Regroupment at Hagaru
_4312 Casualties Evacuated by Air--537 Replacements Flown to
Hagaru--Air Drops of Ammunition--Planning for Breakout to Koto-ri--3/1
Relieved by RCT-5 at Hagaru--East Hill Retaken from Chinese--Attack of
RCT-7 to the South--Advance of the Division Trains_
The marines at Hagaru would have been astonished to learn how much
anxiety over their “encirclement” was being currently felt in the
United States. It had been a rude shock for Americans who believed
that the troops in Korea would be “home by Christmas” to realize that
the unexpected Chinese intervention had created virtually a new war.
This war, moreover, was apparently going against the UN forces. On
Thanksgiving Day the victory over Communist aggression had seemed
almost complete, yet only a week later the headlines announced major
reverses. The Eighth Army was in full retreat, and an entire Marine
division was said to be “trapped.”
So disturbing were the reports from Korea, newspaper readers and
radio listeners could scarcely have imagined the mood of confidence
prevailing at Hagaru after the arrival of the troops from Yudam-ni.
Even prior to that event, few Marines had any doubts as to the ability
of the Division to fight its way out to the seacoast.
The Hagaru perimeter presented a scene of bustling activity during the
first days of December. Trucks and jeeps bounced along the bumpy roads
in such numbers as to create a traffic problem. Twin-engined planes
roared in and out of the snow-covered airstrip at frequent intervals
throughout the daylight hours. Overhead the “Flying Boxcars” spilled a
rainbow profusion of red, blue, yellow, green and orange parachutes to
drift earthward with heavy loads of rations, gasoline and ammunition.
The busy panorama even had its humorous aspects. Parka-clad Marines
displaying a five-day growth of beard went about with their cheeks
bulging from an accumulation of Tootsie Rolls--a caramel confection
much esteemed by Stateside youngsters for its long-lasting qualities.
The Post Exchange Section had originally brought merchandise into
Hagaru on the assumption that it would be established as a base. No
space in vehicles was available for its removal and the commanding
general directed that the entire remaining stock, $13,547.80 worth,
chiefly candies and cookies, should be issued gratuitously to the
troops.[536] Tootsie Rolls proved to be a prime favorite with men who
would have scorned them in civilian life. Not only were they more
tasty than half-frozen “C” rations, but they resulted in no intestinal
disorders. Moreover, they were useful as temporary repairs for leaking
radiators.
[536] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex T (Post Exchange), n. p. Smith,
_Notes_, 1017–1018.
There was nothing during the daytime to indicate the presence of
CCF troops near Hagaru. Even in hours of darkness the enemy was
quiet throughout the first five nights of December. Apparently the
Chinese were powerless to renew the attack until reinforcements and
replenishments of supplies and ammunition reached the area.
_4312 Casualties Evacuated by Air_
Evacuation of the wounded was the chief problem on 2 December, when
it became evident that previous estimates of losses at Yudam-ni and
among the Army troops east of the Reservoir were far too low. A total
of 914 casualties were flown out by the C-47s and R4Ds that day and
more than 700 on the 3d. Captain Hering and his assistants had assumed
that the Air Force evacuation officer was screening the casualties
until he informed them that this was not his responsibility. The
Division surgeon then set a Spartan standard. He passed personally on
all controversial cases and approved for evacuation only those in as
bad shape as Lieutenant Commander Lessenden, the 5th Marines surgeon
who had refused to be flown out and continued on duty after both feet
were painfully frozen. Apparently it was not too severe a test for
men who could stand the pain, since Lessenden suffered no permanent
injuries.[537]
[537] Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, U. S. Navy, Public
Information Release, 21 Apr 51; LCdr J. H. Craven, (ChC)
USN, interv by HistDiv, HQMC, 22 Oct 52; Hering, “Address
Before U. S. Association of Military Surgeons, 9 Oct 52.”
Captain Hering had to use his medical authority in several instances to
overcome the objections of Yudam-ni casualties who declined evacuation,
though in obvious need of hospitalization.[538]
[538] _Ibid._ Study of the frostbite casualties of the Chosin
Reservoir campaign led to the adoption of the thermal
boot as an effective preventive measure during the
operations of the following two winters of the Korean
conflict.
The liaison airstrip at Koto-ri had been of little use, since it was
outside the perimeter and exposed to enemy fire. But the completion of
a new strip on the 2d made it possible to evacuate about 47 casualties
that day from the 2/1 perimeter.[539]
[539] 2/1 _SAR_, 16; LtCol W. S. Bartley ltr, 7 Feb 56; X
Corps, _Special Report, Chosin Reservoir_, 93; Smith,
_Notes_, 844; VMO-6 _SAR_, 13–18.
More than 1400 casualties remained at Hagaru on the morning of 5
December. They were all flown out before nightfall, making a total
of 4312 men (3150 Marines, 1137 Army personnel and 25 Royal Marines)
evacuated from Hagaru by air in the first five days of December,
according to Marine figures.[540] X Corps estimated a total of 4207 for
the same period.[541]
[540] Smith, _Notes_, 998–999.
[541] X Corps _Special Report, Chosin Reservoir_, 93.
R4Ds of the 1st MAW, flying under Wing operational control, were
represented in the flights to and from Hagaru as well as the C-47s
of the Combat Cargo Command, FEAF.[542] The large-scale casualty
evacuation was completed without losing a man, even though the aircraft
landing on the rough strip careened precariously as they bounced along
the frozen runway. Only two planes could be accommodated simultaneously
at first, but Marine engineers widened the 2900-foot strip until six
planes could be parked at a time.
[542] Maj Paul A. Noel, Jr. interv, 4 Dec 56.
A four-engine Navy R5D made a successful landing with stretchers flown
in from Japan. After taking off with a load of wounded, the pilot
barely cleared the surrounding hills, and it was decided to risk no
further evacuations with such large aircraft. Two crash landings marred
operations on the field. An incoming Marine R4D, heavily loaded with
artillery ammunition, wiped out its landing gear on the rough surface
and was abandoned after its load had been put to good use by the
gunners. A second accident involved an Air Force C-47 which lost power
on the take off and came down just outside the Marine lines without
injury to its load of casualties. Troops from the perimeter were
rushed out immediately to rescue its occupants but the plane had to be
destroyed.[543]
[543] _Ibid._, Smith, _Notes_, 998–999.
Not until long later were final official casualty reports rendered for
the period of the Yudam-ni regroupment and breakout. Regimental figures
are not available, and the totals included the losses suffered by the
troops at Hagaru during the night of 30 November-1 December. Following
are the figures for the 1st Marine Division as a whole throughout this
five-day period:
---------+-----+-----+-----+-----+--------+--------------
| | | | | Total |
| KIA | DOW | MIA | WIA | Battle | Non-Battle[B]
---------+-----+-----+-----+-----+--------+--------------
30 Nov | 27 | 6 | 6 | 183 | 222 | 102
1 Dec | 27 | 14 | 6 | 111 | 158 | 134
2 Dec | 55 | 2 | 33 | 231 | 321 | 180
3 Dec | 16 | 1 | 6 | 194 | 217 | 196
4 Dec | 10 | 6 | 4 | 202 | 222 | 582
---------+-----+-----+-----+-----+--------+--------------
Totals | 135 | 29 | 55 | 921 | 1140 | 1194
---------+-----+-----+-----+-----+--------+--------------
[B] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex E (Division Adjutant), appendix
II, 3.
