CONTRARY TO THE ASCERTAINED TRUTHS OF MENTAL SCIENCE.
I now proceed to the consideration of the remaining alternative, the truth
of which the form of the narrative seems most to favour, viz., that our
Lord accepted the distinction between possession and mania; and that
during those times possessions were actual occurrences.
In considering this subject, it will be necessary to pay attention to the
distinction to which I have referred in the previous chapter, that even if
many of the phenomena that accompanied possession were due to superhuman
agency, the Gospels are by no means pledged to any particular theory of
the _modus operandi_ by which the phenomena were brought about. What I
mean is that these phenomena might have been due to a superhuman agency,
without involving the fact that the demon had a local habitation either in
the body or the spirit of the man. All that the Gospels can be taken to
affirm is, that the evil spirit in some way or other, of which we are
ignorant, held the man in a state of thraldom, made his mental powers the
subject of a divided consciousness, overpowered the functions of his
reason and his will, and through his action on the mind used for his own
purposes the organs of his body. The writers of the New Testament are
pledged to no theory as to how such results were effected. They have
simply reported the phenomena as they presented themselves to their
observation. In doing this, the language which they have employed denotes
local habitation; but the words used in stilling the storm make it quite
clear that the literal meaning cannot be pressed. Considering the general
character of these narratives, it is impossible to pledge them to the
particular mode in which these results were brought about.
One circumstance seems to militate against the supposition that possession
involved nothing but simple mania, namely, the numbers of those who are
spoken of as possessed. If the Gospel narratives are historical, it would
appear that such cases were numerous. Not only are several miracles of
this description definitely recorded, but the Evangelists several times
affirm that our Lord cured demoniacs in considerable numbers, without
furnishing us with the details. Now it is difficult to believe that
maniacs existed in such large numbers in a country of the size and
population of Judæa. Yet all the phenomena of possession point to
maniacal, and not to harmless lunacy. The number of the cases of mania
that occur bears but a small proportion to those of the latter form of
derangement. It is true that at times of popular excitement various forms
and numerous cases of frenzy manifest themselves; but these differ from
mania, though they not unfrequently terminate in it. I have made these
observations, because, in discussing such a subject, it is only right to
state fully the difficulties with which particular theories are attended.
It is very probable, however, that as the symptoms so closely resembled
each other, many cases of actual mania would be confounded in popular
estimation with possession, and, therefore, that cases of actual
possession may not have been so numerous as at first sight would appear.
On the supposition that possession was a reality, we have no means of
determining what moral or physical preconditions were necessary for its
manifestation. It is clear that the authors of the Gospels must have
considered that it was owing to some predisposing causes, physical or
moral, though they have not described them. Unless this was the case, the
evil, instead of being partial, would have been universal. Various moral
causes would naturally form a suitable precondition for its manifestation.
There can be no doubt that a number of vices, when indulged in beyond a
certain point, reduce man’s moral being to a wreck and render him
obnoxious to the action of external agency. The power of self‐control may
be indefinitely weakened. If vice is carried to its extreme forms, it
produces phenomena hardly, if at all, distinguishable from madness. Such a
state of man’s moral nature would form a suitable precondition to enable a
superhuman being to overpower the reason and the will, the supremacy of
which was already impaired by an influence from within. In such cases
possession would have been rendered possible by a man’s self‐induced moral
corruption.
The testimony of history proves that during the century which preceded and
that which followed the Advent, the state of moral corruption was extreme.
Men were sated with the old, and craving for new and unheard of forms of
sensual gratification. The old class of ideas, moral and religious, were
gradually dying out, and men were eagerly seeking for something to fill
the void. There consequently never was a time when a greater number of
abnormal forms of thought burst on the human mind, which was shaken to its
utmost depths. The outbreak of fanaticism combined with moral wickedness,
which displayed itself forty years after in the Jewish war of
independence, is probably without a parallel in the history of man. For
this there must have been years of preparation. A somewhat similar state
of things existed in the Pagan world, which led to the production of
numerous religious charlatans and impostors. The times were characterised
by an extravagance of thought on almost every subject, philosophy itself
forming no exception. Such an abnormal mental condition was peculiarly
suited to the reception of external mental influences, if we suppose them
possible.
