The day of great causes that could inspire the average man with the

resolution to conquer or die was, however, past, and the "shallow order"

(_l'ordre mince_), with all its demands on the individual's sense of

duty, had become an integral part of the military system. How then was

the sense of duty to be created? Louis and Louvois and their

contemporaries sought to create it by taking raw recruits in batches,

giving them a consistent training, quartering them in barracks and

uniforming them. Henceforward the soldier was not a unit, self-taught

and free to enter the service of any master. He had no existence as a

soldier apart from his regiment, and within it he was taught that the

regiment was everything and the individual nothing. Thus by degrees the

idea of implicit obedience to orders and of _esprit de corps_ was

absorbed. But the self-respecting Englishman or the quick ardent

Frenchman was not the best raw material for quasi-automatic regiments,

and it was not until an infinitely more rigorous system of discipline

was applied to an unimaginative army that the full possibilities of this

enforced sense of duty were realized.

Methods of fire before 1740.

The method of delivering fire originally used by the Spaniards, in

which each man in succession fired and fell back to the rear of the

file to reload, required for its continued and exact performance a

degree of coolness and individual smartness which was probably rarely

attained in practice. This was not of serious moment when the "shot"

were simple auxiliaries, but when under Gustavus the offensive idea

came to the front, and the bullets of the infantry were expected to do

something more than merely annoy the hostile pikemen, a more effective

method had to be devised. First, the handiness of the musket was so

far improved that one man could reload while five, instead of as

formerly ten, fired. Then, as the enhanced rate of fire made the

file-firing still more disorderly than before, two ranks and three

were set to fire "volews" or "salvees" together, and before 1640 it

had become the general custom for the musketeers to fire one or two

volleys and then, along with the pikemen, to "fall on." It was of

course no mean task to charge even a disordered mass of pikes with a

short sword or a clubbed musket, and usually after a few minutes the

combatants would drift apart and the musketeers on either side would

keep up an irregular fire until the officers urged the whole forward

for a second attempt.

The bayonet.

With the general disuse of the lance, the disappearance of the

personal motives that formerly made the cavalryman charge home, the

adoption of the flintlock musket and the invention of the socket

bayonet (the fixing of which did not prevent fire being delivered),

all reason for retaining the pike vanished, and from about 1700 to the

present day, therefore, the invariable armament of infantry has been

the musket (or rifle) and bayonet. The manner of employing the

weapons, however, changed but slowly. In the French army in 1688, for

instance (15 years before the abolition of the pike), the old

file-fire was still officially recognized, though rarely employed, the

more usual method being for the musketeers in groups of 12 to 30 men

to advance to the front and deliver their volleys in turn, these

groups corresponding in size to one of the musketeer wings (_manches_)

of a company or double company. But the fire and shock action of

infantry were still distinct, the idea of "push of pike" remained, the

bayonet (as at Marsaglia) taking the place of the pike, and musketry

methods were still and throughout the War of the Spanish Succession

somewhat half-hearted and tentative. Two generals so entirely

different in genius and temperament as Saxe and Catinat could agree on

this point, that attacking infantry ought to close with the enemy,

bayonets fixed, without firing a shot. Catinat's orders to his army in

1690, indeed, seem rather to indicate that he expected his troops to

endure the enemy's first fire without replying in order that their own

volley, when it was at last delivered at a few paces distance, should

be as murderous as possible, while Saxe, who was a dreamer as well as

a practical commander of troops, advocated the pure bayonet charge.

But the fact that is common to both is the relative ineffectiveness of

musketry before the Prussian era, whether this musketry was delivered

by groups of men running forward and returning in line or even by

companies in a long line of battle.

This ineffectiveness was due chiefly to the fact that _fire_ and

_movement_ were separate matters. The enemy's volley, that Catinat and

others ordered their troops to endure without flinching, was sometimes

(as at Fontenoy) absolutely crushing. But as a rule it inflicted an

amount of loss that was not sufficient to put the advancing troops out

of action, and experienced officers were aware that to halt to reply

gave the enemy time to reload, and that once the fight became an

interchange of partial and occasional volleys or a general

_tiraillerie_, there was an end to the attack.

Linear tactics.

Meanwhile, the tactics of armies had been steadily crystallizing into

the so-called "linear" form, which, as far as concerns the infantry, is

simply two long lines of battalions (three, four or five deep) and gave

the utmost possible development to fire-power. The object of the "line"

was to break or beat down the opposing line in the shortest possible

time, whether by fire action or shock action, but fire action was only

decisive at so short a range that the principal volley could be followed

immediately by a charge over a few score paces at most and the crossing

of bayonets. Fire was, however, effective at ranges outside charging

distance, especially from the battalion guns, and however the decision

was achieved in the end, it was necessary to cross the zone between

about 300 yds. and 50 yds. range as quickly as possible. It was

therefore the business of the regimental officer to force his men across

this zone before fire was opened. If, as Catinat recommended, decisive

range was reached with every musket loaded and the troops well in hand,

their fire when finally it was delivered might well be decisive. But in

practice this rarely happened, and though here and there such expedients

as a skirmishing line were employed to assist the advance by disturbing

the enemy's fire the most that was hoped by the average colonel or

captain was that in the advance fire should be opened as late as

possible and that the officers should strive to keep in their hands the

power of breaking off the fire-fight and pushing the troops forward

again. Theorists were already proposing column formations for shock

action, and initiating the long controversy between _l'ordre mince_ and

_l'ordre profonde_, but this was for the time being pure speculation.

The linear system rested on the principle that the maximum weight of

controlled fire at short range was decisive, and the practical problem

of infantry tactics was how to obtain this. The question of _fire versus

shock_ had been answered in favour of the former, and henceforward for

many years the question of _fire versus movement_ held the first place.

The purpose was settled, and it remained to discover the means.

This means was Prussian fire-discipline, which was elaborated by Leopold

of Dessau and Frederick William I., and practically applied by Frederick

the Great. It consisted first in the combination, instead of the

alternation, of fire and movement, and secondly in the thorough

efficiency of the fire in itself. But both these demanded a more

stringent and technically more perfect drill than had ever before been

imagined, or, for that matter, has ever since been attained. A hundred

years before the steady drill of the Spanish veterans at Rocroi, who at

the word of command opened their ranks to let the cannon fire from the

rear and again closed them, impressed every soldier in Europe. But such

drill as this was child's play compared with the Old Dessauer's.

Prussian fire discipline, 1740.

On approaching the enemy the marching columns of the Prussians, which

were generally open columns of companies 4 deep, wheeled, in

succession to the right or left (almost always to the right) and thus

passed along the front of the enemy at a distance of 800-1200 yds.

until the rear company had wheeled. Then the whole together (or in the

case of a deployment to the left, in succession) wheeled into line

facing the enemy. These movements, if intervals and distances were

preserved with proper precision, brought the infantry into two long

well-closed lines, and parade-ground precision was actually attained,

thanks to remorseless drilling and to the reintroduction of the march

in step to music. Of course such movements were best executed on a

firm plain, and as far as possible the attack and defence of woods and

villages was left to light infantry and grenadiers. But even in

marshes and scrub, the line managed to manoeuvre with some approach to

the precision of the barrack square.[9] Now, this precision allowed

Frederick to take risks that no former commander would have dared to

take. At Hohenfriedberg the infantry columns crossed a marshy stream

almost within cannon shot of the enemy; at Kolin (though there this

insolence was punished) the army filed past the Imperialist

skirmishers within less than musket shot, and the climax of this

daring was the "oblique order" attack of Leuthen. With this was bound

up a fire discipline that was more extraordinary than any perfection

of manoeuvre. Before Hohenfriedberg the king gave orders that

"pelotonfeuer" was to be opened at 200 paces from the enemy and

continued up to 30 paces, when the line was to fall on with the

bayonet. The possibility of this combination of fire and movement was

the work of Leopold, who gave the Prussian infantry iron ramrods, and

by sheer drill made the soldier a machine capable of delivering (with

the flintlock muzzle-loading muskets, be it observed) five volleys a

minute. This _pelotonfeuer_ or company volleys replaced the old fire

by ranks practised in other armies. Fire began from the flanks of the

battalion, which consisted of eight companies (for firing, 3 deep).

When the right company commander gave "fire," the commander of No. 2

gave "ready," followed in turn by other companies up to the centre.

The same process having been gone through on the left flank, by the

time the two centre companies had fired the two flank companies were

ready to recommence, and thus a continuous series of rolling volleys

was delivered, at one or two seconds' interval only between companies.

In attack this fire was combined with movement, each company in turn

advancing a few paces after "making ready." In square, old-fashioned

methods of fire were employed. Square was an indecisive and defensive

formation, rarely used, and in the advance of the deployed line, the

offensive and decision-seeking formation _par excellence_, the special

Prussian fire-discipline gave Frederick an advantage of five shots to

two against all opponents. The bayonet-attack, if the rolling volleys

had done their work, was merely "presenting the cheque for payment" as

a modern German writer puts it. The cheque had been drawn, the

decision given, in the fire-fight.

Leuthen.

For some years this method of infantry training gave the Prussians a

decisive superiority in whatever order they fought. But their enemies

improved and also grew in numbers, while the Prussian army's resources

were strictly limited. Thus in the Seven Years' War, after the two

costly battles of Prague and Kolin (1757) especially, it became

necessary to manoeuvre with the object of bringing the Prussian infantry

into contact with an equal or if possible smaller portion of the enemy's

line. If this could be achieved, victory was as certain as ever, but the

difficulties of bringing about a successful manoeuvre were such that the

classical "oblique order" attack was only once completely executed. This

was at Leuthen, December 5th, 1757, perhaps the greatest day in the

history of the Prussian army. Here, in a rolling plain country

occasionally broken by marshes and villages, the "oblique order" was

executed at high speed and with clockwork precision. Frederick's object

was to destroy the left of the Austrian army (which far outnumbered his

own) before the rest of their deployed line of battle could change front

to intervene. His method was to place his own line, by a concealed flank

march, opposite the point where he desired to strike, and then to

advance, not in two long lines but in échelon of battalions from the

right (see LEUTHEN). The échelon was not so deep but that each battalion

was properly supported by the following one on its left (100 paces

distance), and each, as it came within 200 yds. of the Austrian

battalion facing it, opened its "rolling volleys" while continuing to

advance; thus long before the left and most backward battalions were

committed to the fight, the right battalions were crumbling the Austrian

infantry units one by one from left to right. It was the same, without

parade manoeuvres, when at last the Austrians managed to organize a line

of defence about Leuthen village. Unable to make an elaborate change of

front with the whole centre and right wing for want of time, they could

do no more than crowd troops about Leuthen, on a short fighting front,

and this crumbled in turn before the Prussian volleys.

One lesson of Leuthen that contemporary soldiers took to heart was that

even a two-to-one superiority in numbers could not remedy want of

manoeuvring capacity. It might be hoped that with training and drill an

Austrian battalion could be made equal to a Prussian one in the

front-to-front fight, and in fact, as losses told more and more heavily

on Frederick's army as years went on, the specific superiority of his

infantry disappeared. From 1758 therefore, to the end of the war, there

were no more Rossbachs and Leuthens. Superiority in efficiency through

previous training having exhausted its influence, superiority in force

through manoeuvre began to be the general's ideal, and as it was a more

familiar notion to the average Prussian general, trained to manoeuvre,

than to his opponent, whose idea of "manoeuvre" was to sidle carefully

from one _position_ to another, Prussian generalship maintained its

superiority, in spite of many reverses, to the end. The last campaigns

were indeed a war of positions, because Frederick had no longer the men

available for forcing the Austrians out of them, and on many occasions

he was so weak that the most passive defensive and the most elaborate

entrenchments barely sufficed to save him. But whenever opportunity

offered itself, the king sought a decisive success by bringing the whole

of his infantry against part of the enemy's--the principle of Leuthen

put in practice over a wider area and with more elastic manoeuvre

methods. The long échelon of battalions directed against a part of the

hostile line developed quite naturally into an irregular échelon of

brigade columns directed against a part of the enemy's position. But the

history of the "cordon system" which followed this development belongs

rather to the subject of tactics in general than to that of infantry

fighting methods. Within the unit the tactical method scarcely varied.

