hope. Already, as early as the beginning of 1810, the appropriation by
Napoleon of the estates of the Duke of Oldenburg, a relative of
Alexander, had induced the Czar to declare his freedom from the
Continental System. It had become evident to him that, sooner or later,
war would be forced upon him, and he had entered into open preparations.
Under one pretext or another Napoleon had also been strengthening his
troops upon the eastern frontier of his dominions, and though the forms
of friendship were still kept up, it was plain that before long the two
empires would be plunged into hostilities. During the whole of 1811
remonstrances and recriminations had passed between the courts.
Alexander had at first intended to re-establish the kingdom of Poland,
where the influence of Napoleon was still great, and to begin offensive
movements. The success of Wellington at Torres Vedras is said to have
suggested to him and to his counsellors the more prudent method of
attracting the French into the heart of Russia, and of allowing the
weather and the natural difficulties of the country to have their full
force as his allies. He knew that, in spite of the marriage of the
Austrian archduchess with Napoleon, he could rely upon the friendship of
the Court of Vienna should any opportunity arise of successful
opposition to France. Prussia likewise, since the battle of Jena, had
undergone a complete though silent revolution; feudalism had been almost
destroyed, the peasants given a share in the property of the land, and
bourgeois and peasant alike endowed with self-government; the people and
the government were absolutely at one. While ostensibly restricted to
the treaty number of 42,000, the army had been practically increased to
150,000 men; and, by an extraordinary effort of patience and good
administration, the broken nation had been re-established. There, too,
it was certain that any successful effort to check Napoleon would be
hailed with delight. But Napoleon, observing that Russia did not take
the initiative, and seeing that both Austria and Prussia were to all
appearance still at his service, forgetting the lesson which he should
have learnt from Spain, that the enmity of the people is more to be
feared than the enmity of the government, seemed irresistibly led to the
war which was to complete his ruin. In August 1811 there took place
another of those scenes which had so frequently preluded war. At a
public meeting of ministers in the Tuileries the Russian ambassador had
to undergo a violent attack from the Emperor. From that moment all
Europe knew that the war with Russia was determined on. It was upon the
certainty of the approach of this event and the nature of the French
warfare in Spain that Wellington rested his hopes.
[Sidenote: Wellington's plan for the campaign of 1812.]
[Sidenote: Capture of Rodrigo and Badajos.]
Marmont's army had been moved for the sake of procuring food into the
valley of the Tagus, which was thus called upon to support two armies,
that of the centre and that of Portugal. Wellington did not believe that
it could do this for long, but while the armies were there barring the
valley of the Tagus offensive movements of any importance were
impossible, as Soult and Drouet occupied the south, and the northern
army in Asturias, capable of being reinforced by Marmont, prevented
action in the valley of the Douro. But meanwhile Ciudad Rodrigo was not
itself within immediate reach of the covering army; a sudden attack and
capture of this fortress would almost certainly bring Marmont northward
to save the neighbouring country and to relieve the valley of the Tagus.
Even a weak army covered by the fortress would probably be able to make
good its position, while Wellington himself marching southward might
also capture Badajos, and thence defeat Soult and Drouet in Andalusia.
With infinite pains to avoid discovery he ripened his plan; preparations
were secretly made at Almeida and at Elvas for the two sieges, and the
first rapid blow was successfully struck, and Ciudad Rodrigo captured
(Jan. 19). It had the effect expected; Marmont collected his troops at
Salamanca, the scattered detachments of the French were everywhere drawn
in, Hill's southern army was moved towards the north, and Wellington was
sufficiently strong to fight a battle if necessary. Marmont for the
present resigned the fortress and again distributed his troops.
Wellington then proceeded to strike his second blow. Leaving one
division behind him, with some Spanish troops and Portuguese militia, he
moved southward, and at length succeeded in storming Badajos also,
though with fearful loss (April 6). He acted with unusual skill, and the
charge against him of having foolishly wasted life in the siege proves
upon examination to be utterly groundless; for it was the extreme
rapidity with which the fortress was captured which prevented Soult from
coming to its relief. But again the fruits of his success were snatched
from him; he was unable to follow out his plan of driving Soult from
Estremadura, for he was badly seconded by the troops he had left in the
north; Marmont, though somewhat slowly, had begun to carry out
Napoleon's orders to regain Ciudad Rodrigo and to invade Portugal, and
Wellington had to make all haste back to re-establish his affairs there.