_537 Replacements Flown to Hagaru_
At 1359, on 3 December, X Corps issued OI 22, directing the 1st
Marine Division to withdraw all elements to Hamhung area via the
Hagaru-Hamhung axis as rapidly as evacuation of wounded and other
preparations would permit.[544] General Almond flew to Hagaru that same
day for a conference with General Smith. Nothing further was said about
destruction of equipment. At that very time, in fact, various critical
items were being salvaged and flown out from Hagaru when space on
planes was available.
[544] X Corps _OI 22_, 2 Dec 50.
Surplus weapons had accumulated as a result of casualties and the
Marine general wished to avoid the destruction of any material that
could be removed by air without interfering with casualty evacuation.
It was particularly necessary to salvage and fly out the parachutes and
packages used for air drops, since a critical shortage of these had
been reported from Japan. Before leaving Hagaru, the Division also
planned to evacuate large quantities of stoves, tents, typewriters,
rifles, machine guns and damaged 4.2″ mortars.[545]
[545] This section, except where otherwise noted, is derived
from the following sources: G-1 _SAR_, 6–7 and G-4 _SAR_
6–7, appendix 3–5; X Corps _Special Report, Chosin
Reservoir_; Smith, _Notes_, 1011–1015, and _Chronicle_,
103–105; Forney, _Special Report_, 3–5; Maj M. J. Sexton
interv by HistDiv, HQMC, 6 May 51.
Space in empty planes landing at Hagaru was utilized not only for
bringing in equipment and medical supplies, but also replacements.
Since the Wonsan landing some hundreds of Marines, most of them wounded
in the Inchon-Seoul operation, had returned from hospitals in Japan.
These men, upon reporting at Hungnam, were temporarily assigned to
the Headquarters Battalion, since the Division had no provision in
its T/O for a replacement organization. Ordinarily they would have
been returned to their units, but enemy action made this procedure
impossible until the completion of the airstrip.
During the first five days of December, therefore, 537 replacements
were flown to Hagaru, fit for duty and equipped with cold-weather
clothing. Those destined for the 1st Marines were assigned to the 3d
Battalion for perimeter defense, and personnel for the 5th and 7th
Marines joined those units after their arrival at Hagaru.
Major General William H. Tunner, USAF, the chief of the Combat Cargo
Command, expressed astonishment during his visit of 5 December on
learning about these replacements. He had come to offer his C-47s for
troop evacuation after the casualties were flown out, but General Smith
explained that all able-bodied men would be needed for the breakout.
_Air Drops of Ammunition_
Visitors and press correspondents arrived daily at Hagaru in the empty
C-47s and R4Ds. Among them was Miss Marguerite Higgins, reporter for
the New York _Herald-Tribune_. General Smith ruled that for her own
protection, considering the possibility of enemy attack, she must leave
the perimeter before nightfall.
French and British publications were represented as well as most of
the larger American dailies and wire services. At one of the press
conferences the question arose as to the proper name of the Marine
operation. A British correspondent had intended to refer to it as a
“retreat” or “retirement,” but General Smith held that there could be
no retreat when there was no rear. Since the Division was surrounded,
he maintained, the word “retreat” was not a correct term for the coming
breakout to the coast.[546]
[546] Smith, _Notes_, 977–978; _Chronicle_, 103–106.
General Smith and Lieutenant Colonel Murray were interviewed for
television by Charles de Soria, who also “shot” Marines on infantry
duty and casualties awaiting evacuation. These pictures and recordings
were later shown in the United States under the title _Gethsemane_.
The correspondents were astonished to find the Hagaru perimeter so
lacking in enemy activity. This quiet was shattered at 2010 on 5
December when two B-26s bombed and strafed the area. Marine night
fighters were absent on a search mission, but one was recalled to offer
protection against further efforts of the sort. A possible explanation
was advanced by First Lieutenant Harry S. Wilson, of VMF(N)-542, who
reported that he had received orders by radio to attack Hagaru. It was
his conviction that Chinese use of captured radio equipment accounted
for the B-26 attack.[547]
[547] 1stMarDiv _G-3 Journal_, 5–6 Dec 50, entry 7; Maj H. E.
Hood, memo: Close Air Support, 11 Feb 51; Wilson interv,
29 Jan 51.
The interlude of CCF inactivity gave the 1st Marine Division an
opportunity to build up a stock of air-dropped ammunition and supplies.
Poor communications had prevented the obtaining of advance information
as to the requirements of the Yudam-ni troops, and their needs had to
be estimated by the assistant G-4.
It was planned that units moving out from Hagaru would take only enough
supplies for the advance to Koto-ri. Materiel would be air-dropped
there to support the next stage of the breakout.
The C-119s of the Combat Cargo Command were called upon to fly in the
largest part of the total of the 372.7 tons requested for air delivery
at Hagaru. C-47s and R4Ds were available for some items, particularly
of a fragile nature; and specially packaged small drops to meet
specific needs could be made by planes of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing.
Officers and men of the Headquarters Battalion at Hagaru were ordered
to assist the 1st Regulating Detachment in the operation of the Hagaru
airhead. Army service troops were also assigned to the task, and
dumps were set up adjacent to the drop zone for the direct issuing of
supplies. The major items requested were artillery, mortar and small
arms ammunition, hand grenades, gasoline and diesel oil, rations, and
communication wire.[548]
[548] HqBn _URpt 13_; G-4 _SAR_, appendix II, 2–3; LtCol F.
Simpson Comments, 24 Sep 56.
There is no record of the amounts actually received. Pilots sometimes
missed the drop zone so far that the containers were “captured” by the
enemy or landed in areas where recovery was not feasible because of
enemy fire. In other instances, the supplies fell near the positions of
front-line units which issued them on the spot without any formalities
of bookkeeping.
Breakage rates were high, due to the frozen ground. About 70 per cent
of the POL products and 70 to 80 per cent of the rations were recovered
in usable condition. Of the artillery ammunition delivered to the drop
zone, 40 per cent was badly damaged and only 25 per cent ever reached
the gun positions. About 45 per cent of the small arms ammunition
was recovered and usable. A hundred per cent of the requested mortar
ammunition and 90 per cent of the 81mm rounds were put into the air
over the drop zone, though the damage rate was nearly as high as that
of the artillery shells.[549]
[549] G-4 _SAR_, appendix II, 3–5.
