was marked by still more complete success against the French in other
parts of Europe. Marlborough was determined to wipe out the bad
impression which the inactivity of the last campaign had caused. His own
ardent wish was to march with the army as he had in the Blenheim
campaign, and to throw himself into Italy, where the critical position
of affairs still continued. Finding it impossible to gratify this wish,
he determined that he would at least do something vigorous in Flanders
which might serve as a diversion to his friend Eugene in Italy. Bringing
his army therefore across the lines which he had broken the year before
in the neighbourhood of the sources of the little river Gheet, he came
in sight of Villeroi, with whose army the Elector of Bavaria, having
lost all troops of his own, was now serving. The place where the armies
met was Ramillies. Thither Villeroi had drawn his troops, with the
intention of covering Namur, which Marlborough's advance seemed to
threaten. The French general had received instructions to risk a battle
to save that town, and therefore afforded Marlborough the opportunity he
so much desired. The French army was very strongly posted upon a range
of heights forming a semicircle round the sources of the little Gheet
river. Their right almost touched the Mehaigne river, and was covered by
the villages of Tavière and Ramillies. Across it ran an old road known
as the road of Queen Brunehaud, closely adjoining which, in the highest
part of the position, was a barrow known as the Tomb of Ottomond: from
this point the position swept round till it terminated at the village of
Autre-Eglise, being covered from that point by the Gheet and the marshes
in which it rises. The steepness of the heights at Autre-Eglise, and the
river and marsh in its front, rendered the position almost impregnable,
but at the same time made it difficult for the troops stationed there to
act upon the offensive. Marlborough at once saw that he had the
advantage of occupying the inside of a circle, so that to any given
point the movement of his troops was shorter than that of his enemy's
could be. He saw also that the Tomb of Ottomond was the key of the
position. If this was once in his possession, the whole line of the
enemy could be enfiladed. He ordered therefore a vigorous but false
assault on Autre-Eglise. His feint succeeded; both the French generals
rode to that part of the field, believing it to be the point of danger.
Then Marlborough ordered the real attack to be made in the neighbourhood
of Tavière, Ramillies, and the road of Brunehaud. He was enabled to draw
troops from his right to strengthen his left in their attack, and after
some warm fighting, especially about the village of Ramillies, the
position was forced, the English troops formed at right angles to their
original position, and pressed onward along the high ground occupied by
the enemy. Villeroi and the Elector found it impossible to save the day.
Fresh difficulty was caused by the breaking down of the French baggage
as it was withdrawing northwards towards Judoigne. Thus interrupted, the
retreat became a rout; the enemy were pursued far beyond Judoigne to
within two leagues of Louvain. They did not even rest there; a hurried
consultation was held by torchlight in the market-place, and the flight
immediately continued towards Brussels. The river Dyle, which
Marlborough had failed to pass the preceding year, was thus left open.
The consequences of this victory were unexpectedly great. Brussels
opened its gates to the advancing conquerors; King Charles was
proclaimed King in the capital of the Spanish Netherlands; even the line
of the Scheldt was deserted, and Ghent, Bruges, and Oudenarde, fell into
the hands of the allies; the great naval strongholds, Antwerp and
Ostend, which had before now sustained memorable sieges, surrendered,
the one on account of some quarrel within its walls, the other because
of its inability to withstand the advancing allies. The list of
conquests is concluded by the strongholds of Menin and Ath. In fact the
effect of the battle was to drive the French entirely out of the
Netherlands; Mons and Namur being the only towns of importance still
remaining in their hands.
[Sidenote: Saves Eugene in Italy.]
