Nothing has more contributed to import an almost hopeless confusion of
thought into the entire controversy about miracles than the ambiguous
senses in which the most important terms connected with it have been
employed, both by theologians and men of science, by the defenders of
revelation as well as by its opponents. Of these terms the words “nature,”
“natural”, “law,” “force,” “supernatural,” “superhuman,” “miracle,” and
“miraculous,” are the most conspicuous. It is quite clear that unless we
use these terms in a definite and uniform sense, we shall be fighting the
air. The neglect to do so has thrown the greatest obscurity over the
entire subject. This vague and uncertain use of them is not confined to
writers on theological subjects, but is diffused over a large number of
scientific works. My object in the present chapter will be, not to lay
down strictly accurate definitions of all the terms used in the
controversy (for this in the present state of thought on the subject is
hardly possible) but to endeavour to assign a definite meaning to those
which it will be necessary for me to employ, and to draw attention to some
of the fallacies which a vague use of language has introduced.
First: No terms are more frequently used in this controversy than the
words “nature” and “natural.” They are constantly used as if their meaning
was definite and invariable. Nothing is more common than to use the
expression “laws of nature,” and to speak of miracles as involving
contradictions, violations, and suspensions of the laws and order of
nature, as though there was no danger of our falling into fallacies of
reasoning by classing wholly different orders of phenomena under a common
name.
What do we mean by the terms “nature” and “natural”? It is evident that no
satisfactory result can come from reasonings on this subject, unless the
parties to the discussion agree to attach to those words a steady and
consistent meaning. Are we in fact under the expression “nature” to
include both matter and its phenomena, and mind and its phenomena? Is
nature to include all things which exist, including their causes; laws,
and forces; or is it to be restricted to matter, its laws and forces? Or
is it to include all things that exist, except God? I need hardly observe
that the laying down some clear and definite principles on this subject is
vital to the present controversy.
Again: What do we mean by the laws of nature? How do we distinguish
between the laws and the forces of nature? Do the laws of nature, in the
sense in which that expression is used by science, possess any efficient
power whatever; or ought not efficiency to be predicated only of the
forces of nature, and never of its laws? Or when we speak of the forces of
nature, do we recognise any distinction between material and moral forces,
or do we confound phenomena so utterly differing in outward character, and
on whose difference some of the most important points of the controversy
about miracles rest, under a common name? What again do we mean by the
order of nature? Is it its material order; or does it include the order of
the moral universe? Until we can agree to attach a definite meaning to
these expressions, to argue that miracles are contrary to nature, or
involve a suspension of its laws, or a violation of its order, or even to
affirm the contrary position, is fighting the air. Yet this I may almost
say is the present aspect of the controversy.
Again: What do we intend, when we use the different expressions,
“miracles,” “supernatural,” “superhuman,” or events occurring out of the
order of nature? It is evident that whether they point to any real
distinctions or not, it is necessary to employ them with consistency.
The mere enumeration of these questions makes it clear that by a vague and
indefinite use of terms, or by attaching to them meanings which they
cannot accurately be made to bear, we may unconsciously assume the entire
question at issue.
First: With respect to the terms “nature” and “natural.” What do we
include under them? Bishop Butler considers that the latter term is
satisfied by attaching to it the meaning “usual.” Nature then would mean
the ordinary course of things. But such a meaning would by no means
satisfy the requirements of modern science, philosophy, or theology.
One obvious sense to attach to the word “nature” is to use it to denote
the entire mass of phenomena as contemplated by physical science. In this
point of view it would include matter, its forces, and its laws, and
embrace the entire range of those phenomena and forces where action is
necessary; and into the conception of which neither volition nor freedom
enters. If “nature” and “natural” had been used only in this sense, it
would have saved us from a great mass of inconclusive reasoning. But this
is far from being the case. Not only are they used to include matter, its
laws and forces, but also the whole phenomena of mind.
To this use of the terms the Duke of Argyll has given no inconsiderable
countenance in his admirable work, “The Reign of Law,” especially in the
sixth chapter. He uses the term law as alike applicable to the operations
of mind and matter, and this of course implies that the whole of our
mental phenomena form a portion of nature and its order. He is led to
this, among other considerations, by the use which we make of the word
“natural” as applied to the results of all kinds of mental operations. The
question may fairly be asked, Are not the works wrought by man in nature,
or is not the building of its nest by a bird, or of its comb by the bee, a
natural operation? If so, man, bird, and bee, must form a portion of
nature, and their various actions, of its order.