In spite of the seemingly low percentages of receipts as compared
to requests, it was considered that the Hagaru air drops had been
successful on the whole. “Without the extra ammunition,” commented
General Smith, “many more of the friendly troops would have been
killed.... There can be no doubt that the supplies received by this
method proved to be the margin necessary to sustain adequately the
operations of the division during this period.”[550]
[550] Smith, _Notes_, 1010.
_Planning for Breakout to Koto-ri_
The need of the Yudam-ni troops for recuperation was so urgent that 6
December was set as the D-day of the attack from Hagaru to Koto-ri. On
the recommendation of his staff, General Smith decided that the need
of the troops for rest and regroupment outweighed the advantages of a
speedy advance, even though the enemy would be allowed more time to get
his forces into position along the MSR.
Another factor influencing this decision was the thinning of the
command group and staff sections of the Division. It will be recalled
that General Craig, the Assistant Division Commander, had recently been
returned on emergency leave to the United States. Colonel Walseth (G-1)
was wounded on 30 November, while Lieutenant Colonel Chidester, had
been MIA since that date. Colonel McAlister (G-4) had been directed to
remain at Hungnam to co-ordinate logistic functions.
A serious handicap to planning was the shortage of staff personnel.
This was due in part to the casualties suffered by the last convoy of
Headquarters troops to move up from Hungnam. Moreover, the office force
had been depleted by calls for reinforcements to defend the perimeter.
By dint of working round the clock, however, planning for the breakout
to Koto-ri was completed on schedule. OpnO 25-50, issued at 0800 on 5
December, provided for an advance of the 1st Marine Division at first
light the following morning on the Koto-ri-Chinhung-ni-Majon-dong
axis to close the Hamhung area. The principal subordinate units were
assigned these tasks:
(a) RCT-5 (3/1 attached) to relieve all elements on perimeter
defense in the Hagaru area by 1200, 5 December; to cover
the movement of RCT-7 out of Hagaru to the south; to follow
RCT-7 to the south on the Hagaru-ri-Koto-ri-Chinhung-ni axis;
to protect the Division rear from Hagaru to Koto-ri; and to
follow RCT-7 from Koto-ri to the Hamhung area as Division
reserve.
(b) RCT-7 to advance south at first light on 6 December on the
Hagaru-Koto-ri-Chinhung-ni axis to close the Hamhung area.
(c) RCT-1 (-) to continue to hold Koto-ri and Chanhung-ni,
protecting the approach and passage of the remainder of the
Division through Koto-ri; and to protect the Division rear
from Koto-ri to the Hamhung area.[551]
[551] 1stMarDiv _OpnO 25-50_, 5 Dec 50. Other sources for the
remainder of this section are: 1stMarDiv _AdmO 20-50_, 4
Dec 50; 1stMarDiv Destruction Plan, Hagaru Area, 4 Dec
50; Smith, _Chronicle_, 104–106.
All personnel except drivers, relief drivers, radio operators,
casualties and men specially designated by RCT commanders, were to
march on foot alongside motor serials to provide close-in security.
It was directed that vehicles breaking down should be pushed to the
side of the road and destroyed if not operative by the time the column
passed. During halts a perimeter defense of motor serials was to be
established.
Nine control points were designated by map references to be used for
reporting progress of the advance or directing air drops. Demolitions
to clear obstacles from the front and to create them to the rear were
planned by the Division Engineer Officer.
Division AdminO 20-50, which accompanied OpnO 25-50, prescribed that
the troops were to take enough “C” rations for two days, equally
distributed between individual and organic transportation. Selected
items of “B” rations were to be loaded on organic vehicles, and the
following provision was made for ammunition:
On individual, up to 1 U/F per individual weapon; on vehicle,
minimum 1 U/F, then proportionate share per RCT until dumps
depleted or transportation capacity exceeded.
Helicopter evacuation was indicated for emergency cases. Other
casualties were to be placed in sleeping bags and evacuated in vehicles
of the column.
Two Division trains were set up by AdminO 20-50. Lieutenant Colonel
Banks commanded Train No. 1, under RCT-7; and No. 2, under RCT-5, was
in charge of Lieutenant Colonel Milne. Each motor serial in the trains
was to have a commander who maintained radio communication with the
train commander.
Truck transportation not being available for all supplies and equipment
at Hagaru, a Division destruction plan was issued on 4 December, making
unit commanders responsible for disposing of all excess supplies and
equipment within their own areas. “Commanding officer 1st Regulating
Detachment is responsible for destruction all classes supplies and
equipment remaining in dumps,” the order continued. “Unit commanders
and CO 1st Regulating Detachment report types and amounts of supplies
and equipment to this headquarters (G-4) prior to destruction.
Permission to use fuel and ammunition for destruction purposes must be
obtained from this headquarters (G-4).”
_3/1 Relieved by RCT-5 at Hagaru_
General Smith held conferences on 4 and 5 December of senior unit
commanders. During the afternoon of the 4th General Almond arrived by
plane and was briefed on the plan for the breakout. In a brief ceremony
at the Division CP he presented the Distinguished Service Cross to
General Smith, Colonel Litzenberg and Lieutenant Colonels Murray and
Beall.
The night of 5–6 December was the fifth in a row to pass without enemy
activity at Hagaru. But if Division G-2 summaries were to be credited,
it was the calm before the storm. For the Chinese were believed to
be assembling troops and supplies both at Hagaru and along the MSR
to Koto-ri. Up to this time seven CCF divisions, the 58th, 59th,
60th, 76th, 79th, 80th and 89th, had been identified through POW
interrogations. But there were evidences that the 77th and 78th were
also within striking distance.[552]
[552] Smith, _Notes_, 1025, 1051; CG’s Diary in X Corps
_Command Report Annex (CR)_, 4 Dec 50.
At 1200 on 5 December the 5th Marines relieved 3/1 of the
responsibility for the defense of the Hagaru area. Division elements
other than infantry were withdrawn from the front line, leaving
Lieutenant Colonel Murray’s three battalions, with 3/1 attached,
disposed around the perimeter as follows:
1/5--From the Yudam-ni road around the north of Hagaru and astride
the Changjin Valley to a point at the base of the ridge about
1,000 yards east of the bridge over the Changjin River.
2/5--In position on western slopes of East Hill.
3/5--From the south nose of East Hill west across the river to
link up with 3/1 south of the airstrip.
3/1--South and southwest of airstrip in sector formerly held by
How and Item Companies of 3/1.[553]
[553] CG 1stMarDiv msg to Subordinate Units, Hagaru, 2000 4 Dec
50; 5th Mar _SAR_, 30–31.
Not only were the CCF positions on East Hill a threat to Hagaru; they
also dominated the road leading south to Koto-ri. Thus the plan for the
breakout called for simultaneous attacks to be launched at first light
on the 6th--RCT-5 to regain the enemy-held portion of East Hill, and
RCT-7 to lead the advance of the Division motor column toward Koto-ri.
