the sole guide of English politics. It is remarkable how few great
measures can be traced to him; but he probably displayed true wisdom in
allowing all reforms, however much they may have been required, to
remain for a time in abeyance. The one thing which England required was
rest. The last hundred years had been one continual scene of political
turmoil. During the whole of that period the Revolution had been slowly
working itself out, and the English Constitution had been changing. The
power had gradually shifted from the King to the House of Commons. The
ministry had ceased to be a body of secretaries, to whom was indeed
intrusted the chief management of all national affairs, but who,
inasmuch as they were still in theory, and in a great degree in
practice, merely called upon to execute the King's commands, might be
chosen indiscriminately from all parties. Instead of this it had become,
what it has practically ever since been, a Committee of the majority in
the House of Commons. In a social point of view, during much of the same
period, England had been perplexed by a choice of masters, and in some
degree by a choice of religions. Walpole seems thoroughly to have
understood this position, and to have set himself steadily to work to
complete and give stability to the changes which had been going on. He
had seen, that far more important than any further improvements to the
Constitution was the establishment on a firm footing of what had already
been done. His chief object was therefore to make himself absolute
master of the House of Commons. For this purpose he used means which we
should now consider disgraceful. He is reported to have acted on the
principle that every man had his price. He steadily opposed all efforts
for the exclusion of pensioners, not from a wish to increase the power
of the Crown, but because he wanted to secure the power of the minister,
who he saw must henceforward be the real governor of England. He opposed
the Peerage Bill because it threatened to increase the power of the
Lords as against the Commons. He persistently refused all attempts at
coalition (such as had been contemplated by Stanhope and subsequently
proposed by Bolingbroke), because he wanted the ministry to be the
representatives of the party which had the majority in the House, and of
that party only. He kept a tight hand throughout his administration upon
the Jacobites, conscious that the security of the reigning house was the
only way of calming the uneasiness which all classes felt while they had
any choice of rulers offered them. For similar reasons, with regard to
religion, he refused to listen to any propositions for the relief of
Roman Catholics, which Stanhope had also contemplated; and still further
to calm religious discords by the sense of one strong paramount Church
of England, he also refused all concessions to the Dissenters, although
they systematically supported him. In saying, however, that the power
had passed to the House of Commons, we must be careful not to regard the
House of Commons as a popular assembly. The next phase of our history,
the complement to that part of the Revolution which we have now passed,
is the struggle of the people to get possession of their own House. At
the time of which we are speaking the House of Commons was so filled
with nominees of great lords, the electoral body was so limited, and the
distribution of seats so arbitrary, that the House of Commons could in
no way be regarded as a fair representation of the people, and the great
Whig majority rested not on the liberal feeling of the nation, but upon
an oligarchy of great Whig nobles. In his foreign policy Walpole was
influenced by similar principles. Though the Peace of Utrecht was a Tory
peace, its maintenance, and that of the balance of power it had
established, was his chief object. Anything was better than that England
should be engaged in war. War at once opened the door for Jacobite
hopes. War at once touched that material prosperity which was to be the
surest claim of gratitude to the reigning house. Moreover, as a
financier, Walpole hated war. It was in this capacity, if we set aside
his general ability and skill in management, that Walpole was greatest.
We have seen how prudently he re-established credit after the bursting
of the South Sea bubble, and how wise was his plan in his ill-fated
Excise Bill. If some of his measures (as the Salt Tax) were dictated by
political rather than economical necessities, it is yet certain that he
inspired universal confidence, and owed much of his power to the support
of the moneyed interest. His personal character, like that of most of
his contemporaries, was not good. A large, coarse-looking person did not
belie the coarseness of his tastes. He drank freely, joked coarsely, and
had more than one natural child. Although in one of his speeches he
plumes himself on having never been charged with corruption, his private
fortune was certainly much increased by his ministry, and if we except
his collection of pictures at Houghton, there is no sign that he had any
appreciation of literature or of the arts. His ignorance of literature,
and his contempt for it, is indeed notorious. He spent vast sums of
money in purchasing the services of pamphleteers; scarcely one of them
was worth anything. He seems to have regarded writing like any other
trade, as being capable of being purchased by the piece. Patronage to
literary men he systematically refused; we therefore find all the able
writers of the time ranged on the side of the Opposition; and it is for
the same reason perhaps that the worst points of his character are those
which are more commonly known.
