Battalion.

SigBn--Signal Battalion.

SigRepCo--Signal Repair Company.

SitRpt--Situation Report.

SP--Shore Party.

SMS--Marine Supply Squadron.

TAC--Tactical Air Coordinator; Tactical Air Commander.

TACP--Tactical Air Control Party.

Tacron--Tactical Air Control Squadron.

TADC--Tactical Air Direction Center.

T-AP--Transport Operated by MSTS.

TBM--General Motors “Avenger” Torpedo Bomber.

TE--Task Element.

T/E--Table of Equipment.

Tel--Telephone Message.

TF--Task Force.

TG--Task Group.

TkBn--Tank Battalion.

Trk--Truck.

T/O--Table of Organization.

TU--Task Unit.

UDT--Underwater Demolitions Team.

U/F--Unit of Fire.

UN--United Nations.

UNC--United Nations Command.

URpt--Unit Report.

USA--United States Army.

USAF--United States Air Force.

USMC--United States Marine Corps.

USN--United States Navy.

VMF--Marine Fighter Squadron.

VMF(N)--All-Weather, Fighter Squadron.

VMO--Marine Observation Squadron.

VMR--Marine Transport Squadron.

WD--War Diary.

WD Sum--War Diary Summary.

WIA--Wounded in Action.

YMS--Motor Minesweeper.

APPENDIX B

Task Organization 1st Marine Division

In order to present a true picture of the Task Organization of the

1st Marine Division during its operations in northeast Korea the

organization will be presented for the following periods:

1. Wonsan Landing (OpnO 16-50)

2. Advance to the Reservoir (OpnO 19-50)

3. Movement south from Hagaru (OpnO 25-50)

4. Hungnam Evacuation (OpnO 27-50)

1. TASK ORGANIZATION OF 1ST MARINE DIVISION FOR WONSAN LANDING

_1st Marine Division, (Reinf), FMF_ MajGen O. P. SMITH

HqBn, 1stMarDiv, less dets LtCol M. T. STARR

163rd MISD, USA

441st CIC Det, USA

1st SigBn, less dets Maj R. L. SCHREIER

Carrier Plat, FMF

Det, 4th SigBn, USA

2d SigRepUnit, USA

Det, 205th SigRepCo, USA

1st ServBn, less dets LtCol C. L. BANKS

1stMTBn LtCol O. L. BEALL

1st OrdBn Maj L. O. WILLIAMS

1st SPBn, less dets LtCol H. P. CROWE

SPCommSec, 1stSigBn

Det, 1st CSG

Det, NavBchGru 1

1st MedBn, less dets Cdr H. B. JOHNSON, USN

2d Plat, 560thMedAmbCo, USA

7thMTBn Maj J. F. STEPKA

1st CSG, less dets Col. J. S. COOK

1st Fum&BathPlat, FMF

1st AirDelPlat, FMF

Plat, 20th QMSubsistSupCo, USA

Plat, 506th QMPetDisCo, USA

NavBchGru 1, less dets

_Regimental Combat Team 1_ Col L. B. PULLER

1st Marines

Det, 5th KMC Bn

Co C, 1st EngrBn

Co C, 1st MTBn

Co D, 1st MedBn

Plat, 1stArmd AmphBn

Det, 1stSigBn

FO & LnO Secs, 2/11

LnDet, 1stTkBn

SP Gru B

Det, MP Co

Det, 1st CSG

Det, NavBchGru 1

_Regimental Combat Team 5_ LtCol R. L. MURRAY

5th Marines

Co A, 1st EngrBn

Co D, 1st MTBn

Co C, 1st MedBn

Det, 1stSigBn

FO & LnO Secs, 1/11

SP Gru A

Det, MP Co

Det, 1st CSG

Det, NavBchGru 1

_Regimental Combat Team 7_ Col H. L. LITZENBERG

7th Marines

Det, 3d KMC Bn

Co D, 1st EngrBn

Co B, 1st MTBn

Co D, 1st MedBn

Plat, 1st ArmdAmphBn

Det, 1st SigBn

FO & LnO Secs, 3/11

LnDet, 1st TkBn

SP Gru C

Det, MP Co

Det, 1st CSG

Det, NavBchGru 1

_11th Marines, Reinf_ Col J. H. BROWER

Btry C, 1st 4.5″ RktBn

1st AmphTrkCo, FMF

_1st Tank Battalion_, less dets LtCol H. T. MILNE

_1st Engineer Battalion_, less dets LtCol J. H. PARTRIDGE

_3d KMC Battalion_, less dets Maj KIM YUN GUN

_5th KMC Battalion_, less dets Col KIM TAI SHIK

_1st AmphTracBn, FMF_ LtCol E. F. WANN

_Reconnaissance Company, 1stMarDiv_ 1stLt R. B. CROSSMAN

_VMO-6_ Maj V. J. GOTTSCHALK

2. TASK ORGANIZATION FOR ADVANCE TO THE RESERVOIR

_1st Marine Division, Reinf, FMF_ MajGen O. P. SMITH

HqBn, less dets

163d MISD

441st CIC Det

1stSigBn, Reinf, less dets

1stServBn, Reinf, less dets

Co A. 7th MTBn (less 1 plat)

Det, 1st MTBn

1st OrdBn

1stMedBn, less dets

1st AmphTracBn

Co B, 1st ArmdAmphBn (less 1st Plat)

7th MT Bn, less dets

1st CSG, Reinf

1st AmphTrkCo

1st AirDelPlat

1st Fum&Bath Plat

_Regimental Combat Team 1_ Col L. B. PULLER

1st Marines

2/11

Co D, 1st MedBn

Co C, 1st TkBn

Co C, Reinf, 1st EngrBn

Det, 1stSigBn

Det, 1stServBn

Det, MP Co

_Regimental Combat Team 7_ Col H. L. LITZENBERG

7th Marines

3/11

Recon Co, 1stMarDiv

1st MTBn, less dets

Co D, Reinf, 1st EngrBn

Co E, 1st MedBn

Det, 1stSigBn

Det, MP Co

Det, 1stServBn

_Regimental Combat Team 5_ LtCol R. L. MURRAY

5th Marines

1/11

Co A, Reinf, 1stEngrBn

Co C, 1stMedBn

Co, 1stMTBn

Det, 1stSigBn

Det, MP Co

Det, 1stServBn

_11th Marines, Reinf_, less dets Col J. H. BROWER

Btry C, 1st 4.5″ RktBn

_1st Tank Battalion, Reinf_, less dets LtCol H. T. MILNE

Tk Plat, 5thMar

Tk Plat, 7thMar

_1st Engineer Battalion_, less dets LtCol J. H. PARTRIDGE

_VMO-6_ Maj V. J. GOTTSCHALK

3. TASK ORGANIZATION FOR MOVEMENT SOUTH FROM HAGARU

(Except where noted the organization remained the same for the

movement south from Koto-ri.).