In a battle each battalion or brigade fought as a unit in line, using

company volleys and seeking the decision by fire.

Controversies and developments, 1760-1790.

In this, and in even the most minute details of drill and uniform,

military Europe slavishly copied Prussia for twenty years after the

Seven Years' War. The services of ex-Prussian officers were at a premium

just as those of Gustavus's officers had been 150 years before. Military

missions from all countries went to Potsdam or to the "Reviews" to study

Prussian methods, with as simple a faith in their adequacy as that shown

to-day by small states and half-civilized kingdoms who send military

representatives to serve in the great European armies. And withal, the

period 1763-1792 is full of tactical and strategical controversies. The

principal of these, as regards infantry, was that between "fire" and

"shock" revived about 1710 by Folard, and about 1780 the American War of

Independence complicated it by introducing a fresh controversy between

_skirmishing_ and _close order_. As to the first, in Folard's day as in

Frederick's, fire action at close range was the deciding factor in

battle, but in Frederick's later campaigns, wherein he no longer

disposed of the old Prussian infantry and its swift mechanical

fire-discipline, there sprang up a tendency to trust to the bayonet for

the decision. If the (so-called) Prussian infantry of 1762 could be in

any way brought to close with the enemy, it had a fair chance of victory

owing to its leaders' previous dispositions, and then the advocates of

"shock," who had temporarily been silenced by Mollwitz and

Hohenfriedberg, again took courage. The ordinary line was primarily a

formation for fire, and only secondarily or by the accident of

circumstances for shock, and, chiefly perhaps under Saxe's influence,

the French army had for many years been accustomed to differentiate

between "linear" formations for fire and "columnar" for attack--thus

reverting to 16th-century practice. While, therefore, the theoreticians

pleaded for battalion columns and the bayonet or for line and the

bullet, the practical soldier used both. Many forms of combined line and

column were tried, but in France, where the question was most

assiduously studied, no agreement had been arrived at when the advent of

the skirmisher further complicated the issues.

In the early Silesian wars, when armies fought in open country in

linear order, the outpost service scarcely concerned the line troops

sufficiently to cause them to get under arms at the sound of firing on

the sentry line. It was performed by irregular light troops, recruited

from wild characters of all nations, who were also charged with the

preliminary skirmishing necessary to clear up the situation before the

deployment of the battle-army, but once the line opened fire their

work was done and they cleared away to the flanks (generally in search

of plunder). Later, however, as the preliminary manoeuvring before the

battle grew in importance and the ground taken into the manoeuvring

zone was more varied and extended than formerly, light infantry was

more and more in demand--in a "cordon" defensive for patrolling the

intervals between the various detachments of line troops, in an attack

for clearing the way for the deployment of each column. Yet in all

this there was no suggestion that light troops or skirmishers were

capable of bringing about the decision in an armed conflict. When

Frederick gained a durable peace in 1763 he dismissed his "free

battalions" without mercy, and by 1764 not more than one Prussian

soldier in eleven was an "irregular," either of horse or foot.[10]

Light Infantry.

But in the American War of Independence the line was pitted against

light infantry in difficult country, and the British and French

officers who served in it returned to Europe full of enthusiasm for

the latter. Nevertheless, their light infantry was, unlike

Frederick's, _selected line infantry_. The light infantry

duties--skirmishing, reconnaissance, outposts--were grafted on to a

thorough close-order training. At first these duties fell to the

grenadiers and light companies of each battalion, but during the

struggle in the colonies, the light companies of a brigade were so

frequently massed in one battalion that in the end whole regiments

were converted into light infantry. This combination of "line"

steadiness and "skirmisher" freedom was the keynote of Sir John

Moore's training system fifteen years later, and Moore's regiments,

above all the 52nd, 43rd (now combined as the Oxfordshire Light

Infantry) and 95th Rifles (Rifle Brigade), were the backbone of the

British Army throughout the Peninsular War. At Waterloo the 52nd,

changing front in line at the double, flung itself on the head and

flank of the Old Guard infantry, and with the "rolling volleys"

inherited from the Seven Years' War, shattered it in a few minutes.

Such an exploit would have been absolutely inconceivable in the case

of one of the old "free battalions." But the light infantry had not

merely been levelled up to the line, it had surpassed it, and in 1815

there were no troops in Europe, whether trained to fight in line or

column or skirmishers, who could rival the three regiments named, the

"Light Division" of Peninsular annals. For meantime the infantry

organization and tactics of the old régime, elsewhere than in England,

had been disintegrated by the flames of the French Revolution, and

from their ashes a new system had arisen, which forms the real

starting-point of the infantry tactics of to-day.

The French Revolution.

The controversialists of Louis XVI.'s time, foremost of whom were

Guibert, Joly de Maizeroy and Menil Durand (see Max Jähns, _Gesch. d.

Kriegswissenschaften_, vol. iii.), were agreed that shock action should

be the work of troops formed in column, but as to the results to be

expected from shock action, the extent to which it should be facilitated

by a previous fire preparation, and the formations In which fire should

be delivered (line, line with skirmishers or "swarms") discussion was so

warm that it sometimes led to wrangles in ladies' drawing-rooms and

meetings in the duelling field. The drill-book for the French infantry

issued shortly before the Revolution was a common-sense compromise,

which in the main adhered to the Frederician system as modified by

Guibert, but gave an important place in infantry tactics to the

battalion "columns of attack," that had hitherto appeared only

spasmodically on the battlefields of the French army and never

elsewhere. This, however, and the quick march (100 paces to the minute

instead of the Frederician 75) were the only prescriptions in the

drill-book that survived the test of a "national" war, to which within a

few years it was subjected (see FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY WARS). The rest,

like the "linear system" of organization and manoeuvre to which it

belonged (see ARMY, §§ 30-33; CONSCRIPTION, &c.) was ignored, and

circumstances and the practical troop-leaders evolved by circumstances

fashioned the combination of _close-order columns and loose-order

skirmishers_ which constituted essentially the new tactics of the

Revolutionary and Napoleonic infantry.

Tactical evolution in France 1792-1807.

The process of evolution cannot be stated in exact terms, more

especially as the officers, as they grew in wisdom through experience,

learned to apply each form in accordance with ground and circumstances,

and to reject, when unsuitable, not only the forms of the drill-book,

but the forms proposed by themselves to replace those of the drill-book.

But certain tendencies are easily discernible. The first tendency was

towards the dissolution of all tactical links. The earlier battles were

fought partly in line for fire action, partly in columns for the bayonet

attack. Now the linear tactics depended on exact preservation of

dressing, intervals and distances, and what required in the case of the

Prussians years of steady drill at 76 paces to the minute was hardly

attainable with the newly levied ardent Frenchmen marching at 100 to

120. Once, therefore, the line moved, it broke up into an irregular

swarm of excited firers, and experience soon proved that only the troops

kept out of the turmoil, whether in line or in column, were susceptible

of manoeuvre and united action. Thus from about 1795 onwards the forms

of the old régime, with half the troops in front in line of battle

(practically in dense hordes of firers) and the other half in rear in

line or line of columns, give way to new ones in which the skirmishers

are fewer and the closed troops more numerous, and the decision rests no

longer with the fire of the leading units (which of course could not

compare in effectiveness with the rolling volleys of the drilled line)

but with the bayonets of the second and third lines--the latter being

sometimes in line but more often, owing to the want of preliminary

drill, in columns. The skirmishers tended again to become pure light

infantry, whose rôle was to prepare, not to give, the decision, and who

fought in a thin line, taking every advantage of cover and marksmanship.

In the Consulate and early Empire, indeed, we commonly find, in the

closed troops destined for the attack, mixed line and column formations

combining in themselves shock and controlled close-order

fire--absolutely regardless of the skirmishers in front.

In sum, then, from 1792 to 1795 the fighting methods of the French

infantry, of which so much has been written and said, are, as they have

aptly been called, "horde-tactics." From 1796 onwards to the first

campaigns of the Empire, on the other hand, there is an ever-growing

tendency to combine skirmishers, properly so called, with controlled and

well-closed bodies in rear, the first to prepare the attack to the best

of their ability by individual courage and skill at arms, the second to

deliver it at the right moment (thanks to their retention of manoeuvre

formations), and with all possible energy (thanks to the cohesion, moral

and material, which carried forward even the laggards). Even when in the

long wars of the Empire the quality of the troops progressively

deteriorated, infantry tactics within the regiment or brigade underwent

no radical alteration. The actual formations were most varied, but they

always contained two of the three elements, column, line and

skirmishers. Column (generally two lines of battalions in columns of

double-companies) was for shock or attack, line for fire-effect, and

skirmishers to screen the advance, to scout the ground and to disturb

the enemy's aim. Of these, except on the defensive (which was rare in a

Napoleonic battle), the "column" of attack was by far the most

important. The line formations for fire, with which it was often

combined, rarely accounted for more than one-quarter of the brigade or

division, while the skirmishers were still less numerous. Withal, these

formations in themselves were merely fresh shapes for old ideas. The

armament of Napoleon's troops was almost identical with that of

Frederick's or Saxe's. Line, column and combinations of the two were as

old as Fontenoy and were, moreover, destined to live for many years

after Napoleon had fallen. "Horde-tactics" did not survive the earlier

Revolutionary campaigns. Wherein then lies the change which makes 1792

rather than 1740 the starting-point of modern tactics?

Napoleon's infantry and artillery tactics, 1807-1815.

The answer, in so far as so comprehensive a question can be answered

from a purely infantry standpoint, is that whereas Frederick, disposing

of a small and highly finished instrument, used its manoeuvre power and

regimental efficiency to destroy one part of his enemy so swiftly that

the other had no time to intervene, Napoleon, who had numbers rather

than training on his side, only delivered his decisive blow after he had

"fixed" all bodies of the enemy which would interfere with his

preparations--i.e. had set up a physical barrier against the threatened

intervention. This new idea manifested itself in various forms. In

strategy (q.v.) and combined tactics it is generally for convenience

called "economy of force." In the domain of artillery (see ARTILLERY) it

marked a distinction, that has revived in the last twenty years, between

slow disintegrating fire and sudden and overpowering "fire-preparation."

As regards infantry the effect of it was revolutionary. Regiments and

brigades were launched to the attack to compel the enemy to defend

himself, and fought until completely dissolved to force him to use up

his reserves. "On s'engage partout et puis l'on voit" is Napoleon's own

description of his _holding attack_, which in no way resembled the

"feints" of previous generations. The self-sacrifice of the men thus

engaged enabled their commander to "see," and to mass his reserves

opposite a selected point, while little by little the enemy was

hypnotized by the fighting. Lastly, when "the battle was ripe" a hundred

and more guns galloped into close range and practically annihilated a

part of the defender's line. They were followed up by masses of reserve

infantry, often more solidly formed at the outset than the old Swiss

masses of the 16th century.[11] If the moment was rightly chosen these

masses, dissolved though they soon were into dense formless crowds,

penetrated the gap made by the guns (with their arms at the slope) and

were quickly followed by cavalry divisions to complete the enemy's

defeat. Here, too, it is to be observed there is no true shock. The

infantry masses merely "present the cheque for payment," and apart from

surprises, ambushes and fights in woods and villages there are few

recorded cases of bayonets being crossed in these wars. Napoleon himself

said "Le feu est tout, le reste peu de chose," and though a mere plan of

his dispositions suggests that he was the disciple of Folard and Menil

Durand, in reality he simply applied "fire-power" in the new and grander

form which his own genius imagined.

