the year 1821 they found it necessary to strengthen themselves by a
coalition with the Conservative section of the Opposition, hoping by
this means to give a more broad and liberal appearance to the
administration. Lord Grenville himself declined office, but several of
his followers were admitted to the ministry, while a still further
improvement was made by the retirement of Lord Sidmouth, who had played
so prominent a part in all the late repressive measures, and the
substitution in his place of Mr. Peel, as yet Tory in his views, but
capable, as was subsequently proved, of constant advance, and of an
intellect so clear and sensible as to be able to learn, as his
predecessor never could, the growing requirements of the time. At the
same time Lord Wellesley was sent as Lord-Lieutenant to Ireland, with
Mr. Plunkett as his Attorney-General, both of them supporters of the
Catholic claims; and although Wellesley's statesmanlike character and
moderation excited the anger of extreme men on both sides, the mere fact
of such a man being placed at the head of the Irish Government was a
clear mark of the relaxation of the principles of the Tory system. These
new appointments were but the beginning, to be followed in a few months
by other changes far more important, which were to effect an entire
alteration in the position which England occupied in Europe, and in the
principles which governed her financial policy. These changes were the
admission, in 1822 and 1823, of Mr. Canning and Mr. Huskisson to the
ministry. Throughout the trial of Queen Caroline, Canning had held
himself studiously aloof. He had been early one of the Queen's advisers,
had declared from the first his intention to avoid any participation in
her trial, and had in fact remained abroad during its continuance. On
his return in December, thinking it impossible for a minister to be
entirely absent from his duties, but determined to take no part in the
discussions on the trial which were inevitable, he insisted on resigning
his place at the Board of Trade. He was therefore at first excluded from
the new ministerial arrangements. The India Company indeed had decided
upon sending him as Governor-General to India. His preparations for
taking the post were being made, and he was at Liverpool on a farewell
visit to his constituents, when a piece of news was heard which caused a
profound movement both at home and abroad,--Lord Castlereagh, now become
Lord Londonderry, had committed suicide. The man who was regarded as the
real soul of the Tory party, as the type of the arbitrary and
absolutist temper which distinguished it, had passed away. Honourable
and amiable in his private life, he had contrived to render himself so
unpopular that the news of his death was received with unseemly
rejoicings, and his coffin was followed to the Abbey with shouts of
gladness from his enemies. Europe was in a critical condition. Lord
Londonderry had been in the act of going to an European Congress held at
Verona. Canning appeared to be the only man fitted to supply his place.
When asked to join the ministry as Secretary of State for foreign
affairs, after some consideration, he threw up the great post for which
he was at the moment destined, and accepted the office.
[Sidenote: Retrospect of the affairs of Europe.]
[Sidenote: Position of England abroad.]
To understand the importance of this change it is necessary to say a few
words on what had passed in Europe since the Peace. The hopes of the
liberal party in Europe had received a heavy blow at the Congress of
Vienna. England had so constantly put herself forward as the champion of
freedom, and her influence had been so preponderating in the late events
of the war, that she was expected to have taken up strong ground in the
settlement of Europe, and to have demanded and secured some sort of
popular rights in the countries to which her assistance had been given.
The nation had shown itself so full of resources, and had been so
exceptional in the success of its opposition to Napoleon, that a general
belief had arisen that there was something peculiarly excellent in the
character of its constitution. So strong was this feeling, that many of
the sovereigns of Europe promised constitutions to their people. It was
forgotten that the freedom for which England had been fighting meant
deliverance from external conquest, and had no connection with the
internal freedom of national constitutions, that, on the contrary, the
war against France had been originally undertaken, if not ostensibly yet
really, to oppose the revolutionary temper of France. It was a severe
disappointment when the English minister was seen joining with
Talleyrand in upholding legitimacy, and for the sake of that principle,
and to preserve in its old lines the balance of European power, himself
demanding the destruction of the liberty of Belgium and of Genoa, and
calmly acquiescing in the absorption of much of Saxony, the final
division of Poland, and the destruction of Norway. Even the one
constitutional effort which was made, the establishment of a limited
monarchy in France, was rendered nugatory by the fact, that the
privileges were given as a grant and charter from the crown, and the
first principle of the English Constitution--that power is from the
people--ignored.
