The new epoch.
The Franco-German War marks a turning-point in the history of the
exterior policy of France as distinct as does the fall of the ancient
monarchy or the end of the Napoleonic epoch. With the disappearance of
the Second Empire, by its own fault, on the field of Sedan in September
1870, followed in the early months of 1871 by the proclamation of the
German empire at Versailles and the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine
under the treaty of peace of Frankfort, France descended from its
primacy among the nations of continental Europe, which it had gradually
acquired in the half-century subsequent to Waterloo. It was the design
of Bismarck that united Germany, which had been finally established
under his direction by the war of 1870, should take the place hitherto
occupied by France in Europe. The situation of France in 1871 in no wise
resembled that after the French defeat of 1815, when the First Empire,
issue of the Revolution, had been upset by a coalition of the European
monarchies which brought back and supported on his restored throne the
legitimate heir to the French crown. In 1871 the Republic was founded in
isolation. France was without allies, and outside its frontiers the form
of its executive government was a matter of interest only to its German
conquerors. Bismarck desired that France should remain isolated in
Europe and divided at home. He thought that the Republican form of
government would best serve these ends. The revolutionary tradition of
France would, under a Republic, keep aloof the monarchies of Europe,
whereas, in the words of the German ambassador at Paris, Prince
Hohenlohe, a "monarchy would strengthen France and place her in a better
position to make alliances and would threaten our alliances." At the
same time Bismarck counted on governmental instability under a Republic
to bring about domestic disorganization which would so disintegrate the
French nation as to render it unformidable as a foe and ineffective as
an ally. The Franco-German War thus produced a situation unprecedented
in the mutual relations of two great European powers. From that
situation resulted all the exterior policy of France, for a whole
generation, colonial as well as foreign.
In 1875 Germany saw France in possession of a constitution which gave
promise of durability if not of permanence. German opinion had already
been perturbed by the facility and speed with which France had paid off
the colossal war indemnity exacted by the conqueror, thus giving proof
of the inexhaustible resources of the country and of its powers of
recuperation. The successful reorganization of the French army under the
military law of 1872 caused further alarm when there appeared to be some
possibility of the withdrawal of Russia from the Dreikaiserbund, which
had set the seal on Germany's triumph and France's abasement in Europe.
It seemed, therefore, as though it might be expedient for Germany to
make a sudden aggression upon France before that country was adequately
prepared for war, in order to crush the nation irreparably and to remove
it from among the great powers of Europe.
The constitution of the Third Republic was voted by the National
Assembly on the 25th of February 1875. The new constitution had to be
completed by electoral laws and other complementary provisions, so it
could not become effective until the following year, after the first
elections of the newly founded Senate and Chamber of Deputies. M. Buffet
was then charged by the president of the republic, Marshal MacMahon, to
form a provisional ministry in which the duc Decazes, who had been
foreign minister since 1873, was retained at the Quai d'Orsay. The
cabinet met for the first time on the 11th of March, and ten days later
the National Assembly adjourned for a long recess.
The crisis of 1875.
It was during that interval that occurred the incident known as "The
Scare of 1875." The Kulturkampf had left Prince Bismarck in a state of
nervous irritation. In all directions he was on the look out for traces
of Ultramontane intrigue. The clericals in France after the fall of
Thiers had behaved with great indiscretion in their desire to see the
temporal power of the pope revived. But when the reactionaries had
placed MacMahon at the head of the state, their divisions and their
political ineptitude had shown that the government of France would soon
pass from their hands, and of this the voting of the Republican
constitution by a monarchical assembly was the visible proof.
Nevertheless Bismarck, influenced by the presence at Berlin of a French
ambassador, M. de Gontaut-Biron, whom he regarded as an Ultramontane
agent, seems to have thought otherwise. A military party at Berlin
affected alarm at a law passed by the French Assembly on the 12th of
March, which continued a provision increasing from three to four the
battalions of each infantry regiment, and certain journals, supposed to
be inspired by Bismarck, argued that as the French were preparing, it
might be well to anticipate their designs before they were ready. Europe
was scared by an article on the 6th of May in _The Times_, professing to
reveal the designs of Bismarck, from its Paris correspondent, Blowitz,
who was in relations with the French foreign minister, the duc Decazes,
and with Prince Hohenlohe, German ambassador to France, both being
prudent diplomatists, and, though Catholics, opposed to Ultramontane
pretensions. Europe was astounded at the revelation and alarmed at the
alleged imminence of war. In England the Disraeli ministry addressed the
governments of Russia, Austria and Italy, with a view to restraining
Germany from its aggressive designs, and Queen Victoria wrote to the
German emperor to plead the cause of peace. It is probable that there
was no need either for this intervention or for the panic which had
produced it. We know now that the old emperor William was steadfastly
opposed to a fresh war, while his son, the crown prince Frederick, who
then seemed likely soon to succeed him for a long reign, was also
determined that peace should be maintained. The scare had, however, a
most important result, in sowing the seeds of the subsequent
Franco-Russian alliance. Notwithstanding that the tsar Alexander II. was
on terms of affectionate intimacy with his uncle, the emperor William,
he gave a personal assurance to General Le Flo, French ambassador at St
Petersburg, that France should have the "moral support" of Russia in the
case of an aggression on the part of Germany. It is possible that the
danger of war was exaggerated by the French foreign minister and his
ambassador at Berlin, as is the opinion of certain French historians,
who think that M. de Gontaut-Biron, as an old royalist, was only too
glad to see the Republic under the protection, as it were, of the most
reactionary monarchy of Europe. At the same time Bismarck's denials of
having acted with terrorizing intent cannot be accepted. He was more
sincere when he criticized the ostentation with which the Russian
Chancellor, Prince Gortchakoff, had claimed for his master the character
of the defender of France and the obstacle to German ambitions. It was
in memory of this that, in 1878 at the congress of Berlin, Bismarck did
his best to impair the advantages which Russia had obtained under the
treaty of San Stefano.
Congress of Berlin.