[Sidenote: The new ministry under Wilmington.]
The chief fault of Walpole had been his jealousy of talent; on his fall
there was no one in the ministry of sufficient influence to take up the
reins which had fallen from his hands. Had there been any great
difference of principle between him and the Opposition, a complete
change of ministry would naturally have resulted. But both the
Government and the Opposition had been in the main Whigs. Any man of
commanding intellect might have kept the late ministry together. As it
was, a sort of coalition was made. Pulteney, it is difficult to say why,
avoided the responsibility of the Premiership, and withdrew into
insignificance in the Upper House as Lord Bath. The nominal head of the
new Government was Wilmington, that same dull man who had for a moment
thought to supersede Walpole at the beginning of the reign. Under him
many of the old Cabinet were retained; Newcastle, Hardwicke, and Young
keeping their offices. The new element was represented by Argyle, who
was reinstated as Master of the Ordnance, Carteret, who succeeded Lord
Harrington as Secretary, and Sandys, who became Chancellor of the
Exchequer. Of Tories there appeared none, and Chesterfield and Pitt were
excluded from the arrangement.
[Sidenote: Character of the new ministry.]
So slight a change in the construction of the Government seemed but a
poor termination to the fierce opposition to which Walpole had been
subjected. In fact, the rivalry had been one of persons and not of
principles. The ministry were compelled indeed, by pressure from without
excited by their own clamours, to institute a Committee to inquire into
the conduct of the great Prime Minister. But though it consisted
principally of his personal enemies, too many interests were at stake to
render their task easy; and when their report came, it appeared so
trumpery, when compared with the charges which had been lavished upon
the minister in Parliament, that it was a mere object of ridicule. It
seemed as though the system of Walpole was after all to be continued.
Many of his followers still remained in the Cabinet, as the Pelhams
(Newcastle and his brother Henry Pelham), and Yorke, Lord Hardwicke, and
even the virtual Prime Minister, his enemy Carteret, was obliged by
stress of circumstances to adopt that very Hanoverian policy which had
so often been laid to the charge of the late minister. Carteret was a
man of genius, but of irregular life, and so capricious, and sudden in
his actions, that his administration has been called the drunken
administration. Disregarding home patronage for the higher and more
exciting work of foreign diplomacy, he found his influence gradually and
surely passing into the hands of the Pelhams. It was necessary for him
at all hazards to secure the King's friendship; he therefore allowed
16,000 Hanoverians to be taken into English pay, and it was strange to
hear Lord Bath, and Sandys, the accuser of Walpole, upholding the
Hanoverian connection.
[Sidenote: Pelham succeeds Wilmington. 1743.]
A ministry which showed itself thus inconsistent with its assertions
when out of office, and in which the elements of disunion were so
evident, could not last long. The death of Wilmington (1743), the
nominal Prime Minister, was the signal for its dissolution. The
candidates for the Premiership were Pulteney on the one hand, supported
by the talents of Carteret, and by the favour which this minister's
newly-found interest for Hanover had given him with the King; and on the
other hand Pelham, as representative of the party of Walpole, and backed
by the influence which he still possessed. The question was settled in
favour of Pelham, who, though without commanding abilities and
constitutionally timid, possessed much of his late leader's love of
quiet and power of management. Carteret continued for some time in power
under his new chief; but their union could never be cordial, and before
the close of 1744, Carteret--who had by continual flattery of the King's
weakness so ingratiated himself with his master that the Pelhams thought
their legitimate influence damaged by it--was dismissed. But before the
confusion which arose on Walpole's fall had settled down one great point
in his policy had at all events been reversed--England had thrown itself
vigorously into the Continental war.
[Sidenote: Question of the Austrian succession.]