The problem, then, was not what it had been one hundred and fifty years

before. The business of the attack was not to break down the passive

resistance of the defence, but to destroy or to evade its fire-power. No

attack with the bayonet could succeed if this remained effective and

unbroken, and no resistance (in the open field at least) availed when it

had been mastered or evaded. In Napoleon's army, the circumstance that

the infantry was (after 1807) incapable of carrying out its own

fire-preparation forced the task into the hands of the field artillery.

In other armies the 18th-century system had been discredited by repeated

disasters, and the infantry, as it became "nationalized," was passing

slowly through the successive phases of irregular lines, "swarms,"

skirmishers and line-and-column formations that the French Revolutionary

armies had traversed before them--none of them methods that in

themselves had given decisive results.

The British Peninsular infantry.

In all Europe the only infantry that represented the Frederician

tradition and prepared its own charge by its own fire was the British.

Eye-witnesses who served in the ranks of the French have described the

sensation of powerlessness that they felt as their attacking column

approached the line and watched it load and come to the present. The

column stopped short, a few men cheered, others opened a ragged

individual fire, and then came the volleys and the counter-attack that

swept away the column. Sometimes this counterstroke was made, as in the

famous case of Busaco, from an apparently unoccupied ridge, for the

British line, under Moore's guidance, had shaken off the Prussian

stiffness, fought 2 deep instead of 3 and was able to take advantage of

cover. The "blankness of the battlefield" noted by so many observers

to-day in the South African and Manchurian Wars was fully as

characteristic of Wellington's battles from Vimeiro to Waterloo, in

spite of close order and red uniforms. But these battles were of the

offensive-defensive type in the main, and for various reasons this type

could not be accepted as normal by the rest of Europe. Nonchalance was

not characteristic of the eager national levies of 1813 and 1814, and

the Wellington method of infantry tactics, though it had brought about

the failure of Napoleon's last effort, was still generally regarded as

an illustration of the already recognized fact that on the defensive the

fire-power of the line, unless partly or wholly evaded by rapidity in

the advance and manoeuvring power or mastered and extinguished by the

fire-power of the attack, made the front of the defence impregnable.

There was indeed nothing in the English tactics at Waterloo that,

standing out from the incidents of the battle, offered a new principle

of winning battles.

Infantry methods, 1815-1870.

Nor indeed did Europe at large desire a fresh era of warfare. Only the

French, and a few unofficial students of war elsewhere, realized the

significance of the rejuvenated "line." For every one else, the later

Napoleonic battle was the model, and as the great wars had ended before

the "national" spirit had been exhausted or misused in wars of

aggrandizement, infantry tactics retained, in Germany, Austria and

Russia, the characteristic Napoleonic formations, lines of battalion or

regimental columns, sometimes combined with linear formations for fire,

and always covered by skirmishers. That these columns must in action

dissolve sooner or later into dense irregular swarms was of course

foreseen, but Napoleon had accustomed the world to long and costly

fire-fighting as the preliminary to the attack of the massed reserves,

and for the short remainder of the period of smooth-bore muskets, troops

were always launched to the attack in columns covered by a thin line of

picked shots as skirmishers. The moral power of the offensive "will to

conquer" and the rapidity of the attack itself were relied upon to evade

and disconcert the fire-power of the defence. If the attack failed to do

so, the ranges at which infantry fire was really destructive were so

small that it was easy for the columns to deploy or disperse and open a

fire-fight to prepare the way for the next line of columns. And after a

careful study of the battle of the Alma, in which the British line won

its last great victory in the open field, Moltke himself only proposed

such modifications in the accepted tactical system as would admit of the

troops being deployed for _defence_ instead of meeting attack, as the

Russians met it, in solid and almost stationary columns. Fire in the

attack, in fact, had come to be considered as chiefly the work of

artillery, and as artillery, being an expensive arm, had been reduced

during the period of military stagnation following Waterloo, and was no

longer capable of Napoleonic feats, the attack was generally a bayonet

attack pure and simple. Waterloo and the Alma were credited, not to

fire-power, but to English solidity, and as Ardant du Picq observes,

"All the peoples of Europe say 'no one can resist our bayonet attack if

it is made resolutely'--and _all are right_.... Bayonet fixed or in the

scabbard, it is all the same." Since the disappearance of the "dark

impenetrable wood" of spears, the question has always turned on the word

"resolute." If the defence cannot by any means succeed in mastering the

resolution of the assailant, it is doomed. But the means (moral and

material) at the disposal of the defence for the purpose of mastering

this resolution were, within a few years of the Crimean War,

revolutionized by the general adoption of the rifle, the introduction of

the breech-loader and the revival of the "nation in arms."

Thirty years before the Crimea the flint-lock had given way to the

percussion lock (see GUN), which was more certain in its action and

could be used in all weathers. But fitting a copper cap on the nipple

was not so simple a matter for nervous fingers as priming with a pinch

of powder, and the usual rate of fire had fallen from the five rounds a

minute of Frederick's day to two or three at the most. "Fire-power"

therefore was at a low level until the general introduction[12] of the

rifled barrel, which while further diminishing the rate of fire, at any

rate greatly increased the range at which volleys were thoroughly

effective. Artillery (see ARTILLERY, § 13), the fire-weapon of the

attack, made no corresponding progress, and even as early as the Alma

and Inkerman (where the British troops used the Minie rifle) the dense

columns had suffered heavily without being able to retaliate by

"crossing bayonets." Fire power, therefore, though still the special

prerogative of the defence, began to reassert its influence, and for a

brief period the defensive was regarded as the best form of tactics. But

the low rate of fire was still a serious objection. Many incidents in

the American Civil War showed this, notably Fredericksburg, where the

key of the Confederate position was held--against a simple frontal

attack unsupported by effective artillery fire--by three brigades in

line one behind the other, i.e. by a _six-deep_ firing line. No less

force could guarantee the "inviolability of the front," and even when,

in this unnatural and uneconomical fashion, the rate of fire was

augmented as well as the effective range, a properly massed and well-led

attack in column (or in a rapid succession of deployed lines) generally

reached the defender's position, though often in such disorder that a

resolute counterstroke drove it back again. The American fought over

more difficult country and with less previous drill-training than the

armies of the Old World. The fire-power of the defence, therefore, that

even in America did not always prevail over the resolution of the

attack, entirely failed in the Italian war of 1859 to stop the swiftly

moving, well-drilled columns of the French professional army, in which

the national _élan_ had not as yet been suppressed, as it was a few

years later, by the doctrine that "the new arms found their greatest

scope in the defence." The Austrians, who had pinned their faith to this

doctrine, deserted their false gods, forbade any mention of the

defensive in their drill-books, and brought back into honour the bayonet

tactics of the old wars.

The need of artillery support for the attack was indeed felt (though the

gunners had not as yet evolved any substitute for the case-shot

preparation of Napoleon's time), but men remembered that artillery was

used by the great captain, not so much to enable good troops to close

with the enemy, as to win battles with masses of troops of an inferior

stamp, and contemporary experience seemed to show that (if losses were

accepted as inevitable) good and resolute troops could overpower the

defence, even in face of the rifle and without the aid of case shot. But

a revolution was at hand.

The breech-loading rifle.

In 1861 Moltke, discussing the war in Italy, wrote, "General Niel

attributes his victory (at Solferino) to the bayonet. But that does not

imply that the attack was often followed by a hand-to-hand fight. In

principle, when one makes a bayonet charge, it is because one supposes

that the enemy will not await it.... _To approach the enemy closely,

pouring an efficacious fire into him_--as Frederick the Great's infantry

did--_is also a method of the offensive_." This method was applicable at

that time for the Prussians alone, for they alone possessed a

breech-loading firearm. The needle-gun was a rudimentary weapon in many

respects, but it allowed of maintaining more than twice the rate of fire

that the muzzle-loader could give, and, moreover, it permitted the full

use of cover, because the firer could lie down to fire without having to

rise between every round to load. Further, he could load while actually

running forward, whereas with the old arms loading not only required

complete exposure but also checked movement. The advantages of the

Prussian weapon were further enhanced, in the war against Austria, by

the revulsion of feeling in the Imperial army in favour of the pure

bayonet charge in masses that had followed upon Magenta and Solferino.

With the stiffly drilled professional soldier of England, Austria and

Russia the handiness of the new weapon could hardly have been exploited,

for (in Russia at any rate) even skirmishers had to march in step. The

Prussians were drilled nominally in accordance with regulations dating

from 1812, and therefore suitable, if not to the new weapon, at least to

the "swarm" fighting of an enthusiastic national army, but upon these

regulations a mass of peace-time amendments had been superposed, and in

theory their drill was as stiff as that of the Russians. But, as in

France in 1793-1796, the composition of their army--a true "nation in

arms"--and the character of the officers evolved by the universal

service system saved them from their regulations. The offensive spirit

was inculcated as thoroughly as elsewhere, and in a much more practical

form. Dietrich von Bülow's predictions of the future battle of

"skirmishers" (meaning thereby a dense but irregular firing line) had

captivated the younger school of officers, while King William and the

veterans of Napoleon's wars were careful to maintain small columns

(sometimes company[13] columns of 240 rifles, but quite as often

half-battalion and battalion columns) as a solid background to the

firing line. Thus in 1866 (see SEVEN WEEKS' WAR), as Moltke had

foreseen, the attacking infantry fought its way to close quarters by

means of its own fire, and the bayonet charge again became, in his own

words, "not the first, but the last, phase of the combat," immediately

succeeding a last burst of rapid fire at short range and carried out by

the company and battalion reserves in close order. Against the

Austrians, whose tactics alternated between unprepared bayonet rushes by

whole brigades and a passive slow-firing defensive, victory was easily

achieved.

Infantry in the war of 1870.

But immediately after Königgrätz the French army was served out with a

breech-loading rifle greatly superior in every respect to the

needle-gun, and after four years' tension France pitted breech-loader

against breech-loader. In the first battles (see WÖRTH, and METZ:

_Battles_) the decision-seeking spirit of the "armed nation," the

inferior range of the needle-gun as compared with that of the chassepot,

and the recollections of easy triumphs in 1864 and 1866, all combined to

drive the German infantry forward to within easy range before they began

to make use of their weapons. Their powerful artillery would have

sufficed of itself to enable them to do this (see SEDAN), had they but

waited for its fire to take effect. But they did not, and they suffered

accordingly, for, owing to the ineffectiveness of their rifle between

1000 and 400 yds. range, they had to advance, as the Austrians and

Russians had done in previous wars, without firing a shot. In these

circumstances their formations, whether line or column, broke up, and

the whole attacking force dissolved into long irregular swarms. These

swarms were practically composed only of the brave men, while the rest

huddled together in woods and valleys. When, therefore, at last the

firing line came within 400 or 500 yds. of the French, it was both

severely tried and numerically weak, but the fact that it was composed

of the best men only enabled it to open and to maintain an effective

fire. Even then the French, highly disciplined professional soldiers

that they were, repeatedly swept them back by counterstrokes, but these

counterstrokes were subjected to the fire of the German guns and were

never more than locally and momentarily effective. More and more German

infantry was pushed forward to support the firing line, and, like its

predecessors, each reinforcement, losing most of its unwilling men as it

advanced over the shot-swept ground, consisted on arrival of really

determined men, and closing on the firing line pushed it forward,

sometimes 20 yds., sometimes 100, until at last rapid fire at the

closest ranges dislodged the stubborn defenders. Bayonets (as usual)

were never actually used, save in sudden encounters in woods and

villages. The decisive factors were, first the superiority of the

Prussian guns, secondly, heavy and effective fire delivered at short

range, and above all the high moral of a proportion of resolute soldiers

who, after being subjected for hours to the most demoralizing

influences, had still courage left for the final dash. These three

factors, in spite of changes in armament, rule the infantry attack of

to-day.