The events which led to that congress put into abeyance the prospect of
a serious understanding between France and Russia. The insurrection in
Herzegovina in July 1875 reopened the Eastern question, and in the
Orient the interests of France and Russia had been for many years
conflicting, as witness the controversy concerning the Holy Places,
which was one of the causes of the Crimean War. France had from the
reign of Louis XIV. claimed the exclusive right of protecting Roman
Catholic interests in the East. This claim was supported not only by the
monarchists, for the most part friendly to Russia in other respects, who
directed the foreign policy of the Third Republic until the
Russo-Turkish War of 1877, but by the Republicans, who were coming into
perpetual power at the time of the congress of Berlin--the ablest of the
anti-clericals, Gambetta, declaring in this connexion that
"anti-clericalism was not an article of exportation." The defeat of the
monarchists at the elections of 1877, after the "Seize Mai," and the
departure from office of the duc Decazes, whose policy had tended to
prepare the way for an alliance with the tsar, changed the attitude of
French diplomacy towards Russia. M. Waddington, the first Republican
minister for foreign affairs, was not a Russophil, while Gambetta was
ardently anti-Russian, and he, though not a minister, was exercising
that preponderant influence in French politics which he retained until
1882, the last year of his life. Many Republicans considered that the
monarchists, whom they had turned out, favoured the support of Russia
not only as a defence against Germany, which was not likely to be
effective so long as a friendly uncle and nephew were reigning at Berlin
and at St Petersburg respectively, but also as a possible means of
facilitating a monarchical restoration in France. Consequently at the
congress of Berlin M. Waddington and the other French delegates
maintained a very independent attitude towards Russia. They supported
the resolutions which aimed at diminishing the advantages obtained by
Russia in the war, they affirmed the rights of France over the Holy
Places, and they opposed the anti-Semitic views of the Russian
representatives. The result of the congress of Berlin seemed therefore
to draw France and Russia farther apart, especially as Gambetta and the
Republicans now in power were more disposed towards an understanding
with England. The contrary, however, happened. The treaty of Berlin,
which took the place of the treaty of San Stefano, was the ruin of
Russian hopes. It was attributed to the support given by Bismarck to the
anti-Russian policy of England and Austria at the congress, the German
chancellor having previously discouraged the project of an alliance
between Russia and Germany. The consequence was that the tsar withdrew
from the Dreikaiserbund, and Germany, finding the support of Austria
inadequate for its purposes, sought an understanding with Italy. Hence
arose the Triple Alliance of 1882, which was the work of Bismarck, who
thus became eventually the author of the Franco-Russian alliance, which
was rather a sedative for the nervous temperament of the French than a
remedy necessary for their protection. The twofold aim of the Triplice
was the development of the Bismarckian policy of the continued isolation
of France and of the maintenance of the situation in Europe acquired by
the German empire in 1871. The most obvious alliance for Germany was
that with Russia, but it was clear that it could be obtained only at the
price of Russia having a free hand to satisfy its ambitions in the East.
This not only would have irritated England against Germany, but also
Austria, and so might have brought about a Franco-Austrian alliance, and
a day of reckoning for Germany for the combined rancours of two nations,
left by 1866 and 1871. It was thus that Germany allied itself first with
Austria and then with Italy, leaving Russia eventually to unite with
France.
Egyptian question.
As the congress of Berlin took in review the general situation of the
Turkish empire, it was natural that the French delegates should
formulate the position of France in Egypt. Thus the powers of Europe
accepted the maintenance of the _condominium_ in Egypt, financial and
administrative, of England and France. Egypt, nominally a province of
the Turkish empire, had been invested with a large degree of autonomy,
guaranteed by an agreement made in 1840 and 1841 between the Porte and
the then five great powers, though some opposition was made to France
being a party to this compact. By degrees Austria, Prussia and Russia
(as well as Italy when it attained the rank of a great power) had left
the international control of Egypt to France and England by reason of
the preponderance of the interests of those two powers on the Nile.
In 1875 the interests of England in Egypt, which had hitherto been
considered inferior to those of France, gained a superiority owing to
the purchase by the British government of the shares of the khedive
Ismail in the Suez Canal. Whatever rivalry there may have been between
England and France, they had to present a united front to the
pretensions of Ismail, whose prodigalities made him impatient of the
control which they exercised over his finances. This led to his
deposition and exile. The control was re-established by his successor
Tewfik on the 4th of September 1879. The revival ensued of a so-called
national party, which Ismail for his own purposes had encouraged in its
movement hostile to foreign domination. In September 1881 took place the
rising led by Arabi, by whose action an assembly of notables was
convoked for the purpose of deposing the government authorized by the
European powers. The fear lest the sultan should intervene gave an
appearance of harmony to the policy of England and France, whose
interests were too great to permit of any such interference. At the end
of 1879 the first Freycinet cabinet had succeeded that of M. Waddington
and had in turn been succeeded in September 1880 by the first Ferry
cabinet. In the latter the foreign minister was M. Barthelemy
Saint-Hilaire, an aged philosopher who had first taken part in politics
when he helped to dethrone Charles X. in 1830. In September 1881 he
categorically invited the British government to join France in a
military intervention to oppose any interference which the Porte might
attempt, and the two powers each sent a war-ship to Alexandria. On the
14th of November Gambetta formed his _grand ministere_, in which he was
foreign minister. Though it lasted less than eleven weeks, important
measures were taken by it, as Arabi had become under-secretary for war
at Cairo, and was receiving secret encouragement from the sultan. On the
7th of January 1882, at the instance of Gambetta, a joint note was
presented by the British and French consuls to the khedive, to the
effect that their governments were resolved to maintain the _status
quo_, Gambetta having designed this as a consecration of the
Anglo-French alliance in the East. Thereupon the Porte protested, by a
circular addressed to the powers, against this infringement of its
suzerainty in Egypt. Meanwhile, the assembly of notables claimed the
right of voting the taxes and administering the finances of the country,
and Gambetta, considering this as an attempt to emancipate Egypt from
the financial control of Europe, moved the British government to join
with France in protesting against any interference on the part of the
notables in the budget. But when Lord Granville accepted this proposal
Gambetta had fallen, on the 26th of January, being succeeded by M. de
Freycinet, who for the second time became president of the council and
foreign minister. Gambetta fell nominally on a scheme of partial
revision of the constitution. It included the re-establishment of
_scrutin de liste_, a method of voting to which many Republicans were
hostile, so this gave his enemies in his own party their opportunity. He
thus fell the victim of republican jealousy, nearly half the Republicans
in the chamber voting against him in the fatal division. The subsequent
debates of 1882 show that many of Gambetta's adversaries were also
opposed to his policy of uniting with England on the Egyptian question.
Henceforth the interior affairs of Egypt have little to do with the
subject we are treating; but some of the incidents in France which led
to the English occupation of Egypt ought to be mentioned. M. de
Freycinet was opposed to any armed intervention by France; but in the
face of the feeling in the country in favour of maintaining the
traditional influence of France in Egypt, his declarations of policy
were vague. On the 23rd of February 1882 he said that he would assure
the non-exclusive preponderance in Egypt of France and England by means
of an understanding with Europe, and on the 11th of May that he wished
to retain for France its peculiar position of privileged influence.