Such indeed was the position of Europe that it was impossible that
England should hold aloof. But Walpole had at least tried, and with some
effect, the power of diplomacy. The death of the Emperor Charles VI. of
Germany had opened two great questions for which Europe had been long
preparing. One of these was the succession to the Austrian dominions,
which Charles had attempted to secure for his daughter by means of the
Pragmatic Sanction, and the other was the succession to the Empire. The
questions were closely connected. The most dangerous claimant for the
succession to the Austrian dominions was the Elector of Bavaria, who
alone of the powers of Europe had refused the acceptance of the
Pragmatic Sanction; he was also the most influential candidate for the
Imperial dignity. The Elector rested his claim to the Austrian
succession upon an arrangement by which, as long ago as the middle of
the sixteenth century, Ferdinand I. was said to have substituted the
heir of his daughter Anne, from whom the Elector was descended, in the
place of any other female heir. A second claimant was the King of Spain,
who regarded himself as the heir of all the rights of a descendant of
Charles V., who, when he divided his empire with his brother, reserved
the right of succession to his own immediate posterity should the direct
male line of Ferdinand become extinct. Both Bavaria and Spain were close
allies of France, and the possession of the Empire by the Elector, or of
the Austrian dominions either by the Elector or the Spanish King, would
render the influence of France paramount in Europe. It was necessary for
England to oppose such an increase of the power of the Bourbons. For
this purpose it had appeared necessary to Walpole to re-establish
something resembling the Grand Alliance, a union at all events which
should include the maritime powers, Hanover, Prussia (rapidly rising to
a first-rate power), and Austria.
[Sidenote: Ambition of Prussia.]
But Prussia had just fallen into the hands of the ambitious Frederick
II., supplied by his father's care with a magnificent army and with a
full treasury. He saw that the opportunity had arrived for making good
certain long pending claims upon a portion of Silesia, and without
declaration of war, occupied the disputed territory, and marching into
Bohemia, entirely defeated the Austrian troops at Molwitz. He was
however yet so far German at heart, that he was willing to guarantee the
election of Maria Theresa's husband to the Empire, and to support the
Pragmatic Sanction, if his claims in Silesia were satisfied. To induce
the Austrian princess to accept these terms became the object of English
diplomacy. It was thwarted by Maria Theresa herself. A strange
infatuation had taken possession of the Austrian ministers during the
close of the late Emperor's reign; in spite of his action in the Polish
war, they believed in the pacific tendencies of Fleury, and relied upon
the friendship of France. All overtures on the part of Frederick were
therefore disregarded, all appeals from England set at naught. The
foolish dreams of Austria were dispelled when Frederick, thus repulsed,
threw away his last remnant of German feeling and entered into close
alliance with France, offering to renounce the claims which he had upon
the Duchy of Berg, and to give his vote for the election of the Bavarian
Elector to the Empire if his claims on Silesia were guaranteed.
[Sidenote: Position of Maria Theresa.]
Thus Maria Theresa found herself standing alone in Europe, supported by
England only, which indeed supplied her willingly with subsidies, but
still directed its chief efforts to persuading her to purchase
Frederick's friendship by the cession of Silesia. In accordance with the
convention with Prussia, in August 1741, two French armies were poured
across the Rhine, one passing through Swabia to assist the Elector in a
direct advance on Vienna, the second through Westphalia. So little was
England prepared for war, that the King, as Elector of Hanover, was
obliged to declare the neutrality of his Continental dominions for a
year, a step which excited great anger in England, where the war spirit
ran high, and which was a fresh source of complaint against Walpole. At
this crisis of her danger Maria Theresa found assistance in that part of
her dominions where she had least right to expect it. The hand of the
Hapsburgs had been heavy upon Hungary, yet thither she betook herself,
and yielding back to them almost the whole of their constitution,
excited the warlike magnates to enthusiasm by confiding to their charge
her person and that of her child. As they crowded round to kiss the
infant's hand, the hall rang with the shouts, "We will die for our king,
Maria Theresa!" A moment's breathing space would allow time to bring the
levée en masse of Hungary into the field: the opportunity was afforded
by the diplomacy of England, which induced Frederick, who saw with
jealousy the advancing power of France and Germany, to check his
victorious march and sign a secret treaty at Kleinschnellendorf. The
gathering forces of Hungary, the withdrawal of Frederick, and the errors
of the Elector and of the French, who were jealous of each other,
changed the face of the war. The march to Vienna was postponed for the
capture of Prague. The withdrawal of the invaders to Bohemia allowed the
Austrians to make a counter blow. As the Elector Charles Albert hastened
to Frankfort to secure his election as Emperor, Khevenhüller, with the
Austrian troops, was approaching his capital of Munich. Again, at the
earnest entreaties of France, Frederick deserted his late engagements
and renewed the war, but, unable to hold his advanced position at Olmutz
in Moravia, he too fell back upon Bohemia, where the war was now
centred.