[Sidenote: Effect of Castlereagh's policy.]
But though in the general triumph of the moment his foreign policy was
accepted and even approved, it will be remembered that even Castlereagh
felt himself compelled to respect public opinion at home and to hold
aloof from the Holy Alliance, which seemed to assert the unity of
interests of the crowned heads and their sole right, as of divine
origin, to be the governors of the world. It was the extension of the
principles of the Holy Alliance which had produced the present critical
state of Europe, with which his moderate abilities, his natural tendency
towards repressive government, aggravated by domestic affairs, and the
entanglements in which his policy at the Vienna Treaty had involved him,
rendered Castlereagh unable to cope. It was no use to ignore the fact
that the French Revolution had given a great impulse to the ideas of
constitutional freedom. Even the conquests of Napoleon, followed as they
always were by democratic changes, had fostered these ideas in the very
countries which had suffered most from them; and when it appeared that
all hopes and promises of freedom were entirely illusory, insurrections
of the deceived people burst out in several parts of Europe, and where
the strength of the government rendered such outbreaks impossible,
secret societies, more dangerous and extravagant because they were
secret, sprang everywhere into existence.
[Sidenote: Insurrection in Spain. 1820.]
[Sidenote: Insurrection in Portugal.]
[Sidenote: Insurrection in Naples.]
The first outbreak was in Spain, where Ferdinand had entirely refused
the constitution to which he was pledged, and had shown his character by
directing his vengeance chiefly against those very men who had been most
prominent in saving his kingdom from the French. During the occupation
of Spain by the French, when the central authority of the mother country
was virtually destroyed, the South American colonies had, one after the
other, thrown off their allegiance, and were still engaged in making
good their independence. It was an army collected at Cadiz for the
purpose of reducing the victorious colonies which set the example of
insurrection. It mutinied in the beginning of the year 1820, and was so
successful that the King was compelled, on the 7th of March, to accept
the constitution of 1812, which had been drawn up under the influence of
Napoleonic and American ideas. In August the constitutional spirit
passed to Portugal. Since the departure of the royal family from Lisbon
in 1808, the King had not returned to his European dominions. Brazil
became the seat of government, the restrictions formerly put upon its
trade were removed, it was elevated nominally to the rank of a kingdom,
and Portugal seemed to occupy the position of a colony of its former
dependency. The discontent which had thus been fostered displayed itself
in August, when national Juntas were established both in Oporto and
Lisbon; subsequently, on the 1st of October, the provincial assembly
coalesced with that of the capital, and the regency was compelled to
resign its functions. When at length in the following spring the King
set out for his continental dominions, it was a question whether he
would arrive in time to save them. Almost at the same time similar
events took place in Naples. Ferdinand IV. could not entirely disregard
popular wishes and rule despotically, as his nephew in Spain had done,
for the longer and more complete hold which Murat, Napoleon's nominee,
had obtained upon the throne had given time for ideas of constitutional
government to become prevalent, and the army was full of Napoleonic
soldiers. But in spite of the comparative liberality of his government,
Ferdinand's army was full of discontented soldiers, and the secret and
revolutionary societies of the Carbonari undermined society. At the same
time, in the island of Sicily a constitution had been established under
the influence of Lord William Bentinck, and had been swept away on the
restoration. In July the garrison at Nola mutinied, and before a week
was over the King was obliged to accept the Spanish constitution, which
had become the formula of the Liberal party, although there was actually
no copy of that document to be found, and no one in fact knew anything
about it. Sicily soon followed Naples; but recollections of its old
independence prevented it at first from joining the revolutionary
government of the mainland, and its complete acquiescence in the
movement had to be secured by force of arms.
