complete form of it, _i.e._, the city-culture of the Greeks, based as it
was on their mythical and social foundations; and one incomplete form,
the Roman, which acted as an adornment of life, derived from the Greek.
Now all these bases, the mythical and the politico-social, have changed;
our alleged culture has no stability, because it has been erected upon
insecure conditions and opinions which are even now almost ready to
collapse.--When we thoroughly grasp Greek culture, then, we see that it
is all over with it. The philologist is thus a great sceptic in the
present conditions of our culture and training · that is his mission.
Happy is he if, like Wagner and Schopenhauer, he has a dim presentiment
of those auspicious powers amid which a new culture is stirring.
169
Those who say: "But antiquity nevertheless remains as a subject of
consideration for pure science, even though all its educational purposes
may be disowned," must be answered by the words, What is pure science
here! Actions and characteristics must be judged; and those who judge
them must stand above them: so you must first devote your attention to
overcoming antiquity. If you do not do that, your science is not pure,
but impure and limited . as may now be perceived.
170
To overcome Greek antiquity through our own deeds: this would be the
right task. But before we can do this we must first _know_ it!--There is
a thoroughness which is merely an excuse for inaction. Let it be
recollected how much Goethe knew of antiquity: certainly not so much as
a philologist, and yet sufficient to contend with it in such a way as to
bring about fruitful results. One _should_ not even know more about a
thing than one could create. Moreover, the only time when we can
actually _recognise_ something is when we endeavour to _make_ it. Let
people but attempt to live after the manner of antiquity, and they will
at once come hundreds of miles nearer to antiquity than they can do with
all their erudition.--Our philologists never show that they strive to
emulate antiquity in any way, and thus _their_ antiquity remains without
any effect on the schools.
The study of the spirit of emulation (Renaissance, Goethe), and the
study of despair.
The non-popular element in the new culture of the Renaissance: a
frightful fact!
171
The worship of classical antiquity, as it was to be seen in Italy, may
be interpreted as the only earnest, disinterested, and fecund worship
which has yet fallen to the lot of antiquity. It is a splendid example
of Don Quixotism; and philology at best is such Don Quixotism. Already
at the time of the Alexandrian savants, as with all the sophists of the
first and second centuries, the Atticists, &c., the scholars are
imitating something purely and simply chimerical and pursuing a world
that never existed. The same trait is seen throughout antiquity · the
manner in which the Homeric heroes were copied, and all the intercourse
held with the myths, show traces of it. Gradually all Greek antiquity
has become an object of Don Quixotism. It is impossible to understand
our modern world if we do not take into account the enormous influence
of the purely fantastic. This is now confronted by the principle · there
can be no imitation. Imitation, however, is merely an artistic
phenomenon, _i.e._, it is based on appearance . we can accept manners,
thoughts, and so on through imitation; but imitation can create nothing.
True, the creator can borrow from all sides and nourish himself in that
way. And it is only as creators that we shall be able to take anything
from the Greeks. But in what respect can philologists be said to be
creators! There must be a few dirty jobs, such as knackers' men, and
also text-revisers: are the philologists to carry out tasks of this
nature?
172
What, then, is antiquity _now_, in the face of modern art, science, and
philosophy? It is no longer the treasure-chamber of all knowledge; for
in natural and historical science we have advanced greatly beyond it.
Oppression by the church has been stopped. A _pure_ knowledge of
antiquity is now possible, but perhaps also a more ineffective and
weaker knowledge.--This is right enough, if effect is known only as
effect on the masses; but for the breeding of higher minds antiquity is
more powerful than ever.
Goethe as a German poet-philologist; Wagner as a still higher stage: his
clear glance for the only worthy position of art. No ancient work has
ever had so powerful an effect as the "Orestes" had on Wagner. The
objective, emasculated philologist, who is but a philistine of culture
and a worker in "pure science," is, however, a sad spectacle.
173
Between our highest art and philosophy and that which is recognised to
be truly the oldest antiquity, there is no contradiction: they support
and harmonise with one another. It is in this that I place my hopes.
174
The main standpoints from which to consider the importance of antiquity:
1. There is nothing about it for young people, for it exhibits man with
an entire freedom from shame.
2. It is not for direct imitation, but it teaches by which means art has
hitherto been perfected in the highest degree.
3. It is accessible only to a few, and there should be a _police des
moeurs,_ in charge of it--as there should be also in charge of bad
pianists who play Beethoven.
4. These few apply this antiquity to the judgment of our own time, as
critics of it; and they judge antiquity by their own ideals and are thus
critics of antiquity.
5. The contract between the Hellenic and the Roman should be studied,
and also the contrast between the early Hellenic and the late
Hellenic.--Explanation of the different types of culture.
175
The advancement of science at the expense of man is one of the most
pernicious things in the world. The stunted man is a retrogression in
the human race: he throws a shadow over all succeeding generations The
tendencies and natural purpose of the individual science become
degenerate, and science itself is finally shipwrecked: it has made
progress, but has either no effect at all on life or else an immoral
one.
