Men getting much physical exercise in the open air consume much more
food than those confined. In cold weather such food must contain the
heat which is usually supplied by fuel. All of which is true of the
soldier in a greater degree. This, and the fact that in army
subsistence, transportation and distribution are usually coupled with
great difficulty, made it necessary for the Central Powers to provide
their forces chiefly with food staples.
Before the war about 35 per cent. of the men mobilized had lived largely
on cereals and vegetables. Little meat is consumed by the rural
population of Central Europe. For the reasons already given, that diet
had to make room for one composed of more concentrated and more
heat-producing elements. Bread, meat, fats, and potatoes were its
principal constituents. Beans, peas, and lentils were added as the
supply permitted. In the winter larger quantities of animal fats were
required to keep the men warm, and in times of great physical exertion
the allowance of sugar had to be increased.
Since at first the army produced no food at all, the civil population
had to produce what was needed. With, roughly, 42 per cent. of the
soldiers coming from the food-producing classes, this was no small task,
especially since the more fitted had been called to the colors.
The governments of Central Europe realized as early as in the spring of
1915 that the army would have to produce at least a share of the food it
needed. Steps were taken to bring that about. The war had shown that
cavalry was, for the time being, useless. On the other hand, it was not
good military policy to disband the cavalry organizations and turn them
into artillery and infantry. These troops might be needed again sooner
or later. That being the case, it was decided to employ mounted troops
in the production of food. Fully 65 per cent. of the men in that branch
of the military establishments of Central Europe came from the farm and
were familiar with the handling of horses. That element was put to work
behind the fronts producing food.
No totals of this production have ever been published, to my knowledge,
so that I can deal only with what I actually saw. I must state, however,
that the result cannot have been negligible, though on the whole it was
not what some enthusiasts have claimed for it.
I saw the first farming of this sort in Galicia. There some
Austro-Hungarian cavalry organizations had tilled, roughly, sixty
thousand acres, putting the fields under wheat, rye, oats, and
potatoes. When I saw the crops they were in a fair state of prosperity,
though I understand that later a drought damaged them much. The colonel
in charge of the work told me that he expected to raise food enough for
a division, which should not have been difficult, seeing that three
acres ought to produce food enough for any man, even if tilled in a
slovenly way.
Throughout Poland and the parts of Russia then occupied the Germans were
doing the same thing. What the quality of their effort was I have no
means of knowing, but if they are to be measured by what I saw in
France, during the Somme offensive in 1916, the results obtained must
have been very satisfying.
One of the organizations then lying in the Bapaume sector
was the German Second Guards Substitute-Reserve Division--
_Garde-Ersatz-Reserve-Division_. I think that the palm for war
economy must be due that organization. In my many trips to various
fronts (I have been on every front in Central Europe, the Balkan,
Turkey, and Asia) and during my long stays there I have never seen a
crowd that had made itself so much at home in the enemy country.
The body in question had then under cultivation some sixteen hundred
acres of very good soil, on which it was raising wheat, rye, barley,
oats, beans, peas, lentils, sugar-beets, roots of various sorts, and
potatoes. It had made hay enough for its own draft animals and had sold
a large quantity to neighboring divisions.
At Gommecourt the division operated a well-equipped modern dairy, able
to convert into butter and cheese the milk of about six hundred cows.
Its output was large enough to supply the men in the trenches with all
the butter and cheese they could reasonably expect. A large herd of pigs
was kept by the division, and as General von Stein, the commander of the
sector, now Prussian Minister of War, informed me at a table that
offered the products of the division at a luncheon, the organization was
then operating, somewhere near the actual firing-line, two water-mills,
a large sugar-plant, and even a brewery. Coffee, salt, and a few other
trifles were all the division received from the rear.
It was then the middle of August, so that I was able to see the results
of what had been done by these soldier-farmers. I can state that soil
was never put to better use. Cultivation had been efficiently carried
out and the crops were exceedingly good.