England and France sent to Alexandria a combined squadron, which did not
prevent a massacre of Europeans there on the 11th of June, the khedive
being now in the hands of the military party under Arabi. On the 11th of
July the English fleet bombarded Alexandria, the French ships in
anticipation of that action having departed the previous day. On the
18th of July the Chamber debated the supplementary vote for the fleet in
the Mediterranean, M. de Freycinet declaring that France would take no
active part in Egypt except as the mandatory of the European powers.
This was the occasion for the last great speech of Gambetta in
parliament. In it he earnestly urged close co-operation with England,
which he predicted would otherwise become the mistress of Egypt, and in
his concluding sentences he uttered the famous "_Ne rompez jamais
l'alliance anglaise._" A further vote, proposed in consequence of
Arabi's open rebellion, was abandoned, as M. de Freycinet announced that
the European powers declined to give France and England a collective
mandate to intervene in their name. In the Senate on the 25th of July M.
Scherer, better known as a philosopher than as a politician, who had
Gambetta's confidence, read a report on the supplementary votes which
severely criticized the timidity and vacillation of the government in
Egyptian policy. Four days later in the Chamber M. de Freycinet proposed
an understanding with England limited to the protection of the Suez
Canal. Attacked by M. Clemenceau on the impossibility of separating the
question of the canal from the general Egyptian question, the ministry
was defeated by a huge majority, and M. de Freycinet fell, having
achieved the distinction of being the chief instrument in removing Egypt
from the sphere of French interest.
Some of the Republicans whose votes turned out M. de Freycinet wanted
Jules Ferry to take his place, as he was considered to be a strong man
in foreign policy, and Gambetta, for this reason, was willing to see his
personal enemy at the head of public affairs. But this was prevented by
M. Clemenceau and the extreme Left, and the new ministry was formed by
M. Duclerc, an old senator whose previous official experience had been
under the Second Republic. On its taking office on the 7th of August,
the ministerial declaration announced that its policy would be in
conformity with the vote which, by refusing supplies for the occupation
of the Suez Canal, had overthrown M. de Freycinet. The declaration
characterized this vote as "a measure of reserve and of prudence but not
as an abdication." Nevertheless the action of the Chamber--which was due
to the hostility to Gambetta of rival leaders, who had little mutual
affection, including MM. de Freycinet, Jules Ferry, Clemenceau and the
president of the Republic, M. Grevy, rather than to a desire to abandon
Egypt--did result in the abdication of France. After England
single-handed had subdued the rebellion and restored the authority of
the khedive, the latter signed a decree on the 11th of January 1883
abolishing the joint control of England and France. Henceforth Egypt
continued to be a frequent topic of debate in the Chambers; the
interests of France in respect of the Egyptian finances, the judicial
system and other institutions formed the subject of diplomatic
correspondence, as did the irritating question of the eventual
evacuation of Egypt by England. But though it caused constant friction
between the two countries up to the Anglo-French convention of the 8th
of April 1904, there was no longer a French active policy with regard to
Egypt. The lost predominance of France in that country did, however,
quicken French activity in other regions of northern Africa.
Algerian policy.
Tunis.
The idea that the Mediterranean might become a French lake has, in
different senses, been a preoccupation for France and for its rivals in
Europe ever since Algeria became a French province by a series of
fortuitous incidents--an insult offered by the dey to a French consul,
his refusal to make reparation, and the occasion it afforded of
diverting public attention in France from interior affairs after the
Revolution of 1830. The French policy of preponderance in Egypt had only
for a secondary aim the domination of the Mediterranean. The French
tradition in Egypt was a relic of Napoleon's vain scheme to become
emperor of the Orient even before he had made himself emperor of the
West. It was because Egypt was the highway to India that under Napoleon
III. the French had constructed the Suez Canal, and for the same reason
England could never permit them to become masters of the Nile delta. But
the possessors of Algeria could extend their coast-line of North Africa
without seriously menacing the power which held Gibraltar and Malta. It
was Italy which objected to a French occupation of Tunis. Algeria has
never been officially a French "colony." It is in many respects
administered as an integral portion of French territory, the
governor-general, as agent of the central power, exercising wide
jurisdiction. Although the Europeans in Algeria are less than a seventh
of the population, and although the French are actually a minority of
the European inhabitants--Spaniards prevailing in the west, Italians and
Maltese in the east--the three departments of Constantine, Algiers and
Oran are administered like three French departments. Consequently, when
disturbances occurred on the borderland separating Constantine from
Tunis, the French were able to say to Europe that the integrity of their
national frontier was threatened by the proximity of a turbulent
neighbour. The history of the relations between Tunis and France were
set forth, from the French standpoint, in a circular, of which Jules
Ferry was said to be the author, addressed by the foreign minister, M.
Barthelemy Saint-Hilaire on the 9th of May 1881, to the diplomatic
agents of France abroad. The most important point emphasized by the
French minister was the independence of Tunis from the Porte, a
situation which would obviate difficulties with Turkey such as had
always hampered the European powers in Egypt. In support of this
contention a protest made by the British government in 1830, against the
French conquest of Algiers, was quoted, as in it Lord Aberdeen had
declared that Europe had always treated the Barbary states as
independent powers. On the other hand, there was the incident of the bey
of Tunis having furnished to Turkey a contingent during the Crimean War,
which suggested a recognition of its vassalage to the Sublime Porte. But
in 1864, when the sultan had sent a fleet to La Goulette to affirm his
"rights" in Tunis, the French ambassador at Constantinople intimated
that France declined to have Turkey for a neighbour in Algeria. France
also in 1868 essayed to obtain control over the finances of the regency;
but England and Italy had also large interests in the country, so an
international financial commission was appointed. In 1871, when France
was disabled after the war, the bey obtained from Constantinople a
firman of investiture, thus recognizing the suzerainty of the Porte.
