I fully admit that a difficulty is involved in the idea that a being like
Satan is permitted to perform actions which bear even a remote analogy to
divine miracles. I have already shown that the New Testament only
apparently ascribes to him a supernatural action of a very limited and
special kind, differing widely from our usual conception of a miracle. I
now proceed to inquire how far this limited action, thus attributed to
him, if we suppose that possession was an objective fact, and not a form
of madness, interferes with the validity of the attestation of miracles to
the Christian revelation.
The existence of a being like Satan is alleged as constituting an enormous
difficulty against the statements of the New Testament. A numerous class
of writers dismiss the idea of his existence as unworthy of serious
argument, and endeavour to dispose of it with a sneer. This world however
contains numerous analogous cases of very evil men endowed with the
highest mental powers, who have exerted the most injurious influences on
others. Their existence is a fact; and the difficulties attending it
cannot be got rid of by any kind of evasion. The objections that have been
urged in connection with this subject are not founded on the facts of the
moral universe as they exist; but on _à priori_ principles alone. It has
been affirmed to be incredible that Almighty God should have permitted the
existence of such a being as Satan; or if his existence is permitted, that
he can be allowed to interfere in the affairs of men.
In dealing with this question it is evident that I must proceed on the
supposition that I am reasoning with theists only. The whole question is
irrelevant on the principles of Pantheism or Atheism, or, to put the case
more distinctly, on such principles there is no greater difficulty in
supposing that nature has evolved evil beings superior to men in their
faculties and powers in some other part of the universe, than that it has
evolved evil men, who are gifted with high forms of intelligence in this;
or even that such beings should be capable of interfering in human
affairs. If Pantheism or Atheism is a correct account of the facts of the
universe, it is impossible to say what kind of beings nature may have
evolved in the past, or may evolve in the future from her prolific womb.
But if it is once conceded that a personal God exists, who is the moral
Governor of the Universe, the affirmation that the existence of such
beings is inconsistent with his attributes, is only another form of
asserting that the existence of moral evil is incompatible with them. The
ground of its existence has been a problem, into which the human mind has
striven to penetrate from the earliest dawn of thought, without ever
approaching to its solution; but into this question it is useless to
enter. In the present argument we are dealing with facts, and the
existence of aggravated forms of moral evil in the universe is a fact. If
there be a God, it must be consistent with his attributes. The real
difficulty lies in its existence at all in the universe of a God who is
all‐powerful and good.
But since it does exist, the existence of a being like Satan is a mere
question of degree. It is an unquestionable fact, whether we can explain
it or not, that many men of the worst moral principles have been gifted
with the highest intellectual powers, and have been placed in positions in
society which have enabled them to inflict the greatest evil on others.
History is full of such cases. The most extreme forms of human corruption
have been not inaptly designated as “Satanic.” If therefore under the
moral government of God it is a fact that such forms of human wickedness
exist; and if it is supposable, that there are other rational beings in
the universe endowed with higher powers than man, how can it be
inconceivable that they may differ in moral character, precisely in the
same way as men do; and that some may be eminently virtuous, and others
fearfully corrupt? It is clear that the difficulty centres in the
existence of moral evil in the universe of a God who is possessed of
almighty power, and perfect holiness and goodness. Why has He permitted
it? Is its existence a necessary condition of the creation of a free moral
agent? If so, might not the amount of it have been greatly diminished? The
utmost light that reason can throw on these questions consists of a few
very imperfect glimmerings. The fact is undeniable, that a large mass of
moral evil exists, and in very fearful forms. If there be a Creator of the
universe, it is plain that the present state of things must be consistent
with his attributes. The only mode of escaping from this difficulty is by
taking refuge in the vastly greater ones of pantheism or atheism.
Many theists, pressed by these difficulties, have attempted to evade them
by endeavouring to reduce the amount of moral evil in the universe, the
existence of which they cannot deny, to indefinitely small proportions,
and then affirming that it will be ultimately swallowed up in the ocean of
universal good. But the mere diminishing of its amount by no means solves
the difficulty. The real question is, how has it come even into temporary
existence? But there is also a still more grave objection to this course
of reasoning. It renders it necessary that we should close our eyes to the
most obvious facts. So far is it from being the case that the amount of
moral evil in the world is small, that it is very large. This fact is
indisputable. The whole course of history tells us that it has existed in
all past ages and in very aggravated forms. To try to get rid of the
difficulty in this manner is simply to close our eyes, and refuse to see
it.