In a popular point of view such expressions involve no difficulty, and as
a mere verbal distinction the whole question would not be worth the labour
of discussion. But in a question like the one now under consideration,
which requires the utmost accuracy both of thought and reasoning, the case
is far different. The classing together of phenomena which differ so
entirely as mind and matter, under a common term, leads to the inference
that there is no essential difference between them, which involves at the
outset a _petitio principii_ of the entire question under definition. I
shall have occasion repeatedly to point out in the course of this work the
number of fallacious reasonings which have been introduced into the
question about the possibility and the credibility of miracles by thus
including under a common term phenomena utterly different in character. It
would be far better to get rid of words so vague as “nature” and “natural”
in this discussion, and substitute for them terms of which it is
impossible to mistake the meaning, than to employ them in senses which are
simply ambiguous and misleading. But of this more hereafter.
What then are we to do with man? Is he a part of nature and its order? I
reply that man is within material nature as far as regards his bodily
organization; but that he is outside, or above it, and belongs to a
different order, as far as his rational action, his volition, and his
moral powers are concerned. All that I am contending for is that a clear
distinction must be preserved between the necessary action of the forces
of material nature, and the voluntary action of man; and that terms must
be used which accurately denote this distinction. Matter, its forces and
laws, involve the conception of necessary action. They act in a particular
manner because they cannot help so acting. With action purely intellectual
I am not concerned, but all moral action is voluntary. Man as an agent can
act or forbear acting; matter cannot. This distinction is of the highest
importance, and must not be lost sight of behind a confused use of such
terms as natural, law, force, or order of nature, applied indeterminately
to the necessary action of material agents, and the voluntary action of
moral ones.
It will doubtless be objected by a certain order of philosophy that all
mental and moral force is only some special modification of material
force, and consequently that there is no distinction between material and
moral action, or between material and moral force, and that the words
“nature” and “natural” are correctly applied to both alike, as being
simple manifestations of the same original force. To this it will be
sufficient to reply, first: that this is an assertion only, and never has
been nor can be proved. Secondly: that it contradicts the highest of all
our certitudes, the direct testimony of consciousness, which affirms that
we live under a law of freedom, wholly different from the necessary laws
of material nature. Thirdly: that it contradicts the universal experience
of mankind, as embodied in the primary laws of human language and human
thought. To assume this at the commencement of the argument is to take for
granted the point which requires to be proved.
It would be quite out of place in a treatise like the present to attempt
to discuss the question of the origin of the free agency and the moral
nature of man. It is sufficient for the purpose to observe that, however
voluntary agency may have originated, it is a simple fact that it exists
in the universe, and that its phenomena belong to an order of its own. It
is no mere theory, but a fact, that man not only is capable of modifying
the action of the forces of the material universe, but that he has
modified them, and has produced results utterly different from those which
would have followed from their simple action. To use terms in this
controversy which overlook this plain and obvious fact, can lead to no
satisfactory result.
Are then the actions of man, the bird, and the bee, properly designated as
natural? In a popular use of language the question may be one purely
verbal; but when we are dealing with subjects requiring accurate thought,
it is in the highest degree necessary to use language which does not
confound the distinct phenomena of mind and matter under a common
designation. Both together compose the universe; but each belongs to a
different order of phenomena. The whole difficulty proceeds from the fact
that both material forces which act in conformity with necessary laws, and
moral ones which act in conformity with those of freedom, are united in
the person of man.
Another order of thought uses the term “nature” as including everything
that exists, even God; or in other words, it affirms that every thing
which has existed and exists is a manifestation of Him. As this theory
involves the denial of the personality of the Divine Being, it stands
excluded from the question under consideration, namely, the credibility of
miracles, which is utterly irrelevant, except on the assumption of the
existence of a personal God. It ought to be observed, however, that while
theism affirms that God and the universe, whether material or moral, are
distinct, it fully recognises the fact that God is immanent in both the
worlds of mind and matter, while at the same time he transcends them both.
This is an important consideration, which is too often overlooked by both
parties to the discussion.
