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THE COMPLETE WORKS OF FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE
_First Complete and Authorised English translation in Eighteen Volumes_
EDITED BY
DR OSCAR LEVY
[Illustration: Nietzsche.]
VOLUME EIGHT
* * * * *
THIRD EDITION
WE PHILOLOGISTS
TRANSLATED BY
J. M. KENNEDY
* * * * *
T. N. FOULIS
13 & 15 FREDERICK STREET
EDINBURGH · AND LONDON
1911
CONTENTS
TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE TO "WE PHILOLOGISTS" 105
WE PHILOLOGISTS 109
WE PHILOLOGISTS
AUTUMN 1874
(PUBLISHED POSTHUMOUSLY)
TRANSLATED BY J. M. KENNEDY
AUTHOR OF "THE QUINTESSENCE OF NIETZSCHE," "RELIGIONS AND PHILOSOPHIES
OF THE EAST," &C.
The mussel is crooked inside and rough outside · it is only when we
hear its deep note after blowing into it that we can begin to
esteem it at its true value.--(Ind. Spruche, ed Bothlingk, 1 335)
An ugly-looking-wind instrument · but we must first blow into it.
TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION
The subject of education was one to which Nietzsche, especially during
his residence in Basel, paid considerable attention, and his insight
into it was very much deeper than that of, say, Herbert Spencer or even
Johann Friedrich Herbart, the latter of whom has in late years exercised
considerable influence in scholastic circles. Nietzsche clearly saw that
the "philologists" (using the word chiefly in reference to the teachers
of the classics in German colleges and universities) were absolutely
unfitted for their high task, since they were one and all incapable of
entering into the spirit of antiquity. Although at the first reading,
therefore, this book may seem to be rather fragmentary, there are two
main lines of thought running through it: an incisive criticism of
German professors, and a number of constructive ideas as to what
classical culture really should be.
These scattered aphorisms, indeed, are significant as showing how far
Nietzsche had travelled along the road over which humanity had been
travelling from remote ages, and how greatly he was imbued with the
pagan spirit which he recognised in Goethe and valued in Burckhardt.
Even at this early period of his life Nietzsche was convinced that
Christianity was the real danger to culture; and not merely modern
Christianity, but also the Alexandrian culture, the last gasp of Greek
antiquity, which had helped to bring Christianity about. When, in the
later aphorisms of "We Philologists," Nietzsche appears to be throwing
over the Greeks, it should be remembered that he does not refer to the
Greeks of the era of Homer or Æschylus, or even of Aristotle, but to the
much later Greeks of the era of Longinus.
Classical antiquity, however, was conveyed to the public through
university professors and their intellectual offspring, and these
professors, influenced (quite unconsciously, of course) by religious and
"liberal" principles, presented to their scholars a kind of emasculated
antiquity. It was only on these conditions that the State allowed the
pagan teaching to be propagated in the schools; and if, where classical
scholars were concerned, it was more tolerant than the Church had been,
it must be borne in mind that the Church had already done all the rough
work of emasculating its enemies, and had handed down to the State a
body of very innocuous and harmless investigators. A totally erroneous
conception of what constituted classical culture was thus brought about.
Where any distinction was actually made, for example, later Greek
thought was enormously over-rated, and early Greek thought equally
undervalued. Aphorism 44, together with the first half-dozen or so in
the book, may be taken as typical specimens of Nietzsche's protest
against this state of things.
It must be added, unfortunately, that Nietzsche's observations in this
book apply as much to England as to Germany. Classical teachers here may
not be rated so high as they are in Germany, but their influence would
appear to be equally powerful, and their theories of education and of
classical antiquity equally chaotic. In England as in Germany they are
"theologians in disguise." The danger of modern "values" to true culture
may be readily gathered from a perusal of aphorisms that follow: and, if
these aphorisms enable even one scholar in a hundred to enter more
thoroughly into the spirit of a great past they will not have been
penned in vain.
J. M. KENNEDY.
LONDON, _July 1911_.
I
To what a great extent men are ruled by pure hazard, and how little
reason itself enters into the question, is sufficiently shown by
observing how few people have any real capacity for their professions
and callings, and how many square pegs there are in round holes: happy
and well chosen instances are quite exceptional, like happy marriages,
and even these latter are not brought about by reason. A man chooses his
calling before he is fitted to exercise his faculty of choice. He does
not know the number of different callings and professions that exist; he
does not know himself; and then he wastes his years of activity in this
calling, applies all his mind to it, and becomes experienced and
practical. When, afterwards, his understanding has become fully
developed, it is generally too late to start something new; for wisdom
on earth has almost always had something of the weakness of old age and
lack of vigour about it.