One of the most vivid pictures I retain from that week in "Hell" shows
several German soldiers plowing a field east of Bucquoi into which
British shells were dropping at the time. The shells tore large craters
in the plowed field, but with an indifference that was baffling the men
continued their work. I have not yet been able to explain what was the
purpose of this plowing in August, except to lay the knife at the root
of the weeds; nor can I quite believe that this end justified exposing
men and valuable animals. At any rate, the thing was done.
The case cited represents the maximum that was achieved in food
production by any army organization, so far as I know. But that maximum
was no mean thing. That division, at least, did not depend on the civil
population for food.
Several trips through Serbia and Macedonia in the same year showed me
what the German "economic" and occupation troops had done in those
parts.
On the whole, the efforts at food production of the "economic"
troops--organization of older men barely fit for service in the
firing-line--had not been fortunate. The plan had been to put as much
soil under crops as was possible. For this purpose traction plows had
been brought along and whole country sites had been torn up. Though the
soil of the valleys of Serbia is generally very rich, and the climate
one of the best for farming, the crops raised in that year were far from
good. Some held that it was due to the seed, which had been brought from
Germany. Others were of the opinion that the plowing had been carelessly
done, leaving too much leeway to the weeds. Be that as it may, the work
of the economic companies was not a success.
The occupation troops did much better, however. Together with the
Serbian women they had cultivated the fields on the intensive principle.
Yields had been good, I was told.
In Macedonia the fields had also been put to use by the Germans,
Austro-Hungarians, and Bulgars. The last named, familiar with the
cultivation of the tobacco plant, were exchanging with the others
tobacco for grain. Food production was also attempted by the
Austro-Hungarians on the Isonzo front. But since they were fighting on
their own territory in districts which still had their civil population,
there was little opportunity, all the less since the soil of the
Carso and Bainsizza plateaus, and the mountainous regions north
of them, is not suited for agriculture on a large scale. Every
_doline_--funnel-shaped depression--of the Carso had its garden,
however, whence the army drew most of the vegetables it consumed.
The food that was being raised for the army never reached the interior,
of course. If an organization produced more than what it consumed, and
such cases were extremely rare, it sold the surplus to the army
commissaries. It took men and time to cultivate the fields, and these
could not always be spared, especially when the losses in men were
beginning to be severely felt and when the opponent engaged in
offensives. It had meanwhile become necessary to throw, several times a
year, divisions from one front to another, and that, too, began to
interfere with the scheme, since the men no longer took the interest in
the crops they had taken when they were established in a position.
I spent considerable time with the Ninth German Army operating against
the Roumanians late in the fall of 1916. Much booty in food fell into
the hands of that organization, among it some eleven hundred thousand
tons of wheat and other grains.
Bread was bad and scarce in the Central states. When it became known
that so large a quantity of breadstuff had fallen in the hands of the
Centralist troops, people in Berlin and Vienna already saw some of it on
their tables--but only in their minds. Falkenhayn and Mackensen issued
orders that not a pound of breadstuff was to be taken from the war zone
they had established, which comprised all of Roumania occupied,
Transylvania, and the Dobrudja district. Nor could other food be
exported to the Central civilian population. Whatever was found in the
conquered territory was reserved for the use of the troops that had been
employed, and the surplus was assigned to the German, Austro-Hungarian,
and Bulgarian commissaries-general.
The quantities taken, however, were large, and six months later, when
all needs of the armed forces had been met, the civilian populations
were remembered so far as it was prudent to do so. To give that
population too much might have resulted in a lessening of production at
home, and that was something which could not be invited.
This policy was followed always. I know of no instance in which it was
abandoned, even when the clamor for bread at home was loudest. The army
came first in all things, much in the manner of the driver of a team of
mules.
But it was not selfishness alone that gave rise to this policy. It
served no good purpose to ship into the interior food that would later
be needed by the troops. That merely increased the burden of the
railroads, first by the transport of the booty homeward, and later by
shipping back food as the troops needed it. Keeping the food where it
was found obviated this traffic entirely.