But not only does moral, but physical evil exist. This is another
unquestionable fact, and its existence bears directly on my argument. Many
and vain have been the attempts to explain it away. It has been affirmed
that pain after all is no such great matter. I strongly suspect that those
who have asserted this, have experienced but little of it. It is true that
it may ultimately result in good under God’s government, but taken by
itself, it is undeniably an evil. Do not frightful sufferings abound? Do
not most painful diseases afflict our frames? Is it not possible to suffer
terribly from causes quite independent of our own conduct? Is not a great
earthquake a terrible calamity to those who suffer from its effects,
although it may be attended with beneficial results to those who do not?
Pains may be said to be useful warnings; but surely the warning might have
been given without the extremity of the suffering. They are also affirmed
to be the penalties of ignorance, and this may be partially true: but the
ignorance is in a vast majority of cases unavoidable. It is a simple fact,
that a great amount of physical suffering exists, the reason of which we
are wholly unable to explain.
But further: moral evil propagates itself, and inflicts calamities on
those who are not implicated in its guilt. Is it not true that men have
existed both in the ancient and modern world, whose actions have inflicted
the greatest evils on mankind for generation after generation? Can any one
doubt that descendants suffer for the sins of remote ancestors, and
children for those of their parents? Facts are facts, and they will not
become less so by our refusing to look at them. The evil wrought by such a
man as Philip II. of Spain, is a fact, and it has extended its baneful
influence to our own times. Is not a large portion of the evils under
which France has groaned, traceable to the misdeeds of two of her
sovereigns? These were quietly sleeping in their graves, when the evils
they had occasioned burst on the head of their guiltless successor. But it
is needless to quote examples. History is one long succession of them.
Whether we like it or not, the old saying is an accurate account of the
moral order of the universe as it exists, “Visiting the sins of the
fathers on the children unto the third and fourth generation of them that
hate me, and showing mercy unto thousands of them that love me, and keep
my commandments.” These are facts which the theist equally with the
Christian must face, for they exist in the universe of that God, in whose
moral perfections both believe. I repeat, therefore, that the only way of
escaping from them is by rushing into the far greater difficulties of
pantheism or atheism.
These reasonings might be indefinitely extended. The result which follows
from them is clear, that if we attempt to reason from abstract principles
to the constitution of a universe, we shall produce one utterly unlike
that which actually exists. It follows, that as they cannot account for
the facts of the universe, as they come under our observation, they are
unsafe guides on all similar questions. Consequently they are unable to
show that the existence of evil beings possessed of superhuman powers, is
inconsistent with the perfections of God.
Nor is there any greater force in the objection, that if such beings exist
at all, it is inconsistent with our conceptions of the divine government,
that they should be allowed to interfere in the affairs of men. I reply,
that it is equally inconceivable, that God should have allowed a man, to
whom he has imparted the greatest mental endowments, and whom he has
placed in an elevated position in society, who lived centuries ago, to
exert an evil influence on the present generation. The difficulty that a
powerful influence for evil can be exerted by men on those who have never
seen them, and of whose existence they have never heard, is just as great
as the one under consideration. Yet it is one of the most undeniable of
facts, that men do exert the most powerful influence on one another, and
that such influence can be exerted by generations long since passed away
on those who live ages afterwards; and that it can be exerted
unconsciously.
I am far from wishing to deny, that the difficulty is a real one. On the
contrary, I fully admit it; and that it is one which our present faculties
are unable to explain. But it is one which is not peculiar to
Christianity, nor has it originated in it. The interference of superhuman
beings in human affairs for the purposes of evil, would be only another
form of the same difficulty.
Precisely similar reasonings to those which have been employed to prove
that the existence of a being like Satan is impossible, when they are
applied to other subjects, bring us into direct collision with realities.
There can be no doubt, that if the constitution of the universe had been
placed in our hands, its phenomena would have been very different. But our
function is a far humbler one. It is not to erect a universe according to
our conceptions of what is best, but to learn the order of that in which
we live, and to accept facts on sufficient evidence, however strongly they
may conflict with abstract theories.