For the most part the task is to make good, and to set to rights as well
as possible, that which was bungled in the beginning. Many will come to
recognise that the latter part of their life shows a purpose or design
which has sprung from a primary discord: it is hard to live through it.
Towards the end of his life, however, the average man has become
accustomed to it--then he may make a mistake in regard to the life he
has lived, and praise his own stupidity: _bene navigavi cum naufragium
feci_ . he may even compose a song of thanksgiving to "Providence."
2
On inquiring into the origin of the philologist I find:
1. A young man cannot have the slightest conception of what the Greeks
and Romans were.
2. He does not know whether he is fitted to investigate into them;
3. And, in particular, he does not know to what extent, in view of the
knowledge he may actually possess, he is fitted to be a teacher. What
then enables him to decide is not the knowledge of himself or his
science; but
(_a_) Imitation.
(_b_) The convenience of carrying on the kind of work which he had
begun at school.
(_c_) His intention of earning a living.
In short, ninety-nine philologists out of a hundred _should_ not be
philologists at all.
3
The more strict religions require that men shall look upon their
activity simply as one means of carrying out a metaphysical scheme: an
unfortunate choice of calling may then be explained as a test of the
individual. Religions keep their eyes fixed only upon the salvation of
the individual . whether he is a slave or a free man, a merchant or a
scholar, his aim in life has nothing to do with his calling, so that a
wrong choice is not such a very great piece of unhappiness. Let this
serve as a crumb of comfort for philologists in general; but true
philologists stand in need of a better understanding: what will result
from a science which is "gone in for" by ninety-nine such people? The
thoroughly unfitted majority draw up the rules of the science in
accordance with their own capacities and inclinations; and in this way
they tyrannise over the hundredth, the only capable one among them. If
they have the training of others in their hands they will train them
consciously or unconsciously after their own image . what then becomes
of the classicism of the Greeks and Romans?
The points to be proved are--
(_a_) The disparity between philologists and the ancients.
(_b_) The inability of the philologist to train his pupils, even with
the help of the ancients.
(_c_) The falsifying of the science by the (incapacity of the) majority,
the wrong requirements held in view; the renunciation of the real aim of
this science.
4
All this affects the sources of our present philology: a sceptical and
melancholy attitude. But how otherwise are philologists to be produced?
The imitation of antiquity: is not this a principle which has been
refuted by this time?
The flight from actuality to the ancients: does not this tend to falsify
our conception of antiquity?
5
We are still behindhand in one type of contemplation: to understand how
the greatest productions of the intellect have a dreadful and evil
background . the sceptical type of contemplation. Greek antiquity is now
investigated as the most beautiful example of life.
As man assumes a sceptical and melancholy attitude towards his life's
calling, so we must sceptically examine the highest life's calling of a
nation: in order that we may understand what life is.
6
My words of consolation apply particularly to the single tyrannised
individual out of a hundred: such exceptional ones should simply treat
all the unenlightened majorities as their subordinates; and they should
in the same way take advantage of the prejudice, which is still
widespread, in favour of classical instruction--they need many helpers.
But they must have a clear perception of what their actual goal is.
7
Philology as the science of antiquity does not, of course, endure for
ever; its elements are not inexhaustible. What cannot be exhausted,
however, is the ever-new adaptation of one's age to antiquity; the
comparison of the two. If we make it our task to understand our own age
better by means of antiquity, then our task will be an everlasting
one.--This is the antinomy of philology: people have always endeavoured
to understand antiquity by means of the present--and shall the present
now be understood by means of antiquity? Better: people have explained
antiquity to themselves out of their own experiences; and from the
amount of antiquity thus acquired they have assessed the value of their
experiences. Experience, therefore, is certainly an essential
prerequisite for a philologist--that is, the philologist must first of
all be a man; for then only can he be productive as a philologist. It
follows from this that old men are well suited to be philologists if
they were not such during that portion of their life which was richest
in experiences.
It must be insisted, however, that it is only through a knowledge of the
present that one can acquire an inclination for the study of classical
antiquity. Where indeed should the impulse come from if not from this
inclination? When we observe how few philologists there actually are,
except those that have taken up philology as a means of livelihood, we
can easily decide for ourselves what is the matter with this impulse for
antiquity: it hardly exists at all, for there are no disinterested
philologists.
Our task then is to secure for philology the universally educative
results which it should bring about. The means: the limitation of the
number of those engaged in the philological profession (doubtful whether
young men should be made acquainted with philology at all). Criticism of
the philologist. The value of antiquity: it sinks with you: how deeply
you must have sunk, since its value is now so little!
8
It is a great advantage for the true philologist that a great deal of
preliminary work has been done in his science, so that he may take
possession of this inheritance if he is strong enough for it--I refer to
the valuation of the entire Hellenic mode of thinking. So long as
philologists worked simply at details, a misunderstanding of the Greeks
was the consequence. The stages of this undervaluation are · the
sophists of the second century, the philologist-poets of the
Renaissance, and the philologist as the teacher of the higher classes of
society (Goethe, Schiller).