_1st Marine Division, Reinf, FMF_ MajGen O. P. SMITH

HqBn, Reinf, less dets

163d MISD

181st CIC

1stSigBn, Reinf, less dets

1st ServBn, Reinf, less dets

Co A, 7thMTBn, less dets

AutoSup Co, 1stMTBn

AutoMaint Co, 1stMTBn

1stOrdBn, less dets

1stMedBn, Reinf, less dets

1st Fum&Bath Plat

2d Plat, 506thMedAmbCo, USA

(under opn control X Corps)

1stAmphTracBn, Reinf, less dets

1st CSG, Reinf

7thMTBn, less dets

Co A, 1stAmphTracBn

1st AirDel Plat

1stSPBn (under opn control 3dInfDiv)

1stTkBn, less dets

VMO-6

_Regimental Combat Team 5_ LtCol R. L. MURRAY

5th Marines, less Tk Plat

1/11

Btry D, 2/11 (released to RCT 1 on

passage through Koto-ri)

11th Marines, Reinf, less dets

4/11, less Btry L

Det, 96th FABn, USA 3/1 (released to RCT 1 on

passage through Koto-ri)

Det, 1stSigBn

Tk Co, 31st Inf, USA

Prov Plat, 1stTkBn

Co A, 1stEngrBn (released to RCT 1 on

passage through Koto-ri)

Det, 1stEngrBn

41 Commando, RM

Division Train 2 LtCol H. T. MILNE

Traffic Plat, MP Co

Det, 513th TrkCo, USA

Det, 1stMTBn

Co D, 10thEngr(C)Bn, USA

Det, 1stMedBn

Det, 1stServBn

Det, 1stSigBn

Det, 515th Trk Co, USA

_Regimental Combat Team 7_ Col H. L. LITZENBERG

7th Marines, less Tk Plat 3/11

Btry L, 4/11 (released to RCT 1 on

arrival Koto-ri)

ProvBn, 31st Inf, USA

Det, 1stSigBn

Co D, 1stTkBn

Co D, Reinf, 1stEngrBn

Division Train 1 LtCol C. L. BANKS

Det, HqBn, 1stMarDiv

Det, Hq X Corps

Det, 1stServBn

Det, 1stOrdBn

Det, 7thMTBn

Det, X Corps Ord Co, USA

MP Co, 1stMarDiv, less dets

1stMTBn, less dets

Det, 1stSigBn

AirSptSec, MTACS-2

Det, 1stMedBn

_Regimental Combat Team 1_ Col L. B. PULLER

1st Marines, less 3/1 and Tk Plat

2/31, Reinf, USA

2/11, less Btry D (Btry D attached on passage

Koto-ri)

Btry L, 4/11 (Btry L attached on arrival

Koto-ri)

Cos A & B, 7thMTBn

Co C, Reinf, 1stMTBn

Det, 1stSigBn

Det, 1stServBn

Det, HqBn, 1stMarDiv

Det, 1stOrdBn

Cos B & D, 1stMedBn

Recon Co, 1stMarDiv

Det, 1stEngr Bn

Det, 7th Mar

Det, 41 Commando, RM (released to 41 Commando on

passage Koto-ri by RCT 5)

Co B, Reinf, 1stTkBn

Misc elms, USA

4. TASK ORGANIZATION FOR HUNGNAM EVACUATION.

_Forward Echelon_ BrigGen E. A. CRAIG

_Main Body, 1st Marine Division_, MajGen O. P. SMITH

_Reinf, FMF_, less dets

_Regimental Combat Team 7_ Col H. L. LITZENBERG

7th Marines, less Tk Plat

3/11

Co D, 1stEngrBn

1st CSG, less dets

Det, HqBn

1stServBn

Co A, 7th MTBn

Det, 1stSigBn

1stMedBn, Reinf

1st Fum&Bath Plat

_Regimental Combat Team 5_ LtCol R. L. MURRAY

5th Marines

1/11

41 Commando, RM

Co A, 1stEngrBn

1stOrdBn

1stMTBn

Det, 1stSigBn

_Regimental Combat Team 1_ Col L. B. PULLER

1st Marines

2/11

Co C, 1stEngrBn

1stTkBn

Tk Plat, 5th Mar

Tk Plat, 7th Mar

Det, 1stSigBn

_HqBn, Reinf_, less dets LtCol M. T. STARR

1stSigBn, less dets

163d MISD, USA

181st CIC Det, USA

_11th Marines, Reinf_, less dets LtCol C. A. YOUNGDALE

Btry C, 1st 4.5″ RktBn

1st EngrBn, less dets

7thMTBn, less dets

ANGLICO, 1stSigBn

_1stSPBn_, less dets LtCol H. P. CROWE

_1st AmphTracBn, Reinf, FMF_ LtCol E. F. WANN

Co A, Reinf, 1stAmphTrkBn, FMF

Co B, 1stArmdAmphBn, FMF

APPENDIX C

Naval Task Organization

1. _Wonsan Landing_

JTF 7 VAdm A. D. Struble

TF 90 Attack Force RAdm J. H. Doyle

TG 91.2 Landing Force (1st MajGen O. P. Smith

MarDiv)

TE 90.00 Flagship Element

_Mount McKinley_ 1 AGC

TE 90.01 Tactical Air Control Cdr T. H. Moore

Element

TU 90.01.1 TacRon 1

TU 90.01.2 TacRon 3

TE 90.02 Naval Beach Group Capt W. T. Singer

Element

TU 90.02.1 Headquarters Unit

TU 90.02.2 Beachmaster Unit LCdr M. C. Sibisky

TU 90.02.3 Boat Unit One LCdr H. E. Hock

TU 90.02.4 Amphibious LCdr M. T. Jacobs, Jr.

Construction Bn.

TU 90.02.5 Underwater LCdr W. R. McKinney

Demolitions Team Unit

TG 90.1 Administrative Group RAdm L. A. Thackery

TE 90.10 Flagship Element Capt J. B. Stefonek

_Eldorado_ 1 AGC

TU 90.1.1 Medical Unit

_Consolation_ 1 AH

_LST 898_[665]

_LST 975_[665] 2 LST

TU 90.1.2 Repair and Salvage Capt P. W. Mothersill

Unit

_Lipan_

_Cree_

_Arikara_ 3 ATF

_Conserver_ 1 ARS

_Askari_ 1 ARL

_Gunston Hall_

_Fort Marion_

_Comstock_

_Catamount_

_Colonial_ 5 LSD

Plus other units as assigned

TU 90.1.3 Service Unit LCdr J. D. Johnston

15 LSU

TG 90.2 Transport Group Capt V. R. Roane

TE 90.21 Transport Division Capt S. G. Kelly

ABLE

_Bayfield_

_Noble_

_Cavalier_

_Okanogan_ 4 APA

_Washburn_

_Seminole_

_Titania_

_Oglethorpe_

_Archenar_ 5 AKA

_Marine Phoenix_ 1 T-AP

TE 90.22 Transport Division Capt A. E. Jarrell

BAKER

_Henrico_

_George Clymer_

_Pickaway_

_Bexar_ 4 APA

_Union_

_Algol_

_Alshain_

_Winston_

_Montague_ 5 AKA

_Aiken Victory_ 1 T-AP

_Robin Goodfellow_

1 Commercial freighter

TG 90.3 Tractor Group Capt R. C. Peden

_Gunston Hall_[666]

_Fort Marion_[666]

_Comstock_[666]

_Catamount_[666]

_Colonial_[666] 5 LSD

_LST 1123_

_LST 715_

_LST 742_

_LST 799_

_LST 802_

_LST 845_

_LST 883_

_LST 898_

_LST 914_

_LST 973_

_LST 975_

_LST 1048_ 12 LST

23 SCAJAP LSTs 23 LST

TG 90.4 Control Group LCdr C. Allmon

_PCEC 896_ 1 PCEC

TU 90.4.1 Control Unit Lt S. C. Pinksen

BLUE

_Wantuck_ 1 APD

TU 90.4.2 Control Unit Lt A. C. Ansorge

YELLOW

_Horace A. Bass_ 1 APD

TG 95.6 Minesweeping and Capt R. T. Spofford

Protection Group

_Collett_ 1 DD

_Diachenko_ 1 APD

_Doyle_

_Endicott_ 2 DMS

_Pledge_

_Incredible_ 2 AM

_Kite_

_Merganser_

_Mockingbird_

_Osprey_

_Redhead_

_Chatterer_ 7 AMS

HMS _Mounts Bay_

HMNZS _Pukaki_

HMNZS _Putira_

_LaGrandiere_ (French)