But I am bound to admit that the facts recorded in the Gospels prove that
possession was not always the result of moral degradation. This is proved
by the case of the youth, whose possession the father directly connects
with lunacy, and says that it had seized him from a child. In this case
the cause which rendered the possession possible must have been physical,
probably a derangement of the nervous system.
If I understand rightly the position which is taken by those who affirm
that possession was mania, and nothing else, it is as follows. It is
alleged that at certain periods of history, the belief in possession has
been widely spread. Possessions are unknown in modern times; and all the
instances which have been alleged are either cases of mania or delusion.
The belief in it has gradually died away as knowledge has advanced. In
former times it generated a number of grotesque stories, which were pure
inventions of the imagination heated by enthusiasm. Such facts as were
real may be referred to madness as their cause. The others are simply
disbelieved. Under the influence of increasing knowledge, there has arisen
a widespread belief in modern times, that there is nothing superhuman in
the causes of such phenomena, but that they are due to influences existing
within the mind itself. This, as it is affirmed, being true of all the
alleged instances of possession in the modern world, it is inferred that
similar ones in the ancient world are equally unreal; and if we had the
requisite data before us, we should be able to refer them all to ordinary
human causes.
With respect to the general fact, there can be no doubt that advancing
knowledge has caused a general disbelief in the reality of any modern form
of possession, or of witchcraft. The supreme grotesqueness of the
phenomena of the latter has caused the belief in it to perish under the
influence of common sense, aided by an increased acquaintance with sound
principles of causation, and the stability of the operations of nature.
Still it is incorrect to affirm that the prevalence of such beliefs has
been due to no other cause than universal ignorance. The belief in
witchcraft produced its most unhappy results during the reigns of
Elizabeth and the Stuarts, in the very age of Bacon, Shakespeare, and
Raleigh. Such beliefs originate in certain principles of our minds whose
gratification consists in the contemplation of the marvellous, the action
of which I shall consider hereafter. They have existed in every condition
of society, and only changed the form of their manifestation. Those who
boast of our freedom from such delusions, owing to the superior light of
the nineteenth century, seem to have forgotten the existence at the
present day of a belief in spiritualism, which is little, if at all, less
absurd than witchcraft, though the former has encountered a less severe
treatment than the latter. This has been more due to the improvement of
our humanity than to our knowledge of physical science. It is a fact that
spiritualism is believed in by multitudes; and its votaries belong far
more to the cultivated class of society than to the ignorant and the
vulgar. What the witch mania was to the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, spiritualism is to the nineteenth. It is the peculiar form
rather than the possibility of such delusions that has passed away.
It should be observed also that the demoniacal supernaturalism of the
monastic writers, and of the middle ages, differs from that of the New
Testament to such a degree that they cannot fairly be compared. In the
former the apparition of demons and departed spirits was a thing of
constant occurrence; in the latter, never. To the monks the devil was
continually appearing in the most phantastic forms, and performing the
most grotesque miracles. To this form of demonology modern spiritualism
can put in very strong claims to be esteemed the genuine successor. The
heated imagination of even such a man as Luther suggested to him that he
saw Satan in visible reality. It is worthy of remark that St. Paul knew
nothing of visible Satanic manifestations. With him they were invariably
spiritual.
It is important to keep steadily in view the fact, that the New Testament
invariably represents possession as consisting in the action of a stronger
mind on a weaker one. The influence which the demon exerted on the bodily
organs might have been effected through the agency of the man himself. It
is never described as involving a visible manifestation of the demon, but
his action is one which is purely mental and spiritual. His presence and
his departure were simply judged of by their effects.
It follows, therefore, that the denial of the possibility of an influence
of this kind must rest on a very wide principle. It cannot be confined to
such action alone, but must go to the extent of denying the possibility of
the action of all spiritual beings on the mind of man. The only principle
on which the denial can rest is, that our mental science has so far
succeeded in analyzing all the past and present operations of the human
mind, that it is justified in affirming that they all originate entirely
within the mind itself; and are never brought about by an action on it
from without by any invisible agent. If this is the principle on which the
denial rests, it will be equally valid to exclude the action of God on our
minds, as well as that of all other invisible beings. It will doubtless be
urged that it is only intended to deny the action of invisible evil
beings. But if it is true that our mental philosophy has ascertained that
all our thoughts originate either in the mind itself, or in the mind acted
on by external nature, or by other men, the principle must be valid for
proving that all other spiritual agency exerted on the mind is impossible,
and that all supposed instances of it are delusions. It is impossible on
this principle to exclude the evil agency, and not to exclude the good
also.