Valuing is the most difficult of all.
In what respect is one most fitted for this valuing?
--Not, at all events, when one is trained for philology as one is now.
It should be ascertained to what extent our present means make this last
object impossible.
--Thus the philologist himself is not the aim of philology.
9
Most men show clearly enough that they do not regard themselves as
individuals: their lives indicate this. The Christian command that
everyone shall steadfastly keep his eyes fixed upon his salvation, and
his alone, has as its counterpart the general life of mankind, where
every man lives merely as a point among other points--living not only as
the result of earlier generations, but living also only with an eye to
the future. There are only three forms of existence in which a man
remains an individual as a philosopher, as a Saviour, and as an artist.
But just let us consider how a scientific man bungles his life: what
has the teaching of Greek particles to do with the sense of life?--Thus
we can also observe how innumerable men merely live, as it were, a
preparation for a man, the philologist, for example, as a preparation
for the philosopher, who in his turn knows how to utilise his ant-like
work to pronounce some opinion upon the value of life. When such
ant-like work is not carried out under any special direction the greater
part of it is simply nonsense, and quite superfluous.
10
Besides the large number of unqualified philologists there is, on the
other hand, a number of what may be called born philologists, who from
some reason or other are prevented from becoming such. The greatest
obstacle, however, which stands in the way of these born philologists is
the bad representation of philology by the unqualified philologists.
Leopardi is the modern ideal of a philologist: The German philologists
can do nothing. (As a proof of this Voss should be studied!)
11
Let it be considered how differently a science is propagated from the
way in which any special talent in a family is transmitted. The bodily
transmission of an individual science is something very rare. Do the
sons of philologists easily become philologists? _Dubito_. Thus there is
no such accumulation of philological capacity as there was, let us say,
in Beethoven's family of musical capacity. Most philologists begin from
the beginning, and even then they learn from books, and not through
travels, &c. They get some training, of course.
12
Most men are obviously in the world accidentally; no necessity of a
higher kind is seen in them. They work at this and that, their talents
are average. How strange! The manner in which they live shows that they
think very little of themselves: they merely esteem themselves in so far
as they waste their energy on trifles (whether these be mean or
frivolous desires, or the trashy concerns of their everyday calling). In
the so-called life's calling, which everyone must choose, we may
perceive a touching modesty on the part of mankind. They practically
admit in choosing thus. "We are called upon to serve and to be of
advantage to our equals--the same remark applies to our neighbour and to
his neighbour, so everyone serves somebody else; no one is carrying out
the duties of his calling for his own sake, but always for the sake of
others and thus we are like geese which support one another by the one
leaning against the other. _When the aim of each one of us is centred in
another, then we have all no object in existing;_ and this 'existing for
others' is the most comical of comedies."
13
Vanity is the involuntary inclination to set one's self up for an
individual while not really being one; that is to say, trying to appear
independent when one is dependent. The case of wisdom is the exact
contrary: it appears to be dependent while in reality it is independent.
14
The Hades of Homer--From what type of existence is it really copied? I
think it is the description of the philologist: it is better to be a
day-labourer than to have such an anæmic recollection of the past.--[1]
15
The attitude of the philologist towards antiquity is apologetic, or else
dictated by the view that what our own age values can likewise be found
in antiquity. The right attitude to take up, however, is the reverse
one, viz., to start with an insight into our modern topsyturviness, and
to look back from antiquity to it--and many things about antiquity which
have hitherto displeased us will then be seen to have been most profound
necessities.
We must make it clear to ourselves that we are acting in an absurd
manner when we try to defend or to beautify antiquity: _who_ are we!
16
We are under a false impression when we say that there is always some
caste which governs a nation's culture, and that therefore savants are
necessary; for savants only possess knowledge concerning culture (and
even this only in exceptional cases). Among learned men themselves there
might be a few, certainly not a caste, but even these would indeed be
rare.
17
One very great value of antiquity consists in the fact that its writings
are the only ones which modern men still read carefully.
Overstraining of the memory--very common among philologists, together
with a poor development of the judgment.
18
Busying ourselves with the culture-epochs of the past: is this
gratitude? We should look backwards in order to explain to ourselves the
present conditions of culture: we do not become too laudatory in regard
to our own circumstances, but perhaps we should do so in order that we
may not be too severe on ourselves.
19
He who has no sense for the symbolical has none for antiquity: let
pedantic philologists bear this in mind.
20
My aim is to bring about a state of complete enmity between our present
"culture" and antiquity. Whoever wishes to serve the former must hate
the latter.