[Sidenote: Arbitrary action of the Holy Alliance.]
[Sidenote: England refuses to join.]
[Sidenote: Popular anger at Castlereagh's weak policy. 1821.]
It was in presence of these disturbances that the true principles of the
Holy Alliance began to show themselves. The three Eastern powers seemed
to consider themselves authorized to introduce into Europe a new form of
international law. Regarding themselves as the only legitimate and
divinely appointed powers, and holding themselves pledged to mutual
support against their enemies, and having declared their intention to
act as a brotherhood in international questions, they appear to have
believed that the enemies against whom their mutual assistance was
required were all those who resisted established authority, and that any
disturbances thus arising ought to be regulated by European congresses.
In other words, they arrogated to themselves, for the sake of
suppressing what they considered revolutionary movements, the right of
federative action in the cause of legitimacy and absolutism. Already, at
Vienna and Aix-la-Chapelle, they had acted more or less on this
principle, and now they summoned a similar Congress at Troppau (1820).
It was impossible for an English minister to accede to this new
doctrine, however much he may have had at heart the cause which the
allied sovereigns were supporting, and Lord Castlereagh, as early as
April, declared that the alliance to which England was a party existed
for particular cases only, and was not to be generalized as the Eastern
sovereigns appeared to wish to generalize it. It shows how the position
of England had sunk under Castlereagh's management, that the monarchs
determined to act without England, and it shows the weakness of
Castlereagh's mode of action that he allowed, under these circumstances,
an English minister to be present at the meeting, not to take part in
the discussions, but merely to report their progress to his Government.
The Holy Alliance proceeded to act upon its own principles. In November
the English minister learnt that the three powers intended to join and
to act in common for the restoration of Ferdinand of Naples, whom they
had invited to meet them at Laibach, whither the Congress was adjourned.
Early in December 1820 a circular to that effect was issued in the name
of the three sovereigns, which, in spite of what Castlereagh had said,
proceeded to declare that, as what they were now doing was in accordance
with the late treaties, they felt no doubt of the adhesion of France and
England. On the 19th of that month, without knowledge of this circular,
Castlereagh wrote an explicit declaration that England would not join in
any united action. Had he openly declared this intention and withdrawn
the English ambassador he would not have acted otherwise than as became
an English minister. But on the 19th of January 1821 a letter of
Castlereagh's, purporting to be an answer to the circular of December
8th, which had been published by some indiscretion in the public prints,
while reasserting the position he had taken up in his previous
declaration, went on to confess that the Government had looked with the
strongest disapproval on the insurrection in Naples. This weak document,
coming as it did just before the meeting of Parliament, after the
popular temper had been roused by the knowledge of the arrogant circular
of December, and taken in connection with the facts that diplomatic
relations had not been renewed with the constitutional Government of
Naples, and that an English fleet was cruising off the coast, seemed to
show that the minister's heart was really with the sovereigns, and that
his letter was only written to suit party purposes in England. At the
opening of Parliament (Jan. 23, 1821) the Government had to withstand
the most bitter assaults from the Opposition, headed by Lords Grey and
Holland in the Lords, by Mackintosh, Brougham, and Tierney in the Lower
House, and although a public vote of censure, considering the
constitution of the House, was out of the question, it was plain that
the feeling of all parties was strong against the action of the Holy
Alliance. The attacks on the minister were still continuing when the
uselessness of English interference was demonstrated by the entrance of
an Austrian army into Italy, by which the revolution was summarily
suppressed.
[Sidenote: Insurrection in Greece. March 1821.]