[Sidenote: England supports Austria.]
The changed aspect of affairs was completed by the conduct of England:
the pride of the country had been touched by Vernon's failure at
Carthagena; the neutrality of Hanover had caused great discontent; and
when, in February 1742, Walpole had been driven from the ministry, the
first act of his successors had been to increase both army and navy, to
vote large subsidies to Maria Theresa, to induce the States-General to
follow the lead of England, and to send an army of 30,000 English and
Hanoverians into the Low Countries. It was understood that, although as
yet but auxiliaries in the main quarrel, it was the rivalry of France
and England which was again to be decided in arms. Both the arms and
diplomacy of England were successful. In the Mediterranean the fleet
under Commodore Matthews forced King Charles of Naples to neutrality,
and allowed Sardinia, driven by the ambition of Spain to side with
Austria, to defeat all the projects of the Bourbons in that country;
while the urgent instances of the ambassador at Vienna at length
prevailed, and Maria Theresa was induced to give the price which Prussia
demanded,--Silesia was conceded by the Treaties of Breslau and Berlin in
June 1742. Frederick once more threw over his allies, and the French and
Bavarians stood alone in Germany. They were unable to make head against
their enemies, their troops were shut up in Prague, and only after a
brilliant but disastrous retreat did a shattered remnant of 14,000 men
reach a place of safety in January 1743.
[Sidenote: The English army in Flanders.]
[Sidenote: Battle of Dettingen.]
[Illustration: Battle of Dettingen. June 27th 1743.]
The tide of victory was then already turned when the English made their
first appearance in Europe, acting in conjunction with some 18,000
subsidized Hanoverians. The command of the English army, which to the
number of 16,000 had been all the last year lying inactive in Flanders,
was given to Lord Stair, and the object of the allies was to drive the
French entirely out of Germany, and if possible invade Alsace and
Lorraine, on which the eyes of the Austrians, who had but lately lost
them, were constantly fixed. To oppose the movement an army under the
Duke de Noailles entered Franconia, and the various divisions of the
British army and their allies from Hanover were set in motion towards
the Maine. With characteristic slowness, Stair proceeded to collect upon
the Maine an army of 40,000 men. Towards the Maine also on the south De
Noailles betook himself with about 60,000. Stair lay idly awaiting his
12,000 Hanoverians and Hessians who had not yet appeared, and thus gave
De Noailles opportunity of securing the south of the river and holding
most of the passages across it. Having waited long enough to be thus
outgeneralled, Stair suddenly changed his plan, and, without receiving
his reinforcements, marched up the river towards Franconia. He passed
Hanau, where he established his chief magazines, and moved towards
Aschaffenberg. Between these two towns branches of the Spessart
mountains approach the Maine, and about half way between the two is the
large village of Dettingen. From Dettingen to Aschaffenberg extends a
narrow plain, entered by a somewhat difficult passage between the
mountains and river at Dettingen. On reaching this plain the English
found themselves outmarched by De Noailles, and thus cut off from
Aschaffenberg. It was while thus entangled that they were joined by the
King and the Duke of Cumberland. The King found the army cut off from
the supplies it had hoped to draw from Franconia, and in danger of being
separated from its magazines at Hanau also. Thither it was determined if
possible to secure a retreat. As the English believed that the enemy was
higher up the river than they were, and that they should be closely
pursued, the King took command of the rear as the post of danger, but De
Noailles had already forestalled them. He had at once moved down the
river so as to put himself between the English and Hanau, taking up his
position at Seligenstadt. He sent some 23,000 men, under his nephew the
Duc de Grammont, across the river to occupy Dettingen. These troops
occupied a very strong position behind a swamp and a ravine made by a
watercourse. De Noailles' main army lay on the southern bank, but
bridges of communication were made between the two divisions, and cannon
placed on the south bank to play upon the flank of the retreating
English. Escape seemed almost impossible, especially as the English were
in entire ignorance of these movements. On finding his advance checked
at Dettingen, George at once left the rear and put himself at the head