21
Careful meditation upon the past leads to the impression that we are a
multiplication of many pasts · so how can we be a final aim? But why
not? In most instances, however, we do not wish to be this. We take up
our positions again in the ranks, work in our own little corner, and
hope that what we do may be of some small profit to our successors. But
that is exactly the case of the cask of the Danæ · and this is useless,
we must again set about doing everything for ourselves, and only for
ourselves--measuring science by ourselves, for example with the question
· What is science to us? not . what are we to science? People really
make life too easy for themselves when they look upon themselves from
such a simple historical point of view, and make humble servants of
themselves. "Your own salvation above everything"--that is what you
should say; and there are no institutions which you should prize more
highly than your own soul.--Now, however, man learns to know himself: he
finds himself miserable, despises himself, and is pleased to find
something worthy of respect outside himself. Therefore he gets rid of
himself, so to speak, makes himself subservient to a cause, does his
duty strictly, and atones for his existence. He knows that he does not
work for himself alone; he wishes to help those who are daring enough to
exist on account of themselves, like Socrates. The majority of men are
as it were suspended in the air like toy balloons; every breath of wind
moves them.--As a consequence the savant must be such out of
self-knowledge, that is to say, out of contempt for himself--in other
words he must recognise himself to be merely the servant of some higher
being who comes after him. Otherwise he is simply a sheep.
22
It is the duty of the free man to live for his own sake, and not for
others. It was on this account that the Greeks looked upon handicrafts
as unseemly.
As a complete entity Greek antiquity has not yet been fully valued · I
am convinced that if it had not been surrounded by its traditional
glorification, the men of the present day would shrink from it horror
stricken. This glorification, then, is spurious; gold-paper.
23
The false enthusiasm for antiquity in which many philologists live. When
antiquity suddenly comes upon us in our youth, it appears to us to be
composed of innumerable trivialities; in particular we believe ourselves
to be above its ethics. And Homer and Walter Scott--who carries off the
palm? Let us be honest! If this enthusiasm were really felt, people
could scarcely seek their life's calling in it. I mean that what we can
obtain from the Greeks only begins to dawn upon us in later years: only
after we have undergone many experiences, and thought a great deal.
24
People in general think that philology is at an end--while I believe
that it has not yet begun.
The greatest events in philology are the appearance of Goethe,
Schopenhauer, and Wagner; standing on their shoulders we look far into
the distance. The fifth and sixth centuries have still to be discovered.
25
Where do we see the effect of antiquity? Not in language, not in the
imitation of something or other, and not in perversity and waywardness,
to which uses the French have turned it. Our museums are gradually
becoming filled up: I always experience a sensation of disgust when I
see naked statues in the Greek style in the presence of this thoughtless
philistinism which would fain devour everything.
PLANS AND THOUGHTS RELATING TO A WORK ON PHILOLOGY
(1875)
26
Of all sciences philology at present is the most favoured · its progress
having been furthered for centuries by the greatest number of scholars
in every nation who have had charge of the noblest pupils. Philology has
thus had one of the best of all opportunities to be propagated from
generation to generation, and to make itself respected. How has it
acquired this power?
Calculations of the different prejudices in its favour.
How then if these were to be frankly recognised as prejudices? Would not
philology be superfluous if we reckoned up the interests of a position
in life or the earning of a livelihood? What if the truth were told
about antiquity, and its qualifications for training people to live in
the present?
In order that the questions set forth above may be answered let us
consider the training of the philologist, his genesis: he no longer
comes into being where these interests are lacking.
If the world in general came to know what an unseasonable thing for us
antiquity really is, philologists would no longer be called in as the
educators of our youth.
Effect of antiquity on the non-philologist likewise nothing. If they
showed themselves to be imperative and contradictory, oh, with what
hatred would they be pursued! But they always humble themselves.
Philology now derives its power only from the union between the
philologists who will not, or cannot, understand antiquity and public
opinion, which is misled by prejudices in regard to it.
The real Greeks, and their "watering down" through the philologists.
The future commanding philologist sceptical in regard to our entire
culture, and therefore also the destroyer of philology as a profession.
THE PREFERENCE FOR ANTIQUITY
27
If a man approves of the investigation of the past he will also approve
and even praise the fact--and will above all easily understand it--that
there are scholars who are exclusively occupied with the investigation
of Greek and Roman antiquity: but that these scholars are at the same
time the teachers of the children of the nobility and gentry is not
equally easy of comprehension--here lies a problem.
Why philologists precisely? This is not altogether such a matter of
course as the case of a professor of medicine, who is also a practical
physician and surgeon. For, if the cases were identical, preoccupation
with Greek and Roman antiquity would be identical with the "science of
education." In short, the relationship between theory and practice in
the philologist cannot be so quickly conceived. Whence comes his
pretension to be a teacher in the higher sense, not only of all
scientific men, but more especially of all cultured men? This
educational power must be taken by the philologist from antiquity; and
in such a case people will ask with astonishment: how does it come that
we attach such value to a far-off past that we can only become cultured
men with the aid of its knowledge?