A plan for air support, prepared by the command and staff of the 1st
MAW, was brought to Hagaru by Brigadier General Thomas J. Cushman,
Assistant Wing Commander, on 5 December. Aircraft were to be on station
at 0700 to furnish close support for the attack on East Hill. Along
the MSR to Koto-ri an umbrella of 24 close support aircraft was to
cover the head, rear and flanks of the breakout column while search
and attack planes scoured the ridges flanking the road and approaches
leading into it. Support was also to be furnished after dark by the
night hecklers. All strikes within three miles of either side of the
MSR were to be controlled by the ground forces while the planes were
free to hit any targets beyond.
The concentration of aircraft covering the advance south from Hagaru
was one of the greatest of the whole war. Marine planes at Yonpo would,
of course, continue approximately 100 daily sorties to which VMF-323
would add 30 more from the _Badoeng Strait_. The Navy’s fast carriers,
_Leyte_, _Valley Forge_, _Philippine Sea_, and _Princeton_ were to
abandon temporarily their deep support or interdiction operations
and contribute about 100 or more attack sorties daily. The Fifth Air
Force was to add more power with additional U. S. and Australian
fighter-bombers as well as medium and heavy bomber interdiction
beyond the bomb line. To augment the carrier support for the X Corps
consolidation and possible redeployment by sea, VMF-212 had departed
Yonpo on 4 December and was re-equipping in Itami for return to
battle aboard the newly arrived USS _Bataan_. The _Sicily_ was also
heading for the area to take back aboard the Corsairs of VMF-214 on 7
December.[554]
[554] 1stMAW _OpnO 2-50_, 5 Dec 50; 1stMAW, “Summary of Air
Support for 6 Dec,” 5 Dec 50; 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex
CC (Air Officer), 6–7; CinCPacFlt, _Interim Evaluation
Report No. 1_, III, 225–226; MajGen H. L. Litzenberg
Comments, 5 Oct 56; Maj H. D. Kuokka interv, 13 Dec 56.
1stMAW _HD, Dec 50_. The VMF-214 pilots casually made
their transition from shore to carrier base between
sorties.
Continuous artillery support, both for RCT-5 and RCT-7, was planned
by the 11th Marines. Two batteries of the 3d Battalion and one of the
4th were to move out at the head of the RCT-7 train, the two from 3/11
to occupy initial positions halfway to Koto-ri to support the attack
southward to that objective, and the 4/11 battery to take position in
Koto-ri and provide general support northward in combination with the
battery of 2/11 attached to that perimeter. The remaining batteries of
the 3d and 4th Battalions would provide initial support from Hagaru
southward until ordered to move out.
The three batteries of 1/11, with D/11 attached, were to support the
operations of RCT-5 in a similar manner. Two batteries would move out
at the head of the regimental train to positions halfway to Koto-ri,
the remaining two would fire to the south in support of withdrawing
units and then displace when the first two were in position.[555]
[555] 1stMarDiv _SAR_, annex SS (hereafter 11Mar _SAR_), 8. As
a consequence of the loss of nine 155mm howitzers during
the last night of the Yudam-ni-Hagaru breakout, 4/11 was
reorganized into two firing batteries of four howitzers
each.
Throughout the night of 5–6 December, the darkness was stabbed by
flashes as the artillery at Hagaru fired concentrations to saturate
the area along the Hagaru-Koto-ri axis. In order to prevent cratering
of the road the 155’s fired VT rounds. A secondary purpose of this
bombardment was to expend profitably the surplus of ammunition which
could not be brought out.[556]
[556] _Ibid._, 1stMarDiv _POR_ 209, 6 Dec 50; LtCol W.
McReynolds Comments, 16 Aug 56.
At daybreak on the 6th the Division Headquarters broke camp. General
Smith had decided to fly the command group to Koto-ri in advance of
the troops, so that planning could begin immediately for the breakout
from Koto-ri southward. General Barr visited during the morning and
was informed that the 7th Infantry Division casualties who had reached
Hagaru had been flown out. The remaining 490 able-bodied men (including
385 survivors of Task Force Faith) had been provided with Marine
equipment and organized into a provisional battalion under the command
of Lieutenant Colonel Anderson, USA. This battalion was attached to the
7th Marines and sometimes referred to as 31/7.
Throughout the morning General Smith kept in close touch with the
progress of RCT-7 toward Koto-ri. At 1400 a reassuring message was
received from Colonel Litzenberg, and the commanding general took off
from Hagaru by helicopter. Ten minutes later he and his aide, Captain
Martin J. Sexton, landed at Koto-ri. The other members of the command
group, following by OY and helicopter, set up in a large tent at
Koto-ri and started planning for the next stage.[557]
[557] Smith, _Notes_, 1058–1060; HqBn, _HD, Dec 50_, 5.
_East Hill Retaken from Chinese_
Meanwhile, at Hagaru, Lieutenant Colonel Murray had designated his
2d Battalion for the assault on East Hill. At 0700 on 6 December, as
the 4.2″ mortars began their planned preparation, the 7th Marines had
already initiated the breakout to Koto-ri. When Marine planes arrived
on station at 0725, a shortage of napalm tanks limited the air attack
to bombing, rocket and strafing runs. These had little apparent effect
on the objective. Further air strikes were directed by the FAC, First
Lieutenant Manning T. Jeter, Jr., who was severely wounded while
standing on the crest to direct the Corsairs to the target. Captain
David G. Johnson, the air liaison officer, took his place. A total of
76 planes participated in the day’s air attacks.
At 0900 Captain Smith’s Dog Company moved out to the assault (see Map
26) with First Lieutenant George A. Sorenson’s 3d Platoon in the lead,
followed by the 2d and 1st Platoons in that order.[558] Attacking to
the northward, Sorensen was pinned down by fire from Objective A before
he had covered 50 yards. This was the enemy’s main forward position
on East Hill, which he had held against Marine attacks ever since
seizing it in the early morning hours of 29 November. First Lieutenant
John R. Hinds replaced Sorensen, after that officer was wounded. While
he engaged the enemy frontally, First Lieutenant George C. McNaughton’s
2d Platoon poured in flanking fires and First Lieutenant Richard M.
Johnson’s 1st Platoon executed a flanking movement.
[558] This section, except when otherwise noted, is based upon
the following sources: 5thMar _SAR_, 31–32; 1/5 _SAR_,
17–18; 2/5 _SAR_, 27–29; Smith, _Notes_, 1031–1033; Geer,
_The New Breed_, 353–357; Capt S. Smith, 1stLt J. R.
Hines (sic) and 1stLt J. H. Honeycutt interv by Capt K.
A. Shutts, 4 Feb 51; Alvarez ltr, 18 Oct 55. Col R. L.
Murray, Comments, n. d.