4 PF

8 Japanese mine sweepers

4 Japanese mine destruction

and buoying vessels

1 ROKN 1 AKL

Plus other units assigned

TG 90.6 Reconnaissance Group Cdr S. C. Small

_Horace A. Bass_

_Wantuck_ 2 APD

UDT 1

UDT 3 2 UDT

TG 96.8 Escort Carrier Group RAdm R. W. Ruble

_Badoeng Strait_

_Sicily_ 2 CVE

_Taussig_

_Hanson_

_George K. Mackenzie_

_Ernest G. Small_

_Southerland_

_Rowan_ 6 DD

TG 95.2 Gunfire Support Group RAdm G. R. Hartman

_Helena_

_Rochester_

_Toledo_ 3 CA

HMS _Ceylon_ 1 CL

HMS _Cockade_

HMCS _Alhabaskan_

HMAS _Warramunga_

3 DD of DesRon 9 6 DD

LSMR 401[667]

LSMR 403[667]

LSMR 404[667]

2. _Hungnam Evacuation_

TF 90 Amphibious Force, Naval Forces Far East RAdm J. H. Doyle

TE 90.00 Flagship Element

_Mount McKinley_

TE 90.01 Tactical Air Control Element Cdr R. W. Arndt

TacRon ONE

TE 90.02 Repair and Salvage Unit Cdr L. C. Conwell

_Kermit Roosevelt_ ARG

_Askari_ ARL

_Bolster_

_Conserver_ 2 ARS

_Tawakoni_ ATF

TE 90.03 Control Element LCdr C. Allmon

_Diachenko_

_Begor_ 2 APD

PCEC 882 PCEC

TG 90.2 Transport Group Capt S. G. Kelly

TE 90.21 Transport Element Capt A. E. Jarrell

_Bayfield_

_Henrico_

_Noble_ 3 APA

_Winston_

_Seminole_

_Montague_ 3 AKA

_Begor_

_Diachenko_ 2 APD

PCEC 882 PCEC

_Fort Marion_[668]

_Colonial_[668]

_Catamount_[668] 3 LSD

LST 742

LST 715

LST 845

LST 802

LST 883

LST 799

LST 898

LST 914

LST 975

LST 973

LST 1048 11 LST

TG 90.8 Gunfire Support Group RAdm R. H. Hillenkoetter

_St. Paul_

_Rochester_ 2 CA

_Zellars_

_Charles S. Sperry_

_Massey_

_Forrest Royal_ 4 DD

LSMR 401

LSMR 403

LSMR 404 3 LSMR

Plus DD as assigned from TG 95.2

TG 95.2 Blockade, Escort and RAdm J. M. Higgins

Minesweeping Group

_Rochester_ CA

_English_

_Hank_

_Wallace L. Lind_

_Borie_ 4 DD

_Sausalito_

_Hoquiam_

_Gallup_

_Gloucester_

_Bisbee_

_Glendale_ 6 PF

TG 95.6 Minesweeping Group Capt R. T. Spofford

_Endicott_

_Doyle_ 2 DMS

_Incredible_ AM

_Curlew_

_Heron_ 2 AMS

TG 96.8 Escort Carrier Group RAdm R. W. Ruble

_Badoeng Strait_

_Sicily_ 2 CVE

_Bataan_ CVL

_Lofberg_

_John A. Bole_

_Mackenzie_

_Taussig_

_Ernest G. Small_

_Brinkley Bass_

_Arnold J. Isbell_ 7 DD

_Hanson_ DDR

Vessels attached TF 90 for

operational control.

_Missouri_ BB

_Duncan_ DDR (from 10 Dec)

_Foss_ DE (from 9 Dec)

_Consolation_

AH (from 2 Dec)

[665] Reported to CTG 95.2 upon arrival at objective area.

[666] Carrying 3 LSU.

[667] Reported to CTF 90 when released by CTG 95.2.

[668] 3 LSU embarked

APPENDIX D

Effective Strength of 1st Marine Division[669]

----------+--------+--------+--------+--------+-------

|Organic |Attached|Attached| |

Date | USMC | U. S. | Royal |Attached|

|and USN | Army |Marines | KMC | Total

----------+--------+--------+--------+--------+-------

8 Oct 50 | 23,533 | 78 | 0 | 2,159 | 25,770

26 Oct 50 | 23,608 | 83 | 0 | 1,588 | 25,279

27 Nov 50 | 25,166 | 73 | 234 | 0 | 25,473

5 Dec 50 | 21,551 | 2,535 | 157 | 0 | 24,243

8 Dec 50 | 21,039 | 2,448 | 157 | 0 | 23,644

15 Dec 50 | 19,362 | 14 | 144 | 0 | 19,520

----------+--------+--------+--------+--------+-------

[669] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex A (G-1), 4.

APPENDIX E

1st Marine Division Casualties[670]

--------+-----+-----+-----+-------+-----------

| | | | | Non-battle

Date | KIA | DOW | MIA | WIA | casualties

--------+-----+-----+-----+-------+-----------

8Oct50 | | | | | 21

9Oct50 | | | | | 12

10Oct50 | | | | | 11

11Oct50 | | | | | 35

12Oct50 | | | | | 23

13Oct50 | | | | | 5

14Oct50 | | | | | 5

15Oct50 | | | | | 4

16Oct50 | | | | | 3

17Oct50 | | | | | 5

18Oct50 | | | | | 2

19Oct50 | | | | | 1

20Oct50 | | | | | 4

21Oct50 | | | | | 1

22Oct50 | | | | | 2

23Oct50 | | | | | 1

24Oct50 | | | | | 5

25Oct50 | | | | | 12

26Oct50 | | | | | 43

27Oct50 | 22 | | 4 | 44 | 54

28Oct50 | 1 | | | 3 | 68

29Oct50 | | | | | 115

30Oct50 | 1 | | | 5 | 52

31Oct50 | | | | | 36

1Nov50 | | | | | 29

2Nov50 | 22 | 2 | | 67 | 64

3Nov50 | 22 | 3 | 1 | 162 | 93

4Nov50 | 17 | 4 | | 84 | 126

5Nov50 | 1 | 1 | | 23 | 94

6Nov50 | 5 | 1 | | 38 | 87

7Nov50 | 15 | | | 60 | 51

8Nov50 | 1 | 2 | | 17 | 50

9Nov50 | 2 | 7 | | | 50

10Nov50 | 3 | | | 20 | 57

11Nov50 | 8 | | | 16 | 48

12Nov50 | 2 | | | 4 | 40

13Nov50 | 7 | | | 9 | 63

14Nov50 | | | | | 66

15Nov50 | | | | 1 | 172

16Nov50 | 1 | | | 2 | 136

17Nov50 | | | | 2 | 77

18Nov50 | | | | | 79

19Nov50 | | | | 1 | 58

20Nov50 | | | | | 46

21Nov50 | 4 | | | 5 | 63

22Nov50 | | | | | 65

23Nov50 | 1 | | | 3 | 58

24Nov50 | 3 | | | 8 | 51

25Nov50 | | | | 8 | 55

26Nov50 | 2 | | 1 | 5 | 68

27Nov50 | 37 | 1 | 17 | 186 | 96

28Nov50 | 95 | 3 | 43 | 539 | 259

29Nov50 | 60 | 14 | 42 | 396 | 105

30Nov50 | 27 | 6 | 6 | 183 | 102

1Dec50 | 27 | 14 | 6 | 111 | 134

2Dec50 | 55 | 2 | 33 | 231 | 180

3Dec50 | 16 | 1 | 6 | 194 | 196

4Dec50 | 10 | 6 | 4 | 202 | 582

5Dec50 | 2 | 7 | 2 | 81 | 469

6Dec50 | 32 | 4 | 7 | 212 | 262

7Dec50 | 51 | 16 | | 281 | 304

8Dec50 | 29 | 8 | 4 | 127 | 170

9Dec50 | 6 | 7 | 1 | 46 | 224

10Dec50 | 7 | 5 | 8 | 45 | 266

11Dec50 | 9 | 4 | 3 | 38 | 308

12Dec50 | | 2 | 4 | 3 | 123

13Dec50 | | | | 1 | 52

14Dec50 | | | | | 103

15Dec50 | | 1 | | | 34

16Dec50 | | | | | 90

17Dec50 | | | | 1 | 105

18Dec50 | | | | | 282

19Dec50 | | | | | 202

20Dec50 | | | | | 151

21Dec50 | | | | 1 | 111

22Dec50 | | | | | 68

23Dec50 | | | | 3 | 79

24Dec50 | 1 | | | 10 | 42

--------+-----+-----+-----+-------+-----------

Total | 604 | 114 | 192 | 3,485 | 7,338

--------+-----+-----+-----+-------+-----------

[670] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex E, appendix 2 (Casualty