These questions, however, are not asked as a rule: The sway of philology
over our means of instruction remains practically unquestioned; and
antiquity _has_ the importance assigned to it. To this extent the
position of the philologist is more favourable than that of any other
follower of science. True, he has not at his disposal that great mass of
men who stand in need of him--the doctor, for example, has far more than
the philologist. But he can influence picked men, or youths, to be more
accurate, at a time when all their mental faculties are beginning to
blossom forth--people who can afford to devote both time and money to
their higher development. In all those places where European culture has
found its way, people have accepted secondary schools based upon a
foundation of Latin and Greek as the first and highest means of
instruction. In this way philology has found its best opportunity of
transmitting itself, and commanding respect: no other science has been
so well favoured. As a general rule all those who have passed through
such institutions have afterwards borne testimony to the excellence of
their organisation and curriculum, and such people are, of course,
unconscious witnesses in favour of philology. If any who have not passed
through these institutions should happen to utter a word in
disparagement of this education, an unanimous and yet calm repudiation
of the statement at once follows, as if classical education were a kind
of witchcraft, blessing its followers, and demonstrating itself to them
by this blessing. There is no attempt at polemics · "We have been
through it all." "We know it has done us good."
Now there are so many things to which men have become so accustomed that
they look upon them as quite appropriate and suitable, for habit
intermixes all things with sweetness; and men as a rule judge the value
of a thing in accordance with their own desires. The desire for
classical antiquity as it is now felt should be tested, and, as it were,
taken to pieces and analysed with a view to seeing how much of this
desire is due to habit, and how much to mere love of adventure--I refer
to that inward and active desire, new and strange, which gives rise to a
productive conviction from day to day, the desire for a higher goal, and
also the means thereto · as the result of which people advance step by
step from one unfamiliar thing to another, like an Alpine climber.
What is the foundation on which the high value attached to antiquity at
the present time is based, to such an extent indeed that our whole
modern culture is founded on it? Where must we look for the origin of
this delight in antiquity, and the preference shown for it?
I think I have recognised in my examination of the question that all our
philology--that is, all its present existence and power--is based on the
same foundation as that on which our view of antiquity as the most
important of all means of training is based. Philology as a means of
instruction is the clear expression of a predominating conception
regarding the value of antiquity, and the best methods of education. Two
propositions are contained in this statement. In the first place all
higher education must be a historical one, and secondly, Greek and Roman
history differs from all others in that it is classical. Thus the
scholar who knows this history becomes a teacher. We are not here going
into the question as to whether higher education ought to be historical
or not; but we may examine the second and ask: in how far is it classic?
On this point there are many widespread prejudices. In the first place
there is the prejudice expressed in the synonymous concept, "The study
of the humanities": antiquity is classic because it is the school of the
humane.
Secondly: "Antiquity is classic because it is enlightened----"
28
It is the task of all education to change certain conscious actions and
habits into more or less unconscious ones; and the history of mankind is
in this sense its education. The philologist now practises unconsciously
a number of such occupations and habits. It is my object to ascertain
how his power, that is, his instinctive methods of work, is the result
of activities which were formerly conscious, but which he has gradually
come to feel as such no longer: _but that consciousness consisted of
prejudices_. The present power of philologists is based upon these
prejudices, for example the value attached to the _ratio_ as in the
cases of Bentley and Hermann. Prejudices are, as Lichtenberg says, the
art impulses of men.
29
It is difficult to justify the preference for antiquity since it has
arisen from prejudices:
1. From ignorance of all non-classical antiquity.
2. From a false idealisation of humanitarianism, whilst Hindoos and
Chinese are at all events more humane.
3. From the pretensions of school-teachers.
4. From the traditional admiration which emanated from antiquity itself.
5. From opposition to the Christian church; or as a support for this
church.
6. From the impression created by the century-long work of the
philologists, and the nature of this work. It must be a gold mine,
thinks the spectator.
7. The acquirement of knowledge attained as the result of the study. The
preparatory school of science.
In short, partly from ignorance, wrong impressions, and misleading
conclusions; and also from the interest which philologists have in
raising their science to a high level in the estimation of laymen.
Also the preference for antiquity on the part of the artists, who
involuntarily assume proportion and moderation to be the property of all
antiquity. Purity of form. Authors likewise.
The preference for antiquity as an abbreviation of the history of the
human race, as if there were an autochthonous creation here by which all
becoming might be studied.