[Illustration: SEIZURE OF EAST HILL AND CHINESE COUNTER ATTACK
6–7 December
MAP-26
]
Chinese resistance suddenly collapsed about 1100. Thus it seemed almost
an anticlimax that East Hill, after holding out against the Marines
more than a week, should have been retaken at a cost of one man killed
and three wounded. About 30 CCF dead were found.
As events were to prove, however, this was but the first round in a
hard-fought 22-hour battle for the hill mass. The next phase began
at 1130, when Roise ordered Captain Peters’ Fox Company to relieve
Smith so that Dog Company could resume the attack against Objective
B, a ridge about 500 yards to the southeast. The lower slopes of this
position were now being cleared by 2/7.
After a 10-minute artillery preparation, the three platoons of Dog
Company jumped off at 1250. The Chinese put up a stubborn resistance
and it took until 1430 to seize the new objective. Marine casualties
were moderate, however, and Captain Smith set up three platoon
positions along the ridge running to the south whence he could control
the road leading out of Hagaru.
Late in the day the enemy appeared to be massing for a counterattack in
the saddle between the two objectives. Johnson called an air strike and
all Dog and Fox Company troops within range opened up with everything
they had as McNaughton led a patrol against the Chinese in the saddle.
Caught between the infantry fires and the rocket and strafing runs of
the Corsairs, the CCF survivors surrendered en masse to McNaughton and
his platoon. About 220 prisoners were taken to set a record for the 1st
Marine Division in the Reservoir campaign.[559]
[559] 2/5 _SAR_, 28–29.
At the request of Captain Smith, the saddle between the two Marine
companies was occupied by reinforcements consisting of an officer and
11 men from the regimental AT Company and an officer and 32 men from
the 4th Signal Battalion, USA. Shortly after dark the enemy launched
a vigorous counterattack. Tanks and 81mm mortars fired in support of
Marines who made good use of 2.36″ white phosphorus rockets at close
range.
Although the Chinese endured frightful casualties, they returned again
and again to the attack until midnight. It was evident that they
considered this a fight to a finish for East Hill, and at 0205 they
renewed the assault against all three companies of the 2d Battalion as
well as Charlie Company of the 1st Battalion.
The struggle during the next three hours was considered the most
spectacular if not the most fiercely contested battle of the entire
Reservoir campaign even by veterans of the Yudam-ni actions. Never
before had they seen the Chinese come on in such numbers or return
to the attack with such persistence. The darkness was crisscrossed
with a fiery pattern of tracer bullets at one moment, and next the
uncanny radiance of an illumination shell would reveal Chinese columns
shuffling in at a trot, only to go down in heaps as they deployed.
Marine tanks, artillery, mortars, rockets and machine guns reaped
a deadly harvest, and still the enemy kept on coming with a dogged
fatalism which commanded the respect of the Marines. Looking like
round little gnomes in their padded cotton uniforms, groups of Chinese
contrived at times to approach within grenade-throwing distance before
being cut down.
The fight was not entirely one-sided. The Marines took a pounding from
CCF mortars and machine guns, and by 0300 Dog Company was hard-pressed
in its three extended positions pointed like a pistol at the heart of
the enemy’s assembly areas. Both McNaughton and the executive officer,
First Lieutenant James H. Honeycutt, were wounded but remained in
action.
This was the second time in three months that Dog Company had
spearheaded a Marine attack on a desperately defended hill complex.
Northwest of Seoul in September, only 26 able-bodied men had survived
to break the back of North Korean resistance. The company commander,
First Lieutenant H. J. Smith, had died a hero’s death at the moment
of victory, and First Lieutenant Karle F. Seydel was the unit’s only
unwounded officer.
Now another Smith commanded Dog Company, and Seydel was killed as enemy
pressure from front and flank threatened to overwhelm the three riddled
platoons. Casualties of 13 KIA and 50 WIA were taken in the battle
for East Hill as Dog Company and the provisional platoons fell back
fighting to the former Objective A and tied in with Fox Company.
[Illustration: THE LAST NIGHT AT HAGARU
6–7 DECEMBER 1950
MAP-27
]
Along the low ground at the northern end of East Hill the Chinese
were beaten off with ruinous losses by Jaskilka’s Easy Company of 2/5,
Jones’ Charlie Company of 1/5 and three Army tanks (see Map 27). Enemy
troops had to cross a comparatively level expanse which provided a
lucrative field of fire for Marine supporting arms. Heaps of CCF dead,
many of them charred by white phosphorus bursts, were piled up in front
of the Marine positions.
Next, the Chinese hit Captain James B. Heater’s Able Company of 1/5,
still farther to the left, and overran several squad positions. One
platoon was forced to withdraw to the rise on which the Division CP had
previously been located. The lines were restored at 0546 with the help
of Lieutenant Hancock and his Baker Company, which had been in reserve.
Altogether the 1st Battalion had suffered casualties of ten killed
and 43 wounded, while the counted CCF slain numbered 260 in front of
Charlie Company and 200 in the area of Able Company. George Company
of 3/1 also beat off a Chinese attack on the south of the perimeter.
With the coming of daylight these Marines found that they had one of
the Chinese withdrawal routes under their guns. Mortar and rifle fire
annihilated one group of about 60 enemy and another group of 15 Reds
surrendered.[560]
[560] Capt G. E. Shepherd, “Attack to the South,” (MS), 10–13.
The new day revealed a scene of slaughter which surpassed anything
the Marines had seen since the fight for the approaches of Seoul in
September. Estimates of CCF dead in front of the 2d Battalion positions
on and around East Hill ran as high as 800, and certain it is that the
enemy had suffered a major defeat.
When Marine air came on station, the Chinese as usual scattered for
cover. About 0200 Murray ordered 3/5, which had not been in contact
with the enemy during the night, to displace to the south at the head
of Division Train No. 2, followed by 1/5 and Ridge’s battalion of the
1st Marines. This meant that Roise’s men with a platoon of tanks and
the engineers in charge of demolitions would be the last troops out of
Hagaru.
_Attack of RCT-7 to the South_
During the 22-hour battle on East Hill the 7th Marines had been
attacking toward Koto-ri (see Map 28). On the eve of the breakout the
gaps in the infantry ranks were partially filled with 300 artillerymen
from the 11th Marines, bringing Litzenberg’s strength up to about 2200
men. 7th Mar OpnO 14-50 called for the advance to be initiated at first
light on 6 December as follows:
1st Battalion--to move out at 0430 to clear the ground to the right
of the river;
2d Battalion--supported by tanks, to attack as advanced guard along
the MSR;
Provisional Battalion (31/7)--to clear the ground to the left of
the MSR;[561]
[561] Since the ground to the left of the MSR was too cut up to
permit advance through the high ground, the Provisional
Battalion was to operate from the valley and clear enemy
from noses found to be occupied. Litzenberg Comments, 5
Oct 56.