On the whole, the Centralist troops never fared poorly in subsistence.
It had become necessary to reduce the bread ration from 500 grams (18
ounces) to 400 grams (14 ounces) per day, but this was made good by
increasing the meat and fat ration. Enough to eat was the surest way of
keeping the war popular with the soldiers.
Since it is very easy to exaggerate the value of food production due to
the army, I will state here specifically that this production took care
of little more than what the men consumed in excess over their former
diet. Their normal consumption was still borne by the civilian
population, and, as the losses on the battle-field increased, and the
reserves had to be employed oftener, food production in the army fell
rapidly, though at present this condition appears to be discounted by
the food produced in Roumania, Serbia, and Poland. The area involved is
large, of course, but the surplus actually available is not great. The
population of these territories has dwindled to old men, boys, and
women, and their production is barely able to meet actual needs. The
little that can be extracted from these people does not go very far in
the subsistence of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Bulgaria. These
countries have together a population of, roundly, one hundred and
fifteen millions to-day, of which not less than ten million of the best
producers are under the colors, thereby causing a consumption in food
and _matériel_ that is at least one-third greater than normal--munitions
and ammunition not included.
But the army had much to do with food in other directions. It controlled
inter-allied exports and imports and was a power even in trade with the
neutrals of Europe.
The relations between Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey
were essentially military. They were this to such an extent that
they almost overshadowed even the diplomatic services of these
countries. For the time being, the _Militärbevollmächtigte_--military
plenipotentiary--as the chief communication officer was known, eclipsed
often the diplomatic plenipotentiary. Militarism was absolute. The civil
government and population had no right which the military authorities
need respect.
All commercial exchange passed into the hands of these military
plenipotentiaries. The diplomatic service might reach an agreement for
the exchange of food against manufactured articles, but finally the
military saw to it that it was carried out. They bought and shipped, and
received in turn the factory products that were the _quid pro quo_ for
the food and raw material thus secured.
In Roumania, so long as she was neutral, the _Einkaufstelle_--purchasing
bureau--was indeed in the hands of civilians. As a neutral, Roumania
could not permit German and Austro-Hungarian officers to be seen in the
streets in their uniforms. They were, for all that, members of the
army. For the time being, they wore mufti, nor did their transactions
show that they were working directly for the army. The food that was
bought was intended for the civilian population, naturally. But it has
always been hard to keep from any army that which it may need. The same
sack of wheat may not go to the military commissaries, but what
difference will it make so long as it releases for consumption by the
army a like quantity of home-grown cereals?
The German and Austro-Hungarian purchasing bureaus in Switzerland,
Holland, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden are similarly organized. Many
members of their staffs are indeed civilians, but that does not change
anything, since all shipments of food entering Central Europe fall
immediately under the control of the government Food Commissions, if not
under that of the military commissaries direct.
To the military, then, the Central states civilian population had to
look for such food as could be imported.
There was the case of Bulgaria. That country is still essentially an
agricultural state. Of the five and a half million inhabitants fully 90
per cent. engage in farming and animal industry. The products of the
soil constitute the major portion of Bulgaria's exports. That meant that
she could ease to some extent the food shortage in Germany and
Austria-Hungary.
An acquaintance of mine, a Captain Westerhagen, formerly a banker in
Wall Street, was in charge of the German purchasing bureau in Sofia. He
bought whatever was edible--wheat, rye, barley, peas, beans, potatoes,
butter, eggs, lard, pork, and mutton. His side lines were hides, wool,
flax, mohair, hay, and animal feed-stuffs.
Indirectly, he was also an importer. Under his surveillance were brought
into Bulgaria the manufactured goods Bulgaria needed, such as iron and
steel products in the form of farm implements, farm machinery, building
hardware, small hardware, and general machinery, glassware, paper
products, instruments, surgical supplies, railroad equipment, medicines,
and chemicals generally.