The fact actually is that the foundations of this preference are being
removed one by one, and if this is not remarked by philologists
themselves, it is certainly being remarked as much as it can possibly be
by people outside their circle. First of all history had its effect, and
then linguistics brought about the greatest diversion among philologists
themselves, and even the desertion of many of them. They have still the
schools in their hands: but for how long! In the form in which it has
existed up to the present philology is dying out; the ground has been
swept from under its feet. Whether philologists may still hope to
maintain their status is doubtful; in any case they are a dying race.
30
The peculiarly significant situation of philologists: a class of people
to whom we entrust our youth, and who have to investigate quite a
special antiquity. The highest value is obviously attached to this
antiquity. But if this antiquity has been wrongly valued, then the whole
foundation upon which the high position of the philologist is based
suddenly collapses. In any case this antiquity has been very
differently valued, and our appreciation of the philologists has
constantly been guided by it. These people have borrowed their power
from the strong prejudices in favour of antiquity,--this must be made
clear.
Philologists now feel that when these prejudices are at last refuted,
and antiquity depicted in its true colours, the favourable prejudices
towards them will diminish considerably. _It is thus to the interest of
their profession not to let a clear impression of antiquity come to
light; in particular the impression that antiquity in its highest sense
renders one "out of season?"_ i.e., _an enemy to one's own time._
It is also to the interest of philologists as a class not to let their
calling as teachers be regarded from a higher standpoint than that to
which they themselves can correspond.
31
It is to be hoped that there are a few people who look upon it as a
problem why philologists should be the teachers of our noblest youths.
Perhaps the case will not be always so--It would be much more natural
_per se_ if our children were instructed in the elements of geography,
natural science, political economy, and sociology, if they were
gradually led to a consideration of life itself, and if finally, but
much later, the most noteworthy events of the past were brought to their
knowledge. A knowledge of antiquity should be among the last subjects
which a student would take up; and would not this position of antiquity
in the curriculum of a school be more honourable for it than the present
one?--Antiquity is now used merely as a propædeutic for thinking,
speaking, and writing; but there was a time when it was the essence of
earthly knowledge, and people at that time wished to acquire by means of
practical learning what they now seek to acquire merely by means of a
detailed plan of study--a plan which, corresponding to the more advanced
knowledge of the age, has entirely changed.
Thus the inner purpose of philological teaching has been entirely
altered; it was at one time material teaching, a teaching that taught
how to live, but now it is merely formal.[2]
32
If it were the task of the philologist to impart formal education, it
would be necessary for him to teach walking, dancing, speaking, singing,
acting, or arguing · and the so-called formal teachers did impart their
instruction this way in the second and third centuries. But only the
training of a scientific man is taken into account, which results in
"formal" thinking and writing, and hardly any speaking at all.
33
If the gymnasium is to train young men for science, people now say there
can be no more preliminary preparation for any particular science, so
comprehensive have all the sciences become. As a consequence teachers
have to train their students generally, that is to say for all the
sciences--for scientificality in other words; and for that classical
studies are necessary! What a wonderful jump! a most despairing
justification! Whatever is, is right,[3] even when it is clearly seen
that the "right" on which it has been based has turned to wrong.
34
It is accomplishments which are expected from us after a study of the
ancients: formerly, for example, the ability to write and speak. But
what is expected now! Thinking and deduction . but these things are not
learnt _from_ the ancients, but at best _through_ the ancients, by means
of science. Moreover, all historical deduction is very limited and
unsafe, natural science should be preferred.
35
It is the same with the simplicity of antiquity as it is with the
simplicity of style: it is the highest thing which we recognise and must
imitate; but it is also the last. Let it be remembered that the classic
prose of the Greeks is also a late result.
36
What a mockery of the study of the "humanities" lies in the fact that
they were also called "belles lettres" (bellas litteras)!
37
Wolf's[4] reasons why the Egyptians, Hebrews, Persians, and other
Oriental nations were not to be set on the same plane with the Greeks
and Romans: "The former have either not raised themselves, or have
raised themselves only to a slight extent, above that type of culture
which should be called a mere civilisation and bourgeois acquirement, as
opposed to the higher and true culture of the mind." He then explains
that this culture is spiritual and literary: "In a well-organised nation
this may be begun earlier than order and peacefulness in the outward
life of the people (enlightenment)."
He then contrasts the inhabitants of easternmost Asia ("like such
individuals, who are not wanting in clean, decent, and comfortable
dwellings, clothing, and surroundings; but who never feel the necessity
for a higher enlightenment") with the Greeks ("in the case of the
Greeks, even among the most educated inhabitants of Attica, the contrary
often happens to an astonishing degree; and the people neglect as
insignificant factors that which we, thanks to our love of order, are in
the habit of looking upon as the foundations of mental culture itself").