Secondly: a still greater confusion has been introduced by a vague and
indefinite use of the term “law,” and by confusing a number of utterly
diverse phenomena under the designation of the “laws of nature.” It is
absolutely necessary to trace this fallacy to its source. The Duke of
Argyll tells us in his “Reign of Law” that there are five different senses
at least in which this word is habitually used even in scientific
writings. They are as follows:—
“First, we have law as applied simply to an observed order of facts.”
“Secondly, to that order as involving the action of some force or forces
of which nothing more can be known.”
“Thirdly, as applied to individual forces, the measure of whose operation
has been more or less defined or ascertained.”
“Fourthly, as applied to those combinations of forces which have reference
to the fulfilment of purposes or the discharge of functions.”
“Fifthly, as applied to abstract conceptions of the mind—not corresponding
with any actual phenomena, but deduced therefrom as axioms of thought,
necessary to an understanding of them. Law, in this sense, is a reduction
of the phenomena, not merely to an order of facts, but to an order of
thought.”
“These leading significations of the word Law,” says the Duke, “all circle
round the three great questions which science asks of nature, the what,
the how, and the why.”
“What are the facts in their established order?”
“How, _i.e._ from what physical causes does that order come to be? What
relation do they bear to purpose, to the fulfilment of intention, to the
discharge of function?”
Such are the multiform acceptations attached by scientific men to the term
“law,” yet the Duke is not quite certain whether they may not be even more
numerous. It is evident that if they are all imported into the question of
the credibility of miracles, our position must resemble that of persons
who are compelled to fight in the dark; and that the question whether an
occurrence is natural or supernatural, whether it is contrary to, or a
violation of the laws of nature, or above nature, and many others which
enter into this controversy must be without definite meaning. It is clear
that unless we can restrict the word “law” to one, or at most, two
definite meanings, we shall get into hopeless confusion, or to speak more
correctly, we shall open the gate wide for the introduction of any number
of fallacies.
The primary conception implied by the term “law” is unquestionably one
which is strictly applicable to man and his actions, and can only be
applied metaphorically, and in some systems of thought after a
considerable change of meaning, to the facts and phenomena of the material
universe. A law is a rule of action for human conduct and nothing more.
Such rules of conduct for the most part pre‐suppose that they are imposed
by some external authority, which has the right or the power to enforce
obedience to them; or else that the person obeying them has an inward
feeling that it is right to do so, and knows that his conscience will
reproach him for the omission. But law, strictly speaking, is simply the
rule of action itself, as for instance, an Act of Parliament; but as in
practice all such rules are enforced by a sanction of some kind, our
conception of a law is also united with that of a lawgiver, who has both
the right and the power to enforce it.
It follows therefore that such a conception is essentially a moral one. It
is also intimately united with the knowledge that we possess the power to
act or forbear acting in conformity with its dictates, and, if we prefer
it, of taking the consequences of disobedience. But when such a conception
is transferred to material nature it loses a considerable portion of its
original significancy.
In its application therefore to physical science, it may with strict
propriety be used to denote an invariable order of events: and if the
human analogy could hold in physics it might be used to include the power
which originated and enforced them. But as the consideration of will or
purpose forms no portion of strictly physical science, and is expressly
excluded from it, the term law as used by it ought to denote the
invariable order of sequences, and not to include the forces which
generate them. Unless this distinction is carefully observed, we shall be
in danger of introducing into our reasonings human analogies to which
there is nothing corresponding in nature viewed as a mere body of
unintelligent forces.
The use of the term “law” in physical science ought to be confined to
denote the invariable sequences of the material phenomena. Physicists
profess to know nothing of efficient causation; or of a lawgiver standing
outside his laws and possessing power to enforce them. The whole question
of intelligent agency or purpose lies in a region outside their province.
Law, as far as physical science is acquainted with it, can consist only of
a set of antecedents, followed by an invariable set of consequents. Of any
inherent efficacy in these antecedents to produce their consequents, it
can affirm nothing. A very popular philosophy even denies the power of the
human mind to penetrate beyond this, and affirms that its entire knowledge
is limited to phenomena.
But physical science also deals with forces. These, and not its laws, are
its true principles of causation. Mere invariable sequences can effect
nothing; but forces, such as gravitation, heat, electricity, and the
entire body of chemical forces, or whatever force they may ultimately be
resolved into, can effect much. They are in fact the antecedents of which
the invariable order of events are the consequents. Respecting the
ultimate principle of force, or what is its real nature, or how it is
directed, or came to be, physical science is silent. All that it can do is
to observe the order of their occurrence, measure their quantities, and
tabulate their results. By this means it rises to the conception of what
are called the laws of nature.