His rapid appearance from the south on Marmont's flank compelled that
general to retreat, but the opportunity of a southern war was over, and
the English army was again spread along the whole line of Portugal, but
with this important advantage that the two key fortresses of Spain were
now in its hands.
[Sidenote: Wellington's attack on the northern army.]
It was as yet only the spring, Wellington had to choose in which
direction he would arrange the ensuing campaign. He determined to make
his attack on the northern line; a victory over Marmont would throw open
the road to Madrid, and Soult would either have to retire from the south
or be cut off from his communications. A portion of his army might
indeed be sent to assist Marmont; but the harvest in the valley of the
Douro is considerably later than in the south, and it was impossible
that a large additional number of troops should be subsisted for at
least a fortnight to come. Thus for a while he could act against
Marmont alone. Further to secure his position, he strengthened the army
under Hill in the south, planned and executed an extraordinary capture
of the French lines of communication at Almaraz, thus rendering the
intercourse between the two armies lengthy, and at the same time
re-established the bridge of Alcantara, close to the Portuguese
frontier, by which his own communications with Hill were rendered ten
days nearer. It was thus against an army of about equal numbers with his
own, but isolated for the present at all events from reinforcements,
that Wellington advanced. Salamanca and its forts were captured, and
Marmont fell back before him.
[Sidenote: Battle of Salamanca. July 22, 1812.]
[Illustration: Battle of Salamanca]
But his advance was not all triumphant, Marmont succeeded in turn in
obtaining the ascendant. By a series of clever movements he compelled
Wellington to retire, and moving towards the right flank of the English,
seemed to threaten the communications between Salamanca and Ciudad
Rodrigo, while he kept himself in communication with the central army
under the king. Wellington saw that retreat was necessary, and he
intended to return to Portugal. But Marmont was not contented with this
success. He was eager to fight before his junction with the king, and
brought on a battle beyond the Tormes, just south of Salamanca. The
English occupied a sort of basin in a loop of the river; about the
centre was a hill called the Arapiles; round the southern edge was a
ridge which led to the point where the road by which the English must
retreat ran. Marmont, hoping to envelop the English, sent forward his
left along the ridge. Wellington saw the advantage thus offered.
Holding the Arapiles with his left, he fell on the flank of the
advancing column, while Pakenham faced it upon the ridge. The French
left was thus entirely destroyed, their attacks upon the central hill
were unsuccessful, their confusion was increased by the loss of their
commander, who was wounded early in the day, and it was only because a
Spanish garrison which should have cut off their retreat across the
Tormes at Alba had been withdrawn without Wellington's knowledge that
their army escaped destruction. As it was, Clausel, who had succeeded
Marmont, was able to bring off the greater part of his troops in safety.
[Sidenote: Wellington enters Madrid. Aug. 12, 1812.]
The arrival of reinforcements under Sir Home Popham on the north of
Spain had drawn a certain portion of the French troops in that
direction, and against a weakened and defeated army Wellington proceeded
in his triumphant advance toward Madrid. Joseph again left the city and
retreated to Valencia, and with all the signs of wild rejoicing the
conqueror was received in the capital of Spain. The effect of the late
battle was exactly such as had been anticipated--King Joseph, acting as
commander-in-chief, ordered Soult to evacuate Andalusia and the south.
It was in vain that that general pointed out the possibility of holding
his position there, and intreated the king to come with the other armies
to his rescue: the orders were peremptory, and much against his will
Soult withdrew and effected a junction with Joseph and Suchet in
Valencia. The south and centre of Spain thus seemed clear of enemies,
but the hold of the French was as yet shaken only, not broken; for in
fact though Wellington's march had forced his enemies in two directions
(Clausel, with the remainder of Marmont's army, having retired north,
while the king withdrew south-east), such were their numbers that each
division became the centre of an army as powerful as his own. Indeed,
the very effect of his victory in drawing Soult from Andalusia had
concentrated a vast power in Joseph's hands. Wellington was, however,
aided by two circumstances. An expedition had been sent to Sicily under
Sir William Bentinck; a portion of it under Maitland was landed at
Alicante, and kept Suchet and the Catalonian army in play, while Sir
Home Popham did the like for the army of the north.