Certain English writers have reproached the Foreign Office for its lack
of foresight in not taking advantage of France's disablement by
establishing England as the preponderant power in Tunis. The fact that
five-sixths of the commerce of Tunis is now with France and Algeria may
seem to justify such regrets. Yet by the light of subsequent events it
seems probable that England would have been diverted from more
profitable undertakings had she been saddled with the virtual
administration and military occupation of a vast territory which such
preponderance would have entailed. The wonder is that this opportunity
was not seized by Italy; for Mazzini and other workers in the cause of
Italian unity, before the Bourbons had been driven from Naples, had cast
eyes on Tunis, lying over against the coasts of Sicily at a distance of
barely 100 m., as a favourable field for colonization and as the key of
the African Mediterranean. But when Rome became once more the capital of
Italy, Carthage was not fated to fall again under its domination and
the occasion offered by France's temporary impotence was neglected. In
1875 when France was rapidly recovering, there went to Tunis as consul
an able Frenchman, M. Roustan, who became virtual ruler of the regency
in spite of the resistance of the representative of Italy. French action
was facilitated by the attitude of England. On the 26th of July 1878 M.
Waddington wrote to the marquis d'Harcourt, French ambassador in London,
that at the congress of Berlin Lord Salisbury had said to him--the two
delegates being the foreign ministers of their respective
governments--in reply to his protest, on behalf of France, against the
proposed English occupation of Cyprus, "Do what you think proper in
Tunis: England will offer no opposition." This was confirmed by Lord
Salisbury in a despatch to Lord Lyons, British ambassador in Paris, on
the 8th of August, and it was followed in October by an intimation made
by the French ambassador at Rome that France intended to exercise a
preponderant influence in Tunis. Italy was not willing to accept this
situation. In January 1881 a tour made by King Humbert in Sicily, where
he received a Tunisian mission, was taken to signify that Italy had not
done with Tunis, and it was answered in April by a French expedition in
the regency sent from Algeria, on the pretext of punishing the Kroumirs
who had been marauding on the frontier of Constantine. It was on this
occasion that M. Barthelemy Saint-Hilaire issued the circular quoted
above. France nominally was never at war with Tunis; yet the result of
the invasion was that that country became virtually a French possession,
although officially it is only under the protection of France. The
treaty of El Bardo of the 12th of May 1881, confirmed by the decree of
the 22nd of April 1882, placed Tunis under the protectorate of France.
The country is administered under the direction of the French Foreign
Office, in which there is a department of Tunisian affairs. The governor
is called minister resident-general of France, and he also acts as
foreign minister, being assisted by seven French and two native
ministers.
Extension of African Territory.
The protectorate system.
The annexation of Tunis was important for many reasons. It was the first
successful achievement of France after the disasters of the
Franco-German War, and it was the first enterprise of serious utility to
France undertaken beyond its frontiers since the early period of the
Second Empire. It was also important as establishing the hegemony of
France on the southern shores of the Mediterranean. When M. Jules Cambon
became governor-general of Algeria, his brother M. Paul Cambon having
been previously French resident in Tunis and remaining the vigilant
ambassador to a Mediterranean power, a Parisian wit said that just as
Switzerland had its _Lac des quatre_ Cantons, so France had made of the
midland sea its _Lac des deux Cambons_. The _jeu d'esprit_ indicated
what was the primary significance to the French of their becoming
masters of the Barbary coast from the boundary of Morocco to that of
Tripoli. Apart from the Mediterranean question, when the scramble for
Africa began and the Hinterland doctrine was asserted by European
powers, the possession of this extended coast-line resulted in France
laying claim to the Sahara and the western Sudan. Consequently, on the
maps, the whole of northwest Africa, from Tunis to the Congo, is claimed
by France with the exception of the relatively small areas on the coast
belonging to Morocco, Spain, Portugal, Liberia, Germany and England. On
this basis, in point of area, France is the greatest African power, in
spite of British annexations in south and equatorial Africa, its area
being estimated at 3,866,950 sq. m. (including 227,950 in Madagascar) as
against 2,101,411 more effectively possessed by Great Britain. The
immensity of its domain on paper is no doubt a satisfaction to a people
which prefers to pursue its policy of colonial expansion without the aid
of emigration. The acquisition of Tunis by France is also important as
an example of the system of protectorate as applied to colonization.
Open annexation might have more gravely irritated the powers having
interests in the country. England, in spite of Lord Salisbury's
suggestions to the French foreign minister, was none too pleased with
France's policy; while Italy, with its subjects outnumbering all other
European settlers in the regency, was in a mood to accept a pretext for
a quarrel for the reasons already mentioned. Apart from these
considerations the French government favoured a protectorate because it
did not wish to make of Tunis a second Algeria. While the annexation of
the latter had excellent commercial results for France, it had not been
followed by successful colonization, though it had cost France 160
millions sterling in the first sixty years after it became French
territory. The French cannot govern at home or abroad without a
centralized system of administration. The organization of Algeria, as
departments of France with their administrative divisions, was not an
example to imitate. In the beylical government France found, ready-made,
a sufficiently centralized system, such as did not exist in Algeria
under native rule, which could form a basis of administration by French
functionaries under the direction of the Quai d'Orsay. The result has
not been unpleasing to the numerous advocates in France of protectorates
as a means of colonization. According to M. Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, the
most eminent French authority on colonization, who knows Tunis well, a
protectorate is the most pacific, the most supple, and the least costly
method of colonization in countries where an organized form of native
government exists; it is the system in which the French can most nearly
approach that of English crown colonies. One evil which it avoids is the
so-called representative system, under which senators and deputies are
sent to the French parliament not only from Algeria as an integral part
of France, but from the colonies of Martinique, Guadeloupe and French
India, while Cochin-China, Guiana and Senegal send deputies alone. These
sixteen deputies and seven senators attach themselves to the various
Moderate, Radical and Socialist groups in parliament, which have no
connexion with the interests of the colonies; and the consequent
introduction of French political controversies into colonial elections
has not been of advantage to the oversea possessions of France. From
this the protectorate system has spared Tunis, and the paucity of French
immigration will continue to safeguard that country from parliamentary
representation. After twenty years of French rule, of 120,000 European
residents in Tunis, not counting the army, only 22,000 were French,
while nearly 70,000 were Italian. If under a so-called representative
system the Italians had demanded nationalization, for the purpose of
obtaining the franchise, complications might have arisen which are not
to be feared under a protectorate.
The Triple Alliance.