3d Battalion--to bring up the rear of the regimental train, with George
Company disposed along both flanks as security for the vehicles.[562]
[562] Sources for this section, except where otherwise
noted, are: 7thMar _SAR_, 24; 3/7 _SAR_, n. p.; Smith,
_Notes_, 1029–1031, 1033–1047; RCT-7 _URpt 6_; 1stLt
J. B. Chandler, “Thank God I’m a Marine,” _Leatherneck
Magazine_, xxiv, no. 6 (Jun 51), 25–26; MajGen H. L.
Litzenberg, Recollections of the Action from Hagaru to
Koto-ri, 6–7 December 1950, 2 Oct 56, and Comments, 5 Oct
56; Col R. G. Davis Comments, 28 Sep 56; Sawyer Comments,
7 Sep 56; LtCol H. T. Milne Comments, 24 Sep 56; LtCol M.
E. Roach Comments, 27 Nov 56.
Daybreak revealed a peculiar silvery fog covering the Hagaru area.[563]
The 1st Battalion, with Charlie Company in assault, had as its first
objective the high ground southeast of Tonae-ri. No resistance was
encountered, though 24 Chinese were surprised asleep in their positions
near the objective and 17 of them killed.
[563] Litzenberg Recollections, 2 Oct 56.
The 2d Platoon of Dog Company, 1st Tank Battalion, was attached to
2/7 when the advance guard jumped off at 0630 from the road block
south of Hagaru. Almost immediately the column ran into trouble. Upon
clearing the road block the lead dozer-tank took three hits from a
3.5 bazooka. Within twenty minutes the column came under heavy fire
from CCF positions on the high ground on the left. Fox Company, in the
lead, was allowed to pass before the enemy opened up on the Battalion
Command Group, Dog-Easy Company and Weapons Company. The fog prevented
air support initially. When it lifted, First Lieutenant John G.
Theros, FAC of 2/7, brought in Marine aircraft and 81mm fire on the
CCF position.[564] It took a coordinated attack by the two infantry
companies and the tanks, however, before the resistance could be put
down and the advance resumed at 1200. Two and a half hours later the
upper reaches of this hill were cleared by D/5.
[564] 1stLt J. G. Theros, interv by Capt S. W. Higginbotham, 16
Feb 51; Litzenberg Recollections, 2 Oct 56.
After 2/7 and air smothered the initial Chinese resistance, Fox Company
and the platoon of Dog/Tanks advanced down the road. About 4000 yards
south of Hagaru they met the next resistance. Although the Chinese
positions were in plain sight of 1/7, neither 2/7 nor air could spot
them. Colonel Litzenberg and Lieutenant Colonel Lockwood attempted to
co-ordinate mortar fires from 2/7 with observation from 1/7, but were
unsuccessful because of poor radio communications. Following an erratic
artillery barrage and some good shooting by the tanks, Fox Company
cleared the enemy position about 1500, aided by a Dog-Easy flanking
attack and the Provisional Battalion. In order to assist 2/7, Baker
Company of 1/7 came down from the ridge west of the river to act as
right flank guard.
[Illustration: THE BREAKOUT FROM HAGARU TO KOTO-RI
6–7 December 1950
A--1/7’s Initial Objective
B--CCF Position Overlooking the MSR
C--2/7 Held Up by CCF Machine Guns
D--Blown Bridge
E--3/7 B Regtl Train Held Up
F--Commandos Rescued
G--3/11’s Fire Fight
H--Division Train 1 Held Up
I--Pusong-ni
J--Hell Fire Valley
MAP-28
]
Meanwhile 1/7 continued to push ahead methodically to the right of the
MSR as the three rifle companies leapfrogged one another. Enemy contact
was continual but no serious opposition developed during the daytime
hours. On the left flank the Provisional Battalion had several fire
fights, while the advance was uneventful for the 3d Battalion following
in the rear of the regimental train.
About 5000 yards had been covered by dusk. Enemy resistance stiffened
after dark, as had been anticipated. The planners had realized that
the movement could have been made in daylight hours with fewer losses
in personnel and equipment. But intelligence of the expected arrival
of CCF reinforcements influenced the decision to continue the march
throughout the night even at the cost of increased opposition. By noon
long lines of Chinese could be seen along the sky Line to the east of
the road moving towards the MSR. Air attacked these reinforcements but
could not stop their movement, as later events proved.
About 8000 yards south of Hagaru, in Hell Fire Valley, a Chinese
machine gun on the left stopped the 2d Battalion at 2200. The column
was held up until midnight before Army tank fire knocked out the enemy
gun. After covering 1200 more yards a blown bridge caused another halt
while Dog Company engineers made repairs. Movement was resumed at 0200
when a second blown bridge resulted in a delay of an hour and a half
before it could be bypassed.
Dawn brought a significant innovation in air support. Circling above
the 11-mile column inching toward Koto-ri was an airborne Tactical Air
Direction Center (TADC) installed in an R5D of VMR-152 and operated
by Major Harlen E. Hood and his communicators from MTACS-2. Major
Christian C. Lee, Commanding Officer of MTACS-2, had made arrangements
when he realized that with his radios packed in trucks and jeeps he
could not control close air support effectively. Only the addition of
one radio to those standard in the aircraft was necessary to provide
basic communications, but when being readied for the predawn takeoff
the mission faced failure because an engine wouldn’t start. Minus a
refueler truck, the crew chief, Technical Sergeant H. C. Stuart, had
worked all night to pour 2400 gallons of gas into the craft by hand.
Now, in the bitter cold of dawn, he set about to overhaul the starting
motor. Two hours later Major John N. Swartley was piloting the plane
over the MSR.[565]
[565] 1stMAW _SAR_, Annex I (VMR-152), 11–12, and annex K,
appendix J, (hereafter MTACS-2_SAR_), 25; Air Officer’s
Rpt, in X Corps _CR_, 6 Dec 50; LtCol J. N. Swartley ltr
to authors, 15 Oct 56.
No trouble was encountered by 2/7 along the last few miles of the
route and the battalion was first to arrive at Koto-ri. Meanwhile, the
3d Battalion had been assigned the additional mission of replacing
the Provisional Battalion as protection for the left flank as well as
rear of the 7th Marines train. A brief fire fight developed at about
2100 as the Chinese closed to hand-grenade range. Lieutenant Colonel
Harris deployed George and Item Companies around the vehicles and drove
the enemy back to a respectful distance. Between 0200 and 0430, Item
Company of 3/7 and a platoon of tanks were sent back up the road to
clear out a troublesome Chinese position near Hell Fire Valley.
About 0200, during a halt for bridge repairs, the 7th Marines train
was hit by enemy fire. The regimental command group suffered most.
Captain Donald R. France and First Lieutenant Clarence E. McGuinness
were killed and Lieutenant Colonel Frederick W. Dowsett was wounded.
While Lieutenant (jg) Robert G. Medemeyer, (MC), USN, gave first aid,
Chaplain (Lieutenant (jg)) Cornelius J. Griffin entered an ambulance to
console a dying Marine. CCF machine gun bullets shattered his jaw and
killed Sergeant Matthew Caruso at his side. Lieutenant Colonel Harris
and Major Roach supervised the deployment of How Company troops to beat
off the attack.