176
Men not to be used like things!
From the former very incomplete philology and knowledge of antiquity
there flowed out a stream of freedom, while our own highly developed
knowledge produces slaves and serves the idol of the State.
177
There will perhaps come a time when scientific work will be carried on
by women, while the men will have to _create,_ using the word in a
spiritual sense: states, laws, works of art, &c.
People should study typical antiquity just as they do typical men:
_i.e._, imitating what they understand of it, and, when the pattern
seems to lie far in the distance, considering ways and means and
preliminary preparations, and devising stepping-stones.
178
The whole feature of study lies in this: that we should study only what
we feel we should like to imitate; what we gladly take up and have the
desire to multiply. What is really wanted is a progressive canon of the
_ideal_ model, suited to boys, youths, and men.
179
Goethe grasped antiquity in the right way · invariably with an emulative
soul. But who else did so? One sees nothing of a well-thought-out
pedagogics of this nature: who knows that there is a certain knowledge
of antiquity which cannot be imparted to youths!
The puerile character of philology: devised by teachers for pupils.
180
The ever more and more common form of the ideal: first men, then
institutions, finally tendencies, purposes, or the want of them. The
highest form: the conquest of the ideal by a backward movement from
tendencies to institutions, and from institutions to men.
181
I will set down in writing what I no longer believe--and also what I do
believe. Man stands in the midst of the great whirlpool of forces, and
imagines that this whirlpool is rational and has a rational aim in
view: error! The only rationality that we know is the small reason of
man: he must exert it to the utmost, and it invariably leaves him in the
lurch if he tries to place himself in the hands of "Providence."
Our only happiness lies in reason; all the remainder of the world is
dreary. The highest reason, however, is seen by me in the work of the
artist, and he can feel it to be such: there may be something which,
when it can be consciously brought forward, may afford an even greater
feeling of reason and happiness: for example, the course of the solar
system, the breeding and education of a man.
Happiness lies in rapidity of feeling and thinking: everything else is
slow, gradual, and stupid. The man who could feel the progress of a ray
of light would be greatly enraptured, for it is very rapid.
Thinking of one's self affords little happiness. But when we do
experience happiness therein the reason is that we are not thinking of
ourselves, but of our ideal. This lies far off; and only the rapid man
attains it and rejoices.
An amalgamation of a great centre of men for the breeding of better men
is the task of the future. The individual must become familiarised with
claims that, when he says Yea to his own will, he also says Yea to the
will of that centre--for example, in reference to a choice, as among
women for marriage, and likewise as to the manner in which his child
shall be brought up. Until now no single individuality, or only the very
rarest, have been free: they were influenced by these conceptions, but
likewise by the bad and contradictory organisation of the individual
purposes.
182
Education is in the first place instruction in what is necessary, and
then in what is changing and inconstant. The youth is introduced to
nature, and the sway of laws is everywhere pointed out to him; followed
by an explanation of the laws of ordinary society. Even at this early
stage the question will arise: was it absolutely necessary that this
should have been so? He gradually comes to need history to ascertain how
these things have been brought about. He learns at the same time,
however, that they may be changed into something else. What is the
extent of man's power over things? This is the question in connection
with all education. To show how things may become other than what they
are we may, for example, point to the Greeks. We need the Romans to show
how things became what they were.
183
If, then, the Romans had spurned the Greek culture, they would perhaps
have gone to pieces completely. When could this culture have once again
arisen? Christianity and Romans and barbarians: this would have been an
onslaught: it would have entirely wiped out culture. We see the danger
amid which genius lives. Cicero was one of the greatest benefactors of
humanity, even in his own time.
There is no "Providence" for genius; it is only for the ordinary run of
people and their wants that such a thing exists: they find their
satisfaction, and later on their justification.
184
Thesis: the death of ancient culture inevitable. Greek culture must be
distinguished as the archetype; and it must be shown how all culture
rests upon shaky conceptions.
The dangerous meaning of art: as the protectress and galvanisation of
dead and dying conceptions; history, in so far as it wishes to restore
to us feelings which we have overcome. To feel "historically" or "just"
towards what is already past, is only possible when we have risen above
it. But the danger in the adoption of the feelings necessary for this is
very great . let the dead bury their dead, so that we ourselves may not
come under the influence of the smell of the corpses.
THE DEATH OF THE OLD CULTURE.
1. The signification of the studies of antiquity hitherto pursued:
obscure; mendacious.
2. As soon as they recognise the goal they condemn themselves to death ·
for their goal is to describe ancient culture itself as one to be
demolished.
3. The collection of all the conceptions out of which Hellenic culture
has grown up. Criticism of religion, art, society, state, morals.
4. Christianity is likewise denied.
5. Art and history--dangerous.
6. The replacing of the study of antiquity which has become superfluous
for the training of our youth.