INFANTRY TACTICS SINCE 1870

The net result of the Franco-German War on infantry tactics, as far as

it can be summed up in a single phrase, was to transfer the fire-fight

to the line of skirmishers. Henceforward the old and correct sense of

the word "skirmishers" is lost. They have nothing to do with a

"skirmish," but are the actual organ of battle, and their old duties of

feeling the way for the battle-formations have been taken over by

"scouts." The last-named were not, however, fully recognized in Great

Britain[14] till long after the war--not in fact until the war in South

Africa had shown that the "skirmisher" or firing line was too powerful

an engine to be employed in mere "feeling." In most European armies

"combat patrols," which work more freely, are preferred to scouts, but

the idea is the same.

Lessons of 1870.

The fire-fight on the line of skirmishers, now styled the _firing line_,

is the centre of gravity of the modern battle. In 1870, owing to the

peculiar circumstances of unequal armament, the "fire-fight" was

insufficiently developed and uneconomically used, and after the war

tacticians turned their attention to the evolution of better methods

than those of Wörth and Gravelotte, Europe in general following the lead

of Prussia. Controversy, in the early stages, took the form of a contest

between "drill" and "individualism," irrespective of formations and

technical details, for until about 1890 the material efficiency of the

gun and the rifle remained very much what it had been in 1870, and the

only new factor bearing on infantry tactics was the general adoption of

a "national army" system similar to Prussia's and of rifles equal, and

in some ways superior, to the chassepot. All European armies, therefore,

had to consider equality in artillery power, equality in the ballistics

of rifles, and equal intensity of fighting spirit as the normal

conditions of the next battle of nations. Here, in fact, was an

equilibrium, and in such conditions how was the attacking infantry to

force its way forward, whether by fire or movement or by both? France

sought the answer in the domain of artillery. Under the guidance of

General Langlois, she re-created the Napoleonic hurricane of case-shot

(represented in modern conditions by time shrapnel), while from the

doctrine formed by Generals Maillard and Bonnal there came a system of

infantry tactics derived fundamentally from the tactics of the

Napoleonic era. This, however, came later; for the moment (viz. from

1871 to about 1890) the lead in infantry training was admittedly in the

hands of the Prussians.

German officers who had fought through the war had seen the operations,

generally speaking, either from the staff officer's or from the

regimental officer's point of view. To the former and to many of the

latter the most indelible impression of the battlefield was what they

called _Massen-Drückebergertum_ or "wholesale skulking." The rest, who

had perhaps in most cases led the brave remnant of their companies in

the final assaults, believed that battles were won by the individual

soldier and his rifle. The difference between the two may be said to lie

in this, that the first sought a remedy, the second a method. The remedy

was _drill_, the method _extended order_.

The extreme statement of the case in favour of drill pure and simple is

to be found in the famous anonymous pamphlet _A Summer Night's Dream_,

in which a return to the "old Prussian fire-discipline" of Frederick's

day was offered as the solution of the problem, how to give "fire" its

maximum efficacity. Volleys and absolutely mechanical obedience to word

of command represent, of course, the most complete application of

fire-power that can be conceived. But the proposals of the extreme

close-order school were nevertheless merely pious aspirations, not so

much because of the introduction of the breech-loader as because the

short-service "national" army can never be "drilled" in the Frederician

sense. The proposals of the other school were, however, even more

impracticable, in that they rested on the hypothesis that all men were

brave, and that, consequently, all that was necessary was to teach the

recruit how to shoot and to work with other individuals in the squad or

company. Disorder of the firing line was accepted, not as an unavoidable

evil, but as a condition in which individuality had full play, and as

dense swarm formations were quite as vulnerable as an ordinary line, it

was an easy step from a thick line of "individuals" to a thin one. The

step was, in fact, made in the middle of the war of 1870, though it was

hardly noticed that extension only became practicable in proportion as

the quality of the enemy decreased and the Germans became acclimatized

to fire.

Between these extremes, a moderate school, with the emperor William (who

had more experience of the human being in battle than any of his

officers) at its head, spent a few years in groping for close-order

formations which admitted of control without vulnerability, then laid

down the principle and studied the method of developing the greatest

fire-power of which short-service infantry was supposed capable,

ultimately combined the "drill" and teaching ideas in the German

infantry regulations of 1888, which at last abolished those of 1812 with

their multitudinous amendments.

Conditions of the modern battle.

The necessity for "teaching" arose partly out of the new conditions of

service and the relative rarity of wars. The soldier could no longer

learn the ordinary rules of safety in action and comfort in bivouac by

experience, and had to be taught. But it was still more the new

conditions of fighting that demanded careful individual training. Of

old, the professional soldier (other than the man belonging to light

troops or the ground scout) was, roughly speaking, either so far out of

immediate danger as to preserve his reasoning faculties, or so deep in

battle that he became the unconscious agent of his inborn or acquired

instincts. But the increased range of modern arms prolonged the time of

danger, and although (judged by casualty returns) the losses to-day are

far less than those which any regiment of Frederick's day was expected

to face without flinching, and actual fighting is apparently spasmodic,

the period in which the individual soldier is subjected to the fear of

bullets is greatly increased. Zorndorf, the most severe of Frederick's

battles, lasted seven hours, Vionville twelve and Wörth eleven. The

battle of the future in Europe, without being as prolonged as Liao-Yang,

Shaho and Mukden, will still be undecided twenty-four hours after the

advanced guards have taken contact. Now, for a great part of this time,

the "old Prussian fire-discipline," which above all aims at a rapid

decision, will be not only unnecessary, but actually hurtful to the

progress of the battle as a whole. As in Napoleon's day (for reasons

presently to be mentioned) the battle must resolve itself into a

preparative and a decisive phase.[15] In the last no commander could

desire a better instrument (if such were attainable with the armies of

to-day) than Frederick's forged steel machine, in which every company

was human mitrailleuse. But the preparatory combat not only will be

long, but also must be graduated in intensity at different times and

places in accordance with the commander's will, and the Frederician

battalion only attained its mechanical perfection by the absolute and

permanent submergence of the individual qualities of each soldier, with

the result that, although it furnished the maximum effort in the minimum

time, it was useless once it fell apart into ragged groups. The

individual spirit of earnestness and intelligence in the use of ground

by small fractions, which in Napoleon's day made the _combat d'usure_

possible, was necessarily unknown in Frederick's. On the other hand,

graduation implies control on the part of the leaders, and this the

method of irregular swarms of individual fighters imagined by the German

progressives merely abdicates. At most such swarms--however close or

extended--can only be tolerated as an evil that no human power can avert

when the battle has reached a certain stage of intensity. Even the

latest _German Infantry Training_ (1906) is explicit on this point. "It

must never be forgotten that the obligation of abandoning close order is

an evil which can often be avoided when" &c. &c. (par. 342). The

consequences of this evil, further, are actually less serious in

proportion as the troops are well drilled--not to an unnecessary and

unattainable ideal of mechanical perfection, but to a state of

instinctive self-control in danger. Drill, therefore, carried to such a

point that it has eliminated the bad habits of the recruit without

detriment to his good habits, is still the true basis of all military

training, whether training be required for the swift controlled

movements of bodies of infantry in close order, for the cool and steady

fire of scattered groups of skirmishers, or for the final act of the

resolute will embodied in the "decisive attack." Unfortunately for the

solution of infantry problems "drill" and "close order" are often

confused, owing chiefly to the fact that in the 1870 battles the

dissolution of close order formations practically meant the end of

control as control was then understood. Both the material and objective,

and the inward and spiritual significances of "drill" are, however,

independent of "close order." In fact, in modern history, when a

resolute general has made a true decisive attack with half-drilled

troops, he has generally arrayed them in the closest possible

formations.

Drill.

Drill is the military form of education by repetition and association

(see G. le Bon, _Psychologie de l'éducation_). Materially it consists

in exercises frequently repeated by bodies of soldiers with a view to

ensuring the harmonious action of each individual in the work to be

performed by the mass--in a word, rehearsals. Physical "drill" is

based on physiology and gymnastics, and aims at the development of the

physique and the individual will power.[16] But the psychological or

moral is incomparably the most important side of drill. It is the

method or art of discipline. Neither self-control nor devotion in the

face of imminent danger can as a rule come from individual reasoning.

A commander-in-chief keeps himself free from the contact with the

turmoil of battle so long as he has to calculate, to study reports or

to manoeuvre, and commanders of lower grades, in proportion as their

duty brings them into the midst of danger, are subjected to greater or

less disturbing influences. The man in the fighting line where the

danger is greatest is altogether the slave of the unconscious.

Overtaxed infantry, whether defeated or successful, have been observed

to present an appearance of absolute insanity. It is true that in the

special case of great war experience reason resumes part of its

dominion in proportion as the fight becomes the soldier's habitual

_milieu_. Thus towards the end of a long war men become skilful and

cunning individual fighters; sometimes, too, feelings of respect for

the enemy arise and lead to interchange of courtesies at the outposts,

and it has also been noticed that in the last stage of a long war men

are less inclined to sacrifice themselves. All this is "reason" as

against inborn or inbred "instinct." But in the modern world, which is

normally at peace, some method must be found of ensuring that the

peace-trained soldier will carry out his duties when his reason is

submerged. Now we know that the constant repetition of a certain act,

whether on a given impulse or of the individual's own volition, will

eventually make the performance of that act a reflex action. For this

reason peace-drilled troops have often defeated a war-trained enemy,

even when the motives for fighting were equally powerful on each side.

The mechanical performance of movements, and loading and firing at the

enemy, under the most disturbing conditions can be ensured by bringing

the required self-control from the domain of reason into that of

instinct. "_L'éducation_," says le Bon, "_est l'art de faire passer le

conscient dans l'inconscient_." Lastly, the instincts of the recruit

being those special to his race or nation, which are the more powerful

because they are operative through many generations, it is the drill

sergeant's business to bring about, by disuse, atrophy of the

instincts which militate against soldierly efficiency, and to develop,

by constant repetition and special preparation, other useful instincts

which the Englishman or Frenchman or German does not as such possess.

In short, as regards infantry training, there is no real distinction

between drill and education, save in so far as the latter term covers

instruction in small details of field service which demand alertness,

shrewdness and technical knowledge (as distinct from technical

training). As understood by the controversialists of the last

generation, drill was the antithesis of education. To-day, however,

the principle of education having prevailed against the old-fashioned

notion of drill, it has been discovered that after all drill is merely

an intensive form of education. This discovery (or rather definition

and justification of an existing empirical rule) is attributable

chiefly to a certain school of French officers, who seized more

rapidly than civilians the significance of modern psycho-physiology.

In their eyes, a military body possesses in a more marked degree than

another, the primary requisite of the "psychological crowd," studied

by Gustave le Bon, viz. the orientation of the wills of each and all

members of the crowd in a determined direction. Such a crowd generates

a collective will that dominates the wills of the individuals

composing it. It coheres and acts on the common property of all the

instincts and habits in which each shares. Further it tends to

extremes of baseness and heroism--this being particularly marked in

the military crowd--and lastly it reacts to a stimulus. The last is

the keynote of the whole subject of infantry training as also, to a

lesser degree, of that of the other arms. The officer can be regarded

practically as a hypnotist playing upon the unconscious activities of

his subject. In the lower grades, it is immaterial whether reason,

caprice or a fresh set of instincts stimulated by an outside

authority, set in motion the "suggestion." The true leader, whatever

the provenance of his "suggestion," makes it effective by dominating

the "psychological crowd" that he leads. On the other hand, if he

fails to do so, he is himself dominated by the uncontrolled will of

the crowd, and although leaderless mobs have at times shown extreme

heroism, it is far more usual to find them reverting to the primitive

instinct of brutality or panic fear. A mob, therefore, or a raw

regiment, requires greater powers of suggestion in its leader, whereas

a thorough course of drill tunes the "crowd" to respond to the

stimulus that average officers can apply.