38
Our terminology already shows how prone we are to judge the ancients
wrongly: the exaggerated sense of literature, for example, or, as Wolf,
when speaking of the "inner history of ancient erudition," calls it,
"the history of learned enlightenment."
39
According to Goethe, the ancients are "the despair of the emulator."
Voltaire said. "If the admirers of Homer were honest, they would
acknowledge the boredom which their favourite often causes them."
40
The position we have taken up towards classical antiquity is at bottom
the profound cause of the sterility of modern culture; for we have taken
all this modern conception of culture from the Hellenised Romans. We
must distinguish within the domain of antiquity itself: when we come to
appreciate its purely productive period, we condemn at the same time the
entire Romano-Alexandrian culture. But at the same time also we condemn
our own attitude towards antiquity, and likewise our philology.
41
There has been an age-long battle between the Germans and antiquity,
_i.e._, a battle against the old culture. It is certain that precisely
what is best and deepest in the German resists it. The main point,
however, is that such resistance is only justifiable in the case of the
Romanised culture; for this culture, even at that time, was a
falling-off from something more profound and noble. It is this latter
that the Germans are wrong in resisting.
42
Everything classic was thoroughly cultivated by Charles the Great,
whilst he combated everything heathen with the severest possible
measures of coercion. Ancient mythology was developed, but German
mythology was treated as a crime. The feeling underlying all this, in my
opinion, was that Christianity had already overcome the old religion ·
people no longer feared it, but availed themselves of the culture that
rested upon it. But the old German gods were feared.
A great superficiality in the conception of antiquity--little else than
an appreciation of its formal accomplishments and its knowledge--must
thereby have been brought about. We must find out the forces that stood
in the way of increasing our insight into antiquity. First of all, the
culture of antiquity is utilised as an incitement towards the acceptance
of Christianity · it became, as it were, the premium for conversion, the
gilt with which the poisonous pill was coated before being swallowed.
Secondly, the help of ancient culture was found to be necessary as a
weapon for the intellectual protection of Christianity. Even the
Reformation could not dispense with classical studies for this purpose.
The Renaissance, on the other hand, now begins, with a clearer sense of
classical studies, which, however, are likewise looked upon from an
anti-Christian standpoint: the Renaissance shows an awakening of honesty
in the south, like the Reformation in the north. They could not but
clash; for a sincere leaning towards antiquity renders one unchristian.
On the whole, however, the Church succeeded in turning classical studies
into a harmless direction . the philologist was invented, representing a
type of learned man who was at the same time a priest or something
similar. Even in the period of the Reformation people succeeded in
emasculating scholarship. It is on this account that Friedrich August
Wolf is noteworthy he freed his profession from the bonds of theology.
This action of his, however, was not fully understood; for an
aggressive, active element, such as was manifested by the
poet-philologists of the Renaissance, was not developed. The freedom
obtained benefited science, but not man.
43
It is true that both humanism and rationalism have brought antiquity
into the field as an ally; and it is therefore quite comprehensible that
the opponents of humanism should direct their attacks against antiquity
also. Antiquity, however, has been misunderstood and falsified by
humanism · it must rather be considered as a testimony against humanism,
against the benign nature of man, &c. The opponents of humanism are
wrong to combat antiquity as well; for in antiquity they have a strong
ally.
44
It is so difficult to understand the ancients. We must wait patiently
until the spirit moves us. The human element which antiquity shows us
must not be confused with humanitarianism. This contrast must be
strongly emphasised: philology suffers by endeavouring to substitute the
humanitarian, young men are brought forward as students of philology in
order that they may thereby become humanitarians. A good deal of
history, in my opinion, is quite sufficient for that purpose. The brutal
and self-conscious man will be humbled when he sees things and values
changing to such an extent.
The human element among the Greeks lies within a certain _naiveté_,
through which man himself is to be seen--state, art, society, military
and civil law, sexual relations, education, party. It is precisely the
human element which may be seen everywhere and among all peoples, but
among the Greeks it is seen in a state of nakedness and inhumanity which
cannot be dispensed with for purposes of instruction. In addition to
this, the Greeks have created the greatest number of individuals, and
thus they give us so much insight into men,--a Greek cook is more of a
cook than any other.
45
I deplore a system of education which does not enable people to
understand Wagner, and as the result of which Schopenhauer sounds harsh
and discordant in our ears . such a system of education has missed its
aim.
46
(THE FINAL DRAFT OF THE FIRST CHAPTER.)
Il faut dire la vérité et s'immoler--VOLTAIRE.
Let us suppose that there were freer and more superior spirits who were
dissatisfied with the education now in vogue, and that they summoned it
to their tribunal, what would the defendant say to them? In all
probability something like this: "Whether you have a right to summon
anyone here or not, I am at all events not the proper person to be
called. It is my educators to whom you should apply. It is their duty to
defend me, and I have a right to keep silent. I am merely what they have
made me."