It is evident that this principle is far too broad to be used for the
purpose of affirming the impossibility of the action of external evil
agents only. It is based on the supposition that our mental philosophy is
so complete as to be able to assign even the most abnormal portions of our
mental action to definite and known forces, all of which originate within
the mind itself, and are never due to external influences. If mental
philosophy could establish this as a fact, it would doubtless prove that
possession was impossible; but it could prove a great deal more, even that
God never acted on or influenced the spirit of man. But if there is any
one phenomenon of the mind, of the origin of which we are ignorant, the
whole principle is vitiated, for that very phenomenon may be caused by the
action of an external power. The real point of the controversy therefore
is, Is our mental science thus complete? Has it been able to reduce all
our mental phenomena, including the most abnormal of them, to the action
of known forces? Has it analyzed our mental powers to their inmost depths?
Until it has done this, it is impossible to affirm that the abnormal
actions of the mind may not be occasioned by an external agency.
It will probably be urged, that although our philosophy has not yet
succeeded in assigning all our mental phenomena to the action of known
forces, it hopes to accomplish this hereafter; and that its past conquests
ought to be accepted as a pledge of its future performances; and that the
time will certainly come, when it will be able to refer every mental
phenomenon to a cause originating in the mind itself, and acting in
conformity with invariable law. Promises, however, are not performances;
what is requisite to impart validity to wide affirmations is present
actual knowledge, not the hope that future scientific conquests will be
extended over the entire regions of the unknown. Science professes to walk
by sight and not by faith. In a subject of this kind it is most
unphilosophical to assume that the possibilities of the future are the
realities of the present; and to enunciate propositions whose validity
rests solely on the fact that they are so.
I will now definitely state the principle which can alone give any
scientific value to the assertion, that such demoniacal action as that
which is described in the New Testament, is unbelievable. It is as
follows: that we have so completely ascertained the nature of the forces
which act on our minds, and the laws which regulate them, that we know as
a scientifically established truth, that they all originate either in our
own mental organization, or in the action of other men on our minds. The
statement of the principle in this distinct form at once shows that it is
invalid.
It is impossible for one moment to affirm that our knowledge is so
complete, that we have a scientific acquaintance with the causes of all
our varied mental phenomena, and the laws which regulate them. We have
ascertained the nature of several of our mental processes; but how small a
portion of man’s mental activity do they embrace. I need only
particularize a few of which we are in complete ignorance, as to the
forces which generate them, and the laws which regulate their action.
First, with respect to Genius. Genius is a mental power which manifests
itself only on rare occasions. Who can affirm that we have ascertained the
law which regulates its birth? We may judge from analogy that this, as
other things, follows a law of some kind; but respecting the causes which
give it birth our philosophy is profoundly ignorant. Nor have we any
knowledge of its mode of action. It manifests itself in various forms.
There is the genius which makes the poet, the philosopher, the scientific
discoverer, the orator, the politician, and many others. How those who are
possessed of this power effectuate their mental operations, or how their
great ideas originate in their minds is a subject which exceeds the limits
of our scientific knowledge. Take for example the genius of the poet.
Whence came, and what was the nature of that intuitive power with which
Shakespeare was endowed, or how was it called into exercise? We call such
powers intuitions. We say that a great poet is endowed with a species of
inspiration. What is this but to confess our entire ignorance both of the
origin and the mode of his mental operations. Probably the poet himself
would be unable to give us any analysis of the origin of his own thoughts,
or of the laws that regulate them. How then can we venture to affirm that
they must all originate in the mind itself, and not be due to the action
of some external power? The habit of speaking of his inspirations, from
which scientific men are not exempt, proves our complete ignorance both of
its nature and origin.