But of all the results of the French annexation of Tunis, the most
important was undoubtedly the Triple Alliance, into which Italy entered
in resentment at having been deprived of the African territory which
seemed marked out as its natural field for colonial expansion. The most
manifest cause of Italian hostility towards France had passed away four
years before the annexation of Tunis, when the reactionaries, who had
favoured the restitution of the temporal power of the pope, fell for
ever from power. The clericalism of the anti-republicans, who favoured a
revival of the fatal policy of the Second Empire whereby France, after
Magenta and Solferino, had by leaving its garrison at St Angelo, been
the last obstacle to Italian unity, was one of the chief causes of their
downfall. For after the war with Germany, the mutilated land and the
vanquished nation had need to avoid wanton provocations of foreign
powers. Henceforth the French Republic, governed by Republicans, was to
be an anti-clerical force in Europe, sympathizing with the Italian
occupation of Rome. But to make Italy realize that France was no longer
the enemy of complete Italian unity it would have been necessary that
all causes of irritation between the two Latin sister nations were
removed. Such causes of dissension did, however, remain, arising from
economic questions. The maritime relations of the two chief
Mediterranean powers were based on a treaty of navigation of 1862--when
Venice was no party to it being an Austrian port--which Crispi denounced
as a relic of Italian servility towards Napoleon III. Commercial rivalry
was induced by the industrial development of northern Italy, when freed
from Austrian rule. Moreover, the emigrant propensity of the Italians
flooded certain regions of France with Italian cheap labour, with the
natural result of bitter animosity between the intruders and the
inhabitants of the districts thus invaded. The annexation of Tunis,
coming on the top of these causes of irritation, exasperated Italy. A
new treaty of commerce was nevertheless signed between the two countries
on the 3rd of November 1881. Unfortunately for its stability, King
Humbert the previous week had gone to Vienna to see the emperor of
Austria. In visiting in his capital the former arch-enemy of Italian
unity, who could never return the courtesy, Rome being interdicted for
Catholic sovereigns by the "prisoner of the Vatican," Humbert had only
followed the example of his father Victor Emmanuel, who went both to
Berlin and to Vienna in 1873. But that was when in France the duc de
Broglie was prime minister of a clerical government of which many of the
supporters were clamouring for the restitution of the temporal power.
King Humbert's visit to Vienna at the moment when Gambetta, the great
anti-clerical champion, was at the height of his influence was
significant for other reasons. Since the 7th of October 1879 Germany and
Austria had been united by a defensive treaty, and though its provisions
were not published until 1888, the two central empires were known to be
in the closest alliance. The king of Italy's visit to Vienna, where he
was accompanied by his ministers Depretis and Mancini, had therefore the
same significance as though he had gone to Berlin also. On the 20th of
May 1882 was signed the treaty of the Triple Alliance, which for many
years bound Italy to Germany in its relations with the continental
powers. The alliance was first publicly announced on the 13th of March
1883, in the Italian Chamber, by Signor Mancini, minister for foreign
affairs. The aim of Italy in joining the combination was alliance with
Germany, the enemy of France. The connexion with Austria was only
tolerated because it secured a union with the powerful government of
Berlin. It effected the complete isolation of France in Europe. An
understanding between the French Republic and Russia, which alone could
alter that situation, was impracticable, as its only basis seemed to be
the possibility of having a common enemy in Germany or even in England.
But that double eventuality was anticipated by a secret convention
concluded at Skiernewice in September 1884 by the tsar and the German
emperor, in which they guaranteed to one another a benevolent neutrality
in case of hostilities between England and Russia arising out of the
Afghan question.
It will be convenient here to refer to the relations of France with
Germany and Italy respectively in the years succeeding the signature of
the Triple Alliance. With Germany both Gambetta, who died ten weeks
before the treaty was announced and who was a strong Russophobe, and his
adversary Jules Ferry were inclined to come to an understanding. But in
this they had not the support of French opinion. In September 1883 the
king of Spain had visited the sovereigns of Austria and Germany.
Alphonso XII., to prove that this journey was not a sign of hostility to
France, came to Paris on his way home on Michaelmas Day on an official
visit to President Grevy. Unfortunately it was announced that the German
emperor had made the king colonel of a regiment of Uhlans garrisoned at
Strassburg, the anniversary of the taking of which city was being
celebrated by the emperor by the inauguration of a monument made out of
cannon taken from the French, on the very eve of King Alphonso's
arrival. Violent protests were made in Paris in the monarchical and in
not a few republican journals, with the result that the king of Spain
was hooted by the crowd as he drove with the president from the station
to his embassy, and again on his way to dine the same night at the
Elysee. The incident was closed by M. Grevy's apologies and by the
retirement of the minister of war, General Thibaudin, who under pressure
from the extreme Left had declined to meet _le roi uhlan_. Though it
displayed the bitter hostility of the population towards Germany, the
incident did not aggravate Franco-German relations. This was due to the
policy of the prime minister, Jules Ferry, who to carry it out made
himself foreign minister in November, in the place of Challemel-Lacour,
who resigned.
Franco-German relations.
Jules Ferry's idea was that colonial expansion was the surest means for
France to recover its prestige, and that this could be obtained only by
maintaining peaceful relations with all the powers of Europe. His
consequent unpopularity caused his fall in April 1885, and the next year
a violent change of military policy was marked by the arrival of General
Boulanger at the ministry of war, where he remained, in the Freycinet
and Goblet cabinets, from January 1886 to the 17th of May 1887. His
growing popularity in France was answered by Bismarck, who asked for an
increased vote for the German army, indicating that he considered
Boulanger the coming dictator for the war of revenge; so when the
Reichstag, on the 14th of January 1887, voted the supplies for three
years, instead of for the seven demanded by the chancellor, it was
dissolved. Bismarck redoubled his efforts in the press and in diplomacy,
vainly attempting to come to an understanding with Russia and with more
success moving the Vatican to order the German Catholics to support him.