So far from diminishing, drill has increased in importance under modern

conditions of recruiting. It has merely changed in form, and instead of

being repressive it has become educative. The force of modern

short-service troops, as _troops_, is far sooner spent than that of the

old-fashioned automatic regiments, while the reserve force of its

component parts, remaining after the dissolution, is far higher than of

old. But this uncontrolled, force is liable to panic as well as amenable

to an impulse of self-sacrifice. In so far, then, it is necessary to

adopt the catchword of the Bülow school and to "organize disorder," and

the only known method of doing so is drill. "Individualism" pure and

simple had certainly a brief reign during and after the South African

War, especially in Great Britain, and both France and Germany coquetted

with "Boer tactics," until the Russo-Japanese war brought military

Europe back to the old principles.

The South African War.

Formulation of the British "Doctrine."

But the South African War came precisely at the point of time when the

controversies of 1870 had crystallized into a form of tactics that was

not suitable to the conditions of that war, while about the same time

the relations of infantry and artillery underwent a profound change. As

regards the South African War, the clear atmosphere, the trained sight

of the Boers, and the alternation of level plain and high concave kopjes

which constituted the usual battlefield, made the front to front

infantry attacks not merely difficult but almost impossible. For years,

indeed ever since the Peninsular War, the tendency of the British army

to deploy early had afforded a handle to European critics of its

tactical methods. It was a tendency that survived with the rest of the

"linear" tradition. But in South Africa, owing to the special advantages

of the defenders, which denied to the assailant all reliable indications

of the enemy's strength and positions, this early deployment had to take

a non-committal form--viz. many successive lines of skirmishers. The

application of this form was, indeed, made easy by the openness of the

ground, but like all "schematic" formations, open or close, it could not

be maintained under fire, with the special disadvantage that the

extensions were so wide as to make any manoeuvring after the fight had

cleared up a situation a practical impossibility. Hence some

_preconceived idea_ of an objective was an essential preliminary, and as

the Boer mounted infantry hardly ever stood to defend any particular

position to the last (as they could always renew the fight at some other

point in their vast territory), the preconceived idea was always, after

the early battles, an envelopment in which the troops told off to the

frontal holding attack were required, not to force their advance to its

logical conclusion, but to keep the fight alive until the flank attack

made itself felt. The principal tendency of British infantry tactics

after the Boer War was therefore quite naturally, under European as well

as colonial conditions, to deploy at the outset in great depth, i.e. in

many lines of skirmishers, each line, when within about 1400 yds. of the

enemy's position, extending to intervals of 10 to 20 paces between

individuals. The reserves were strong and their importance was well

marked in the 1902 training manual, but their functions were rather to

extend or feed the firing line, to serve as a rallying point in case of

defeat and to take up the pursuit (par. 220, _Infantry Training_, 1902),

than to form the engine of a decisive attack framed by the

commander-in-chief after "engaging everywhere and then seeing" as

Napoleon did. The 1905 regulations adhered to this theory of the attack

in the main, only modifying a number of tactical prescriptions which had

not proved satisfactory after their transplantation from South Africa to

Europe, but after the Russo-Japanese War a series of important

amendments was issued which gave greater force and still greater

elasticity to the attack procedure, and in 1909 the tactical "doctrine"

of the British army was definitively formulated in _Field Service

Regulations_, paragraph 102, of which after enumerating the advantages

and disadvantages of the "preconceived idea" system, laid it down, as

the normal procedure of the British Army, that the general should

"obtain the decision by _manoeuvre on the battlefield_ with a large

general reserve maintained in his own hand" and "_strike with his

reserve at the right place and time_."

The rehabilitation of the Napoleonic attack idea thus frankly accepted

in Great Britain had taken place in France several years before the

South African War, and neither this war nor that in Manchuria

effectively shook the faith of the French army in the principle, while

on the other hand Germany remains faithful to the "preconceived idea,"

both in strategy and tactics.[17] This essential difference in the two

rival "doctrines" is intimately connected with the revival of the

Napoleonic artillery attack, in the form of concentrated time shrapnel.

The Napoleonic artillery preparation, it will be remembered, was a

fire of overwhelming intensity delivered against the selected point of

the enemy's position, at the moment of the massed and decisive assault

of the reserves. In Napoleon's time the artillery went in to within

300 or 400 yds. range for this act, i.e. in front of the infantry,

whereas now the guns fire over the heads of the infantry and

concentrate shells instead of guns on the vital point. The principle

is, however, the same. A model infantry attack in the Napoleonic

manner was that of Okasaki's brigade on the Terayama hill at the

battle of Shaho, described by Sir Ian Hamilton in his _Staff Officer's

Scrap-Book_. The Japanese, methodical and cautious as they were, only

sanctioned a pure open force assault as a last resort. Then the

brigadier Okasaki, a peculiarly resolute leader, arrayed his brigade

in a "schematic" attack formation of four lines, the first two in

single rank, the third in line and the fourth in company columns.

Covered by a powerful converging shrapnel fire, the brigade covered

the first 900 yds. of open plain without firing a shot. Then, however,

it disappeared from sight amongst the houses of a village, and the

spectators watched the thousands of flashes fringing the further edge

that indicated a fire-fight at decisive range (the Terayama was about

600 yds. beyond the houses). Forty minutes passed, and the army

commander Kuroki said, "He cannot go forward. We are in check to-day

all along the line." But at that moment Okasaki's men, no longer in a

"schematic" formation but in many irregularly disposed groups--some of

a dozen men and some of seventy, some widely extended and some

practically in close order--rushed forward at full speed over 600 yds.

of open ground, and stormed the Terayama with the bayonet.

The decisive attack.

Such an attack as that at the battle of Shaho is rare, but so it has

always been with masterpieces of the art of war. We have only to

multiply the front of attack by two and the forces engaged by five--and

to find the resolute general to lead them--to obtain the ideal decisive

attack of a future European war. Instead of the bare open plain over

which the advance to decisive range was made, a European general would

in most cases dispose of an area of spinneys, farm-houses and undulating

fields. The schematic approach-march would be replaced in France and

England by a forward movement of bodies in close order, handy enough to

utilize the smallest covered ways. Then the fire of both infantry and

artillery would be augmented to its maximum intensity, overpowering that

of the defence, and the whole of the troops opposite the point to be

stormed would be thrown forward for the bayonet charge. The formation

for this scarcely matters. What is important is speed and the will to

conquer, and for this purpose small bodies (sections, half-companies or

companies), not in the close order of the drill book but grouped closely

about the leader who inspires and controls them, are as potent an

instrument as a Frederician line or a Napoleonic column.

Controversy, in fact, does not turn altogether on the method of the

assault, or even on the method of obtaining the fire-superiority of guns

and rifles that justifies it. Although one nation may rely on its guns

more than on the rifles, or vice versa, all are agreed that at decisive

range the firing line should contain as many men as can use their rifles

effectually. Perhaps the most disputed point is the form of the

"approach-march," viz. the dispositions and movements of the attacking

infantry between about 1400 and about 600 yds. from the position of the

enemy.

The approach-march.

The condition of the assailant's infantry when it reaches decisive

ranges is largely governed by the efforts it has expended and the losses

it has suffered in its progress. Sometimes even after a firing line of

some strength has been established at decisive range, it may prove too

difficult or too costly for the supports (sent up from the rear to

replace casualties and to augment fire-power) to make their way to the

front. Often, again, it may be within the commander's intentions that

his troops at some particular point in the line should not be committed

to decisive action before a given time--perhaps not at all. It is

obvious then that no "normal" attack procedure which can be laid down in

a drill book (though from time to time the attempt has been made, as in

the French regulations of 1875) can meet all cases. But here again,

though all armies formally and explicitly condemn the normal attack,

each has its own well-marked tendencies.

Current views on the infantry attack.

The German regulations of 1906 define the offensive as "transporting

fire towards the enemy, if necessary to his immediate proximity"; the

bayonet attack "confirms" the victory. Every attack begins with

deployment into extended order, and the leading line advances as close

to the enemy as possible before opening fire. In ground offering cover,

the firing line has practically its maximum density at the outset. In

open ground, however, half-sections, groups and individuals, widely

spaced out, advance stealthily one after the other till all are _in

position_. It is on this position, called the "first fire position" and

usually about 1000 yds. from the enemy, that the full force of the

attack is deployed, and from this position, as simultaneously as

possible, it opens the fight for fire-superiority. Then, each unit

covering the advance of its neighbours, the whole line fights its way by

open force to within charging distance. If at any point a decision is

not desired, it is deliberately made impossible by employing there such

small forces as possess no offensive power. Where the attack is intended

to be pushed home, the infantry units employed act as far as possible

simultaneously, resolutely and in great force (see the German _Infantry

Regulations_, 1906, §§ 324 et seq.).

While in Germany movement "transports the fire," in France fire is

regarded as the way to make movement possible. It is considered (see

Grandmaison, _Dressage de l'infanterie_) that a premature and excessive

deployment enervates the attack, that the ground (i.e. covered ways of

approach for small columns, not for troops showing a fire front) should

be used as long as possible to march "en troupe" and that a firing line

should only be formed when it is impossible to progress without acting

upon the enemy's means of resistance. Thereafter each unit, in such

order as its chief can keep, should fight its way forward, and help

others to do so--like Okasaki's brigade in the last stage of its

attack--utilizing bursts of fire or patches of wood or depressions in

the ground, as each is profitable or available to assist the advance.

"From the moment when a fighting unit is 'uncoupled,' its action must be

ruled by two conditions, and by those only: the one material, an object

to be reached; the other moral, the will to reach the object."

The British _Field Service Regulations_ of 1909 are in spirit more

closely allied to the French than to the German. "The climax of the

infantry attack is the assault, which is made possible by superiority of

fire" is the principle (emphasized in the book itself by the use of

conspicuous type), and a "gradual _building up of the firing line within

close range_ of the position," coupled with the closest artillery

support, and the final blow of the reserves delivered "unexpectedly and

in the greatest possible strength" are indicated as the means.[18]

Defence.

The _defence_, as it used to be understood, needs no description. To-day

in all armies the defence is looked upon not as a means of winning a

battle, but as a means of temporizing and avoiding the decision until

the commander of the defending party is enabled, by the general military

situation or by the course and results of the defensive battle itself,

to take the offensive. In the British _Field Service Regulations_ it is

laid down that when an army acts on the defensive no less than half of

it should if possible be earmarked, suitably posted and placed under a

single commander, for the purpose of delivering a decisive

counter-attack. The object of the purely defensive portion, too, is not

merely to hold the enemy's firing line in check, but to drive it back so

that the enemy may be forced to use up his local reserve resources to

keep the fight alive. A firing line covered and steadied by

entrenchments, and restless local reserves ever on the look-out for

opportunities of partial counterstrokes, are the instruments of this

policy.

Entrenchments.

A word must be added on the use of entrenchments by infantry, a

subject the technical aspect of which is fully dealt with and

illustrated in FORTIFICATION AND SIEGECRAFT: _Field Defences_.

Entrenchments of greater or less strength by themselves have always

been used by infantry on the defensive, especially in the wars of

position of the 17th and 18th centuries. In the Napoleonic and modern

"wars of movement," they are regarded, not as a passive defence--they

have long ceased to present a physical barrier to assault--but as fire

positions so prepared as to be defensible by relatively few men. Their

purpose is, by economizing force elsewhere, to give the maximum

strength to the troops told off for the counter-offensive. In the

later stages of the American Civil War, and also in the Russo-Japanese

War of 1904-1905--each in its way an example of a "war of

positions"--the assailant has also made use of the methods of

fortification to secure every successive step of progress in the

attack. The usefulness and limitations of this procedure are defined

in generally similar terms in the most recent training manuals of

nearly every European army. Section 136, § 7 of the British _Infantry

Training_ (1905, amended 1907) says: "During the process of

establishing a superiority of fire, successive fire positions will be

occupied by the firing line. As a rule those affording natural cover

will be chosen, but if none exist and the intensity of the hostile

fire preclude any immediate further advance, it may be expedient for

the firing line to create some. This hastily constructed protection

will enable the attack to cope with the defender's fire and thus

prepare the way for a farther advance. The construction of cover

during an attack, however, will entail delay and a temporary loss of

fire effect _and should therefore be resorted to only when absolutely

necessary..._. As soon as possible the advance should be resumed, &c."