[Sidenote: His great plans thwarted.]
[Sidenote: He retreats to Portugal.]
Of the two armies against which Wellington had to contend by far the
largest was the army of Soult and the king, on the south-east. On the
other hand, Clausel's forces were beaten and retreating, so that it
appeared to the general better to leave a detachment under Hill to cover
Madrid, while he himself repaired with the bulk of his army to strike a
final blow at Clausel by the capture of Burgos, intending to return at
once and with his whole combined forces fight a great battle with Soult
and the king before the capital. Again events occurred, upon which he
could scarcely have calculated, which thwarted his purpose. The Spanish
army, which had been intrusted with the duty of guarding his
communications with Salamanca and of completing the capture of the
fortresses of the Douro, and some English forces which had been left to
assist it, were so badly handled that the retreating army was in fact
left unmolested, while extreme want of money and political difficulties
hampered Wellington's own march. Clausel, too, proved a general of great
ability; his retreat up the valley of the Arlanzon towards Burgos was a
masterpiece; while, to crown all, the resistance offered by Burgos and
the deficiency of proper artillery proved greater obstacles than had
been expected. The delay thus caused allowed the French to recover; the
crisis was met with energy, fresh troops were poured across the
frontier; Souham, who took the chief command, found himself at the head
of a force almost double that of Wellington; and as Soult began to draw
towards Madrid from Valencia, thus threatening the safety of Hill, there
was no course left but to summon that general northward, and to make a
combined retreat towards Salamanca and Portugal. It was not the most
glorious passage of our arms. Want of pay and some other causes had
somewhat slackened the discipline of the troops, and though no disaster
occurred, and though the French were more than once checked, there were
scenes of wild disorder and insubordination which called forth stern
reprimands from the general.
[Sidenote: Improvement in his position.]
This was the last of Wellington's retreats. Events in Europe lessened
the power of his enemies; while fighting for his very existence on the
main continent of Europe, Napoleon could not but regard the war in Spain
as a very secondary concern, and a great many old and valuable soldiers
were withdrawn. The jealousy which existed between Joseph and the
generals, and the dislike of the great generals to take upon themselves
the Spanish war, threw it into inferior hands for some little while, and
there is little more to chronicle than a succession of hard-won
victories. Moreover, Wellington's position was in other ways much
strengthened; he had received from the Brazils full power of action in
Portugal, at Burgos he had been made commander-in-chief of the Spanish
army, while the changes in the ministry at home, though they had
deprived him of his brother's assistance, had yet been on the whole
favourable to him; his greatness and success had become the chief
support of the ministry. He had, moreover, by his personal authority
established discipline in the Portuguese army, had used his power and
influence to supply the commissariat and other trains, and even the
Spanish troops which had been placed at his disposal had been brought
into something like order. The whole active force of the French had been
reduced to 197,000 men, while Wellington had contrived to prepare
200,000 allied troops for the campaign, although it was chiefly upon the
70,000 Anglo-Portuguese that he relied. The English fleets covered the
coast, and every port thus became a little centre of action. A vigorous
insurrection had arisen all along the northern provinces; and it was
this more than anything else which decided Wellington's course of
action. While leaving troops to occupy the attention of the French in
the valley of the Tagus, he intended to march by his own left (thus
avoiding the difficulties offered by the Douro and the Carrion rivers),
connect himself with the northern insurgents, and directly threaten the
communications with France, either fighting for or turning every
position in which the king might try to intercept him.
[Sidenote: Battle of Vittoria. June 21, 1813.]
His movements, which had to be effected with considerable secresy, were
well carried out; the various divisions of his army met at Toro on the
Douro. As he had expected, the French had to fall back before him; he
compelled them to evacuate Burgos and attempt to defend the Ebro. Their
position there was turned, and they had again to fall back into the
basin of Vittoria. This is the plain of the river Zadora, which forms in
its course almost a right angle at the south-west corner of the plain,
which it thus surrounds on two sides. Across the plain and through
Vittoria runs the high road to France, the only one in the neighbourhood
sufficiently large to allow of the retreat of the French army,
encumbered with all its stores and baggage, and the accumulated wealth
of some years of occupation of Spain. While Wellington forced the
passage of the river in front south of the great bend, and drove the
enemy back to the town of Vittoria, Graham beyond the town closed this
road. The beaten enemy had to retreat as best he could towards
Salvatierra, leaving behind all the artillery, stores, baggage, and
equipments.