The battle even influenced affairs in Italy. The complete
disorganization of the French army in Flanders made a change of
commanders imperatively necessary. Vendome, regarded in some ways as the
ablest French general, was summoned from Italy, where he had been acting
successfully against Eugene. He had driven the Imperial army to retreat
behind the Adige; the Milanese had thus been cleared, and Piedmont
conquered with the exception of Turin. Into that last fortress the
unfortunate Duke had withdrawn. For the purpose of taking it, a
well-appointed army, under the Duke de la Feuillade, son-in-law of
Chamillart the war minister, but without other claims to the command,
crossed the Alps and invested the town. It was of the last importance
that it should be relieved, and Eugene determined upon a march, bold
even to rashness, for the purpose. Crossing the Po not far from its
mouth, he followed the river upwards upon its south bank. The obstacles
he encountered were many; but Vendome at this critical moment was
recalled to Flanders, and Marsin and the Duke of Orleans, who took the
command, allowed Eugene to cross river after river without opposition,
contenting themselves with following his movements upon the opposite
bank of the river. At length Eugene approached Turin, formed a junction
with the Duke of Savoy, whom the laxity of the siege had allowed to
leave the city with 10,000 men, and passing beyond Turin, turned his
back upon France, and marched against the investing army. The siege had
been carried on without skill, the lines were of immense length, and
severed into various sections by the numerous rivers which join the Po
in the neighbourhood of Turin. Orleans was eager to lead the troops out
of the trenches and risk a pitched battle, which, as the French had a
considerable advantage in numbers, might easily have resulted in
Eugene's defeat. He was overruled by Marsin, who unexpectedly produced a
commission as commander-in-chief, and the army awaited the assault in
their trenches. Even in this position they were badly commanded. Three
generals, issuing sometimes contradictory orders, prevented the proper
concentration of troops, and when Eugene marched against that section of
the works which lay between the Doria and the Stura, not more than a
third of the French army is said to have been ready to oppose him. The
route of the French was complete, 200 guns, and much stores and money,
fell a prey to the victors (Sept. 7). The effect of the victory was
greater than the victory itself. It was found impossible to lead the
broken troops into the Milanese; they fell back in confusion behind the
Alps, thus leaving the force on the Adige to be surrounded by enemies.
Piedmont returned to its allegiance, and in fact the whole of Italy was
irretrievably lost to France, and compelled to join the Grand Alliance.
[Sidenote: The disasters of the French in 1706]
[Sidenote: make Louis desire peace.]
[Sidenote: Marlborough rejects his terms.]
The disasters of France had been continuous. Blenheim had secured
Germany, and in this year of 1706, Ramillies had been followed by the
conquest of the whole of the Netherlands, Turin by the conquest of the
whole of Italy, the relief of Barcelona by the occupation of Madrid by
the allied forces, although they had subsequently been compelled to fall
back towards Valencia. So great were the French disasters that Louis
began to think of treating, and suggested as terms on which peace might
be made a new Partition Treaty, by which he would consent to acknowledge
Queen Anne in England, to give the Dutch the barrier they demanded, to
grant great commercial advantages to the maritime powers, and to
surrender Spain and the Indies to the Archduke Charles, if only he could
preserve for his grandson Philip a kingdom in Italy consisting of Milan,
Naples, and Sicily. These terms were very attractive to the Dutch, who
thought they had already secured all they required, but were by no means
satisfactory to the Emperor, who saw that the barrier given to the Dutch
must of necessity be taken from the Spanish dominions in the
Netherlands, and therefore from his brother:[3] nor to Marlborough, who,
though he confessed he did not believe that the King of France would
ever make peace without securing some kingdom for his grandson, was
desirous for his own sake to continue the war, and thought the French
demand for the Milanese after the great victories which had been won
unreasonable. With some difficulty he persuaded Heinsius to reject the
terms, and the war proceeded on its course. It might have been better to
have accepted Louis' terms. Never again were the affairs of the allies
in so prosperous a condition, although the continuation of the war
undoubtedly told in their favour by the gradual exhaustion it produced
in France.
[Sidenote: The tide of victory turns.]
[Sidenote: Almanza. April 25, 1707.]
[Sidenote: Stolhofen. May 22.]
[Sidenote: Toulon. Aug. 20.]
It seemed indeed in the course of the next year as if the tide of
victory had wholly turned. Peterborough had returned to Spain, and
viewing the altered state of affairs, was now as eager to act on the
defensive as he had been before to urge an advance upon Madrid. His
advice was again disregarded. The introduction of Sunderland into the
ministry at home was unfavourable to him, and he was recalled, leaving
the command of Spain in the somewhat incompetent hands of Das Minas and
Galway. These generals, determining to act on the offensive, marched out
of Valencia towards Madrid, but were met near Almanza by the lately
reinforced army of Berwick, and suffered a complete defeat. The
consequence was the loss of Valencia and Saragossa, so that Charles was
only able to maintain himself in the province of Catalonia. The battle
of Almanza was fought on the 25th of April. On the 22nd of the following
month, Marshal Villars completely surprised the Margrave of Bareuth, who
had succeeded the late Margrave Louis of Baden in command of the
Imperial troops on the Rhine. The lines of Stolhofen, which had been so
long held against the French, were taken and destroyed. Nor was the
advance of the allied army of Italy into the south of France more
successful. Eugene and the Duke of Savoy reached Toulon and besieged it.