Thus the task of the science of history is completed and it itself has
become superfluous, if the entire inward continuous circle of past
efforts has been condemned. Its place must be taken by the science of
the _future_.
185
"Signs" and "miracles" are not believed; only a "Providence" stands in
need of such things. There is no help to be found either in prayer or
asceticism or in "vision." If all these things constitute religion, then
there is no more religion for me.
My religion, if I can still apply this name to something, lies in the
work of breeding genius . from such training everything is to be hoped.
All consolation comes from art. Education is love for the offspring; an
excess of love over and beyond our self-love. Religion is "love beyond
ourselves." The work of art is the model of such a love beyond
ourselves, and a perfect model at that.
186
The stupidity of the will is Schopenhauer's greatest thought, if
thoughts be judged from the standpoint of power. We can see in Hartmann
how he juggled away this thought. Nobody will ever call something
stupid--God.
187
This, then, is the new feature of all the future progress of the world ·
men must never again be ruled over by religious conceptions. Will they
be any _worse_? It is not my experience that they behave well and
morally under the yoke of religion; I am not on the side of
Demopheles[14] The fear of a beyond, and then again the fear of divine
punishments will hardly have made men better.
188
Where something great makes its appearance and lasts for a relatively
long time, we may premise a careful breeding, as in the case of the
Greeks. How did so many men become free among them? Educate educators!
But the first educators must educate themselves! And it is for these
that I write.
189
The denial of life is no longer an easy matter: a man may become a
hermit or a monk--and what is thereby denied! This conception has now
become deeper . it is above all a discerning denial, a denial based upon
the will to be just; not an indiscriminate and wholesale denial.
190
The seer must be affectionate, otherwise men will have no confidence in
him · Cassandra.
191
The man who to-day wishes to be good and saintly has a more difficult
task than formerly . in order to be "good," he must not be so unjust to
knowledge as earlier saints were. He would have to be a knowledge-saint:
a man who would link love with knowledge, and who would have nothing to
do with gods or demigods or "Providence," as the Indian saints likewise
had nothing to do with them. He should also be healthy, and should keep
himself so, otherwise he would necessarily become distrustful of
himself. And perhaps he would not bear the slightest resemblance to the
ascetic saint, but would be much more like a man of the world.
192
The better the state is organised, the duller will humanity be.
To make the individual uncomfortable is my task!
The great pleasure experienced by the man who liberates himself by
fighting.
Spiritual heights have had their age in history; inherited energy
belongs to them. In the ideal state all would be over with them.
193
The highest judgment on life only arising from the highest energy of
life. The mind must be removed as far as possible from exhaustion.
In the centre of the world-history judgment will be the most accurate;
for it was there that the greatest geniuses existed.
The breeding of the genius as the only man who can truly value and deny
life.
Save your genius! shall be shouted unto the people: set him free! Do all
you can to unshackle him.
The feeble and poor in spirit must not be allowed to judge life.
194
_I dream of a combination of men who shall make no concessions, who
shall show no consideration, and who shall be willing to be called
"destroyers": they apply the standard of their criticism to everything
and sacrifice themselves to truth. The bad and the false shall be
brought to light! We will not build prematurely: we do not know, indeed,
whether we shall ever be able to build, or if it would not be better not
to build at all. There are lazy pessimists and resigned ones in this
world--and it is to their number that we refuse to belong!_
FOOTNOTES:
[1] No doubt a reminiscence of the "Odyssey," Bk. ix--TR.
[2] Formal education is that which tends to develop the critical and
logical faculties, as opposed to material education, which is intended
to deal with the acquisition of knowledge and its valuation, _e.g._,
history, mathematics, &c. "Material" education, of course, has nothing
to do with materialism--TR.
[3] The reference is not to Pope, but to Hegel.--TR.
[4] Friedrich August Wolf (1759-1824), the well-known classical scholar,
now chiefly remembered by his "Prolegomena ad Homerum."--TR.
[5] Students who pass certain examinations need only serve one year in
the German Army instead of the usual two or three--TR.
[6] Otto Jahn (1813-69), who is probably best remembered in philological
circles by his edition of Juvenal.--TR.
[7] Gustav Freytag at one time a famous German novelist--TR.
[8] A well-known anti-Wagnerian musical critic of Vienna.--TR.
[9] See note on p 149.--TR.
[10] Karl Ottfried Muller (1797-1840), classical archæologist, who
devoted special attention to Greece--TR.
[11] Friedrich Gottlieb Welcker (1784-1868), noted for his
ultra-profound comments on Greek poetry--TR.
[12] "We shall once again be shipwrecked." The omission is in the
original--TR.
[13] Johann Gottfried Jakob Hermann (1772-1848), noted for his works on
metre and Greek grammar.--TR.
[14] A type in Schopenhauer's Essay "On Religion." See "Parerga and
Paralipomena"--TR.
FINIS.
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_Printed at_ THE DARIEN PRESS, _Edinburgh_