I now proceed to consider the real difficulty connected with this subject,
and which has been very strongly urged by the author of “Supernatural
Religion.” It is this. “If it is conceivable that beings exist who possess
superhuman knowledge and power; and that they are capable of interfering
as the New Testament affirms, in the affairs of men, how can the
performance of a miracle be the guarantee of a divine commission? May not
inferior agents, who possess superhuman knowledge and power, be able to
produce results which would to all outward appearance be miraculous? Might
not an evil being, who was possessed of the highest intelligence like
Satan, perform such actions as would be equivalent to miracles, for the
purpose of authenticating falsehoods? All that such actions prove is the
presence of superhuman knowledge and power; but they would leave it quite
uncertain whether the power was divine or Satanic.” Such is the objection,
and it demands an adequate solution.
I reply, that if we view the question merely as an abstract one, it is
quite possible, if a superhuman being of high intelligence is permitted to
interfere in the affairs of men, that he should be able to perform actions
which might have all the appearance of being supernatural. Such results
might be even brought about by a superior acquaintance with the existing
forces of nature, and by a successful combination of them, without the
introduction of any new force whatever. For such results we need not
invoke the aid of a supernatural being. They have been frequently effected
by a superior human intelligence acting on an inferior one. We all know
how Columbus used his superior knowledge of astronomy, to predict an
eclipse, and the ignorant natives of America mistook this as denoting the
presence of a superhuman being. Such results may be always produced, when
superior knowledge acts on ignorance; and such is the origin of no
inconsiderable number of impositions which have been practised on mankind.
It is therefore quite conceivable, as an abstract question, that as men
who possess a very superior intelligence, are capable of producing results
which to an inferior intelligence would have the appearance of being
supernatural, without really being so, in the same manner, if Satan is
supposed to possess an intelligence greater than that of the wisest of
mankind, and if his interference in human affairs is permitted, he may be
able to perform actions which would have the appearance of being
supernatural, by a skilful use of the existing forces of nature.
But to such power there must be a limit. There are certain results which
plainly lie beyond the power of any mere combination of the forces of
nature to produce. Of these, many of the miracles recorded in the Gospels
are instances, such as the cure of blind or leprous men by no other
visible instrumentality than a word or a touch. Actions of this kind
differ wholly in character from those which we are now considering. If a
miracle was a more objective fact taking place in external nature, and
nothing more, it might be open to question whether its performance was
owing to supernatural agency, or to some combination of known or unknown
forces. But the miracles with which we are concerned in this controversy,
involve a great deal more than more objective facts in material nature.
But assuming, as I cannot help doing in an argument like the present, the
existence of a God, who is the Creator and Governor of the universe, the
question is not a mere abstract one, what a Being like Satan, if he is
supposed to exist, might be capable of doing; but it becomes entirely one
of permitted agency. It is plain, that if there is a God, every being in
the universe, however powerful or intelligent, can only act within a
certain definite sphere of operation, which the Governor of the universe
has assigned to him. Within what limits then is he allowed act? Are
subordinate agents permitted to interfere with the material forces of
external nature? and if so, within what bounds? Can they wander over the
universe at their mere will and pleasure, and interfere with its
operations? How far is their interference permitted in the moral and
spiritual worlds? The question before as is even reduced to one of far
narrower limits. Our only direct knowledge of the existence of such an
agency is derived from Revelation. The real point therefore which concerns
us is, to what extent is such permitted agency affirmed in the New
Testament. Do the Satanic interventions there described interfere with
divine miracles as attestations of a divine commission? We have nothing
whatever to do with abstract propositions or with what Rabbinical writers
may have affirmed on this subject, but with the assertions of the New
Testament alone.
If there is a God, it is certain that the present order of nature must be
a manifestation of His will. So must be the energy of its forces in
conformity with invariable law. Whatever power He has delegated to
subordinate agents, must form a portion of this universal order, and be
exercised in conformity with the divine purposes. It is inconceivable that
subordinate agents can be allowed to break in upon it at their will and
pleasure, for the general permanence of its order forms an essential
condition for the exercise of moral agency. If they are allowed to do so,
it must be only within clear and definite limits, which ultimately
effectuate the purposes of the Creator. Such is the nature of the power
which man can exert over material nature. It can only modify results, by
giving a new direction to its forces. In the case of man this power is
limited to the world in which he lives. In a similar manner, if beings
superior to him in power and intelligence exist, their interference must
be subject to definite limitations. Such is the uniform affirmation of the
writers of the New Testament. Even if we take their language in the most
literal sense, the supernatural interventions which they attribute to
Satan, are confined to a very definite order of phenomena. In one word,
the sacred writers have described Satanic intervention as limited to the
world of mind; and as capable, through its action on the mind, of
producing certain results on the bodily organization. To this there is one
exception, the apparent ascription of a few diseases to Satanic agency.