These educators would now be hauled before the tribunal, and among them
an entire profession would be observed · the philologists. This
profession consists in the first place of those men who make use of
their knowledge of Greek and Roman antiquity to bring up youths of
thirteen to twenty years of age, and secondly of those men whose task it
is to train specially-gifted pupils to act as future teachers--_i.e._,
as the educators of educators. Philologists of the first type are
teachers at the public schools, those of the second are professors at
the universities.
The first-named philologists are entrusted with the care of certain
specially-chosen youths, those who, early in life, show signs of talent
and a sense of what is noble, and whose parents are prepared to allow
plenty of time and money for their education. If other boys, who do not
fulfil these three conditions, are presented to the teachers, the
teachers have the right to refuse them. Those forming the second class,
the university professors, receive the young men who feel themselves
fitted for the highest and most responsible of callings, that of
teachers and moulders of mankind; and these professors, too, may refuse
to have anything to do with young men who are not adequately equipped or
gifted for the task.
If, then, the educational system of a period is condemned, a heavy
censure on philologists is thereby implied: either, as the consequence
of their wrong-headed view, they insist on giving bad education in the
belief that it is good; or they do not wish to give this bad education,
but are unable to carry the day in favour of education which they
recognise to be better. In other words, their fault is either due to
their lack of insight or to their lack of will. In answer to the first
charge they would say that they knew no better, and in answer to the
second that they could do no better. As, however, these philologists
bring up their pupils chiefly with the aid of Greek and Roman antiquity,
their want of insight in the first case may be attributed to the fact
that they do not understand antiquity, and again to the fact that they
bring forward antiquity into the present age as if it were the most
important of all aids to instruction, while antiquity, generally
speaking, does not assist in training, or at all events no longer does
so.
On the other hand, if we reproach our professors with their lack of
will, they would be quite right in attributing educational significance
and power to antiquity; but they themselves could not be said to be the
proper instruments by means of which antiquity could exhibit such power.
In other words, the professors would not be real teachers and would be
living under false colours, but how, then, could they have reached such
an irregular position? Through a misunderstanding of themselves and
their qualifications. In order, then, that we may ascribe to
philologists their share in this bad educational system of the present
time, we may sum up the different factors of their innocence and guilt
in the following sentence: the philologist, if he wishes for a verdict
of acquittal, must understand three things antiquity, the present time,
and himself · his fault lies in the fact that he either does not
understand antiquity, or the present time, or himself.
47
It is not true to say that we can attain culture through antiquity
alone. We may learn something from it, certainly; but not culture as the
word is now understood. Our present culture is based on an emasculated
and mendacious study of antiquity. In order to understand how
ineffectual this study is, just look at our philologists · they, trained
upon antiquity, should be the most cultured men. Are they?
48
Origin of the philologist. When a great work of art is exhibited there
is always some one who not only feels its influence but wishes to
perpetuate it. The same remark applies to a great state--to everything,
in short, that man produces. Philologists wish to perpetuate the
influence of antiquity and they can set about it only as imitative
artists. Why not as men who form their lives after antiquity?
49
The decline of the poet-scholars is due in great part to their own
corruption: their type is continually arising again; Goethe and
Leopardi, for example, belong to it. Behind them plod the
philologist-savants. This type has its origin in the sophisticism of the
second century.
50
Ah, it is a sad story, the story of philology! The disgusting erudition,
the lazy, inactive passivity, the timid submission.--Who was ever free?
51
When we examine the history of philology it is borne in upon us how few
really talented men have taken part in it. Among the most celebrated
philologists are a few who ruined their intellect by acquiring a
smattering of many subjects, and among the most enlightened of them were
several who could use their intellect only for childish tasks. It is a
sad story · no science, I think, has ever been so poor in talented
followers. Those whom we might call the intellectually crippled found a
suitable hobby in all this hair-splitting.
52
The teacher of reading and writing, and the reviser, were the first
types of the philologist.
53
Friedrich August Wolf reminds us how apprehensive and feeble were the
first steps taken by our ancestors in moulding scholarship--how even the
Latin classics, for example, had to be smuggled into the university
market under all sorts of pretexts, as if they had been contraband
goods. In the "Gottingen Lexicon" of 1737, J. M. Gesner tells us of the
Odes of Horace: "ut imprimis, quid prodesse _in severioribus studiis_
possint, ostendat."
54
I was pleased to read of Bentley "non tam grande pretium emendatiunculis
meis statuere soleo, ut singularem aliquam gratiam inde sperem aut
exigam."
Newton was surprised that men like Bentley and Hare should quarrel about
a book of ancient comedies, since they were both theological
dignitaries.
55