The German regulations are as follows (_Infantry Training_, 1906, §

313): "In the offensive the entrenching tool may be used where it is

desired, for the moment, to content one's self with maintaining the

ground gained.... The entrenching tool is only to be used with the

greatest circumspection, because of the great difficulty of getting an

extended line to go forward under fire when it has expended much

effort in digging cover for itself. The construction of trenches must

never paralyze the desire for the irresistible advance, _and above all

must not kill the spirit of the offensive_."

ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT

The organization of infantry varies rather more than that of other

arms in different countries. Taking the British system first, the

battalion (and not as elsewhere the regiment of two, three or more

battalions) is the administrative and manoeuvre unit. It is about 1000

strong, and is commanded by a lieutenant-colonel, who has a major and

an adjutant (captain or lieutenant) to assist him, and an officer of

lieutenant's or captain's rank (almost invariably promoted from the

ranks), styled the quartermaster, to deal with supplies, clothing, &c.

There are eight companies of a nominal strength of about 120 each.

These are commanded by captains (or by junior majors), and each

captain has or should have two lieutenants or second lieutenants to

assist him. Machine guns are in Great Britain distributed to the

battalions and not massed in permanent batteries. In addition there

are various regimental details, such as orderly-room staff, cooks,

cyclists, signallers, band and ambulance men. The company is divided

into four sections of thirty men each and commanded by sergeants. A

half-company of two sections is under the control of a subaltern

officer. A minor subdivision of the section into two "squads" is made

unless the numbers are insufficient to warrant it. In administrative

duties the captain's principal assistant is the colour-sergeant or

pay-sergeant, who is not assigned to a section command. The

lieutenant-colonel, the senior major and the adjutant are mounted. The

commanding officer is assisted by a battalion staff, at the head of

which is the adjutant. The sergeant-major holds a "warrant" from the

secretary of state for war, as does the bandmaster. Other members of

the battalion staff are non-commissioned officers, appointed by the

commanding officer. The most important of these is the

quartermaster-sergeant, who is the assistant of the quartermaster. The

two colours ("king's" and "regimental") are in Great Britain carried

by subalterns and escorted by colour-sergeants (see COLOURS).

The "tactical" unit of infantry is now the _company_, which varies

very greatly in strength in the different armies. Elsewhere the

company of 250 rifles is almost universal, but in Great Britain the

company has about 110 men in the ranks, forming four sections. These

sections, each of about 28 rifles, are the normal "fire-units," that

is to say, the unit which delivers its fire at the orders of and with

the elevation and direction given by its commander. This, it will be

observed, gives little actual executive work for the junior officers.

But a more serious objection than this (which is modified in practice

by arrangement and circumstances) is the fact that a small unit is

more affected by detachments than a large one. In the home battalions

of the Regular Army such detachments are very large, what with finding

drafts for the foreign service battalions and for instructional

courses, while in the Territorial Force, where it is so rarely

possible to assemble all the men at once, the company as organized is

often too small to drill as such. On the other hand, the full

war-strength company is an admirable unit for control and manoeuvre in

the field, owing to its rapidity of movement, handiness in using

accidents of ground and cover, and susceptibility to the word of

command of one man. But as soon as its strength falls below about 80

the advantages cease to counterbalance the defects. The sections

become too small as fire-units to effect really useful results, and

the battalion commander has to coordinate and to direct 8

comparatively ineffective units instead of 4 powerful ones. The

British regular army, therefore, has since the South African War,

adopted the _double company_ as the unit of training. This gives at

all times a substantial unit for fire and manoeuvre training, but the

disadvantage of having a good many officers only half employed is

accentuated. As to the tactical value of the large or double company,

opinions differ. Some hold that as the small company is a survival

from the days when the battalion was the tactical unit and the company

was the unit of volley-fire, it is unsuited to the modern exigencies

that have broken up the old rigid line into several independent and

co-operating fractions. Others reply that the strong continental

company of 250 rifles came into existence in Prussia in the years

after Waterloo, not from tactical reasons, but because the state was

too poor to maintain a large establishment of officers, and that in

1870, at any rate, there were many instances of its tactical

unwieldiness. The point that is common to both organizations is the

fact that there is theoretically one subaltern to every 50 or 60

rifles, and this reveals an essential difference between the British

and the Continental systems, irrespective of the sizes or groupings of

companies. The French or German subaltern effectively commands his 50

men as a unit, whereas the British subaltern supervises two groups of

25 to 30 men under responsible non-commissioned officers. That is to

say, a British sergeant may find himself in such a position that he

has to be as expert in controlling and obtaining good results from

collective fire as a German lieutenant. For reasons mentioned in ARMY,

§ 40, non-commissioned officers, of the type called by Kipling the

"backbone of the army," are almost unobtainable with the universal

service system, and the lowest unit that possesses any independence is

the lowest unit commanded by an officer. But apart from the rank of

the fire-unit commander, it is questionable whether the section, as

understood in England, is not too small a fire-unit, for European

warfare at any rate. The regulations of the various European armies,

framed for these conditions, practically agree that the fire-unit

should be commanded by an officer and should be large enough to ensure

good results from collective fire. The number of rifles meeting this

second condition is 50 to 80 and their organization a "section"

(corresponding to the British half-company) under a subaltern officer.

The British army has, of course, to be organized and trained for an

infinitely wider range of activity, and no one would suggest the

abolition of the small section as a fire-unit. But in a great European

battle it would be almost certainly better to group the two sections

into a real unit for fire effect. (For questions of infantry fire

tactics see RIFLE: § _Musketry_.)

On the continent of Europe the "regiment," which is a unit, acting in

peace and war as such, consists normally of three battalions, and each

battalion of four companies or 1000 rifles. The company of 250 rifles

is commanded by a captain, who is mounted. In France the company has

four sections, commanded in war by the three subalterns and the

"adjudant" (company sergeant-major); the sections are further grouped

in pairs to constitute _pelotons_ (platoons) or half-companies under

the senior of the two section leaders. In peace there are two

subalterns only, and the _peloton_ is the normal junior officer's

command. The battalion is commanded by a major (_commandant_ or

strictly _chef de bataillon_), the regiment (three or four battalions)

by a colonel with a lieutenant-colonel as second. An organization of

3-battalion regiments and 3-company battalions was proposed in 1910.

In Germany, where what we have called the continental company

originated, the regiment is of three battalions under majors, and the

battalion of four companies commanded by captains. The company is

divided into three _Züge_ (sections), each under a subaltern, who has

as his second a sergeant-major, a "vice-sergeant-major" or a

"sword-knot ensign" (aspirant officer). In war there is one additional

officer for company. The _Zug_ at war-strength has therefore about 80

rifles in the ranks, as compared with the French "section" of 50, and

the British section of 30.

The system prevailing in the United States since the reorganization of

1901 is somewhat remarkable. The regiment, which is a tactical as well

as an administrative unit, consists of three battalions. Each

battalion has four companies of (at war-strength) 3 officers and 150

rifles each. The regiment in war therefore consists of about 1800

rifles in three small and handy battalions of 600 each. The

circumstances in which this army serves, and in particular the

maintenance of small frontier posts, have always imposed upon

subalterns the responsibilities of small independent commands, and it

is fair to assume that the 75 rifles at a subaltern's disposal are

regarded as a tactical unit.

In sum, then, the infantry battalion is in almost every country about

1000 rifles strong in four companies. In the United States it is 600

strong in four companies, and in Great Britain it is 1000 strong in

eight. The captain's command is usually 200 to 250 men, in the United

States 150, and in Great Britain 120. The lieutenant or second

lieutenant commands in Germany 80 rifles, in France 50, in the United

States 75, as a unit of fire and manoeuvre. In Great Britain he

commands, with relatively restricted powers, 60.

A short account of the infantry equipments--knapsack or valise, belt,

haversack, &c.--in use in various countries will be found in UNIFORMS,

NAVAL AND MILITARY. The armament of infantry is, in all countries, the

magazine rifle (see RIFLE) and bayonet (q.v.), for officers and for

certain under-officers sword (q.v.) and pistol (q.v.). Ammunition

(q.v.) in the British service is carried (a) by the individual

soldier, (b) by the reserves (mules and carts) in regimental charge,

some of which in action are assembled from the battalions of a brigade

to form a brigade reserve, and (c) by the ammunition columns.

BIBLIOGRAPHY.--The following works are selected to show (1) the

historical development of the arm, and (2) the different "doctrines"

of to-day as to its training and functions:--Ardant du Picq, _Études

sur le combat_; C. W. C. Oman, _The Art of War: Middle Ages_; Biottot,

_Les Grands Inspirés--Jeanne d'Arc_; Hardy de Périni, _Batailles

françaises_; C. H. Firth, _Cromwell's Army_; German official history

of Frederick the Great's wars, especially _Erster Schlesische Krieg_,

vol. i.; Susane, _Histoire de l'infanterie française_; French General

Staff, _La Tactique au XVIII^me--l'infanterie_ and _La Tactique et la

discipline dans les armées de la Révolution--Général Schauenbourg_; J.

W. Fortescue, _History of the British Army_; Moorsom, _History of the

52nd Regiment_; de Grandmaison, _Dressage de l'infanterie_ (Paris,

1908); works of W. v. Scherff; F. N. Maude, _Evolution of Infantry

Tactics and Attack and Defence_; [Meckel] _Ein Sommernachtstraum_

(Eng. trans, in _United Service Magazine_, 1890); J. Meckel, _Taktik_;

Malachowski, _Scharfe- und Revuetaktik_; H. Langlois, _Enseignements

de deux guerres_; F. Hoenig, _Tactics of the Future_ and _Twenty-four

Hours of Moltke's Strategy_ (Eng. trans.); works of A. von

Boguslowski; _British Officers' Reports on the Russo-Japanese War_; H.

W. L. Hime, _Stray Military Papers_; Grange, "Les Réalités du champ de

bataille--Woerth" (_Rev. d'infanterie_, 1908-1909); V. Lindenau, "The

Boer War and Infantry Attack" (_Journal R. United Service

Institution_, 1902-1903); Janin, "Aperçus sur la

tactique--Mandchourie" (_Rev. d'infanterie_, 1909); Soloviev,

"Infantry Combat in the Russo-Jap. War" (Eng. trans. _Journal

R.U.S.I._, 1908); British Official _Field Service Regulations_, part

i. (1909), and _Infantry Training_ (1905); German drill regulations of

1906 (Fr. trans.); French drill regulations of 1904; Japanese

regulations 1907 (Eng. trans.). The most important journals devoted to

the infantry arm are the French official _Revue d'infanterie_ (Paris

and Limoges), and the _Journal of the United Stales Infantry

Association_ (Washington, D. C). (C. F. A.)

FOOTNOTES:

[1] At Bouvines, it is recorded with special emphasis that Guillaume

des Barres, when in the act of felling the emperor, heard the call to

rescue King Philip Augustus and, forfeiting his rich prize, made his

way back to help his own sovereign.

[2] Crossbows indeed were powerful, and also handled by professional

soldiers (e.g. the Genoese at Crécy), but they were slow in action,

six times as slow as the long bow, and the impatient gendarmerie

generally became tired of the delay and crowded out or rode over the

crossbowmen.

[3] As for instance when thirty men-at-arms "cut out" the Captal de

Buch from the midst of his army at Cocherel.

[4] This tendency of the French military temperament reappears at

almost every stage in the history of armies.

[5] The term _landsknecht_, it appears, was not confined to the right

bank of the Rhine. The French "lansquenets" came largely from Alsace,

according to General Hardy de Périni. In the Italian wars Francis I.

had in his service a famous corps called the "black bands" which was

recruited, in the lower Rhine countries.

[6] This practice of "maintenance" on a large scale continued to

exist in France long afterwards. As late as the battle of Lens (1648)

we find figuring in the king of France's army three "regiments of the

House of Condé."