But to descend to a humbler sphere—our own minds. We are all conscious
that thoughts rush into them in a most unbidden manner, and that we pass
through mental states which our analysis is unable to explain. Can any man
affirm, however deep may be his philosophy, that the known laws of
association of ideas are adequate to account for all the mental phenomena
of which he has been conscious? Who has not had experience of severe
efforts to realize something in thought, which have ended in failure, and
that the right thing has suddenly come into his mind uncalled and
unbidden? Not unfrequently has a sudden thought entered the mind (we know
not whence it came) which has entirely changed the whole current of a
previous life. Still more frequently has a happy idea occurred to us, the
origin of which it is impossible to trace. Who again has not had
experience of the sudden rushing of a temptation into his mind with an all
but overwhelming force, even while his thoughts were occupied with
subjects in no way allied to the suggestion? Many of our mental phenomena
may be explained by the principle of association of ideas and other known
mental powers; but who can venture to affirm that they are adequate to
account for all the various states of which he has been conscious, or that
some of them have not originated in suggestions from without? Scientific
knowledge is certainly able to make no such affirmation.
Next: there are numerous abnormal conditions to which the mind is
unquestionably subject. Who will venture to affirm that he has penetrated
to their depths, or ascertained the laws which regulate their action?
These have a most important bearing on the present subject. They are best
designated by the term phrenzy. Their aspect is very varied. They differ
in many respects from mania, though they are closely allied to it. They
are confined to no one race of men, but are co‐extensive with human
nature. They were prevalent in the ancient world, and connected with
various forms of religious belief. They display themselves with peculiar
violence in the religious rites of savages. In Oriental countries at the
present day, they frequently manifest themselves and assume a great
variety of aspects. Examples might be easily adduced. The phrenzied
fanatic often presents indications of his mind being acted on by an
overwhelming external influence; and when under the influence of the rites
of a degraded religion, the symptoms present no little resemblance to
those which accompanied demoniacal possession.
I have no wish to affirm that such phenomena must be due to an action of
this kind, but to draw attention to the fact that we are ignorant of the
power in which they originate, and that such being the case, it is quite
possible that their most violent and terrible forms may be aroused by the
influence of a power external to the mind itself. Equally ignorant are we
of the causes of even their milder manifestations. Whatever may be the
hopes which are entertained of the future triumphs of science, it is not
too much to assert, that it has not yet reduced these abnormal conditions
of the mind to any thing like a scientific law, and that it has not
succeeded in tracing the phenomena to the exclusive operation of a force
acting within the mind itself. In truth our mental science is ignorant of
their causes: and for aught that it can affirm to the contrary, many of
them may be due to causes human, superhuman, or a combination of the two.
In cases where we are profoundly ignorant, dogmatical assertions should be
carefully avoided. While such phenomena are incapable of explanation by
the action of known mental forces, the students of mental science are not
justified in affirming that possession contradicts its known truths.
I fully admit, however, that there is a system of professed mental
science, which, if its truth could be proved, would establish the fact
that possession was impossible. I need hardly say that I allude to that
which affirms that thought is the result of a function of the brain, and
nothing else. According to the views of these philosophers, the brain
secretes thought as a gland secretes its own peculiar secretion. Until
this philosophy has succeeded in proving the truth of its first
principles, it is useless to consider its bearing on this particular
question.
There is another abnormal mental condition, the existence of which is
unquestionable, and which has a close connection with the present
question, namely, the ecstatic state. The forms in which this has
manifested itself have been extremely various, and it is impossible for
any one to assert that our mental philosophy has fully fathomed them, and
has succeeded in assigning them to forces originating within the mind
itself. On the contrary it is not too much to affirm that it has as yet
wholly failed to analyze its nature, or to account for the abnormal powers
displayed by the mind when in this condition. In the ancient world this
state of mind was closely connected with the manifestations of the
prophetic power, the reality of which was recognized by many of its
philosophers. It will of course be observed that I am not speaking of this
power as it existed in the Jewish church, but of its supposed
manifestations in the heathen world. Similar ecstatic states have
frequently displayed themselves in modern times. When in this condition
the mind is especially liable to be acted on by external influences. Is it
possible, I ask, in the present state of our mental philosophy, to assert
that we know their nature, or the forces which produce them? The ecstatic
in union with a phrenzied state of the mind was apparently the condition
of the Delphian priestess when she delivered oracles to those who
consulted her. According to all the accounts that we possess, she
presented the appearance of being subject to an overpowering external
influence. Every other description which we possess of the manifestation
of this prophetic power, (and we have several) describes it as presenting
phenomena closely allied to raving madness, an influence of some kind
apparently overpowering the prophet’s personality. Until the forces which
produced these phenomena in the ancient world, and the somewhat similar
ones which have been manifested in modern times, can be shown to owe their
origin to forces originating in the mind itself, and to nothing else, it
is absurd to affirm that such a phenomenon as possession is in
contradiction to our scientific knowledge of the human mind.