[Sidenote: Battles of the Pyrenees. 1813.]
The offensive armies of France had now to assume the defensive and to
guard their own frontier. Before advancing to attack them in the
mountains, Wellington undertook the blockade of Pampeluna and the siege
of St. Sebastian. It was impossible for the French any longer to regard
diplomatic or dynastic niceties. Joseph was superseded, and the defence
of France intrusted to Soult, with whom the king had hopelessly
quarrelled. He proved himself worthy of the charge. A series of terrible
battles was fought in the Pyrenees, but one by one his positions were
forced. With fearful bloodshed, St. Sebastian was taken, the Bidasoa was
crossed (Oct. 7), the battle of the Nivelle fought and won (Nov. 10),
and at length, in January, Soult was driven even from the Adour and
forced to surrender Bayonne.
[Illustration: Battle of Vittoria.]
[Sidenote: Battle of Toulouse. April 10, 1814.]
But by this time events on the other side of France had changed the
appearance of the war. Napoleon's threatened invasion of Russia had
taken place; the defensive plan adopted by the Russians proved
successful. The Emperor had himself hastened back to Paris after the
conflagration of Moscow, while his ruined and broken army struggled home
through the terrible suffering of the Russian winter. As Alexander had
foreseen, the reverse of the French had been followed by the defection
at first of Prussia and shortly afterwards of Austria. The powers of
Europe were thus again formed in a coalition. With such troops as he
could collect, Napoleon had hurried, in the summer of 1813, to the very
furthest confines of Germany, and fought the great battles of Lutzen and
Bautzen. But the flower of his troops had been lost in Russia, his
armies were no longer what they had been. His enemies in vast numbers
began to gather round him. Though victorious at the gigantic battle of
Dresden (Aug. 24, 1813), he was unable to make a final stand against the
vast armaments of the coalition. Several of his lieutenants were
defeated, and at length, on the 19th of October, the battle of Leipsic
was fought, which ended in his complete defeat. It is said that on the
two sides the killed and wounded amounted to 110,000 men. The victorious
allies swept onwards, and just at the close of the year 1813 entered
France. The spring of the following year was occupied by the brilliant
campaign in which Napoleon exerted all his genius in vain to check the
huge masses of the invaders. While Wellington was making good his
position in the south of France, in spite of the ability which he
displayed, Napoleon was being constantly driven backward upon the east.
The effect could not but be felt by the southern army, and Soult
deserves great credit for the skill with which he still held at bay the
victorious English. He was however defeated at Orthes (Feb. 27), lost
Bordeaux (March 8), and was finally driven eastward towards Toulouse,
intending to act in union with Suchet, whose army in Catalonia was as
yet unbeaten. On the heights upon the east of Toulouse, for Wellington
had brought his army across the Garonne, was fought, with somewhat
doubtful result, the great battle of Toulouse. The victory has been
claimed by both parties; the aim of the English general was however won,
the Garonne was passed, the French position taken, Toulouse evacuated
and occupied by the victors. The triumph such as it was had cost the
victors 7000 or 8000 men, a loss of life which might have been spared,
for Napoleon had already abdicated, and the battle was entirely useless.
This was the last action of the Peninsula War, in which, after years of
steadfast resistance, the English had at length triumphantly swept the
French from the Peninsula, and done their full share in the great events
which temporarily closed the career of Napoleon.
[Sidenote: Long tenure of power of the Tory party.]
[Sidenote: Policy of Canning.]
[Sidenote: Canning's quarrel with Castlereagh.]
[Sidenote: Reconstruction of the ministry. Oct. 1809.]
[Sidenote: Continuation of the same ministry till 1827.]