But sickness had much decreased the number of the allies; a considerable
detachment had been sent to complete the conquest of Naples, and the
appearance of Marshal Tessé with a large army, and the threat of an
assault upon their rear, induced them to raise the siege and retire
beyond the Alps. Nor was there anything done in Flanders to redeem the
ill-success which had met the allied arms elsewhere. Marlborough in vain
attempted to bring the French to a pitched battle. The Dutch had lost
confidence after receiving the news of Almanza and Stolhofen, and
renewed their old dilatory policy; the rains also somewhat impeded the
campaign, which was closed without any important event.
[Sidenote: Marlborough diverts Charles XII.]
One valuable diplomatic service, however, Marlborough had performed.
Charles XII. of Sweden was in the midst of his victorious career. Having
defeated the Russians at Narva, he had succeeded in driving Augustus,
Elector of Saxony, from the throne of Poland, and entering Saxony
itself, was now in the neighbourhood of Leipsic. Sweden was the old ally
of France, and Louis did not let Charles forget it. For a moment there
seemed a chance that Charles would follow in the footsteps of Gustavus
Adolphus, throw himself and his victorious army into Germany, and ruin
the cause of the allies. To deter him from this step Marlborough visited
him at his camp, and successfully directed his ambition towards his old
enemies the Russians, against whom he shortly marched to meet his ruin
at the battle of Pultowa.
[Sidenote: Threatened invasion of Scotland. 1708.]
The beginning of the ensuing year was marked by a new incident in the
war. The hopes of Louis were raised by the reports of the general
discontent prevalent in Scotland; a large portion of that nation had
seen with dislike the late completion of the Union, and assurances were
brought to France of the readiness of the Jacobite party to rise in
arms. An invasion was determined on and actually set on foot. The fleet
was all ready to sail, when Prince James Edward, afterwards called the
Old Pretender, but now known by the name of the Chevalier de St. George,
who was to accompany it, was taken ill of the measles. The expedition
was postponed for some weeks, and these weeks were enough to destroy its
chance of success. Byng with a powerful fleet appeared in the Channel,
troops were brought over from the Continent and others collected in
England, and though the little squadron succeeded in eluding the fleet
and reached the Firth of Forth, there was no sign of a general rising of
the Jacobites, and it had to return from its fruitless expedition, glad
to escape with safety.
[Sidenote: Campaign of 1708.]
[Sidenote: Marlborough's plan.]
This threatened invasion had of course retained Marlborough in England.
It was not till somewhat late that he could join the army. With a slight
change of generals the war continued its old course. Villars was
employed to reduce Piedmont, Berwick and the Elector of Bavaria were on
the Rhine, Spain had been intrusted to the Duke of Orleans, while in
Flanders, which was this year selected as the great battlefield, Vendome
was to oppose Marlborough, having with him as nominal commander-in-chief
the Duke of Burgundy, the heir to the French throne. Marlborough had
again formed a great scheme for the campaign. His intention was that the
Elector of Hanover, who after the defeat of Stolhofen had taken command
of the Imperial troops, should remain on the Rhine, and that Eugene,
with whom he again longed to act in co-operation, should form a new army
and assist him on the Moselle. The two generals met in April at the
Hague, and there agreed that they would make an ostensible plan for the
invasion of Lorraine, but that they should in fact join their two
armies, and act rapidly and decisively to complete the conquest of the
Netherlands. Eugene met with infinite difficulties in forming his new
army, and Marlborough was still singlehanded when Vendome began an
offensive movement.