He obtained his vote for seven years in March, and the same month
renewed the Triple Alliance. In April the Schnaebele incident seemed
nearly to cause war between France and Germany. The commissary-special,
an agent of the ministry of the interior, at Pagny-sur-Moselle, the last
French station on the frontier of the annexed territory of Lorraine,
having stepped across the boundary to regulate some official matter with
the corresponding functionary on the German side, was arrested. It was
said that Schnaebele was arrested actually on French soil, and on
whichever side of the line he was standing he had gone to meet the
German official at the request of the latter. Bismarck justified the
outrage in a speech in the Prussian Landtag which suggested that it was
impossible to live at peace with a nation so bellicose as the French. In
France the incident was regarded as a trap laid by the chancellor to
excite French opinion under the aggressive guidance of Boulanger, and to
produce events which would precipitate a war. The French remained calm,
in spite of the growing popularity of Boulanger. The Goblet ministry
resigned on the 17th of May 1887 after a hostile division on the budget,
and the opportunity was taken to get rid of the minister of war, who
posed as the coming restorer of Alsace and Lorraine to France. The
Boulangist movement soon became anti-Republican, and the opposition to
it of successive ministries improved the official relations of the
French and German governments. The circumstances attending the fall of
President Grevy the same year strengthened the Boulangist agitation, and
Jules Ferry, who seemed indicated as his successor, was discarded by the
Republican majority in the electoral congress, as a revolution was
threatened in Paris if the choice fell on "the German Ferry." Sadi
Carnot was consequently elected president of the Republic on the 3rd of
December 1887. Three months later, on the 9th of March 1888, died the
old emperor William who had personified the conquest of France by
Germany. His son, the pacific emperor Frederick, died too, on the 15th
of June, so the accession of William II., the pupil of Bismarck, at a
moment when Boulanger threatened to become plebiscitary dictator of
France, was ominous for the peace of Europe. But in April 1889 Boulanger
ignominiously fled the country, and in March 1890 Bismarck fell. France
none the less rejected all friendly overtures made by the young emperor.
In February 1891 his mother came to Paris and was unluckily induced to
visit the scenes of German triumph near the capital--the ruins of St
Cloud and the Chateau of Versailles where the German empire was
proclaimed. The incident called forth such an explosion of wrath from
the French press that it was clear that France had not forgotten 1871.
By this time, however, France was no longer isolated and at the mercy of
Germany, which by reason of the increase of its population while that of
France had remained almost stationary, was, under the system of
compulsory military service in the two countries, more than a match for
its neighbour in a single-handed conflict. Even the Triple Alliance
ceased to be a terror for France. An understanding arose between France
and Russia preliminary to the Franco-Russian alliance, which became the
pivot of French exterior relations until the defeat of Russia in the
Japanese war of 1904. So the second renewal of the Triplice was
forthwith answered by a visit of the French squadron to Kronstadt in
July 1891.
France and Italy.
While such were the relations between France and the principal party to
the Triple Alliance, the same period was marked by bitter dissension
between France and Italy. Tunis had made Italy Gallophobe, but the
diplomatic relations between the two countries had been courteous until
the death of Depretis in 1887. When Crispi succeeded him as prime
minister, and till 1891 was the director of the exterior policy of
Italy, a change took place. Crispi, though not the author of the Triple
Alliance, entered with enthusiasm into its spirit of hostility to
France. The old Sicilian revolutionary hastened to pay his respects to
Bismarck at Friedrichsruh in October 1887, the visit being highly
approved in Italy. Before that the French Chamber had, in July 1886, by
a small majority, rejected a new treaty of navigation between France and
Italy, this being followed by the failure to renew the commercial treaty
of 1881. Irritating incidents were of constant occurrence. In 1888 a
conflict between the French consul at Massowah and the Italians who
occupied that Abyssinian port induced Bismarck to instruct the German
ambassador in Paris to tell M. Goblet, minister for foreign affairs in
the Floquet cabinet, in case he should refer to the matter, that if
Italy were involved thereby in complications it would not stand
alone--this menace being communicated to Crispi by the Italian
ambassador at Berlin and officially printed in a green-book. But after
Bismarck's fall relations improved a little, and in April 1890 the
Italian fleet was sent to Toulon to salute President Carnot in the name
of King Humbert, though this did not prevent the French government being
suspected of having designs on Tripoli. Italian opinion was again
incensed against France by the action of the French clericals,
represented by a band of Catholic "pilgrims" who went to Rome to offer
their sympathy to the pope in the autumn of 1891, and outraged the
burial-place of Victor Emmanuel by writing in the visitors' register
kept at the Pantheon the words "_Vive le pape._" In August 1893 a fight
took place at Aigues Mortes, the medieval walled city on the salt
marshes of the Gulf of Lyons, between French and Italian workmen, in
which seven Italians were killed. But Crispi had gone out of office
early in 1891, and the ministers who succeeded him were more disposed to
prevent a rupture between Italy and France. Crispi became prime minister
again in December 1893, but this time without the portfolio of foreign
affairs. He placed at the Consulta Baron Blanc, who though a strong
partisan of the Triple Alliance was closely attached to France, being a
native of Savoy, where he spent his yearly vacations on French soil.
That the relations between the two nations were better was shown by what
occurred after the murder of President Carnot in June 1894. The fact
that the assassin was an Italian might have caused trouble a little
earlier; but the grief of the Italians was so sincere, as shown by
popular demonstrations at Rome, that no anti-Italian violence took place
in France, and in the words of the French ambassador, M. Billot,
Caserio's crime seemed likely to further an understanding between the
two peoples. The movement was very slight and made no progress during
the short presidency of M. Casimir-Perier. On the 1st of November 1894
Alexander III. died, when the Italian press gave proof of the importance
attributed by the Triplice to the Franco-Russian understanding by
expressing a hope that the new tsar would put an end to it. But on the
10th of June 1895, the foreign minister, M. Hanotaux, intimated to the
French Chamber that the understanding had become an alliance, and on the
17th the Russian ambassador in Paris conveyed to M. Felix Faure, who was
now president of the Republic, the collar of St Andrew, while the same
day the French and Russian men-of-war, invited to the opening of the
Kiel Canal, entered German waters together. The union of France with
Russia was no doubt one cause of the cessation of Italian hostility to
France; but others were at work. The inauguration of the statue of
MacMahon at Magenta the same week as the announcement of the
Franco-Russian alliance showed that there was a disposition to revive
the old sentiment of fraternity which had once united France with Italy.
More important was the necessity felt by the Italians of improved
commercial relations with the French. Crispi fell on the 4th of March
1896, after the news of the disaster to the Italian troops at Adowa, the
war with Abyssinia being a disastrous legacy left by him. The previous
year he had caused the withdrawal from Paris of the Italian ambassador
Signor Ressmann, a friend of France, transferring thither Count
Tornielli, who during his mission in London had made a speech, after the
visit of the Italian fleet to Toulon, which qualified him to rank as a
_misogallo_. But with the final disappearance of Crispi the relations of
the two Latin neighbours became more natural. Commerce between them had
diminished, and the business men of both countries, excepting certain
protectionists, felt that the commercial rupture was mutually
prejudicial. Friendly negotiations were initiated on both sides, and
almost the last act of President Felix Faure before his sudden death--M.