The negotiations which had terminated in the abdication of Napoleon had,
as far as England was concerned, been carried on by the same ministry
which had had the duty of conducting the war. The Tory party which the
French Revolution and the policy of Pitt had called into existence,
robbed of the better and more liberal elements which the presence of
Pitt himself and his friends had introduced into it, had succeeded in
spite of its defects and of various opportunities for a change in
continuing its hold upon the Government. There was at first one
important member of it who kept up something of the views of Pitt. This
was Canning, the Foreign Minister. But the presence of so incongruous an
element tended rather to the weakness than to the strength of the
administration; nor is it certain that in the present crisis of Europe
his views were such as to render him the most efficient minister.
Castlereagh, a man of narrower views and of much inferior talent, acted
as War Minister. Between him and Canning a strong antagonism arose.
Canning's errors were those of a liberal and noble mind. He was anxious
to see the Spaniards carry out their insurrection as much as possible by
their own means, and the wish led him to believe the false tales of
their patriotism and resources with which the braggart spirit of the
Spaniards supplied him. This credulity was strengthened by the reports
of Mr. Frere, whom he had sent to the Peninsula as ambassador, and he
was thus induced to misapply the wealth of England, and to misuse the
opportunities which his position as Foreign Minister gave him, so as
seriously to weaken the hands of Wellington. His desire for the
political regeneration of Spain blinded him somewhat to the military
necessities of the time, which required that our general should be
invested with almost absolute authority, and the arrangement of
political matters postponed till after the favourable conclusion of the
war. But though he thus not unfrequently threw obstacles in Wellington's
way, Canning by no means approved of the inefficient administration of
Castlereagh, and the constant starvation of the military side of the
Peninsula War. So far had the quarrel with the War Minister extended
that Canning had contrived, not perhaps so openly and straightforwardly
as could be wished, to extort from the Prime Minister a promise that
Lord Castlereagh should be removed from his responsible situation,
failing which he declared that he would himself withdraw. His support
was so necessary to the Prime Minister that he had persuaded him to
remain in office. But Canning had throughout privately expressed the
strongest disapprobation of the Walcheren expedition, and when its
failure became known, and when inquiries upon the subject brought to
light the fact that, while sitting in the same Cabinet with Castlereagh,
he had been in fact intriguing for his dismissal, the quarrel came to a
point. Sharp words were exchanged between the ministers, and the
consequence was a duel (Sept. 22), in which Canning was slightly
wounded. It was of course impossible for the antagonists to serve longer
in the same ministry. They both resigned, and their example was followed
by the Duke of Portland, whose failing health had from the first
rendered him unfit for his position, and whose weakness was exhibited in
allowing so grave a quarrel to spring up within the limits of his
Cabinet. It became necessary to reconstitute the ministry, and after a
fruitless negotiation with Lords Grey and Grenville--with so little
reality in it that Grey did not think it worth his while to come to
London on the subject--Perceval, who had long been the most important
person in the Cabinet, assumed the nominal direction, and Lord
Wellesley, who had lately been serving as ambassador in Spain, where he
had superseded Mr. Frere, was induced to accept the ministry of foreign
affairs. Lord Castlereagh was succeeded by Lord Liverpool at the War
Office, with Lord Palmerston as under secretary. The reconstruction of
the ministry made no difference in its general tendencies. The
introduction of Lord Wellesley was indeed a slight improvement; he
entered the ministry chiefly for the purpose of supporting his brother's
views in the Peninsula. This to the best of his abilities he did, but he
was constantly thwarted by the mediocre men with whom he was joined, and
with whom he was never able to work comfortably. By far the ablest and
best writer in the Cabinet, his despatches were constantly criticised
and altered. His colleagues could not understand the greatness of the
openings afforded in the Peninsula, and after two years of office he
withdrew (Feb. 19, 1812). The opportunity occurred in a great
ministerial crisis caused by the renewed insanity of the King, which it
was believed must have produced a change of ministry. The Regent,
however, retained Mr. Perceval in office, and upon his death Lord
Liverpool was called to succeed him, and continued in office till 1827,
so that in fact from the fall of the Grenville ministry to that date,
though with some change in the _personnel_, there was a continuance of
the Tory rule.
[Sidenote: Illness of the King. Nov. 1810.]
[Sidenote: The Regency Bill. Feb. 1811.]
[Sidenote: The Perceval ministry continued.]
[Sidenote: Assassination of Mr. Perceval. May 1812.]