Reporting Section, 12Jan51); Smith, _Notes_, 1147–1149.

APPENDIX F

Command and Staff List

8 October-15 December 1950

1ST MARINE DIVISION

Commanding General MajGen Oliver P. Smith

Assistant Division Commander BrigGen Edward A. Craig

Chief of Staff Col Gregon A. Williams

Deputy Chief of Staff Col Edward W. Snedeker

G-1 Col Harvey S. Walseth (to 28 Nov)

LtCol Bryghte D. Godbold

G-2 Col Bankson T. Holcomb, Jr.

G-3 Col Alpha L. Bowser, Jr.

G-4 Col Francis A. McAlister

_Special Staff_

Adjutant Maj Philip J. Costello

Air Officer Maj James N. Cupp

Artillery Officer Col James H. Brower (to 30 Nov)

Col Carl A. Youngdale

Amphibian Tractor Officer LtCol Erwin F. Wann, Jr.

Armored Amphibian Officer LtCol Francis H. Cooper

Chaplain Cdr Robert H. Schwyhart (ChC), USN

Chemical Warfare and

Radiological Defense Officer Maj John H. Blue

Dental Officer Capt Mack Meradith (DC), USN

Embarkation Officer Maj Jules M. Rouse

Engineer Officer LtCol John H. Partridge

Exchange Officer Capt Wilbur C. Conley

Food Director Maj Norman R. Nickerson

Inspector Col John A. White

Historical Officer 2dLt John M. Patrick

Legal Officer LtCol Albert H. Schierman

Motor Transport Officer Maj Henry W. Seeley

Naval Gunfire Officer LtCol Loren S. Fraser

Ordnance Officer Capt Donald L. Shenaut

Provost Marshal Capt John H. Griffin

Public Information Officer Capt Michael Capraro (to 6 Nov)

Maj Carl E. Stahley

Shore Party Officer LtCol Henry P. Crowe

Signal Officer LtCol Albert Creal

Special Services Officer Capt Raymond H. Spuhler (to 29 Nov)

LtCol John M. Bathum

Supply Officer Col Gordon S. Hendricks

Surgeon Capt Eugene R. Hering (MC), USN

Tank Officer LtCol Harry T. Milne

_Attached Units_

Commanding Officer, 163d Military

Intelligence Specialist

Detachment, USA Capt Fujio F. Asano, USA

Commanding Officer, 181st Counter

Intelligence Corps Detachment,

USA Maj Millard E. Dougherty, USA

Commanding Officer, 41st

Independent Commando,

Royal Marines LtCol Douglas B. Drysdale, RM

_Headquarters Battalion_

Commanding Officer LtCol Marvin T. Starr

Commanding Officer,

Headquarters Company Maj Frederick Simpson

Commanding Officer,

Military Police Company Capt John H. Griffin

Commanding Officer,

Reconnaissance Company 1stLt Ralph B. Crossman (to 23 Nov)

Maj Walter Gall

_1st Marines_

Commanding Officer Col Lewis B. Puller

Executive Officer LtCol Robert W. Rickert

S-1 Capt William G. Reeves

S-2 Capt Stone W. Quillian

S-3 Maj Robert E. Lorigan

S-4 Maj Thomas T. Grady

Commanding Officer,

Headquarters Company Capt Frank P. Tatum

Commanding Officer, 4.2-inch

Mortar Company Capt Frank J. Faureck

Commanding Officer, Antitank

Company Capt George E. Petro

_1st Battalion, 1st Marines_

Commanding Officer LtCol Jack Hawkins (to 7 Nov)

LtCol Donald M. Schmuck

Executive Officer Maj Maurice H. Clarke

Commanding Officer, Headquarters

and Service Company Capt William B. Hopkins

Commanding Officer, A Company Capt Robert H. Barrow

Commanding Officer, B Company Capt Wesley Noren

Commanding Officer, C Company Capt Robert P. Wray

Commanding Officer, Weapons

Company Maj William T. Bates, Jr.

_2d Battalion, 1st Marines_

Commanding Officer LtCol Allan Sutter

Executive Officer Maj Clarence J. Mabry

Commanding Officer, Headquarters

and Service Company Capt Raymond Dewees, Jr.

Commanding Officer, D Company Capt Welby W. Cronk

Commanding Officer, E Company Capt Charles D. Frederick (to 6 Nov)

1stLt Harold B. Wilson (6–17 Nov)

Capt Jack A. Smith

Commanding Officer, F Company Capt Goodwin C. Groff

Commanding Officer, Weapons Maj Whitman S. Bartley (to 16 Nov)

Company Capt William A. Kerr

_3d Battalion, 1st Marines_

Commanding Officer LtCol Thomas L. Ridge

Executive Officer Maj Reginald R. Myers

Commanding Officer, Headquarters

and Service Company Capt Thomas E. McCarthy

Commanding Officer, G Company Capt George C. Westover (to 30 Oct)

Capt Carl L. Sitter

Commanding Officer, H Company Capt Clarence E. Corley

Commanding Officer, I Company 1stLt Joseph R. Fisher

Commanding Officer, Weapons

Company Maj Edwin H. Simmons

_5th Marines_

Commanding Officer LtCol Raymond L. Murray

Executive Officer LtCol Joseph L. Stewart

S-1 1stLt Alton C. Weed

S-2 Maj William C. Easterline

S-3 Maj Theodore J. Spiker

S-4 Maj Harold Wallace

Commanding Officer, Headquarters

and Service Company Capt Harold G. Schrier (to 9 Oct)

Capt Jack E. Hawthorn

Commanding Officer, 4.2-inch

Mortar Company 1stLt Robert M. Lucy

Commanding Officer, Antitank

Company 1stLt Almarion S. Bailey

_1st Battalion, 5th Marines_

Commanding Officer LtCol George R. Newton (to 17 Nov)

LtCol John W. Stevens, II

Executive Officer Maj Merlin R. Olson

Commanding Officer, Headquarters

and Service Company Capt Walter E. G. Godenius

Commanding Officer, A Company Capt John R. Stevens (to 17 Nov)

Capt James B. Heater

Commanding Officer, B Company Capt Francis I. Fenton (to 13 Oct)

1stLt John R. Hancock

Commanding Officer, C Company 1stLt Poul F. Pedersen (to 6 Nov)

Capt Jack R. Jones

Commanding Officer, Weapons

Company Maj John W. Russell

_2d Battalion, 5th Marines_

Commanding Officer LtCol Harold S. Roise

Executive Officer LtCol John W. Stevens, II (to 12Nov)

Maj Glen E. Martin (13–21Nov)

Maj John L. Hopkins

Commanding Officer, Headquarters

and Service Company 1stLt David W. Walsh (to 8 Oct)

Capt Franklin B. Mayer

Commanding Officer, D Company Capt Samuel S. Smith

Commanding Officer, E Company Capt Samuel Jaskilka (to 12 Dec)

Capt Lawrence W. Henke, Jr.