of the army. There seemed no course but to cut a way through De
Grammont's forces. This commander, however, believing himself engaged
with the advanced troops of the English army only, and thinking to crush
them, rashly left his strong position and crossed the ravine. He found
himself in front of the whole English army. The King's horse had run
away with him, and he had dismounted and put himself at the head of his
troops, and addressing them a few inspiriting words, led them to the
attack with much gallantry. De Noailles saw the destruction of his plans
and hastened to retrieve the error of his nephew. His efforts however
were useless. The mass of infantry, led by his Majesty in person, broke
through the enemy, whose loss was so great that De Noailles recalled
them beyond the Maine. The retreat towards the bridges became a rout,
and they left more than 6000 dead and wounded upon the field. The King
wisely determined to get out of his dangerous position as soon as
possible, and pushed on that night to Hanau, leaving his wounded to the
mercy of the French commander, who treated them exceedingly well. Stair,
as hasty in the moment of victory as slow in his preliminary movements,
urged immediate pursuit, but was overruled by the King. On receiving
the expected reinforcements he again urged advance, but jealousies had
sprung up between him and the German commanders. He was disgusted at the
rejection of his advice, and talking loudly of Hanoverian influence,
sent in his resignation, which was accepted.
[Sidenote: Effect of the victory.]
The objects of a further advance however were obtained without
bloodshed. The French army in Bavaria had been beaten backwards by
Charles of Loraine,[6] and had retired behind the Lauter into Alsace,
whither De Noailles, finding himself unsupported between two enemies,
also withdrew. The victorious allies pushed on after them, the King to
Worms and Prince Charles to beyond the Rhine opposite Alt Brisach. The
new Emperor was thus left without allies, and concluded (July 1743) a
convention of neutrality with the Austrians, and withdrew to
Philipsburg.
[Sidenote: Negotiations for peace. July.]
A favourable opportunity for peaceful arrangements seemed to have
arrived. Prussia had gained its object; French intervention had failed;
the Austrian succession was secured; the only open question was what was
to be done with the expelled Emperor. George and his favourite minister
Carteret, who were at Hanover, undertook the negotiations. George, as
Elector of Hanover, and Carteret, from his general interest in foreign
politics, took a German and not an English view of the situation. It was
George's object, as Elector of Hanover, to appear as a paramount power
among the other electors, and to form a strong alliance in the
Empire entirely in his own interests. For this purpose he had
naturally,--considering the antecedents of his second kingdom England,
regarded a close alliance with Austria as of the utmost importance. At
the same time, as a Prince of the Empire, he had no strong wish that the
Imperial dignity should be constantly in Austrian hands, and was quite
willing to allow the validity of the election of the Emperor Charles. In
conjunction with Carteret, he therefore agreed that Charles should
retain the Imperial title upon condition of renouncing all claims on
Austria, of allowing the validity of the vote of Bohemia in all affairs
of the Empire, and of dismissing the French from the fortified places
they still held within the Empire. He even consented to insist upon the
restoration by Austria of Charles's hereditary dominions, Bavaria (now
to be erected into a kingdom), and upon the payment of a large sum to
the Emperor to support his dignity. Had this treaty been completed,
George would have appeared as the mediator of the peace of the Empire,
as the champion of the rights of the princes, as the defender of the
Austrian dominions, and altogether as the chief power in Germany. To a
certain point the interests of the people of England had been the same
as that of their King. But their real enmity was against France, and
under the guidance of a Whig aristocracy, they would have wished to
pursue their traditional policy of opposing the Bourbons chiefly at sea.
The arrangements of the proposed treaty by no means suited them. They
had long been clamouring against the German tendencies of the King, they
had seen with extreme dislike the employment of subsidized Hanoverian
troops, and now positively refused to pay a subsidy to the Emperor--a
Bavarian prince and the hereditary friend of France.
[Sidenote: Treaty of Worms. Sept. 13, 1743.]
[Sidenote: League of Frankfort. April 5, 1744.]