It was not only in the West of Europe that difficulties arose. The
Christian populations under the power of the Ottoman Porte rose in
insurrection. They naturally looked, as they have always looked, to the
Czar for protection. Their method of proceeding was closely analogous to
that of the revolutionists in the rest of Europe; and in Greece, as in
Italy, secret societies were organized against the existing powers. It
has always been a part of Russian policy to secure as much influence in
Turkey as possible. On the other hand, it was impossible for the
English, at that time in constant diplomatic rivalry with Russia, to
wish to see that power in possession of Constantinople or the Black Sea.
In the affairs of Greece therefore a complete inversion of the
principles which had been predominant at the Congress of Troppau was
visible. The interests of Russia demanded that she should assist a
revolutionary movement backed up by secret societies and directed
against a legitimate sovereign, while England felt itself compelled to
allege the doctrines of legitimacy and to call to its aid old alliances
in order to shelter Turkey. The difficulty was so great that it was
determined that this question also should be referred to a Congress,
which was held first at Vienna, and subsequently moved to Verona.
[Sidenote: Complications between France and Spain. 1821.]
[Sidenote: Congress at Verona. Sept. 1822.]
But meanwhile fresh complications had arisen in the West. A terrible
visitation of the yellow fever had come upon Spain. Under pretext of
excluding the infection from their own country, the French had massed
troops along the borders; but it soon became evident that something
beyond sanitary precautions had inspired this movement. When the illness
disappeared there was still an army of 100,000 men lying within reach
of the Pyrenees. In fact, the Legitimists of France had seen with
extreme dislike the revolution in Spain; it was political infection they
were chiefly anxious to avoid, and the more advanced members of that
party, which had a large majority in the French Houses, were thinking of
the invasion of Spain, and the re-establishment by force of arms of the
absolutist rule of Ferdinand. Lord Londonderry was preparing to attend
the Congress at Verona when his health and reason gave way and he
committed suicide. In his place the Duke of Wellington attended the
Congress, and was somewhat surprised to find that, instead of the Greek
question, the real point at issue was the demand of France for a joint
action on the part of the Legitimist Courts of Europe to suppress the
revolution in Spain.
[Sidenote: Object of Canning's policy.]
It was to the management of this difficult affair that Canning was
called. It cannot be said that he introduced a new system into our
diplomacy. He had been a party to some of the declarations of his
predecessor, and had accepted the responsibility of them. In fact, as
has been seen in his public despatches, Castlereagh had already declared
the impossibility of English co-operation in any general scheme of
repressive action on the Continent, and his dislike to the government of
Europe by congresses. It is the way in which Canning acted up to and
rendered practical those declarations which makes it possible to say
that his accession to office was an era in English politics. His
instructions to Wellington were clear and precise. If a declaration of
any such determination--that is, of joint action--should be made at
Verona, come what might the Duke was to refuse the King's consent to
become a party to it, even though the dissolution of the alliance should
be the consequence of his refusal. Canning's object was to secure
European peace and to allow nations freedom of choice as to their own
government--to re-establish, in fact, in England and throughout Europe a
policy based upon national grounds, as distinguished from that system of
united and general policy by means of European congresses under which
Europe since the peace had been labouring.
[Sidenote: Partial success of Canning's diplomacy in Spain.]
In the first of his objects Canning was partially successful. The
distinct refusal of Wellington to join in united action, and his
subsequent withdrawal from the Congress, prevented a general European
attack upon Spain. He could not entirely prevent the war, but he
succeeded in reducing it to the dimensions of a national war. He used
his best endeavours to persuade France not to attack Spain. He declared
that the free institutions of the Spanish people could not, as the
French King had asserted, be only held legitimately from the spontaneous
gift of the sovereign; the Spanish nation could not be expected to
subscribe to that principle, nor could any British statesman uphold or
defend it; it was in fact a principle that struck at the root of the
British Constitution. In his eagerness to avert hostilities he even
entreated the Spaniards to make changes in their constitution. His
efforts on both sides were vain. The French invaded Spain; on the 2nd of
May 1823 they entered Madrid; on the 1st of October Cadiz was
surrendered, and Ferdinand and his absolute government were
re-established. But in the matter of English interests Canning declared
himself plainly. Portugal might be involved, and an effort might be made
by Spain, with the assistance of France, to reconquer her colonies.