[7] Even as late as 1645 a battalion of infantry in England was

called a "tercio" or "tertia" (see ARMY; _Spanish army_).

[8] In France it is recorded that the _Gardes françaises_, when

warned for duty at the Louvre, used to stroll thither in twos and

threes.

[9] About this time there was introduced, for resisting cavalry, the

well-known hollow battalion square, which, replacing the former

masses of pikes, represented up to the most modern times the

defensive, as the line or column represented the offensive formation

of infantry.

[10] The Prussian Grenadier battalions in the Silesian and Seven

Years' Wars were more and more confined strictly to line-of-battle

duties as the irregular light infantry developed in numbers.

[11] Even when the hostile artillery was still capable of fire these

masses were used, for in no other formation could the heterogeneous

and ill-trained infantry of Napoleon's vassal states (which

constituted half of his army) be brought up at all.

[12] Rifles had, of course, been used by corps of light troops (both

infantry and mounted) for many years. The British Rifle Brigade was

formed in 1800, but even in the Seven Years' War there were

rifle-corps or companies in the armies of Prussia and Austria. These

older rifles could not compare in rapidity or volume of fire with the

ordinary firelock.

[13] The Prussian company was about 250 strong (see below under

"Organization"). This strength was adopted after 1870 by practically

all nations which adopted universal service. The battalion had 4

companies.

[14] The 1902 edition of _Infantry Training_ indeed treated the new

scouts as a thin advanced firing line, but in 1907, at which date

important modifications began to be made in the "doctrine" of the

British Army, the scouts were expressly restricted to the

old-fashioned "skirmishing" duties.

[15] This is no new thing, but belongs, irrespective of armament, to

the "War of masses." The king of Prussia's fighting instructions of

the 10th of August 1813 lay down the principle as clearly as any

modern work.

[16] In the British Service, men whose nerves betray them on the

shooting range are ordered more gymnastics (_Musketry Regulations_,

1910).

[17] In 1870 the "preconceived idea" was practically confined to

strategy, and the tactical improvisations of the Germans themselves

deranged the execution of the plan quite as often as the act of the

enemy. Of late years, therefore, the "preconceived idea" has been

imposed on tactics also in that country. Special care and study is

given to the once despised "early deployments" in cases where a fight

is part of the "idea," and to the difficult problem of breaking off

the action, when it takes a form that is incompatible with the

development of the main scheme.

[18] In February 1910 a new _Infantry Training_ was said to be in

preparation. The _I.T._ of 1905 is in some degree incompatible with

the later and ruling doctrine of the _F.S. Regulations_, and in the

winter of 1909 the Army Council issued a memorandum drawing attention

to the different conceptions of the decisive attack as embodied in

the latter and as revealed in manoeuvre procedure.

INFANT SCHOOLS. The provision in modern times of systematized training

for children below the age when elementary education normally begins may

be dated from the village school at Waldbach founded by Jean Frédéric

Oberlin in 1774. Robert Owen started an infant school at New Lanark in

1800, and great interest in the question was taken in Great Britain

during the early years of the 19th century, leading to the foundation in

1836 of the Home and Colonial School Society for the training of

teachers in infant schools; this in turn reacted upon other countries,

especially Germany. Further impetus and a new direction were given to

the movement by Friedrich W. A. Froebel, and the methods of training

adopted for children between the ages of three and six have in most

countries been influenced by, if not based on, that system of directed

activities which was the foundation of the type of "play-school" called

by him the _Kinder Garten_, or "children's garden." The growing tendency

in England to lay stress on the mental training of very young children,

and to use the "infant school" as preparatory to the elementary school,

has led to a considerable reaction; medical officers of health have

pointed out the dangers of infection to which children up to the age of

five are specially liable when congregated together--also the physical

effects of badly ventilated class-rooms, and there is a consensus of

opinion that formal mental teaching is directly injurious before the age

of six or even seven years. At the same time the increase in the

industrial employment of married women, with the consequent difficulty

of proper care of young children by the mother in the home, has somewhat

shifted the ground from a purely educational to a social and physical

aspect. While it is agreed that the ideal place for a young child is the

home under the supervision of its mother, the present industrial

conditions often compel a mother to go out to work, and leave her

children either shut up alone, or free to play about the streets, or in

the care of a neighbour or professional "minder." In each case the

children must suffer. The provision by a public authority of

opportunities for suitable training for such children seems therefore a

necessity. The moral advantages gained by freeing the child from the

streets, by the superintendence of a trained teacher over the games, by

the early inculcation of habits of discipline and obedience; the

physical advantages of cleanliness and tidiness, and the opportunity of

disclosing incipient diseases and weaknesses, outweigh the disadvantages

which the opponents of infant training adduce. It remains to give a

brief account of what is done in Great Britain, the United States of

America, and certain other countries. A valuable report was issued for

the English Board of Education by a Consultative Committee upon the

school attendance of children below the age of five (vol. 22 of the

_Special Reports_, 1909), which also gives some account of the provision

of day nurseries or _crèches_ for babies.

_United Kingdom._--Up to 1905 it was the general English practice since

the Education Act of 1870 for educational authorities to provide

facilities for the teaching of children between three and five years old

whose parents desired it. In 1905, of an estimated 1,467,709 children

between those ages, 583,268 were thus provided for in England and Wales.

In 1905 the objections, medical and educational, already stated, coupled

with the increasing financial strain on the local educational

authorities, led to the insertion in the code of that year of Article

53, as follows: "Where the local education authority have so determined

in the case of any school maintained by them, children who are under

five years may be refused admission to that school." In consequence in

1907 the numbers were found to have fallen to 459,034 out of an

estimated 1,480,550 children, from 39.74% in 1905 to 31%. In the older

type of infant school stress was laid on the mental preparation of

children for the elementary teaching which was to come later. This

forcing on of young children was encouraged by the system under which

the government grant was allotted; children in the infant division

earned an annual grant of 17s. per head, on promotion to the upper

school this would be increased to 22s. In 1909 the system was altered; a

rate of 21s. 4d. was fixed as the grant for all children above five, and

the grant for those below the age was reduced to 13s. 4d. Different

methods of training the teachers in these schools as well as the

children themselves have been now generally adopted. These methods are

largely based on the Froebelian plan, and greater attention is being

paid to physical development. In one respect England is perhaps behind

the more progressive of other European countries, viz. in providing

facilities for washing and attending to the personal needs of the

younger children. There is no _femme de service_ as in Belgium on the

staff of English schools. While in Ireland the children below the age of

five attend the elementary schools in much the same proportion as in

England and Wales, in Scotland it has never been the general custom for

such children to attend school.

_United States of America._--In no country has the kindergarten system

taken such firm root, and the provision made for children below the

compulsory age is based upon it. In 1873 there were 42 kindergartens

with 1252 pupils; in 1898 the numbers had risen to 2884 with 143,720

pupils; more than half these were private schools, managed by charitable

institutions or by individuals for profit. In 1904-1905 there were 3176

public kindergartens with 205,118 pupils.

_Austria Hungary._--Provision in Austria is made for children under

six by two types of institution, the Day Nursery

(_Kinderbewahranstalten_) and the Kindergarten. In 1872 as the result

of a State Commission the Kindergarten was established in the state

system of education. Its aim is to "confirm and complete the home

education of children under school age, so that through regulated

exercise of body and mind they may be prepared for institution in the

primary school." No regular teaching in ordinary school subjects is

allowed; games, singing and handwork, and training of speech and

observation by objects, tales and gardening are the means adopted. The

training for teachers in these schools is regulated by law. No

children are to be received in a kindergarten til! the beginning of

the fourth and must leave at the end of the sixth year. In 1902-1903

there were 77,002 children in kindergartens and 74,110 in the day

nurseries. In Hungary a law was passed in 1891 providing for the

education and care of children between three and six, either by asyle

or nurseries open all the year round in communes which contribute from

£830 to £1250 in state taxation, or during the summer in those whose

contribution is less. Communes above the higher sum must provide

kindergartens. In 1904 there were over 233,000 children in such

institutions.

_Belgium._--For children between three and six education and training

are provided by _Écoles gardiennes_ or _Jardins d'enfants_. They are

free but not compulsory, are provided and managed by the communes,

receive a state grant, and are under government inspection. Schools

provided by private individuals or institutions must conform to the

conditions of the communal schools. There is a large amount of

voluntary assistance especially in the provision of clothes and food

for the poorer children. The state first recognized these schools in

1833. In 1881 there were 708 schools with accommodation for over

56,000 children; in 1907 there were 2837 and 264,845 children,

approximately one-half of the total number of children in the country

between the ages of three and six. In 1890 the minister of Public

Instruction issued a code of rules on which is based the organization

of the _Écoles gardiennes_ throughout Belgium, but some of the

communes have regulations of their own. A special examination for

teachers in the _Écoles gardiennes_ was started in 1898. All

candidates must pass this examination before a _certificat de

capacité_ is granted. The training includes a course in Froebelian

methods. While Froebel's system underlies the training in these

schools, the teaching is directed very much towards the practical

education of the child, special stress being laid on manual dexterity.

Reading, writing and arithmetic are also allowed in the classes for

the older children. A marked feature of the Belgian schools is the

close attention paid to health and personal cleanliness. In all

schools there is a _femme de service_, not a teacher, but an

attendant, whose duty it is to see to the tidiness and cleanliness of

the children, and to their physical requirements.

_France._--The first regular infant school was established in Paris at

the beginning of the 19th century and styled a _Salle d'essai_. In

1828 a model school, called a _Salle d'asile_, was started, followed

shortly by similar institutions all over France. State recognition and

inspection were granted, and by 1836 there were over 800 in Paris and

the provinces. In 1848 they became establishments of public

instruction, and the name _École maternelle_ which they have since

borne was given them. Every commune with 2000 inhabitants must have

one of these schools or a _Classe enfantine_. Admission is free, but

not compulsory, for children between two and six. Food and clothes are

provided in exceptional cases. Formal mental instruction is still

given to a large extent, and the older children are taught reading,

writing and arithmetic. Though the staffs of the school include

_femmes de service_, not so much attention is paid to cleanliness as

in Belgium, nor is so much stress laid on hygiene. In 1906-1907 there

were 4111 public and private _Écoles maternelles_ in France, with over

650,000 pupils. The closing of the clerical schools has led to some

diminution in the numbers.

_Germany.___--There are two classes of institution in Germany for

children between the ages of 2½ or 3 and 6. These are the

_Kleinkinderbewahranstalten_ and _Kindergarten_. The first are

primarily social in purpose, and afford a place for the children of

mothers who have to leave their homes for work. These institutions,

principally conducted by religious or charitable societies, remain

open all day and meals are provided. Many of them have a kindergarten

attached, and others provide some training on Froebelian principles.

The kindergartens proper are also principally in private hands, though

most municipalities grant financial assistance. They are conducted on

advanced Froebelian methods, and formal teaching in reading, writing

and arithmetic is excluded. In Cologne, Düsseldorf, Frankfort and

Munich there are municipal schools. The state gives no recognition to

these institutions and they form no part of the public system of

education.

_Switzerland._--In the German speaking cantons the smaller towns and

villages provide for the younger children by _Bewahranstalten_,

generally under private management with public financial help. The

larger towns provide kindergartens where the training is free but not

compulsory for children from four to six. These are generally

conducted on Froebel's system and there is no formal instruction. In

the French speaking cantons the _Écoles enfantines_ are recognized as

the first stage of elementary education. They are free and not

compulsory for children from three to six years of age. (C. We.)

INFINITE (from Lat. _in_, not, _finis_, end or limit; cf. _findere_, to

cleave), a term applied in common usage to anything of vast size.

Strictly, however, the epithet implies the absence of all limitation. As

such it is used specially in (1) theology and metaphysics, (2)

mathematics.