If in the present controversy the word law had been used in this sense
only, it would have been wholly unexceptionable. But it becomes far
otherwise when the idea of force or efficiency is introduced into it.
Nothing is more common in the reasonings of those who attempt to prove
that miracles are impossible, than to import into the term law the idea of
force, or efficient causation, even at the very time when the presence of
intelligent action is denied. It is this which imparts to this class of
reasonings their entire speciousness. The laws of material nature are
continually spoken of as though they were forces which are energetic in
the universe, and to the energy of which all things owe their present
form; or in other words, it is assumed that the laws of nature are causes
which have produced by their unintelligent action the present order of the
universe.
Nothing however can be clearer than that a law of nature, in the sense in
which purely physical science can take cognizance of one, can effectuate
nothing. What can an invariable order of sequences effect? Before the idea
of efficiency can be attached to law, the conception of force must be
introduced into it. Modern controversy, however, is constantly in the
habit of speaking of the laws of nature as though they were efficient
agents. We hear of creation by law, evolution by law, of results brought
about by the action of invariable laws, and a countless number of
assertions of a similar description. To such expressions in a popular
sense when no accuracy of expression is required, there is no objection;
but when they are introduced into the controversy respecting the
credibility of miracles, they create nothing but confusion. What is really
meant is, that such results are brought about by the action of forces
which act in conformity with invariable laws, but the idea of intelligence
and volition is carefully excluded from the conception. It is clearly
inaccurate to speak of laws reigning. Laws do not reign even in political
societies; but only the power which is able to enact and enforce them. In
material nature the only things which possess efficiency are its forces.
There can be no objection to the use of the expression, “the laws of
mind,” when care is taken to use language which clearly distinguishes
between them and unintelligent and necessary sequences of material nature.
But when the term “law” is without any qualification applied to both sets
of phenomena alike, it is certain either to lead to fallacious reasoning,
or to involve the assumption of the point at issue. Whatever may be the
origin of the moral and spiritual in man, it is certain that as they at
present exist in him, they stand out in the strongest contrast with the
forces which act upon material things, and with the laws of their action.
Nothing can be more entirely different in character than the force of
gravitation and the principles of volition and self‐consciousness, or than
the unconscious forces of material nature and those principles which
constitute our rationality. If we affirm that the forces of mind act in
conformity with law, it ought to be clearly understood that they act in
conformity with a law of their own, which affords free action to the
principle of volition. Otherwise there is the greatest danger that the
expression will involve the covert assumption of the truth of the doctrine
of philosophical necessity, or in other words, that all mental and
material forces are of the same character, that is to say, that they are
both equally necessary. This involves the assumption of the very point on
which the entire controversy turns, for if moral and material forces and
laws are all alike, it destroys the conception of a God, and the
significance of a miracle.
This brings us to the conception of force, what is it? Various definitions
of it have been given sufficiently accurate for practical purposes. It
should be observed however that physical science can know nothing of it
except as a phenomenon. The determination of its nature, and its ultimate
cause lie entirely beyond its limits. Many facts respecting it, have been
ascertained and tabulated. Many of its manifestations, which bear a
different phenomenal aspect, it has ascertained to be capable of
transmutation into one another. But it must never be forgotten that it is
able to affirm nothing respecting the source in which the forces of the
universe originate. All that it can affirm is, that they do exist. The
original conception of force is one, however, which we derive, not from
the material universe, but from the action of our own minds. We are
conscious that we are efficient agents, and that definite results follow
the action of our wills. This gives us the conception of force. We apply
it in a metaphorical sense to certain things which we observe in the
material universe and call them forces, having abstracted from our primary
idea of force the conception of volition. But all that we really know
about force tends to prove that its origin is mental and not material.
It is of the utmost importance to preserve a clear distinction between the
unconscious forces of matter and the intelligent ones of mind; otherwise
we shall inevitably be misled by such expressions as “the forces of
nature.” It is impossible to argue the question unless the distinction is
admitted as a fact, whatever theory may be held about their origin. It is
absurd to confound principles so distinct as heat, or gravitation, or
electricity, with those which produce the most disinterested moral
actions, and designate them by the common term “natural forces.” In common
language we are in no danger of error when we speak of the force of
conscience, or the force of a motive; but in discussions like the present,
where such expressions really involve the assumption of the whole
controversy, it is absurd to classify such phenomena, and the
unintelligent forces of matter under a common designation, unless it can
be demonstrated that they are all manifestations of the same power.