There is another point which demands our attention, namely, the close
connection between the extreme forms of moral wickedness, and madness. It
is an unquestionable fact that nothing is more difficult than to draw the
precise line where moral wickedness ends, and madness begins. In their
great outlines they are easily distinguishable, but in the more advanced
stages of moral evil, the one passes into the other by insensible degrees.
So difficult is it to lay down the precise line which separates them, that
scientific men are not wanting, who affirm that every extreme case of
moral wickedness is a species of mania. Consistently with this theory
frequent efforts are made to save the most abandoned criminals from the
consequences of their crimes. If the principle is correct, it is
impossible not to assign lesser degrees of moral evil to the same cause.
Such a principle logically leads to the denial of any distinction between
moral and physical action. Happily however, although this conclusion is
one which has been arrived at by a considerable number of physicists, it
is one which the common sense of mankind steadily refuses to accept. It is
sufficient for the present purpose, that extreme forms of moral evil shade
off into mania by insensible degrees; and that ultimately they are capable
of producing insanity. If insanity can be produced by moral causes, it
follows that a superhuman influence powerful for evil, acting on a
degraded moral nature, may be attended with a similar result, and produce
such a phenomenon as possession.
But further: while madness is produced by physical causes, it is a certain
fact that it is frequently occasioned by causes purely mental. Of this the
instances are innumerable. These mental causes react on the brain and the
nervous system; and thus they superinduce disease on those parts of our
bodily organization by means of which the mind exercises its powers. Still
the disease itself originates in causes that are not seated in the body,
but in the mind. The mind is therefore capable of acting powerfully on our
bodily frame. If therefore possession be viewed as the action of one mind
on another, there is no reason why it should not be able to superinduce
those forms of bodily derangement which exhibited themselves in the
demoniacs by the simple action of the mind upon the body. The mental
causes capable of producing mania are, as we know, of a varied
description; and among them is the action and influence which one mind is
capable of exerting on another. As, therefore, in certain states of our
minds, or of our nervous system, mania with all its results can be
produced by the simple action of mind on mind, and through the action of
the mind disorder may be produced in our bodily organization, there can be
no reason why possession with all its attendant phenomena should not
originate in similar causes. There is nothing to imply that the superhuman
agency manifested in possession was directly exerted on the body of the
possessed. An agency which was entirely mental was fully adequate to
produce all the phenomena with which it was accompanied.
In cases of mania produced by mental action the removal of the exciting
cause is the precondition of its cure, and in many cases effects it.
Similarly, in cases of possession the removal of the exciting cause would
produce similar results.
It follows, therefore, from the foregoing considerations, that the
allegation that the possessions described in the New Testament are
incredible, because they contradict the known truths of mental science, is
disproved.
The question really resolves itself into the following one: Do evil
beings, other than men, exist in the universe? Or, if they exist, is it
credible that they are allowed to interfere in the affairs of men? This
question we have already considered in a former chapter, and we have
arrived at the conclusion that if we free ourselves from the trammels of
_à priori_ theories, and judge only by the facts of the universe as it
exists, neither their existence nor their intervention in human affairs is
contrary to our reason.
Two things, however, must be steadily kept in mind. First: that if such
interventions in human affairs are facts, the agency which can be exerted
is only a permitted agency, and only capable of being exerted in
subordination to the divine purposes in the government of the universe. A
large number of the difficulties with which the subject is attended have
originated in the wholly inaccurate idea that a power is attributed in the
New Testament to Satan, of interfering both in the material and the moral
universe at his own will and pleasure. This, however, is altogether
contrary to the fact. Whatever power is attributed to him is an entirely
permitted one, and exercised in subordination to the general purposes of
God. Secondly, that although the disorder in the moral world might lead us
to suspect the presence of an evil agency, different from that of man; yet
as it is not a visible one, but confined to the regions of the mind, it is
one which cannot come under our distinct observation, and could therefore
only become known to us by revelation.