This I shall consider hereafter.
It is a remarkable fact, and one worthy of particular attention, that the
supernatural action attributed to Satan in the New Testament, with the
exception above referred to, is a mental one. It is through the action on
men’s minds alone, that demoniacal agency produces any results on their
bodily frame. No direct action on the material forces of nature is ever
attributed to it. We find nothing in the smallest degree resembling the
act of a demon overturning a pitcher of water. The kind of influence
attributed to Satan is of a similar character, though much higher in
degree, to that which one man can exert over another. One man of superior
mental power is capable of exerting an influence over a weaker mind to
such a degree, as almost to enthral it. We call this a species of
fascination. In the New Testament the similar but mightier Satanic
influence is Possession. One mind, by getting a powerful hold on another,
can exert an influence on the body, as in mesmerism. The Satanic influence
exerted in possession is only a more powerful one.
It is certain that the extent to which one human mind can act on another
is bounded by no narrow limits; what is more, it is one which is
frequently exerted for evil. It is evidently within the purposes of the
Creator to permit this. Why it is allowed to the extent to which it is, is
beyond our powers to discover. But the wide extent to which it not only
can be, but actually is exerted, is a fact that cannot be denied. It is
also an influence that can be exerted secretly. The difference between
this power and that which is supposed to be attributed to Satan in the New
Testament is far more one of degree than of kind; and the latter is one
which is bounded by clear and definite limits. Between a Satanic
possession and a miracle performed by Jesus the distinction is
unmistakable.
It follows from the foregoing considerations, that the Satanic
supernaturalism, which we have to consider, as far as if stands in
opposition to the miracles of God, is reduced to very narrow limits. It
consists almost exclusively of possession and its phenomena. No other kind
of action bearing even a remote analogy to a miracle, with the single
exception of the history of the temptation, is anywhere attributed to
Satan in the New Testament.
In estimating the evidential character of miracles, it has been a far too
common practice with those who deny the historical character of the
Gospels, to keep out of view their moral aspect as an important portion of
their evidential value. It has been affirmed that a miracle must be
estimated as an act of power quite apart from its moral impress. The
author before me even goes the length of supposing, that, if Satan is as
cunning as he is represented in the New Testament, he may even turn
himself into an angel of light and perform works bearing the impress of
holiness for the purpose of furthering the interests of the kingdom of
lies.
Such an idea receives no countenance from anything which is affirmed by
St. Paul. The passage in which allusion is made to Satan transforming
himself into an angel of light is as follows: “For such are false
apostles, deceitful workers, transforming themselves into the apostles of
Christ. And no marvel, for Satan himself is transformed into an angel of
light. Therefore it is no great thing if his ministers should be
transformed as the ministers of righteousness.” It is quite clear that
nothing was further from the Apostle’s mind than the idea of Satanic
miracles bearing the impress of holiness as wrought in support of the
kingdom of falsehood. He is simply speaking of Judaizing teachers, who
claimed the support of apostolical authority, for the purpose of
disseminating their unchristian views.
The idea is absurd and ridiculous, but we know that it occurred to the
opponents of our Lord, who charged him with working miracles by Satanic
agency. The special instance in which they made this charge was that of
his supposed expulsion of demons. Our Lord met it by the decisive
argument, “How can Satan cast out Satan? If Satan be divided against
himself, how shall his kingdom stand?” In a word, he appealed to the moral
aspect of his miracles as a convincing proof that their accusation could
only have been instigated by deliberate malice.
The same objection was doubtless urged against his other miracles,
although it is nowhere stated in express terms in the Gospels. But
whatever absurd beliefs may have been entertained by the learned Rabbis,
they were easily met by the common sense of the people. “We know,” said
the Rabbis, “that this man is a sinner.” “How can a man that is a sinner
perform such miracles?” is the reply. “Whether he be a sinner, I know not,
but one thing I know, that whereas I was blind, now I see.” “Can a devil
open the eyes of the blind?” It is evident that the difficulties suggested
by the author of “Supernatural Religion” as to the evidential value of
miracles being nullified by the views which prevailed respecting
demoniacal action were not appreciated when the fourth Gospel was
composed, although according to this theory they ought to have been at
that time in full force. But apart from the peculiar character ascribed to
Satanic supernaturalism in the New Testament, the entire idea that there
could have been any danger of confounding Satanic miracles with the
miracles of God, rests on the fallacy of confounding a mere objective fact
with an action of a moral agent. A miracle does not consist merely in the
outward event, which is caused by him, but in the occurrence united with
the character and purpose of the agent. The actions of holy beings must
bear the impress of their holiness; those of evil ones, of the contrary.