We come now to the much vexed question as to the meaning to be attached to
the words “miracle” and “miraculous;” and the terms closely allied to
them, “supernatural” and “superhuman.” Is there any valid distinction
between miracles and supernatural occurrences? Are, in fact, all miracles
supernatural occurrences, and all supernatural occurrences miracles? The
determination of this question is closely connected with an important
point which will be considered hereafter, viz., whether a miracle could
have any evidential value if it were brought about by a special adaptation
of the known or unknown forces of material nature.
Let it be observed that we are not discussing this question as a purely
abstract one, but in reference to the truth of Christianity. What miracles
may be in themselves, I shall not inquire; but in relation to the question
before us, what we mean when we call an occurrence a miracle ought to be
made sufficiently clear and distinct. In this controversy it would greatly
tend to precision if we used the term “miracle” as distinguished from an
occurrence which is supernatural or superhuman, to denote only those
supernatural occurrences which have an evidential value in connection with
the evidences of a divine revelation, since there may be supernatural
occurrences which would not be in any proper sense evidential.
But the further question arises, Is it necessary in order to constitute an
event a miracle that it should be one which transcends the known or the
unknown forces of material nature to have produced? It is clear that to
constitute an event a miracle it must involve supernatural or superhuman
agency of some kind; that is to say, it must be either supernatural in the
mode of its production as an objective fact, or superhuman in its
productive elements, by which I mean, that it must be preceded by an
announcement that it is going to occur, which must be beyond the sphere of
human knowledge. In order to render a supernatural event evidential, or in
other words to constitute it a miracle, it must not only consist of an
external objective fact, but its occurrence must be unknown beforehand,
and take place at the bidding of the agent. Such previous announcement, or
prediction, is necessary to render even a supernatural occurrence in the
strictest sense of the word a miracle. The prediction of some occurrence
in physical nature previously unknown may therefore convert such an event
into an evidential miracle, although the occurrence itself as a mere
objective fact may have been brought about by some known or unknown forces
of material nature. To render it such it would be necessary that the
knowledge of the occurrence should be clearly beyond the bounds of
existing knowledge. Thus, if any person, when the science of astronomy was
utterly unknown, had announced beforehand the day and the hour of the
occurrence of the next two transits of Venus, and the various places on
the earth’s surface in which they would be visible, and if the events had
taken place accordingly, this would have unquestionably proved the
presence of superhuman knowledge. The only question which in such a case
would require to be determined would be whether such a knowledge must have
been communicated by God, or by some being inferior to God. As however
none of the miracles recorded in the New Testament have the smallest
appearance of being of this character, I need not further discuss a
supposed case. My only reason for referring to it is, that if it is
supposable that any of the miracles recorded in the New Testament could,
at some future day, be shown to have been due to a combination of physical
forces, their occurring instantly at the direct command of the agent would
still give them an evidential value.
But it is clear that the miracles recorded in the New Testament, if caused
by material forces at all, could not have been due to their ordinary
action. They must have been due either to an unknown combination of known
forces, or to the calling of unknown forces into activity, or to the
immediate agency of the divine mind. It is clear therefore that their
occurrence as objective facts proves the presence of mind acting in some
way on the material forces of nature. To determine the mode in which this
action mast have taken place has nothing to do with the question of
miracles, or the reality of their occurrence.
A miracle therefore may, for all practical purposes of this argument, be
defined as an occurrence which cannot be effectuated by the ordinary
action of the known material forces of the Universe, and could only have
been brought about by the agency of intelligent volition; and which is
preceded by an announcement on the part of the agent that it is about to
happen or takes place directly on his bidding. The latter element, as I
have observed, is essential to constitute the occurrence an evidential
miracle. Otherwise in our ignorance of what unknown forces may exist in
the universe, we could have no certainty that the event was not a mere
unusual occurrence effected by some already existing but unknown forces.
To the highest form of the miracles in the New Testament, however, such an
idea would be inapplicable.