One more difficulty has to be considered. It is alleged that possession
never takes place now. It is therefore inferred that it never took place
at all.
I reply first, if we grant that demoniacal action, in the form of
possession has now ceased, it by no means follows that it was not once
real. The objection overlooks the fact that its action was a permitted
one; and could only be exercised within the limits assigned to it. There
may have been reasons at the time of the Advent why the exercise of a
Satanic agency should be permitted at that particular period to a greater
extent than it ever has been before or since.
Secondly: certain moral and physical conditions were necessary for its
exercise. These may be no longer in existence, but they may have passed
away with many other abnormal conditions of human nature which existed in
the ancient world.
Thirdly: it is not possible to affirm with certainty that, even at the
present day, no supernatural agencies bearing an analogy to possession,
are exerted on the mind. This will be only possible, when all those
abnormal phenomena which manifest themselves in connection with various
debased forms of religion and other cases of phrenzied excitement can be
traced to known forces, originating solely in the mind itself.
There is one further objection which requires a brief consideration. It is
urged that the writers of the New Testament entertained the belief, that
diseases were generally occasioned by demoniacal action, quite
independently of possession; and that this belief has received the
sanction of our Lord. One case only is alleged in proof of this, that of
the woman with the spirit of infirmity. She was no demoniac, but an
ordinary diseased person, and the disease is asserted to have been
occasioned by demoniacal action.
I reply, that considering the large number of diseases of various kinds
mentioned in the New Testament, in none of which is there any allusion to
demoniacal agency as their cause, a single example is a narrow foundation
on which to build the affirmation that the followers of our Lord held such
a theory as to the origin of disease in general. I admit that
disorganization of the bodily functions is mentioned among the phenomena
of possession. But this differs widely from a bodily evil superinduced
without the agency of possession. Let us inquire whether the special
instance affords any justification for this wide assertion.
The Evangelist states that the woman was bowed down by a spirit of
infirmity, and could in no wise lift herself up. Here it is just as absurd
to fasten on him the intention to describe a scientific fact, as when on
another occasion it is said that “_power_” went out of our Lord “and
healed them all.” The one stands on the same ground as the other.
In effecting the cure, our Lord uses the words, “Woman, thou art loosed
from thine infirmity.” Here there is no reference to Satanic agency
whatever. The only mention of it occurs in his argument with the ruler of
the synagogue on the lawfulness of effecting such cures on the Sabbath
day. The words are, “Thou hypocrite, ought not this woman, who is a
daughter of Abraham, whom Satan hath bound, lo, these eighteen years, to
be loosed from this bond on the Sabbath day?”
These words are addressed to the ruler in answer to the objection that our
Lord was no prophet, because he effected his cures on the Sabbath. If so,
as the reality of the miracle was not denied, it was intended to be
implied that it had been wrought by the power of Satan, of which the
violation of the Sabbath was the proof. The real point of controversy
therefore was the lawfulness of effecting cures on this day, not the
Satanic origin of the complaint. Was there any conceivable reason why our
Lord should not discuss the point with the ruler on his own principles?
Why was it necessary to raise a wholly different issue, viz. the Satanic
or non‐Satanic origin of the disease, instead of confining it strictly to
the point, which was the all‐important one, that His curing this woman on
the Sabbath day was so far from being a proof that He did not come from
God, that it was a strong reason for believing that He did so? To have
entered on a discussion as to what was the cause of the complaint, would
not only have diverted attention from the real question, but would have
introduced one wholly foreign to the purposes of His divine mission.
Two suppositions only are possible respecting possession. It must have
been either a form of madness produced by natural causes, or a
manifestation of superhuman power. As the facts on which a judgment can be
formed are meagre, I have not ventured to determine which of these two
theories is alone consistent with the facts and phenomena of the New
Testament. I have therefore taken either alternative, and shown, that
neither does the theory that it was mania interfere with the claims of the
Gospels to be accepted as historical documents, nor is the language
attributed to our Lord contrary to the truthfulness of His character; nor
does the supposition that it was due to superhuman causes contradict the
established truths of mental science.