When the German army needed none of the food Captain Westerhagen bought,
the civilian population was the beneficiary of his efforts. The fact is
that my acquaintance bought whatever he could lay hands on. Now and then
he bought so much that the Bulgarians began to feel the pinch. In that
event the Bulgarian general staff might close down on the purchasing
central for a little while, with the result that the Germans would shut
down on their exports. It was a case of no food, no factory products.
This sort of reciprocity led often to hard feeling--situations which
Colonel von Massow, the German military plenipotentiary at Sofia, found
pretty hard to untangle. But, on the whole, the arrangement worked
smoothly enough.
It was so in Turkey.
The Germans had in Constantinople one of their most remarkable men--and
here I must throw a little light on German-Ottoman relations. The name
of this remarkable man--remarkable in capacity, energy, industry, and
far-sightedness--is Corvette-Captain Humann, son of the famous
archeologist who excavated Pergamum and other ancient cities and
settlements in Asia Minor.
Captain Humann was born in Smyrna and had early in life made the
acquaintance of Enver Pasha, now Ottoman Minister of War and
vice-generalissimo of the Ottoman army. Raised in the Orient, Humann
knew the people with whom he was to deal. The viewpoint of the Orient
and the Turk was an open book to him. He had the advantage of being
looked upon as half a Turk, for the reason that he was born in Turkey.
To these qualifications Captain Humann added great natural ability and a
perseverance without equal.
Officially, Captain Humann was known as the commander of the German
naval base in Constantinople and as naval attaché. Actually, he was the
alpha and omega of German-Ottoman relations.
There always was a great deal of friction between the Turks and the
Germans. The Turk often could not see the need for speed, while the
German was eternally in a hurry, from the Oriental point of view. The
Turk was inclined to do things in a slovenly manner. The German insisted
upon everything, in matters economic, military, and diplomatic, being
in its place. German officers who had a great deal to do with these
things had not always the tact and forbearance necessary. Bad blood
would come of this. To make matters worse, the Turk was forever under
the impression that he was being exploited. The Germans, also, refused
to _bakshish_ the officials of their ally, and more trouble came from
that.
It is hard to say what the general result of this would have been had
not Captain Humann been on the spot. He was on _du_--thou--terms with
Enver Pasha, and when things refused to move at all he would call on his
friend in the Harbiyeh Nasaret in Stamboul and set them into motion
again. That Turk and German did not come to blows during the first year
of the war is largely due to the genius of Captain Humann. So great was
the man's influence in Constantinople that the successor of Ambassador
Baron von Wangenheim, Prince Metternich, grew jealous of him and had him
removed to Berlin, where in the Imperial Naval Office Captain Humann
chewed pencils until conditions in Constantinople were so bad that the
German Emperor had to send him back, despite the prejudices he held
against him. Captain Humann is not a noble, and in those days the powers
that be in Prussia and Germany were not yet ready to have a commoner, no
matter how able, take away glamour from the aristocratic class.
Though purchasing in Turkey was not one of the duties of Captain Humann,
he was often obliged to take charge of it. I knew of one hundred and
twenty thousand pounds of wool which the Germans had bought, but which
the Turks were not willing to surrender because they were not satisfied
with the price after the bargain had been closed. The case was ticklish
in the extreme. Everybody had gone as far as safety permitted and the
Turks had meanwhile grown more obdurate. In the end the matter had to be
brought to the attention of the ambassador. He, too, decided that
nothing could be done. Captain Humann was appealed to and succeeded in
securing delivery of the wool.
I have quoted this case to show that very often the exchange of
commodities between the Central allies was attended with much friction
and difficulty. More merchandise moved over and across the Danube as
personal favors done than by virtue of the commercial treaties that had
been made. Personal equation was everything in the scheme, especially at
times when Germany's allies were in no pressing need for arms and
ammunition. The very fact that Germany was the "king-pin" in the Central
European scheme caused the lesser members of the combination to be
sticklers in matters affecting their rights and sovereignty.