The French army had been concentrated at Mons, on the south-west of the
Netherlands. It thence advanced northward towards Brussels. Fearing for
the capital, Marlborough took up a position to cover it, but suddenly
the French marched off eastward, and threatened Louvain. This was,
however, but a feint. The real intention of the French was to act upon
the western frontier, upon the river Scheldt. The Dutch had made
themselves highly unpopular in the Netherlands since they had had
possession of that province; the disaffected inhabitants of the great
towns on the Scheldt had opened correspondence with Vendome, and were
prepared to surrender their cities to him. Having therefore drawn
Marlborough towards Louvain, he suddenly marched westward to Alost,
across the front of the English army, sending forward on his march
detachments, to which Ghent and Bruges surrendered without a struggle.
As the town of Oudenarde, somewhat higher up the river, would complete
the security of these new acquisitions, it was determined to besiege it.
Marlborough had followed close upon the heels of the French, circling
round Brussels so as to defend the capital. He had not ceased to urge
Eugene to join him with his troops, which, according to agreement,
should have been with him many weeks before. The delay was no fault of
the Prince's; he was already hurrying to join Marlborough, when, hearing
that it was his intention to fight a battle in defence of Oudenarde, and
unable to bring up his troops, he hastened forward alone and joined the
English army. Between Marlborough's army and Oudenarde ran the river
Dender, which the French determined to hold to cover the siege. Alost,
which lies a little to the north of Oudenarde, they already possessed;
at about an equal distance to the south, also on the river Dender, was
the entrenched camp of Lessines. Could they occupy this they would be in
a good position to cover the siege. Marlborough foresaw their intention,
and determined to forestall them. Although the river between Lessines
and Alost makes a considerable curve, and Marlborough, on the convex
side of it, had almost twice the distance to traverse that the French
had, he pushed on with such rapidity that he secured Lessines and the
passage of the river before the French columns appeared in sight. It
was now evident to the French generals that Marlborough intended to
fight. They drew in their detachments, and marched rapidly to cross the
Scheldt at Gavre, to the north of Oudenarde. Marlborough marched direct
upon that city, so that the converging lines of march would speedily
meet. It was known that there was much disputing and ill-feeling between
Vendome and the Duke of Burgundy, and that the latter Prince intended,
if possible, to avoid an engagement. With all speed Marlborough sent
forward General Cadogan to secure the passage of the river, and prepare
bridges for his army. After he had performed this duty, Cadogan rode
forward to reconnoitre, and saw the French troops crossing at Gavre,
and, in ignorance of the immediate vicinity of the English, quietly
sending out foragers. With such troops as he had he drove in the
outlying posts of the enemy, who now, apprised of the approach of
Marlborough, found a battle inevitable.
[Sidenote: Battle of Oudenarde. July 11, 1708.]
A little to the north of Oudenarde the river Norken joins the Scheldt,
after a course almost parallel to that river. Between the Norken and the
Scheldt an irregular semicircle of hills sweeps with the convex side of
one of its arms at Oudenarde, while the other, surmounted by the village
Oycke, overhangs the Norken; it contains in its hollow two little brooks
which fall into the Scheldt just north of Oudenarde. On the other side
of these brooks, closing the opening of the semicircle, is an irregular
mass of rising ground sloping away northward towards the junction of the
Scheldt and Norken. Vendome gave orders to occupy this irregular mass
and the valleys of the brooks, the arm of the semicircle between
Oudenarde and the course of the brooks being occupied by Cadogan. But
the Duke of Burgundy counter-ordered his commands, and arranged his
troops upon what was doubtless a stronger position, the range of hills
beyond the Norken. But though stronger for defence, it was much less
favourable for an offensive battle. These contradictory commands cost
the French their first loss. Seven battalions of their troops having
pushed forward towards Oudenarde as far as Eyne, were fallen upon and
destroyed by Cadogan, who thus crossed the brook and ascended the
irregular high land beyond it. Had Vendome's order been carried out the
position of Cadogan would have been very precarious. He was almost
unsupported, although Marlborough was coming to his assistance with some
cavalry, which he led forward for several miles at a gallop. As it was,
however, the English army came up by degrees, and took position with
their left on the semicircle of hills, and their right supporting
Cadogan beyond the brook. Thwarted in his first schemes, Vendome now
wished to remain beyond the Norken, knowing that the enemy were wearied
with a long march (it was already four in the afternoon), and that he
would have an opportunity of withdrawing quietly in the night towards
France. The Duke of Burgundy again thwarted him. He commanded the right
wing, and insisted upon sending his troops forward across the Norken
into the valleys where the brooks ran. The country was there broken up
with enclosures, and a fierce hand-to-hand battle was fought with the
English right, which Marlborough had intrusted to Eugene. The exhibition
of all the English cavalry upon the high lands beyond the brooks held
the French left entirely in check; and while Eugene and the English were
disputing the hedges and enclosures in the valley, Marlborough, passing
to the left, observed that the extremity of the semicircle, which
overhung the Norken and was occupied by the village of Oycke, was
unguarded by the French. He caused Overkirk with the Dutch reserve to
march round the hills to occupy this point, and thus completely envelop
the French right. The effect was the total annihilation of that part of
the French army, and it was owing to an accident alone that any part of
it escaped. The two extremes of the enveloping English line came so
close together, that in the darkness they fired upon each other. The
mistake was happily soon discovered, but fearing a repetition of the
accident, the general gave orders rather to let the French escape than
to run the risk of renewing such a disaster. Some 9000 men thus broke
through at a gap in the semicircle of hills near the Castle of Bevere,
and made their escape to France. The rest of the beaten army retired
toward Ghent.