Commanding Officer, F Company Capt Uel D. Peters (to 6 Dec)

1stLt Charles “H” Dalton

Commanding Officer, Weapons

Company Maj James W. Bateman (to 10 Oct)

Maj Glen E. Martin (11 Oct-12 Nov)

Maj James W. Bateman (13–21 Nov)

Maj Glen E. Martin

_3d Battalion, 5th Marines_

Commanding Officer LtCol Robert D. Taplett

Executive Officer Maj John J. Canney (to 28 Nov)

Maj Harold W. Swain

Commanding Officer, Headquarters

and Service Company Capt Roland A. Marbaugh (to 4 Dec)

Capt Raymond H. Spuhler

Commanding Officer, G Company 1stLt Charles D. Mize (to 17 Nov)

Capt Chester R. Hermanson (18 Nov-2

Dec)

1stLt Charles D. Mize

Commanding Officer, H Company 1stLt Donald E. Watterson (to 8 Nov)

Capt Harold B. Williamson

Commanding Officer, I Company Capt Harold G. Schrier

Commanding Officer, Weapons

Company Maj Murray Ehrlich (to 18 Nov)

Maj Harold W. Swain (19–28 Nov)

1stLt Hubert J. Shovlin

_7th Marines_

Commanding Officer Col Homer L. Litzenberg, Jr.

Executive Officer LtCol Frederick R. Dowsett (to 7 Dec)

LtCol Raymond G. Davis

S-1 Capt John R. Grove

S-2 Capt Donald R. France (to 6 Dec)

S-3 Maj Henry J. Woessner, II

S-4 Maj David L. Mell (to 22 Nov)

Maj Maurice E. Roach

Commanding Officer, Headquarters

and Service Company Capt Nicholas L. Shields (to 3 Dec)

Maj Walter T. Warren (4–7 Dec)[671]

Maj Rodney V. Reigard[672]

Commanding Officer, 4.2-inch

Mortar Company Maj Stanley D. Low (to 2 Nov)

1stLt Gordon Vincent (3–18 Nov)

Maj Rodney V. Reigard

Commanding Officer, Antitank

Company 1stLt Earl R. DeLong (to 20 Oct)

Maj Walter T. Warren (21 Oct-8 Dec)

1stLt Earl R. DeLong

_1st Battalion, 7th Marines_

Commanding Officer LtCol Raymond G. Davis (to 7 Dec)

Maj Webb D. Sawyer

Executive Officer Maj Raymond V. Fridrich

Commanding Officer, Headquarters

and Service Company Capt Elmer L. Starr (to 22 Nov)

1stLt Wilbert R. Gaul

Commanding Officer, A Company Capt David W. Banks (to 20 Nov)

1stLt Eugenous M. Hovatter

Commanding Officer, B Company Capt Myron E. Wilcox, Jr. (to 27 Nov)

1stLt Joseph R. Kurcaba (27 Nov-8-Dec)

1stLt William W. Taylor

Commanding Officer, C Company Capt William E. Shea (to 16 Nov)

Capt John F. Morris

Commanding Officer, Weapons

Company Maj William E. Vorhies

_2d Battalion, 7th Marines_

Commanding Officer Maj Webb D. Sawyer (to 9 Nov)

LtCol Randolph S. D. Lockwood

Executive Officer Maj Roland E. Carey (to 9 Nov)

Maj Webb D. Sawyer (10 Nov-8 Dec)

Maj James F. Lawrence, Jr.

Commanding Officer, Headquarters

and Service Company Capt Walter R. Anderson

Commanding Officer, D Company Capt Milton A. Hull (to 28 Nov)

1stLt James D. Hammond, Jr.

Commanding Officer, E Company Capt Walter D. Phillips, Jr.

(to 28 Nov)

1stLt Raymond O. Ball (28 Nov)

1stLt Robert T. Bey

Commanding Officer, F Company Capt Elmer J. Zorn (to 6 Nov)

Capt William E. Barber (7 Nov-3 Dec)

1stLt John M. Dunne (3–6 Dec)

1stLt Welton R. Abell

Commanding Officer, Weapons

Company Capt Harry L. Givens, Jr. (to 12 Nov)

Maj Joseph L. Abel (13–19 Nov)

Capt Harry L. Givens, Jr.

_3d Battalion, 7th Marines_

Commanding Officer Maj Maurice E. Roach (to 10 Nov)

LtCol William F. Harris (11 Nov-6 Dec)

Maj Warren Morris

Executive Officer Maj Warren Morris (to 6 Dec)

Maj Jefferson D. Smith, Jr.

Commanding Officer, Headquarters

and Service Company Capt Eric R. Haars (to 29 Nov)

Commanding Officer, G Company Capt Thomas E. Cooney (to 27 Nov)

Capt Eric R. Haars (29 Nov-3 Dec)

1stLt George R. Earnest

Commanding Officer, H Company 1stLt Howard H. Harris (to 11 Nov)

Capt Leroy M. Cooke (12–27 Nov)

1stLt Howard H. Harris (27 Nov-1 Dec)

1stLt Harold J. Fitzgeorge (1–5 Dec)

2dLt Minard P. Newton

Commanding Officer, I Company Capt Richard H. Sengewald (to 14 Oct)

1stLt William E. Johnson

(15 Oct-3 Dec)

1stLt Alfred I. Thomas

Commanding Officer, Weapons

Company Maj Jefferson D. Smith (to 5 Dec)

1stLt Austin S. Parker (6–10 Dec)

1stLt Robert E. Hill

_11th Marines_

Commanding Officer Col James H. Brower (to 30 Nov)

LtCol Carl A. Youngdale

Executive Officer LtCol Carl A. Youngdale (to 30 Nov)

S-1 Maj Floyd M. McCorkle

S-2 Capt William T. Phillips

S-3 LtCol James O. Appleyard

S-4 Maj Donald V. Anderson

Commanding Officer,

Headquarters Battery Capt Albert H. Wunderly (to 7 Nov)

Capt Clarence E. Hixson (15–25 Nov)

1stLt William C. Patton

Commanding Officer,

Service Battery Maj Donald V. Anderson (to 16 Nov)

1stLt Joseph M. Brent

Commanding Officer,

Battery C, 1st 4.5-inch

Rocket Battalion 1stLt Eugene A. Bushe

_1st Battalion, 11th Marines_

Commanding Officer LtCol Ransom M. Wood (to 15 Nov)

LtCol Harvey A. Feehan

Executive Officer Maj Francis R. Schlesinger

Commanding Officer,

Headquarters Battery Capt James W. Brayshay (to 25 Nov)

Commanding Officer, Service

Battery 1stLt Kenneth H. Quelch

Commanding Officer, A Battery Capt James D. Jordan

Commanding Officer, B Battery Capt Arnold C. Hoffstetter (to 8 Oct)

Capt Gilbert N. Powell

Commanding Officer, C Battery Capt William J. Nichols, Jr.

_2d Battalion, 11th Marines_

Commanding Officer LtCol Merritt Adelman

Executive Officer Maj Donald E. Noll (to 25 Oct)

Maj Neal G. Newell

Commanding Officer,

Headquarters Battery Capt George J. Batson

Commanding Officer, Service

Battery Capt Herbert R. Merrick, Jr.

Commanding Officer, D Battery Capt Andrew J. Strohmenger (to 8 Dec)

Capt Richard E. Roach

Commanding Officer, E Battery Capt John C. McClelland, Jr.