1. Tracing the history of the world to the earliest date for which there

is any kind of evidence, we are faced with the problem that for

everything there is a prior something: the mind is unable to conceive an

absolute beginning ("ex nihilo nihil"). Mundane distances become trivial

when compared with the distance from the earth of the sun and still more

of other heavenly bodies: hence we infer infinite space. Similarly by

continual subdivision we reach the idea of the infinitely small. For

these inferences there is indeed no actual physical evidence: infinity

is a mental concept. As such the term has played an important part in

the philosophical and theological speculation. In early Greek philosophy

the attempt to arrive at a physical explanation of existence led the

Ionian thinkers to postulate various primal elements (e.g. water, fire,

air) or simply the infinite [Greek: to ápeiron] (see IONIAN SCHOOL).

Both Plato and Aristotle devoted much thought to the discussion as to

which is most truly real, the finite objects of sense, or the universal

idea of each thing laid up in the mind of God; what is the nature of

that unity which lies behind the multiplicity and difference of

perceived objects? The same problem, variously expressed, has engaged

the attention of philosophers throughout the ages. In Christian theology

God is conceived as infinite in power, knowledge and goodness, uncreated

and immortal: in some Oriental systems the end of man is absorption into

the infinite, his perfection the breaking down of his human limitations.

The metaphysical and theological conception is open to the agnostic

objection that the finite mind of man is by hypothesis unable to cognize

or apprehend not only an infinite object, but even the very conception

of infinity itself; from this standpoint the Infinite is regarded as

merely a postulate, as it were an unknown quantity (cf. [root]-1 in

mathematics). The same difficulty may be expressed in another way if we

regard the infinite as unconditioned (cf. Sir William Hamilton's

"philosophy of the unconditioned," and Herbert Spencer's doctrine of the

infinite "unknowable"); if it is argued that knowledge of a thing arises

only from the recognition of its differences from other things (i.e.

from its limitations), it follows that knowledge of the infinite is

impossible, for the infinite is by hypothesis unrelated.

With this conception of _the_ infinite as absolutely unconditioned

should be compared what may be described roughly as lesser infinities

which can be philosophically conceived and mathematically demonstrated.

Thus a point, which is by definition infinitely small, is as compared

with a line a unit: the line is infinite, made up of an infinite number

of points, any pair of which have an infinite number of points between

them. The line itself, again, in relation to the plane is a unit, while

the plane is infinite, i.e. made up of an infinite number of lines;

hence the plane is described as doubly infinite in relation to the

point, and a solid as trebly infinite. This is Spinoza's theory of the

"infinitely infinite," the limiting notion of infinity being of a

numerical, quantitative series, each term of which is a qualitative

determination itself quantitatively little, e.g. a line which is

quantitatively unlimited (i.e. in length) is qualitatively limited when

regarded as an infinitely small unit of a plane. A similar relation

exists in thought between the various grades of species and genera; the

highest genus is the "infinitely infinite," each subordinated genus

being infinite in relation to the particulars which it denotes, and

finite when regarded as a unit in a higher genus.

2. In mathematics, the term "infinite" denotes the result of increasing

a variable without limit; similarly, the term "infinitesimal," meaning

indefinitely small, denotes the result of diminishing the value of a

variable without limit, with the reservation that it never becomes

actually zero. The application of these conceptions distinguishes

ancient from modern mathematics. Analytical investigations revealed the

existence of series or sequences which had no limit to the number of

terms, as for example the fraction 1/(1 - x) which on division gives the

series. 1 + x + x²+ ...; the discussion of these so-called infinite

sequences is given in the articles SERIES and FUNCTION. The doctrine of

geometrical continuity (q.v.) and the application of algebra to

geometry, developed in the 16th and 17th centuries mainly by Kepler and

Descartes, led to the discovery of many properties which gave to the

notion of infinity, as a localized space conception, a predominant

importance. A line became continuous, returning into itself by way of

infinity; two parallel lines intersect in a point at infinity; all

circles pass through two fixed points at infinity (the circular points);

two spheres intersect in a fixed circle at infinity; an asymptote became

a tangent at infinity; the foci of a conic became the intersections of

the tangents from the circular points at infinity; the centre of a conic

the pole of the line at infinity, &c. In analytical geometry the line at

infinity plays an important part in trilinear coordinates. These

subjects are treated in GEOMETRY. A notion related to that of

infinitesimals is presented in the Greek "method of exhaustion"; the

more perfect conception, however, only dates from the 17th century, when

it led to the infinitesimal calculus. A curve came to be treated as a

sequence of infinitesimal straight lines; a tangent as the extension of

an infinitesimal chord; a surface or area as a sequence of

infinitesimally narrow strips, and a solid as a collection of

infinitesimally small cubes (see INFINITESIMAL CALCULUS).

INFINITESIMAL CALCULUS. 1. The infinitesimal calculus is the body of

rules and processes by means of which continuously varying magnitudes

are dealt with in mathematical analysis. The name "infinitesimal" has

been applied to the calculus because most of the leading results were

first obtained by means of arguments about "infinitely small"

quantities; the "infinitely small" or "infinitesimal" quantities were

vaguely conceived as being neither zero nor finite but in some

intermediate, nascent or evanescent, state. There was no necessity for

this confused conception, and it came to be understood that it can be

dispensed with; but the calculus was not developed by its first founders

in accordance with logical principles from precisely defined notions,

and it gained adherents rather through the impressiveness and variety of

the results that could be obtained by using it than through the cogency

of the arguments by which it was established. A similar statement might

be made in regard to other theories included in mathematical analysis,

such, for instance, as the theory of infinite series. Many, perhaps all,

of the mathematical and physical theories which have survived have had a

similar history--a history which may be divided roughly into two

periods: a period of construction, in which results are obtained from

partially formed notions, and a period of criticism, in which the

fundamental notions become progressively more and more precise, and are

shown to be adequate bases for the constructions previously built upon

them. These periods usually overlap. Critics of new theories are never

lacking. On the other hand, as E. W. Hobson has well said, "pertinent

criticism of fundamentals almost invariably gives rise to new

construction." In the history of the infinitesimal calculus the 17th

and 18th centuries were mainly a period of construction, the 19th

century mainly a period of criticism.

I. _Nature of the Calculus._

Geometrical representation of Variable Quantities.

2. The guise in which variable quantities presented themselves to the

mathematicians of the 17th century was that of the lengths of variable

lines. This method of representing variable quantities dates from the

14th century, when it was employed by Nicole Oresme, who studied and

afterwards taught at the Collège de Navarre in Paris from 1348 to 1361.

He represented one of two variable quantities, e.g. the time that has

elapsed since some epoch, by a length, called the "longitude," measured

along a particular line; and he represented the other of the two

quantities, e.g. the temperature at the instant, by a length, called the

"latitude," measured at right angles to this line. He recognized that

the variation of the temperature with the time was represented by the

line, straight or curved, which joined the ends of all the lines of

"latitude." Oresme's longitude and latitude were what we should now call

the abscissa and ordinate. The same method was used later by many

writers, among whom Johannes Kepler and Galileo Galilei may be

mentioned. In Galileo's investigation of the motion of falling bodies

(1638) the abscissa OA represents the time during which a body has been

falling, and the ordinate AB represents the velocity acquired during

that time (see fig. 1). The velocity being proportional to the time, the

"curve" obtained is a straight line OB, and Galileo showed that the

distance through which the body has fallen is represented by the area of

the triangle OAB.

[Illustration: FIG. 1.]

The problems of Maxima and Minima, Tangents, and Quadratures.

The most prominent problems in regard to a curve were the problem of

finding the points at which the ordinate is a maximum or a minimum, the

problem of drawing a tangent to the curve at an assigned point, and the

problem of determining the area of the curve. The relation of the

problem of maxima and minima to the problem of tangents was understood

in the sense that maxima or minima arise when a certain equation has

equal roots, and, when this is the case, the curves by which the problem

is to be solved touch each other. The reduction of problems of maxima

and minima to problems of contact was known to Pappus. The problem of

finding the area of a curve was usually presented in a particular form

in which it is called the "problem of quadratures." It was sought to

determine the area contained between the curve, the axis of abscissae

and two ordinates, of which one was regarded as fixed and the other as

variable. Galileo's investigation may serve as an example. In that

example the fixed ordinate vanishes. From this investigation it may be

seen that before the invention of the infinitesimal calculus the

introduction of a curve into discussions of the course of any

phenomenon, and the problem of quadratures for that curve, were not

exclusively of geometrical import; the purpose for which the area of a

curve was sought was often to find something which is not an area--for

instance, a length, or a volume or a centre of gravity.

Greek methods.

3. The Greek geometers made little progress with the problem of

tangents, but they devised methods for investigating the problem of

quadratures. One of these methods was afterwards called the "method of

exhaustions," and the principle on which it is based was laid down in

the lemma prefixed to the 12th book of Euclid's _Elements_ as follows:

"If from the greater of two magnitudes there be taken more than its

half, and from the remainder more than its half, and so on, there will

at length remain a magnitude less than the smaller of the proposed

magnitudes." The method adopted by Archimedes was more general. It may

be described as the enclosure of the magnitude to be evaluated between

two others which can be brought by a definite process to differ from

each other by less than any assigned magnitude. A simple example of its

application is the 6th proposition of Archimedes' treatise On the

_Sphere and Cylinder_, in which it is proved that the area contained

between a regular polygon inscribed in a circle and a similar polygon

circumscribed to the same circle can be made less than any assigned area

by increasing the number of sides of the polygon. The methods of Euclid

and Archimedes were specimens of rigorous limiting processes (see

FUNCTION). The new problems presented by the analytical geometry and

natural philosophy of the 17th century led to new limiting processes.

Differentiation.

4. In the _problem of tangents_ the new process may be described as

follows. Let P, P´ be two points of a curve (see fig. 2). Let x, y be

the coordinates of P, and x + [Delta]x, y + [Delta]y those of P´. The

symbol [Delta]x means "the difference of two x's" and there is a like

meaning for the symbol [Delta]y. The fraction [Delta]y/[Delta]x is the

trigonometrical tangent of the angle which the secant PP´ makes with

the axis of x. Now let [Delta]x be continually diminished towards

zero, so that P´ continually approaches P. If the curve has a tangent

at P the secant PP´ approaches a limiting position (see § 33 below).

When this is the case the fraction [Delta]y/[Delta]x tends to a limit,

and this limit is the trigonometrical tangent of the angle which the

tangent at P to the curve makes with the axis of x. The limit is

denoted by

dy

--.

dx

If the equation of the curve is of the form y = [f](x) where [f] is a

functional symbol (see FUNCTION), then

[Delta]y [f](x + [Delta]x) - [f](x)

-------- = --------------------------,

[Delta]x [Delta]x

and

dy [f](x + [Delta]x) - [f](x)

-- = lim. --------------------------.

dx [Delta]x = 0 [Delta]x

The limit expressed by the right-hand member of this defining equation

is often written

[f]´(x),

and is called the "derived function" of [f](x), sometimes the

"derivative" or "derivate" of [f](x). When the function [f](x) is a

rational integral function, the division by [Delta]x can be performed,

and the limit is found by substituting zero for [Delta]x in the

quotient. For example, if [f](x) = x², we have

[f](x + [Delta]x) - [f](x) (x + [Delta]x)² - x² 2x[Delta]x + ([Delta]x)²

-------------------------- = -------------------- = ------------------------ = 2x + [Delta]x,

[Delta]x [Delta]x [Delta]x

and

[f]´(x) = 2x.

[Illustration: FIG. 2.]

The process of forming the derived function of a given function is

called _differentiation_. The fraction [Delta]y/[Delta]x is called the

"quotient of differences," and its limit dy/dx is called the

"differential coefficient of y with respect to x." The rules for

forming differential coefficients constitute the _differential

calculus_.

The problem of tangents is solved at one stroke by the formation of

the differential coefficient; and the problem of maxima and minima is

solved, apart from the discrimination of maxima from minima and some

further refinements, by equating the differential coefficient to zero

(see MAXIMA and MINIMA).

[Illustration: FIG. 3.]

Integration.