[Illustration: Battle of Oudenard. July 11th, 1708.]
[Sidenote: Siege of Lille. Dec. 9, 1708.]
Both armies were speedily reinforced. Eugene's troops arrived from the
Moselle, and joined the English; Berwick, with part of the army of the
Rhine, which had been observing them, reinforced the French, but the
relative numbers of the troops were not much changed. Marlborough and
Eugene had now to settle upon a further plan of action. Before them lay
the great city of Lille, one of the earliest conquests of Louis XIV.,
newly fortified with all the skill of Vauban. That the allies should
cross the frontier and enter France was speedily determined. But while
Marlborough suggested the bold plan of leaving troops to mask Lille,
while the main army marched direct to Paris, Eugene, though by no means
a timid general, urged the more regular course of besieging and
capturing the great fortress which lay in their way before proceeding
further. The arguments in favour of this plan were too plausible to be
disregarded. It was decided that while Eugene in person undertook the
siege, Marlborough should command the covering army. Even to bring the
siege material to the spot was a matter of no small difficulty; the
artillery alone required 16,000 horses, and the progress of the siege
was watched by a French army of 100,000. When these preliminary
difficulties were triumphantly overcome, there still remained the great
fortress itself, occupied by 15,000 men, under the able command of
Boufflers. At one time the Dutch deputies were so alarmed at the
slowness of the progress made that they urged the renunciation of the
project. One of the greatest difficulties experienced by the allied
commanders was the provisioning of the army; the land communication with
Brussels was entirely cut off, all provisions had to be brought from
Ostend, whither they had been conveyed by sea. The French determined to
interrupt this line of communication also, and to destroy one of the
convoys which had been intrusted to General Webb, with a most
insufficient detachment of troops. It has been suggested that
Marlborough was here playing one of his old tricks, that, in his
jealousy of Webb, he wished for his destruction, and had intentionally
exposed him to this danger. If such was the case he was thoroughly
disappointed. When the French troops fell upon the convoy at Wynendale,
Webb made a most gallant defence and beat them off. The very slight
notice taken by Marlborough in his despatches of this gallant action
gives some colour to the rumour. The victory of Wynendale was at all
events the turning-point of the siege; from this time rapid progress was
made. On the 22nd of October Boufflers found it necessary to capitulate
for the town, while retaining the citadel, and on the 9th of December he
marched out of his last stronghold with all the honours of war. The
reconquest of Ghent and Bruges followed upon the fall of Lille.
[Sidenote: Capture of Port Mahon.]
In other directions the war had been languid. In Spain only had anything
been done. There Stanhope had taken the command in conjunction with
Staremberg, the Imperial general, and had succeeded without much
difficulty in capturing Port Mahon in Minorca, a place then regarded as
more valuable than Gibraltar, and of the highest importance as affording
a safe winter harbour for the English fleet in the Mediterranean.
[Sidenote: Exhaustion of France. 1709.]
[Sidenote: Louis offers to treat.]
[Sidenote: High demands of the allies.]
[Sidenote: Rejected by Louis.]