About 0530 Lieutenant Colonel Harris disappeared. A search was made for
him to no avail and he was listed as a MIA. It was later determined
that he had been killed.
The 1st Battalion of RCT-7, after a relatively uneventful march over
the high ground west of the river, moved down the slope to join the
regimental column. Major Warren Morris assumed command of the 3d
Battalion, which reached Koto-ri about 0700. At about 1100, after a
brief rest, the men were ordered together with Lockwood’s troops to
move back up along the MSR to the north and set up blocking between
Koto-ri and Hill 1182 to keep the road open for other units of the
Division.[566] While carrying out this mission, the 2d Battalion helped
to bring in 22 British Marines who had been stranded ever since the
Task Force Drysdale fight on the night of 29–30 November. Their plight
was not known until 4 December, when an OY pilot saw the letters
H-E-L-P stamped out in the snow and air-dropped food and medical
supplies.
[566] 1stMarDiv msg to 7thMar, 1030 7 Dec 50; CO RCT 7 FragO,
0930 7 Dec 50.
_Advance of the Division Trains_
By 1700 on 7 December all elements of RCT-7 were in the perimeter at
Koto-ri. Division Train No. 1 was due next, and the planners had hoped
that the rifle battalions would clear the way for the vehicles. As it
proved, however, the Chinese closed in behind RCT-7 and attacked the
flanks of the convoy, with the result that the service troops actually
saw more action than the infantrymen.
One of the causes may be traced to the fact that Division Train No. 1
had to wait at Hagaru until 1600 on the 6th before RCT-7 made enough
progress toward Koto-ri to warrant putting the convoy on the road.
About 2000 yards south of Hagaru elements of the 3d Battalion, 11th
Marines, were hit in the early darkness by CCF mortar and small-arms
fire. The gunners of George and How Batteries deployed as infantrymen
and repulsed the enemy at the cost of a few casualties.
Upon resuming the march, a second fire fight took place after 1500 more
yards had been covered. Several vehicles, set afire by Chinese mortar
shells, blocked the road and brought the convoy to a halt. At daybreak
the enemy swarmed to the attack in formidable numbers. It was nip and
tuck as all pieces of How Battery and three howitzers of George Battery
were emplaced between the trucks of the 1st MT Battalion.
There was no opportunity to dig in the trails of guns employing time
fire with fuses cut for ranges of 40 to 500 yards. But the Chinese were
stopped cold by two hours of continuous fire after approaching within
40 yards. All but about 50 of an estimated 500 to 800 enemy were killed
or wounded before the remainder fled, according to the estimate of the
gunners.[567]
[567] Unless otherwise noted the description of the movement
of the division trains is based on: HqBn, _HD, Dec 50_,
6–9; HqBn, _URpt 13_; Maj F. Simpson interv by Capt K. A.
Shutts, 11 Apr 51.
The convoy of the Division Headquarters Company also had to fight
its way. Small arms ammunition had been distributed throughout the
column, and light machine guns were mounted on top of truck loads.
All able-bodied men with the exception of drivers and radio operators
walked in single file on either side of the vehicles carrying the
wounded.
Progress was slow, with many halts caused by CCF fire. At 0130 several
trucks were set aflame by enemy mortar shells and 2.36 rockets.
Headquarters troops deployed in roadside ditches while two machine guns
manned by bandsmen kept the Chinese at a distance. At 0200 the clouds
cleared enough to permit strikes by night hecklers of VMF (N)-513. They
stopped the Chinese until just before daylight, when a company-size
group penetrated within 30 yards of the convoy. During this fight First
Lieutenant Charles H. Sullivan, who measured six feet four and weighed
240 pounds, emptied his carbine at advancing Chinese. Then he hurled it
like a javelin to drive the bayonet into the chest of an opponent at 15
feet.
Under the coaching of the MTACS commander, Major Lee, two more
night fighters--Major Albert L. Clark and First Lieutenant Truman
Clark--pinned the Chinese down with strafing runs as close as 30 yards
from the Marine ground troops. At dawn Major Percy F. Avant, Jr.,
and his four-plane division from VMF-312 dumped about four tons of
explosives and napalm on Chinese who broke and ran for cover. The fire
fight had cost Headquarters Battalion 6 KIA and 14 WIA.[568]
[568] This description of the headquarters convoy fight is
based on: _Ibid._; Cpl G. L. Coon, “Versatility,”
_Leatherneck Magazine_, xxiv, no. 3 (Mar 51), 18–19;
Simpson Comments, 24 Sept 56; MTACS-2 _SAR_, 19; Maj
C. C. Lee interv by Capt S. W. Higginbotham, 7 Feb 51,
Comments, 14 Aug 56, and ltr 1 Nov 56.
The MP Company, just forward of Headquarters Company, had the problem
of guarding about 160 Chinese prisoners. Captives unable to walk had
been left behind at Hagaru, where Lieutenant Colonel Murray directed
that the wounded be given shelter and provided with food and fuel by
the departing Marines. The prisoners escorted by the MPs were lying
in the middle of the road during the attack when the enemy seemed to
concentrate his fire on them while shouting in Chinese. A scene of
pandemonium ensued as some of the able-bodied prisoners attempted to
make a break. Now the Marines as well as the enemy fired into them and
137 were killed in the wild melee.
When the convoy got under way again, two Communists were captured
and 15 killed after being flushed out of houses in the village of
Pusong-ni. At daybreak a halt was called in Hell Fire Valley for the
purpose of identifying bodies of MPs and Headquarters troops, killed
in the Task Force Drysdale battle, which were to be picked up later.
Attempts to start the looted and abandoned vehicles met with no success
and the convoy continued the movement to Koto-ri without incident,
arriving about 1000 on the 7th.
At this hour the last Marine troops had not yet left Hagaru, so that
the column as a whole extended the entire 11 miles of the route.
Division Train No. 2 had formed up during the afternoon of the 6th,
but was unable to start until after dark. At midnight the train had
moved only a short distance out of Hagaru. Lieutenant Colonel Milne
requested infantry support and 3/5 was given the mission of advancing
at the head of the column, along with the 5th Marines regimental train,
to eliminate enemy resistance.[569] Taplett had only two companies, one
of which proceeded astride the road while the other echeloned to the
left rear. The late start proved to be a blessing, since Division Train
No. 2 completed most of its movement by daylight under an umbrella of
Marine air and met only light and scattered resistance. The head of the
column reached Koto-ri at 1700, and at 2300 all of the major Division
units were in the perimeter except 2/5, the rear guard.[570]
[569] Col J. L. Stewart Comments, n. d.
[570] The description of the operations of the 5th Marines and
3/1 are based on: 3/5 _SAR_, 17; 3/1, _SAR_, 26 Nov-15
Dec 50, 7; 5th Mar _SAR_, 32–34; 1/5 _SAR_, 18–19; 2/5
_SAR_, 29–30, 37.