It may perhaps here be objected that in laying down this definition of a
miracle, I have not sufficiently identified its performance with the
governing power of the universe, _i.e._ God; but that if supernatural
agents exist, inferior to God, it may be due to their operation; and
consequently that it may not be evidential of a divine commission. This
objection will be fully considered in a subsequent portion of this work.
A supernatural event is one which exceeds and which cannot be effected by
any force existing in material nature. But there must always be a
difficulty in determining whether an occurrence, viewed as a bare
objective fact, belongs to that class of events which is supernatural, or
only to that which is unusual. This will always be the case until our
knowledge of the forces of the universe is so complete that we can
ascertain for certain what are the limits of their possible action, and
whether it is possible to bring into action any forces that may exist, but
are unknown to us. In strict language therefore, it is impossible to be
certain whether an occurrence, as a bare objective fact, is supernatural,
until we are acquainted with the possible action of every force that
exists in the universe. This difficulty, however, is one that is entirely
theoretical, and has not the smallest practical importance with respect to
the miracles of the New Testament. Men have had several thousand years’
experience of what can be effected by the ordinary forces of material
nature. Occurrences which lie beyond their power to effectuate prove the
presence of intelligence and volition. The introduction of an unknown
force can only be accomplished by a being who, although he may be immanent
in nature, is yet capable of controlling its material forces. Occurrences
therefore which transcend the power of the known forces existing in the
universe to accomplish, whether they are material or human, may for all
practical purposes be viewed as supernatural; that is to say, they denote
the presence and agency of a being who is possessed of power,
intelligence, and volition. Whether that being be human, superhuman, or
divine, must be determined by an intelligent exercise of our reason.
It is useless to discuss this question further. We are dealing with a very
definite question, the miraculous events recorded in the Gospels. With
respect to the great majority of them, there can be no doubt as to their
being supernatural occurrences, if they took place precisely as they are
recorded. We know enough of the ordinary forces of material nature to be
certain that the instantaneous cure of a blind or leprous man by a word
does not lie within the sphere of their operation. Such an event must
denote the special interposition of an extremely high degree of
intelligence and power. Common sense will affirm that it could only be
brought about by the intervention of the supreme power of the universe,
_i.e._ God.
In this sense every supernatural occurrence may be said to be likewise
evidential, when we have ascertained for certain that it is due to
supernatural causes, and that it cannot have been brought about by the
action of unintelligent forces, or by those which are capable of being
modified by the agency of man. But in that case it would only prove the
presence and intervention of a being who is capable of controlling the
unintelligent forces of nature. The real difficulty, as I have observed,
is to prove the supernatural nature of the occurrence. But although, if it
was certainly supernatural, it would prove the intervention of a
supernatural agent, it would say nothing as to the purpose for which such
an intervention took place. It follows therefore, that to constitute a
supernatural occurrence in the strict sense of the term a miracle, it must
take place after an announcement that it is going to happen, and take
place at the bidding of the agent who performs it.
It is highly important, in considering the miracles of the Gospels, that
the distinction between a merely supernatural event and an evidential
miracle should be kept steadily in view. All creative acts would be
supernatural events, but they would not necessarily be evidential
miracles. The incarnation, and other occurrences mentioned in the New
Testament, are supernatural ones; but to mix them up with evidential
miracles is simply to invite confusion of thought. Another class of
supernatural occurrences mentioned in the New Testament seem to have been
wrought, not for purposes directly evidential, but to awaken attention;
and another class of supernatural endowments were vouchsafed, to render it
possible to lay deep in human society the foundations of the Church as a
visible and permanent institution. Such occurrences are not directly but
indirectly evidential, and it will be necessary carefully to distinguish
between them and occurrences brought about for directly evidential
purposes. To keep this distinction clear, I shall designate the last by
the term “miracle.” A miracle is supernatural in two ways: namely, in the
agency which produced the objective fact, and in the announcement of its
occurrence.
The common definition of a miracle, as a violation or a suspension of the
laws of nature, is open to very grave objections. The question, as I have
observed, at once arises, what is included under nature? It also assumes
that we are acquainted with the mode in which miraculous agency must be
exerted; which we are not. Other definitions which have been proposed take
for granted positions which those who undertake to prove the credibility
of miracles ought never to concede. The plain fact is, that we are simply
ignorant of the mode in which God acts on material nature; and every
definition must be faulty which assumes that we have that knowledge. To
say that miracles must involve even a suspension of the laws of nature
introduces a needless difficulty. No law or force of nature need be
suspended in its action to render the occurrence of a supernatural event
possible. All that is necessary is that forces should be introduced which
are capable of overbalancing the action of opposing forces. It is
extremely inaccurate to affirm that the force of gravitation must be
suspended in order to render possible either walking on the water, or an
ascent into the sky.