On one occasion the predecessor of Captain Westerhagen in Sofia was said
to have boastfully made the statement that what he could not get from
the Bulgarians voluntarily he would find means to get, anyhow. General
Jekoff, the chief of the Bulgarian general staff, heard of this, and
promptly shut down on all exports. For two weeks not a thing moved out
of Bulgaria, and when the two weeks were over there was a new man in
charge of the German purchasing bureau in Sofia. The methods of the
Prussian barrack-yard would not do south of the Danube. It took many a
lesson to bring this home.
Austria and Hungary were two separate economic units in the war. When
food was scarce in Austria it did not necessarily follow that the
Hungarians would make good the deficiency. It took a special permit to
export and import from and into Hungary, and the same rules were
enforced by Austria, Germany, Bulgaria, and Turkey in the case of all
shipments made by civilians, so long as these had a hand in this
inter-allied exchange of necessities and commodities.
Little need be said of the German purchasing centrals in Austria and
Hungary. The war was not very old before these countries had nothing to
spare. Thereafter, exchange was limited entirely to materials needed in
the manufacture of arms and ammunition. Austria and Hungary continued to
exchange medical supplies, chemicals, and machinery for food and the
like, respectively. They also managed now and then to get a little of
the food in Bulgaria and Turkey, though the latter country could sell
food only on rare occasions. Constantinople continued to live on
Roumanian wheat, until the total cessation of activity by the Russian
Black Sea fleet made navigation in those waters possible for the Turks
and brought wheat and other food from northern Anatolia.
The food secured by Germany in other markets was also under military
control, as I have stated before. Exchange in this case depended even
more upon reciprocity in kind than in the instances already cited. At
one time the Swiss government was ready to close its borders against the
export of food to Central Europe entirely. Nothing came of the
intention. The German government informed the government at Bern that
this would lead to an embargo on coal along the Swiss borders. France
and Italy had no coal themselves, and Switzerland had to have fuel.
It has been said that the incident in question was staged for the
purpose of illustrating what the position of the Swiss actually was. At
any rate, they would have no coal, not so much as a shovelful, if
to-morrow they refused to export to the Germans and Austrians dairy
products and animal fats. The same is true of iron products and
chemicals.
Holland is in the same position. Great Britain needs all the coal she
can mine, and the Germans refuse to supply the little they can spare
without getting something in exchange--dairy products, animal fats,
vegetables, and fresh and preserved fish. Holland also gets her coal-oil
and gasolene in that manner. Iron and steel and chemicals are other
strong arguments in this scheme. Denmark is in exactly the same
position, and when German gasolene and benzine are not available the
Norwegian fishermen have to stay at home. For each gallon of these
fuels, which Germany exports from the Galician and Roumanian oil-fields,
the Norwegians are obliged to turn over so many pounds of fish. Sweden
has no food to give for the coal and liquid fuel she gets from Germany,
but exchanges them for wood pulp, certain specialty ores, and on rare
occasions reindeer meat.
That this commerce is strictly military those interested know, of
course. But they have given up splitting hairs over it, because there is
no way out. Coal and iron products, to say nothing of chemicals and
medicines, are things which the European neutrals must have, and this
need warring Central Europe has held over them as a whip. Incidentally,
this traffic has done much toward keeping up the rate of the German
mark. Central Europe would have been bankrupted long ago were it not
that the neutrals must buy what these states have for sale and must buy
it at prices fixed by monopoly.
The need of coal and iron has been a far more efficacious discipline for
the European neutrals than the German armies that have lain along their
borders. That these countries have never combined for the purpose of
throwing off this yoke is due to the influence of racial affinity--the
sentiment upon which in the past has thriven Pan-Germanism. Switzerland,
Holland, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, rising simultaneously, could
overnight cause the defeat of the Germans and their allies. But the ties
of blood and kinship militate against that step, despite the dislike
felt in these countries for certain aspects of German political life.