Delcasse being then foreign minister--was to promulgate, on the 2nd of
February 1899, a new commercial arrangement between France and Italy
which the French parliament had adopted. By that time M. Barrere was
ambassador at the Quirinal and was engaged in promoting cordial
relations between Italy and France, of which Count Tornielli in Paris
had already become an ardent advocate. Italy remained a party to the
Triple Alliance, which was renewed for a third period in 1902. But so
changed had its significance become that in October 1903 the French
Republic received for the first time an official visit from the
sovereigns of Italy. This reconciliation of France and Italy was
destined to have most important results outside the sphere of the Triple
Alliance. The return visit which President Loubet paid to Victor
Emmanuel III. in April 1904, it being the first time that a French chief
of the state had gone to Rome since the pope had lost the temporal
sovereignty, provoked a protest from the Vatican which caused the
rupture of diplomatic relations between France and the Holy See,
followed by the repudiation of the Concordat by an act passed in France,
in 1905, separating the church from the state.
Russian alliance.
While the decadence of the Triple Alliance had this important effect on
the domestic affairs of France, its inception had produced the
Franco-Russian alliance, which took France out of its isolation in
Europe, and became the pivot of its exterior policy. It has been noted
that in the years succeeding the Franco-Prussian War the tsar Alexander
II. had shown a disposition to support France against German aggression,
as though to make up for his neutrality during the war, which was so
benevolent for Germany that his uncle William I. had ascribed to it a
large share of the German victory. The assassination of Alexander II. by
revolutionaries in 1881 made it difficult for the new autocrat to
cultivate closer relations with a Republican government, although the
Third Republic, under the influence of Gambetta, to whom its
consolidation was chiefly due, had repudiated that proselytizing spirit,
inherited from the great Revolution, which had disquieted the monarchies
of Europe in 1848 and had provoked their hostility to the Second
Republic. But the Triple Alliance which was concluded the year after the
murder of the tsar indicated the possible expediency of an understanding
between the two great powers of the West and the East, in response to
the combination of the three central powers of Europe,--though Bismarck
after his fall revealed that in 1884 a secret treaty was concluded
between Germany and Russia, which was, however, said to have in view a
war between England and Russia. Internal dissension on the subject of
colonial policy in the far East, followed by the fall of Jules Ferry and
the Boulangist agitation were some of the causes which prevented France
from strengthening its position in Europe by seeking a formal
understanding with Russia in the first part of the reign of Alexander
III. But when the Boulangist movement came to an end, entirely from the
incompetency of its leader, it behoved the government of the Republic to
find a means of satisfying the strong patriotic sentiment revealed in
the nation, which, directed by a capable and daring soldier, would have
swept away the parliamentary republic and established a military
dictatorship in its place. The Franco-Russian understanding provided
that means, and Russia was ready for it, having become, by the
termination in 1890 of the secret treaty with Germany, not less isolated
in Europe than France. In July 1891, when the French fleet visited
Kronstadt the incident caused such enthusiasm throughout the French
nation that the exiled General Boulanger's existence would have been
forgotten, except among his dwindling personal followers, had he not put
an end to it by suicide two months later at Brussels. The Franco-Russian
understanding united all parties, not in love for one another but in the
idea that France was thereby about to resume its place in Europe. The
Catholic Royalists ceased to talk of the restitution of the temporal
power of the pope in their joy at the deference of the government of the
republic for the most autocratic monarchy of Christendom; the
Boulangists, now called Nationalists, hoped that it would lead to the
war of revenge with Germany, and that it might also be the means of
humiliating England, as shown by their resentment at the visit of the
French squadron to Portsmouth on its way home from Kronstadt. It is,
however, extremely improbable that the understanding and subsequent
alliance would have been effected had the Boulangist movement succeeded.
For the last thing that the Russian government desired was war with
Germany. What it needed and obtained was security against German
aggression on its frontier and financial aid from France; so a French
plebiscitary government, having for its aim the restitution of Alsace
and Lorraine, would have found no support in Russia. As the German
chancellor, Count von Caprivi, said in the Reichstag on the 27th of
November 1891, a few weeks after a Russian loan had been subscribed in
France nearly eight times over, the naval visit to Kronstadt had not
brought war nearer by one single inch. Nevertheless when in 1893 the
Russian fleet paid a somewhat tardy return visit to Toulon, where it was
reviewed by President Carnot, a party of Russian officers who came to
Paris was received by the population of the capital, which less than
five years before had acclaimed General Boulanger, with raptures which
could not have been exceeded had they brought back to France the
territory lost in 1871. In November 1894, Alexander III. died, and in
January 1895, M. Casimir-Perier resigned the presidency of the Republic,
to which he had succeeded only six months before on the assassination of
M. Carnot. So it was left to Nicholas II. and President Felix Faure to
proclaim the existence of a formal alliance between France and Russia.
It appears that in 1891 and 1892, at the time of the first public
manifestations of friendship between France and Russia, in the words of
M. Ribot, secret conventions were signed by him, being foreign minister,
and M. de Freycinet, president of the council, which secured for France
"the support of Russia for the maintenance of the equilibrium in
Europe"; and on a later occasion the same statesman said that it was
after the visit of the empress Frederick to Paris in 1891 that Alexander
III. made to France certain offers which were accepted. The word
"alliance" was not publicly used by any minister to connote the
relations of France with Russia until the 10th of June 1895, when M.