Both 1/5 and 3/1 had formed up in Hagaru on the morning of the 7th and
moved out as rapidly as traffic would permit, which was slow indeed.
They were accompanied by the 41st Commando, which had earned the esteem
of all U. S. Marines by valor in combat. British imperturbability was
at its best when Lieutenant Colonel Drysdale held an inspection shortly
before departing Hagaru. Disdainful of the scattered shots which were
still being heard, the officers moved up and down the rigid lines, and
men whose gear was not in the best possible shape were reprimanded.
By 1000 nobody was left in the battered town except Roise’s battalion,
First Lieutenant Vaughan R. Stuart’s tank platoon and elements of Able
Company, 1st Engineer Battalion, commanded by Captain William R. Gould.
This unit and CWO Willie S. Harrison’s Explosive Ordnance Section of
Headquarters Company engineers were attached to the 5th Marines for the
mission of the demolitions at Hagaru.[571]
[571] Descriptions of the operations of the engineers at Hagaru
are based on these sources: 1st Engr Bn _SAR_, 13;
Partridge interv, 25 Jun 51, 50; Narrative of Capt N. A.
Canzona, 13 Jul 56.
Gould had formed five demolitions teams, each composed of an officer
and four to six men. On the evening of 6 December they began
preparations for burning stockpiles of surplus clothing and equipment
along with the buildings of the Hagaru train yard. There was also the
duty of placing charges in the dumps of mortar and artillery ammunition
which could not be transported to Hagaru.
One of the main problems was the disposal of a small mountain of frozen
surplus rations. A team of engineers spent hours on the 6th at the task
of smashing cans and crates of food with a bulldozer and saturating the
dump with fuel oil.
The Able Company engineers came under the operational control of
the 2d Battalion after the other units of the 5th Marines departed.
Demolitions were to await the order of Lieutenant Colonel Roise on the
morning of the 7th. Hagaru was full of combustibles, however, and fires
of mysterious origin sent up dense clouds of smoke before the engineers
touched off the oil-soaked food supplies and the buildings of the train
yard.
As the Marines of 2/5 pulled back toward the southern tip of East Hill,
smoke blotted out the surrounding area so that enemy movements could
not be detected. Worse yet, premature explosions sent up fountains
of debris just as the engineers were setting up their fuses for a
20-minute delay. Detonations shook the earth on all sides. Rockets
sliced through the air, shells shattered into vicious fragments,
and large chunks of real estate rained down everywhere. Roise was
understandably furious, since his troops were endangered during
their withdrawal. By a miracle they came off East Hill without any
casualties, and the engineers were the last Marines left in Hagaru.
Soon the entire base seemed to be erupting like a volcano. Visibility
was reduced to zero when the engineers pulled out, after setting a last
tremendous charge to blow the bridge.
So compelling was the lure of loot that small groups of Chinese came
down from the high ground toward the man-made hell of flame and
explosions. Between clouds of smoke they could be seen picking over the
debris, and the Marine tanks cranked off a few rounds at targets of
opportunity.
It is not likely that any of Roise’s weary troops paused for a last
sentimental look over their shoulders at the dying Korean town.
Hagaru was not exactly a pleasure resort, and yet hundreds of Marines
and soldiers owed their lives to the fact that this forward base
had enabled the Division to evacuate all casualties and fly in
replacements while regrouping for the breakout to the seacoast.
If it had not been for the forethought of the Division and Wing
commanders, with the concurrence of General Almond, there would have
been no R4D airstrip, no stockpiles of ammunition, rations and medical
supplies. And though the Marines might conceivably have fought their
way out of the CCF encirclement without a Hagaru, it would have been
at the cost of abandoning much equipment and suffering much higher
casualties.
Only a few weeks before, this Korean town had been merely an unknown
dot on the map. But on 7 December 1950 the name was familiar to
newspaper readers and radio listeners all over the United States as
they anxiously awaited tidings of the breakout. Already it had become a
name to be remembered in U. S. Marine annals along with such historical
landmarks as Belleau Wood, Guadalcanal, Peleliu and Iwo Jima.
Prospects of a warm meal and a night’s sleep meant more than history
to Roise’s troops when the column moved out at last shortly after
noon, with the engineers bringing up the rear to blow bridges
along the route. A pitiful horde of Korean refugees followed the
troops--thousands of men, women and children with such personal
belongings as they could carry. Efforts on the part of the engineers to
warn the refugees of impending demolitions were futile. Although these
North Koreans had enjoyed for five years the “blessings” of Communist
government, the prospect of being left behind to the tender mercies
of the Chinese Communists was so terrifying that they took appalling
risks. Knowing that a bridge was about to blow up at any instant, they
swarmed across in a blind panic of flight. Never did war seem more
harsh or its victims more pathetic.[572]
[572] Sexton interv, 16 May 51.
The rear guard had less air and artillery support than any of the
preceding troops, yet CCF opposition was confined to scattered
small-arms fire all the way to Hell Fire Valley. There the enemy lobbed
over a few mortar shells during a long halt at dusk, but the rest of
the advance was uneventful. Gould’s engineers took chances repeatedly
of being cut off when they fell behind to burn abandoned vehicles or
blow bridges. On several occasions a small group found itself entirely
isolated as the infantry and even the refugees pushed on ahead. Luckily
the engineers made it without any casualties, and by midnight the last
troops of the 1st Marine Division had entered the perimeter at Koto-ri.
Thus the first stage of the Division breakout came to a close. In
proportion to total numbers, the service troops of Division Train
No. 1 had taken the heaviest losses--six killed and 12 wounded for
the Division Headquarters Company; one killed and 16 wounded for the
Military Police Company; four killed and 28 wounded for the 1st Motor
Transport Battalion; one killed and 27 wounded for the 1st Ordnance
Battalion; and three killed and 34 wounded for the 3d Battalion of the
11th Marines. Battle casualties for the entire 1st Marine Division,
including those of the East Hill battle, were as follows:
---------+-----+-----+-----+-----+--------
Dates | KIA | DOW | MIA | WIA | Totals
---------+-----+-----+-----+-----+--------
6 Dec | 32 | 4 | 7 | 218 | 261
7 Dec | 51 | 16 | 0 | 288 | 355
---------+-----+-----+-----+-----+--------
Totals | 83 | 20 | 7 | 506 | 616[573]
---------+-----+-----+-----+-----+--------
[573] Div Adjutant _SAR_, Appendix II, 3.
About 38 hours were required for the movement of some 10,000 troops
and more than 1,000 vehicles. The new arrivals filled the perimeter at
Koto-ri to the bursting point, but there was to be no pause at this
point. Division OpnO 26-50, issued at 1815 on the 7th, before the last
troops had arrived, provided for the advance to be resumed from Koto-ri
at first light the following morning.