Commanding Officer, F Battery Capt George J. Kovich, Jr. (to 19 Nov)

1stLt Howard A. Blancheri

_3d Battalion, 11th Marines_

Commanding Officer Maj Francis F. Parry

Executive Officer Maj Norman A. Miller, Jr.

Commanding Officer,

Headquarters Battery 1stLt Michael B. Weir (to 11 Nov)

1stLt Eugene H. Brown (12–18 Nov)

1stLt John J. Brackett

Commanding Officer, Service

Battery Capt Robert A. Thompson (to 17 Oct)

Capt Ernest W. Payne (18 Oct-30 Nov)

Capt Samuel A. Hannah

Commanding Officer, G Battery Capt Samuel A. Hannah (to 30 Nov)

Capt Ernest W. Payne

Commanding Officer, H Battery Capt Benjamin S. Read (to 8 Dec)

1stLt Wilber N. Herndon

Commanding Officer, I Battery Capt John M. McLaurin, Jr. (to 30 Nov)

Capt Robert T. Patterson

_4th Battalion, 11th Marines_

Commanding Officer Maj William McReynolds

Executive Officer Maj Thomas M. Coggins (to 8 Nov)

Maj Maurice J. Coffey

Commanding Officer,

Headquarters Battery Capt Charles S. Cummings (to 25 Oct)

Capt Paul L. Hirt

Commanding Officer, Service

Battery Capt Armand G. Daddazio

Commanding Officer, K Battery 1stLt Robert C. Messman (to 27 Nov)

1stLt Robert C. Parrott

(28 Nov-11 Dec)

Capt Arthur D. Challacombe

Commanding Officer, L Battery Capt Lawrence R. Cloern

Commanding Officer, M Battery Capt Vernon W. Shapiro

_1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion_

Commanding Officer LtCol Erwin F. Wann, Jr.

Executive Officer Maj Arthur J. Barrett

Commanding Officer,

Headquarters Company Capt Frank E. Granucci

Commanding Officer, A Company Maj James P. Treadwell

Commanding Officer, B Company Capt Russell Hamlet

Commanding Officer, C Company Maj Arthur J. Noonan

_1st Armored Amphibian Battalion_

Commanding Officer LtCol Francis H. Cooper

Executive Officer Maj Richard G. Warga

Commanding Officer,

Headquarter Company Capt Roger B. Thompson

Commanding Officer,

Service Company Capt Rex Z. Michael, Jr.

Commanding Officer, A Company Capt Bernard G. Thobe

Commanding Officer, B Company Capt Lewis E. Bolts

_1st Combat Service Group_

Commanding Officer Col John H. Cook, Jr.

Executive Officer LtCol Edward A. Clark

Commanding Officer,

Headquarters Company Capt Francis L. Miller

Commanding Officer,

Maintenance Company Maj Edward H. Voorhees

Commanding Officer,

Supply Company Maj Robert W. Hengesback

Commanding Officer, Support

Company Maj Donald B. Cooley, Jr.

Commanding Officer, Truck Company Capt John A. Pearson (to 11 Nov)

2dLt Alan G. Copp (11–30 Nov)

Capt Jack W. Temple

Commanding Officer, 1st

Fumigation and Bath Company 1stLt James L. Dumas

Commanding Officer, 1st Air

Delivery Platoon Capt Hersel D. C. Blasingame

_1st Engineer Battalion_

Commanding Officer LtCol John H. Partridge

Executive Officer Maj Richard M. Elliott

Commanding Officer,

Headquarters Company Capt James H. McRoberts (to 20 Nov)

Maj Hewitt A. Snow

Capt Edward B. Newton

Commanding Officer,

Service Company Maj James W. McIllwain (to 22 Nov)

Capt Philip A. Terrell, Jr.

Commanding Officer, A Company Capt George W. King (to 2 Dec)

Capt William R. Gould

Commanding Officer, B Company Capt Orville L. Bibb

Commanding Officer, C Company Capt Lester G. Harmon (to 12 Nov)

1stLt Ronald L. Glendinning

Commanding Officer, D Company Capt Byron C. Turner

_1st Medical Battalion_

Commanding Officer Cdr Howard A. Johnson, USN

Executive Officer Cdr William S. Francis, USN

Commanding Officer, Headquarters

and Service Company Cdr William S. Francis, USN

Commanding Officer, A Company Cdr Byron E. Bassham, USN

Commanding Officer, B Company LCdr James A. Kaufman, USN

Commanding Officer, C Company Cdr Harold A. Streit, USN

Commanding Officer, D Company LCdr Gustave J. Anderson, USN

Commanding Officer, E Company LCdr John H. Cheffey, USN (to 15 Oct)

Lt (jg) Ernest N. Grover, USN

(15–30 Oct)

LCdr Charles K. Holloway, USN

_1st Motor Transport Battalion_

Commanding Officer LtCol Olin L. Beall

Executive Officer Maj John R. Barreiro, Jr.

Commanding Officer, Headquarters

and Service Company Capt George B. Loveday

Commanding Officer, A Company Capt Arthur W. Ecklund

Commanding Officer, B Company Capt James C. Camp, Jr.

Commanding Officer, C Company Capt Garfield M. Randall (to 30 Nov)

1stLt Norman E. Stow

Commanding Officer, D Company Capt Bernard J. Whitelock (9 Dec)

1stLt Philip R. Hade

Commanding Officer, Automotive

Maintenance Company Maj Edward L. Roberts

Commanding Officer, Automotive

Supply Company 1stLt Mildridge E. Mangum

Commanding Officer, Amphibian

Truck Company, FMF[673] Capt John Bookhout

_1st Ordnance Battalion_

Commanding Officer Maj Lloyd O. Williams

Executive Officer Maj Samuel A. Johnstone, Jr.

Commanding Officer,

Headquarters Company Capt Theodore Tunis (to 13 Nov)

Capt Gordon H. Moore

Commanding Officer,

Ordnance Supply Company Capt Russel S. LaPointe (to 5 Dec)

1stLt Victor F. Brown

Commanding Officer,

Ammunition Company Capt Harvey W. Gagner (to 30 Nov)

1stLt Charles H. Miller

Commanding Officer, Ordnance

Maintenance Company Capt George L. Williams

_1st Service Battalion_

Commanding Officer LtCol Charles L. Banks

Executive Officer Maj John R. Stone

Commanding Officer,

Headquarters Company Capt Morse “L” Holladay

Commanding Officer,

Service Company Capt Robert A. Morehead

Commanding Officer,

Support Company Capt Richard W. Sinclair (to 27 Oct)

Capt Thomas M. Sagar

_1st Shore Party Battalion_

Commanding Officer LtCol Henry P. Crowe

Executive Officer LtCol Horace H. Figuers

Commanding Officer, Headquarters

and Service Company Capt William T. Miller

Commanding Officer, A Company Maj William L. Batchelor (to 22 Nov)

Capt Nathaniel H. Carver

Commanding Officer, B Company Maj Henry Brzezinski

Commanding Officer C Company Maj George A. Smith (to 24 Nov)

Maj Murray F. Rose

_1st Signal Battalion_

Commanding Officer Maj Robert L. Schreier

Executive Officer Maj Elwyn M. Stimson

Commanding Officer,

Headquarters Company Capt Howard K. Alberts (to 14 Nov)

Capt Earl F. Stanley

Commanding Officer,

Signal Company Maj Richard A. Glaeser

Commanding Officer, ANGLICO Maj Fulton L. Oglesby (to 16 Nov)

Maj Frederick M. Steinhauser

_1st Tank Battalion_

Commanding Officer LtCol Harry T. Milne

Executive Officer Maj Douglas E. Haberlie (to 1 Dec)

Maj Philip C. Morrell

Commanding Officer,

Headquarters Company Capt Bruce W. Clarke (to 18 Nov)