It is equally unwise and unphilosophical to affirm that God cannot work a
miracle by the use of intermediate agencies, _i.e._ by the partial
employment of the forces of the material universe. It is true that in most
of the miracles recorded in the New Testament we cannot affirm the use of
such media, although we observe an economy in the use of divine power:
_i.e._ no power is exerted beyond that which is necessary to produce the
particular result in question. But in the Old Testament the use of such
media is unquestionably affirmed. To lay down in our definition of a
miracle a particular theory as to the mode in which it must be
accomplished, involves the whole subject in needless difficulties.
This question has been obscured by representing a miracle as performed by
the intervention of a higher law, superseding the action of a lower one.
This introduces the conception of force into the idea of law, and leads to
confusion of thought. Laws, or the invariable sequences between phenomena,
are neither forces nor powers. The counteraction of one force by another
is an event of daily occurrence. All that is needful for the working of a
miracle is the intervention of a force or mental energy which is capable
of acting on matter, and of overbalancing those ordinary forces which
would produce a contrary result.
It has also been urged that miracles may obey a law of miracles. The best
illustration of this idea is that which has been supplied from the
supposed operations of Mr. Babbage’s calculating machine. He supposes that
a machine might be constructed which could go on grinding out a particular
set of results for a long, yet definite period of time; then by the
operation of the same machine, that a fresh order might be introduced; and
afterwards that it might revert to the original one; and that this
operation might be continued for ever. If therefore the great Author of
nature had so planned the machine of the universe that whenever a miracle
was requisite in His scheme of Providence this abnormal event occurred,
like the new series introduced into the calculating mill, in that case
miracles might be said to follow a definite law, which might be designated
the law and order of miraculous intervention.
It is impossible to deny the ingenuity of this theory, but unfortunately
it is not only one which takes for granted that the perfection of
mechanical contrivance is the only thing that the Creator had in view in
the production of the universe, but even if this were an unquestionable
fact, it could afford us no help with respect to all the most important
miracles recorded in the New Testament. How is it possible, I ask, to
account for many of our Lord’s miracles on such a supposition? It is
expressly affirmed that this supernatural energy was frequently made to
depend on the faith of the person who invoked His help. Could any miracle‐
working mill be even conceived of, which could bring out, as part of the
normal law of its operations, the cure of blind, deaf, and leprous men by
a word, or effectuate His own resurrection from the dead, or ascension
into Heaven? Such occurrences could not be produced by the action of any
machine which has the smallest analogy to a calculating mill. But further:
such an operation would be impotent to answer the purposes of a miracle,
unless the particular result was announced beforehand by one who was
completely ignorant that the machine was capable of producing such
extraordinary results. This ignorance would likewise have to be extended
to those to whom the announcement was made. It would also be necessary
that the announcer should proclaim that on a particular day and hour the
machine would grind out the particular result of the cure of a blind man,
or a resurrection from the dead. The ability to do this would be utterly
abnormal, and impossible ever to be ground out by the self‐acting agency
of any conceivable machine, however cleverly constructed. Mr. Babbage’s
miracle‐working mill, however ingenious a conception, must therefore be
dismissed as incapable of affording us the smallest help in the present
argument.
The term “superhuman” remains to be considered. It need not detain us
long. Superhuman implies a result brought about by the intervention of a
being superior to man. Whether such an agent be divine or otherwise can
only be determined by the exercise of our reason. It has been objected
that the agency which produces an earthquake is a superhuman agency, that
is, it exceeds the powers of man to produce it. Granted: but this has no
bearing on the subject under discussion. When we use the word “superhuman”
we always mean by it, not the action of the unintelligent forces of
material nature, but of a being possessed of intelligence and will.
There is a large number of other subjects having an intimate bearing on
the correct definition of the terms habitually used in this controversy,
and which greatly modify their meaning. These however will best be
considered when I enter on the direct discussion of the possibility and
the credibility of miracles.