Should Portugal join with Spain voluntarily, England would take no
notice; but if that country were invaded, England would of necessity
come to the assistance of her old ally. With regard to the colonies he
took a similar ground. They were virtually independent; during the
contest, true to his principle of neutrality, he had abetted Government
in preventing Englishmen from joining the insurgents; but the trade with
the colonies being now open, the interests of England were so involved
with their independence that he would not allow any foreign nation to
join in reconquering them; if Spain was itself unable to subdue them, no
foreign country, he declared, should subdue them for her. He followed up
this policy by declaring that he would send English consuls to protect
British trade, and their appointment was in fact the recognition of the
independence of the colonies.
The new minister's conduct at the negotiations at Verona was subjected
to warm discussion at the beginning of the year 1823. The firm attitude
of neutrality which he had taken up did not satisfy the aspirations of
those who looked upon his accession to office as the triumph of the Whig
party. But his vindication was so complete that, upon the division, the
opinion of the House appeared to be quite unanimous. The Opposition was
only twenty in a House of 372, and of those twenty some were professed
ministerialists, who had been shut out from voting by the crowd of their
own adherents.
[Sidenote: Change in commercial policy effected by Huskisson.]
But it was not only in our foreign policy that a change of spirit now
became obvious. In the winter of 1823, a few months after the accession
of Canning to office, further changes took place in the ministry. Mr.
Vansittart resigned the place of Chancellor of the Exchequer, for which
he was very unfit, and went into the Upper House as Lord Bexley. Mr.
Robinson (afterwards Lord Goderich) succeeded him, and, much more
important, Mr. Huskisson was in January made President of the Board of
Trade, and with him a complete alteration came over our commercial
policy, and the reign of restriction began to give way and yield place
to free trade. The questions at issue had not yet become party tests, as
they subsequently were, and Huskisson, as member of a Tory ministry, was
able by his comprehension of the true principles of trade to set on foot
a new system without separating from his colleagues.
[Sidenote: Financial condition of England.]
The expenses of the war had been enormous, perhaps inevitably so, and
the taxes were proportionately heavy. During the last year of the war in
taxes and loans upwards of £170,000,000 had been raised. The National
Debt amounted to nearly £800,000,000, and to meet the necessities of the
moment this had been raised by very expensive methods, so that the
nominal sum on which interest was paid was considerably higher than the
actual money which had passed into Government hands. Mr. Vansittart, who
had had the management of the finances, had no real knowledge of
financial principles, and had acted on the simple plan of increasing
taxes when more money was necessary, and supplying the deficit by loans
contracted in an extravagant fashion, or taken from the sinking fund. He
did not see that doubling a tax by no means doubled the returns from it,
as it inevitably compelled some people, and those the most numerous and
poorest, to surrender the taxed article; and in common with many people
at the time, he believed in the magical effect of the sinking fund,
although the sum yearly paid to it was derived from loans contracted at
considerably higher interest than the fund itself bore. The sinking fund
indeed had, in the hands of the present Government, almost lost its
original object, and was openly declared both by Vansittart and
Castlereagh to be chiefly useful for supplying the ministry with an easy
means of getting money to meet emergencies, instead of a sacred deposit
to be used only for the extinction of debt. The ease with which all
money demands of Government were granted during the war had also
engendered a spirit of extravagance, and economy had been one of the
earliest cries of the Opposition on the resumption of peace. At first
the support of the large standing army which still remained on foot, and
other expenses which were regarded as necessary, had apparently
prevented any relaxation of taxes, but by degrees the universal
discontent excited by their pressure had compelled Government to grant
some relief, and a certain number of taxes had been taken off or
reduced.
[Sidenote: The resources of the country restricted by protective laws.]