1stLt Frederick L. Adams

Commanding Officer,

Service Company Capt Philip C. Morell (to 1 Dec)

Maj Douglas E. Haberlie

Commanding Officer, A Company Capt Gearl M. English (to 1 Dec)

1stLt Robert J. Craig

Commanding Officer, B Company Capt Bruce F. Williams

Commanding Officer, C Company Capt Richard M. Taylor

Commanding Officer, D Company Capt Lester T. Chase (to 18 Nov)

Capt Bruce W. Clarke (19 Nov-10 Dec)

1stLt Paul E. Sanders

_7th Motor Transport Battalion_

Commanding Officer Maj Joseph F. Stepka (to 7 Nov)

LtCol Carl J. Cagle

Executive Officer Maj Vernon A. Tuson

Commanding Officer,

Headquarters Company 1stLt Reed T. King

Commanding Officer, A Company Capt Ira N. Hayes

Commanding Officer, B Company Capt Clovis M. Jones

Commanding Officer, C Company Capt Fred B. Rogers

Commanding Officer, D Company Capt Joseph L. Bunker

_Marine Observation Squadron 6_

(Under operational control of

1stMarDiv and administrative

control of 1stMAW)

Commanding Officer Maj Vincent J. Gottschalk

Executive Officer Capt Victor A. Armstrong (to 13 Nov)

Capt Andrew L. McVickers

1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING

Commanding General MajGen Field Harris

Assistant Commanding General BrigGen Thomas J. Cushman

Chief of Staff Col Kenneth H. Weir (8 Oct-1 Nov)

Col Caleb T. Bailey (2 Nov-15 Dec)

Deputy Chief of Staff for

Operations[674] Col Edward C. Dyer

G-1 Col Raymond E. Hopper

G-2 LtCol Winsor V. Crockett, Jr.

G-3 LtCol Howard A. York (to 9 Nov)

LtCol Paul J. Fontana

(10 Nov-28 Nov)[675]

LtCol Howard A. York

(29 Nov-15 Dec)

G-4 Col Thomas J. Noon

Commanding Officer,

Rear Echelon, Itami Col Roger T. Carleson

Commanding Officer,

Headquarters Squadron, One Capt Earl “B” Sumerlin, Jr.

_Marine Aircraft Group 12_

Commanding Officer Col Boeker C. Batterton

Deputy Group Commander LtCol Paul J. Fontana

Commanding Officer,

Headquarters Squadron 12 Maj John E. Hays

Commanding Officer,

Service Squadron 12 Maj Claude H. Welch (to 4 Nov)

Maj Charles E. J. McLean

_Marine Aircraft Group 33_

Commanding Officer Col Frank C. Dailey

Deputy Group Commander LtCol Radford C. West

Commanding Officer,

Headquarters Squadron 33 Capt Walter “L” Hilton

Commanding Officer,

Marine Service Squadron 33 LtCol James C. Lindsay

_Squadrons_

Commanding Officer,

Marine Fighter Squadron 212 LtCol Richard W. Wyczawski

Commanding Officer,

Marine Fighter Squadron 214 Maj Robert P. Keller (to 2 0Nov)

Maj William M. Lundin

Commanding Officer,

Marine Fighter Squadron 312 LtCol “J” Frank Cole

Commanding Officer,

Marine Fighter Squadron 311 LtCol Neil R. McIntyre (from 8 Nov)

Commanding Officer,

Marine Fighter Squadron 323 Maj Arnold A. Lund

Commanding Officer,

Marine All-Weather Squadron 513 Maj J. Hunter Reinburg (to 4 Nov)

LtCol David C. Wolfe

Commanding Officer,

Marine All-Weather Fighter

Squadron 542 LtCol Max J. Volcansek, Jr.

Commanding Officer,

Marine Transport Squadron 152 Col Deane C. Roberts

Commanding Officer,

Marine Ground Control

Intercept Squadron 1 Maj Harold E. Allen

Commanding Officer,

Marine Tactical Air Control

Squadron 2 Maj Christian C. Lee

[671] Additional duty.

[672] Additional duty.

[673] Redesignated Company A, 1st Amphibian Truck Battalion,

15 Nov.

[674] Also Deputy C/S, Air Support, X Corps.

[675] Additional duty.

APPENDIX G

Enemy Order of Battle

1. North Korean

During operations around Wonsan the 1st Marine Division encountered

fragments and stragglers from many NKPA divisions. The organized

elements were chiefly from the 2d, 5th, and 15th Divisions.

2. Chinese

42d Army

124th Division In action against 7th Marines south of

370th Regiment Sudong 2 Nov. Badly cut up in actions

371st Regiment of 3–6 Nov.

372nd Regiment

125th Division Not in contact. Probably to west of

373rd Regiment 124th Division.

374th Regiment

375th Regiment

126th Division Screened Chinese retreat to Hagaru.

376th Regiment Never heavily engaged.

377th Regiment

378th Regiment

20th Army

58th Division First in action at Hagaru 28 Nov.

172nd Regiment Badly cut up in attacks on Hagaru.

173rd Regiment

174th Regiment

59th Division In contact with 7th Marines southwest

175th Regiment of Yudam-ni 23 Nov. Later defended

176th Regiment Toktong Pass.

177th Regiment

60th Division In contact with 7th Marines southeast

178th Regiment of Yudam-ni 25 Nov. Later moved to

179th Regiment Funchilin Pass area.

180th Regiment

89th Division First contacted by 7th Marines west

266th Regiment of Hagaru 22 Nov. About 2 Dec

267th Regiment moved south to Majon-dong area.

268th Regiment

27th Army

79th Division Attacked Yudam-ni 27 Nov.

235th Regiment

236th Regiment

237th Regiment

80th Division Attacked 7th Infantry Division units

238th Regiment east of Reservoir 27 Nov.

239th Regiment

240th Regiment

81st Division No report of contact until 13 Dec.

241st Regiment May have been in Yudam-ni area.

242nd Regiment

243rd Regiment

90th Division No contact reported. May have been

268th Regiment in reserve near Hagaru.

269th Regiment

270th Regiment

26th Army

76th Division First contacts east of Hagaru 5 Dec.

226th Regiment Suffered heavy losses around Koto-ri.

227th Regiment

228th Regiment

77th Division First contacts at Hagaru 5 Dec.

229th Regiment

230th Regiment

231st Regiment

78th Division Not reported in contact. May not

232nd Regiment have reached area in time for combat.

233rd Regiment

234th Regiment

88th Division Not reported in contact. May not

263rd Regiment have reached area in time for combat.

264th Regiment

265th Regiment

APPENDIX H

Air Evacuation Statistics[676]

--------+------------------+------------------+-----------+-----

| HAGARU | KOTO-RI | YUDAM-NI |

+----+------+------+----+------+------+----+------+-----

Date | OY | C-47 | HO4S | OY | C-47 | HO4S | OY | HO4S |Total

--------+----+------+------+----+------+------+----+------+-----

27Nov50 | 19 | 0| 0 | 0| 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 21

28Nov50 | 24 | 0| 18 | 0| 0 | 0 | 0 | 32 | 74

29Nov50 | 31 | 0| 16 | 0| 0 | 0 | 0 | 22 | 69

30Nov50 | 62 | 0| 0 | 0| 0 | 0 | 0 | 49 | 111

1Dec50 | 52 | 157| 2 | 0| 0 | 7 | 1 | 3 | 222

2Dec50 | 0 | 960| 0 | 47| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |1,007

3Dec50 | 0 | 464| 0 | 53| 0 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 523

4Dec50 | 0 | 1,046| 0 | 89| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |1,135

5Dec50 | 0 | 1,580| 0 | 48| 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 |1,630

6Dec50 | 0 | 137| 0 | 0| 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 140

7Dec50 | 0 | 0| 0 | 226| 0 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 232

8Dec50 | 0 | 0| 0 | 0| 19 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 19

9Dec50 | 0 | 0| 0 | 21| 277 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 300

10Dec50 | 0 | 0| 0 | 0| 8 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 12

--------+----+------+------+----+------+------+----+------+-----

Totals |188 | 4,344| 36 | 484| 304 | 24 | 3 | 112 |5,493

--------+----+------+------+----+------+------+----+------+-----

[676] X Corps, _Special Report, Chosin Reservoir_, 93; Smith,

_Notes_, 844; and VMO-6 _SAR_, 13–18. TBM evacuation

included under OY for Koto-ri, 2 to 7 December 1950.