If, therefore, evil moral agents are capable of performing actions which
are analogous to miracles, they cannot fail to be stamped with the evil of
their characters. Such would always form a discriminating mark between
Divine and Satanic miracles, even on the supposition that the latter are
possible.
This precisely represents the case as it stands in the New Testament. All
the miracles alleged to have been wrought by God, bear a definite impress
of character and purpose. The supernaturalism ascribed to Satan is no less
definitely marked. The one clearly comes from above. The indications that
the other, if real, must have come from below, are equally distinct. The
moral impress which the two series of events bear, is fully sufficient to
discriminate the one from the other.
The attempt to distinguish between the miraculous act and its moral
environment, is absurd. It has been affirmed that one miraculous act is as
good as another, quite apart from the circumstances with which they are
attended. Such a principle would destroy the distinction between a highly
meritorious act and the foulest crime. A, for example, has killed B. The
outward act may be the same; but the accompanying circumstances make all
the distinction between a justifiable homicide, and a most atrocious
murder. It is ridiculous to affirm that principles which are legitimate in
common life become invalid only when they are applied to the evidences of
Christianity. Why, in the name of common sense, may not one miracle be as
clearly distinguishable from another by its moral environment, as an event
in ordinary life is similarly distinguished? The affirmation, therefore,
that the supposition of the possibility of Satanic miracles must
invalidate the miracles of God is absurd.
Our Lord, therefore, was right in appealing to the character of his works
as affording a conclusive proof of the source whence they originated, and
in contrasting them with the species of supernaturalism which was
popularly attributed to Satan. “How can Satan cast out Satan? If I do not
the works of my Father, believe me not; but if I do, though ye believe not
me, believe the works, that ye may see and believe that the Father is in
me and I in Him.”
This is conclusive reasoning. It is only possible to darken the question
by treating it as one of bare possibilities, as to what kind of actions a
being like Satan might be capable of performing, if he is allowed to
interfere with the arrangements of the universe at his pleasure. Such a
supposition is foreign to the question at issue, which is whether the
supernaturalism which the New Testament is supposed to attribute to him
can interfere with the evidential value of the miracles wrought by Jesus.
My reply is, Examine and compare the two. When this has been done, no
doubt can remain on any reasonable mind that the latter, if real, are from
above; and the former from below. The affirmation therefore that if
Satanic miracles, such as possession, are possible, it invalidates the
evidence of those wrought by God in attestation of the truth of a divine
commission is disproved.
Equally invalid is the objection against a miraculous attestation to a
divine commission, on the ground that such testimony can be easily
imitated. I reply, that the great mass of the miracles recorded in the New
Testament do not easily admit of a fraudulent imitation. I by no means
deny that the art of legerdemain is capable of producing results which to
an ignorant observer have the appearance of being supernatural. But this
class of actions bears not the smallest analogy to the miracles recorded
in the New Testament. No art of legerdemain can persuade a man who has
been for many years blind to believe that he has recovered his sight, and
enable him to act accordingly.
But it has been argued; if God is the moral Governor of the universe, is
He not bound to prevent a being like Satan from acting for the purposes of
evil in the affairs of men? This question may be best answered by asking
another. Is He not equally bound to hinder evil men from exerting such
terrible influences on others, even long after they are dead? Is He not
bound to hinder the possibility of the bringing up of children by their
parents in various forms of vice, so as to render them in after life, more
wicked than themselves? Yet it is an indubitable fact that such an
influence is exerted under the moral government of God. Human life abounds
with such cases, which bear a close analogy to Satanic action exerted in
the affairs of men. When we can fully fathom the reason for the permission
of the one, we shall have made considerable progress in understanding
those of the other. The case may be simply stated. There are difficulties
in the moral government of the universe, into the grounds of which we
cannot penetrate. These press equally on every form of theism. The Satanic
supernaturalism described in the New Testament presents a precisely
analogous difficulty. This therefore can form no reason why one who
believes that God is the moral Governor of the universe, as it now exists,
should reject Christianity because the difficulties are of a similar
order, and press equally on both. The only escape from them, as I have
already said, is the inevitable position assumed by atheism, or pantheism,
and the dreary prospect which they afford to the aspirations of the human
mind.