APPENDIX I

Unit Citations

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

WASHINGTON

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the

PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION to the

FIRST MARINE DIVISION, REINFORCED

for service as set forth in the following CITATION:

“For extraordinary heroism and outstanding performance of duty

in action against enemy aggressor forces in the Chosin Reservoir

and Koto-ri area of Korea from 27 November to 11 December 1950.

When the full fury of the enemy counterattack struck both the

Eighth Army and the Tenth Corps on 27 and 28 November 1950, the

First Marine Division, Reinforced, operating as the left flank

division of the Tenth Corps, launched a daring assault westward

from Yudam-ni in an effort to cut the road and rail communications

of hostile forces attacking the Eighth Army and, at the same

time, continued its mission of protecting a vital main supply

route consisting of a tortuous mountain road running southward to

Chinhung-ni, approximately 35 miles distant. Ordered to withdraw to

Hamhung in company with attached army and other friendly units in

the face of tremendous pressure in the Chosin Reservoir area, the

Division began an epic battle against the bulk of the enemy Third

Route Army and, while small intermediate garrisons at Hagaru-ri

and Koto-ri held firmly against repeated and determined attacks by

hostile forces, gallantly fought its way successively to Hagaru-ri,

Koto-ri, Chinhung-ni and Hamburg over twisting, mountainous and

icy roads in sub-zero temperatures. Battling desperately night

and day in the face of almost insurmountable odds throughout a

period of two weeks of intense and sustained combat, the First

Marine Division, Reinforced, emerged from its ordeal as a fighting

unit with its wounded, with its guns and equipment and with its

prisoners, decisively defeating seven enemy divisions, together

with elements of three others, and inflicting major losses which

seriously impaired the military effectiveness of the hostile forces

for a considerable period of time. The valiant fighting spirit,

relentless perseverance and heroic fortitude of the officers and

men of the First Marine Division, Reinforced, in battle against

a vastly outnumbering enemy, were in keeping with the highest

traditions of the United States Naval Service.”

The following reinforcing units of the First Marine Division

participated in operations against enemy aggressor forces in Korea

from 27 November to 11 December 1950:

ORGANIC UNITS OF THE FIRST MARINE DIVISION: First Marine Division

(less Detachment Headquarters Battalion; Detachment First Signal

Battalion; Detachment First Service Battalion; Detachment

Headquarters and Companies A and C, First Tank Battalion;

Automotive Supply Company, First Motor Transport Battalion;

Automotive Maintenance Company, First Motor Transport Battalion;

Detachment First Ordnance Battalion; Detachment Headquarters and

Company A, First Medical Battalion; First Shore Party Battalion;

4.5″ Rocket Battery and Service Battery, Fourth Battalion, Eleventh

Marines).

ATTACHED MARINE CORPS UNITS: Companies A and B, Seventh Motor

Transport Battalion; Detachment Radio Relay Platoon.

ATTACHED ARMY UNITS: Provisional Battalion (Detachments, 31st and

32nd Regimental Combat Teams); Company D, 10th Engineer Combat

Battalion; Tank Company, 31st Infantry Regiment; Headquarters

Company, 31st Infantry Regiment; Company B, 1st Battalion, 31st

Infantry Regiment; 2nd Battalion, 31st Infantry Regiment (less

Company E); 185th Engineer Combat Battalion (less Company A).

For the President,

R. B. ANDERSON

_Secretary of the Navy_

GENERAL ORDERS DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

No. 72 Washington 25, D. C., 9 August 1951

DISTINGUISHED UNIT CITATION

1. The 1st Marine Air Wing, Fleet Marine Force, is cited for

outstanding performance of duty and extraordinary heroism in action

against an armed enemy in the areas of Chosin Reservoir, Hagaru-ri, and

Koto-ri, Korea, during the period 22 November to 14 December 1950. The

historic role of close-support air missions flown by personnel on land

and carrier based aircraft during the operations of the X Corps, United

States Army, contributed immeasurably to the successful withdrawal of

the X Corps when hordes of Chinese Communist and North Korean troops

had encircled their positions endangering the entire operation. In

their magnificent employment of close-support doctrine and in their

exceedingly effective interdiction missions and night combat air

patrols, the 1st Marine Air Wing flew 2,572 day and night sorties

during this period, inflicting 10,313 enemy casualties and destroying

723 buildings, 144 vehicles, 17 tanks, 9 bridges, 4 locomotives, 3

command posts, 30 boxcars, 47 gun positions, and 19 supply, ammunition,

and fuel dumps. These missions were flown over hazardous mountain

terrain under extremely adverse weather conditions and in the face

of intense enemy antiaircraft and small-arms fire. The normally

ground-based Tactical Air Direction Center was ingeniously improvised

into an airborne center in a C-54 aircraft without appreciable loss

of efficiency in operations and the responsibility for controlling

aircraft was assumed and accomplished in a remarkable manner through

day and night operations by controlling personnel. Airborne tactical

air coordinators also were established to supplement the airborne

center to direct specific strikes in areas not under surveillance of

ground control parties to the end that every available sortie was

utilized to maximum effectiveness. In the evacuation of friendly

casualties by cargo airplanes, the use of helicopters for rescue of air

personnel shot down by the enemy and the evacuation of wounded, and

the high state of aircraft availability maintained by ground personnel

working under hazardous and extremely adverse conditions because of

intense cold, personnel of the entire 1st Marine Air Wing displayed

fortitude, courage, and marked esprit de corps. Although suffering a

considerable loss of personnel and equipment during this trying period,

the morale and effectiveness of the 1st Marine Air Wing were sustained

at a constantly high level. The repeated acts of valor and gallantry by

the officers and men of the 1st Marine Air Wing, Fleet Marine Force,

and their enviable combat record reflect great credit on the members

thereof and are in keeping with the highest traditions of the military

service.

By order of the Secretary of the Army:

J. LAWTON COLLINS

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Bibliography

Documents

Forney, Edward H. Col, USMC. Transcript of Special Report, Deputy

Chief of Staff, X Corps, 19 August-31 December 1950. Interviews

(Korea) File, Records and Research Section, Historical Branch,

G-3, Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC Historical).

Shutts, Richard W. Maj, USMC. Report on Amphibious Withdrawal of

the U. S. X Corps from Hungnam, Korea. Copy in Interviews (Korea)

File, HQMC Historical.

Smith, Oliver P. MajGen, USMC. Chronicle of the Operations of the

1st Marine Division During the First Nine Months of the Korean

War, 1950–1951. MS. Manuscript File, HQMC Historical.

----. Notes on the Operations of the 1st Marine Division During the

First Nine Months of the Korean War, 1950–1951. MS. Manuscript

File, HQMC Historical.

Department of the Army. Joint Daily Situation Reports,

October-December 1950. Reports and Orders (1950-    ) (R&O) File,

HQMC Historical.

U. S. Marine Corps. Interviews with participants in the Korean War,

1950–54. Interviews (Korea) File, HQMC Historical.