Hanotaux used the term with cautious vagueness amid the applause of the
Chamber of Deputies. Yet not even when Nicholas II. came to France in
October 1896 was the word "alliance" formally pronounced in any of the
official speeches. But the reception given to the tsar and tsaritsa in
Paris, where no European sovereign had come officially since William of
Germany passed down the Champs Elysees as a conqueror, was of such a
character that none could doubt that this was the consecration of the
alliance. It was at last formally proclaimed by Nicholas II., on board a
French man-of-war, on the occasion of the visit of the president of the
Republic to Russia in August 1897. From that date until the formation of
M. Briand's cabinet in 1909, nine different ministries succeeded one
another and five ministers of foreign affairs; but they all loyally
supported the Franco-Russian alliance, although its popularity
diminished in France long before the war between Russia and Japan, which
deprived it of its efficacy in Europe. In 1901 Nicholas II. came again
to France and was the guest of President Loubet at Compiegne. His visit
excited little enthusiasm in the nation, which was disposed to attribute
it to Russia's financial need of France; while the Socialists, now a
strong party which provided the Waldeck-Rousseau ministry with an
important part of its majority in the Chamber, violently attacked the
alliance of the Republic with a reactionary autocracy. However anomalous
that may have been it did not prevent the whole French nation from
welcoming the friendship between the governments of Russia and of France
in its early stages. Nor can there be any doubt that the popular
instinct was right in according it that welcome. France in its
international relations was strengthened morally by the understanding
and by the alliance, which also served as a check to Germany. But its
association with Russia had not the results hoped for by the French
reactionaries. It encouraged them in their opposition to the
parliamentary Republic during the Dreyfus agitation, the more so because
the Russian autocracy is anti-Semitic. It also made a Nationalist of one
president of the Republic, Felix Faure, whose head was so turned by his
imperial frequentations that he adopted some of the less admirable
practices of princes, and also seemed ready to assume the bearing of an
autocrat. His sudden death was as great a relief to the parliamentary
Republicans as it was a disappointment to the plebiscitary party, which
anti-Dreyfusism, with its patriotic pretensions, had again made a
formidable force in the land. But the election of the pacific and
constitutional M. Loubet as president of the Republic at this critical
moment in its history counteracted any reactionary influence which the
Russian alliance might have had in France; so the general effect of the
alliance was to strengthen the Republic and to add to its prestige. The
visit of the tsar to Paris, the first paid by a friendly sovereign since
the Second Empire, impressed a population, proud of its capital, by an
outward sign which seemed to show that the Republic was not an obstacle
to the recognition by the monarchies of Europe of the place still held
by France among the great powers. Before M. Loubet laid down office the
nation, grown more republican, saw the visit of the tsar followed by
those of the kings of England and of Italy, who might never have been
moved to present their respects to the French Republic had not Russia
shown them the way.
Relations with England.
While the French rejoiced at the Russian alliance chiefly as a check to
the aggressive designs of Germany, they also liked the association of
France with a power regarded as hostile to England. This traditional
feeling was not discouraged by one of the chief artificers of the
alliance, Baron Mohrenheim, Russian ambassador in Paris, who until 1884
had filled the same position in London, where he had not learned to love
England, and who enjoyed in France a popularity rarely accorded to the
diplomatic agent of a foreign power. An _entente cordiale_ has since
been initiated between England and France. But it is necessary to refer
to the less agreeable relations which existed between the two countries,
as they had some influence on the exterior policy of the Third Republic.
England and France had no causes of friction within Europe. But in its
policy of colonial expansion, during the last twenty years of the 19th
century, France constantly encountered England all over the globe. The
first important enterprise beyond the seas seriously undertaken by
France after the Franco-German War, was, as we have seen, in Tunis. But
even before that question had been mentioned at the congress of Berlin,
in 1878, France had become involved in an adventure in the Far East,
which in its developments attracted more public attention at home than
the extension of French territory in northern Africa. Had these pages
been written before the end of the 19th century it would have seemed
necessary to trace the operations of France in Indo-China with not less
detail than has been given to the establishment of the protectorate in
Tunis. But French hopes of founding a great empire in the Far East came
to an end with the partial resuscitation of China and the rise to power
of Japan. As we have seen, Jules Ferry's idea was that in colonial
expansion France would find the best means of recovering prestige after
the defeat of 1870-71 in the years of recuperation when it was
essential to be diverted from European complications. Jules Ferry was
not a friend of Gambetta, in spite of later republican legends. But the
policy of colonial expansion in Tunis and in Indo-China, associated with
Ferry's name, was projected by Gambetta to give satisfaction to France
for the necessity, imposed, in his opinion, on the French government, of
taking its lead in foreign affairs from Berlin. How Jules Ferry
developed that system we know now from Bismarck's subsequent expressions
of regret at Ferry's fall. He believed that, had Ferry remained in
power, an amicable arrangement would have been made between France and
Germany, a formal agreement having been almost concluded to the effect
that France should maintain peaceable and friendly relations with
Germany, while Bismarck supported France in Tunis, in Indo-China and
generally in its schemes of oversea colonization. Even though the
friendly attitude of Germany towards those schemes was not official the
contrast was manifest between the benevolent tone of the German press
and that of the English, which was generally hostile. Jules Ferry took
his stand on the position that his policy was one not of colonial
conquest, but of colonial conservation, that without Tunis, Algeria was
insecure, that without Tongking and Annam, there was danger of losing
Cochin-China, where the French had been in possession since 1861. It was
on the Tongking question that Ferry fell. On the 30th of March 1885, on
the news of the defeat of the French troops at Lang-Son, the Chamber
refused to vote the money for carrying on the campaign by a majority of
306 to 149. Since that day public opinion in France has made amends to
the memory of Jules Ferry. His patriotic foresight has been extolled.
Criticism has not been spared for the opponents of his policy in
parliament of whom the most conspicuous, M. Clemenceau and M. Ribot,
have survived to take a leading part in public affairs in the 20th
century. The attitude of the Parisian press, which compared Lang-Son
with Sedan and Jules Ferry with Emile Ollivier, has been generally
deplored, as has that of the public which was ready to offer violence to
the fallen minister, and which was still so hostile to him in 1887 that
the congress at Versailles was persuaded that there would be a
revolution in Paris if it elected "the German Ferry" president of the
Republic. Nevertheless his adversaries in parliament, in the press and
in the street have been justified--not owing to their superior sagacity,
but owing to a series of unexpected events which the most foreseeing
statesmen of the world never anticipated. The Indo-China dream of Jules
Ferry might have led to a magnificent empire in the East to compensate
for that which Dupleix lost and Napoleon failed to reconquer.
The Russian alliance, which came at the time when Ferry's policy was
justified in the eyes of the public, too late for him to enjoy any
credit, gave a new impetus to the French idea of establishing an empire
in the Far East. In the opinion of all the prophets of Europe the great
international struggle in the near future was to be that of England with
Russia for the possession of India. If Russia won, France might have a
share in the dismembered Indian empire, of which part of the frontier
now marched with that of French Indo-China, since Burma had become
British and Tongking French. Such aspirations were not formulated in
white-books or in parliamentary speeches. Indeed, the apprehension of
difficulty with England limited French ambition on the Siamese frontier.
That did not prevent dangerous friction arising between England and
France on the question of the Mekong, the river which flows from China
almost due south into the China Sea traversing the whole length of
French Indo-China, and forming part of the eastern boundary of Upper
Burma and Siam. The aim of France was to secure the whole of the left
bank of the Mekong, the highway of commerce from southern China. The
opposition of Siam to this delimitation was believed by the French to be
inspired by England, the supremacy of France on the Mekong river being
prejudicial to British commerce with China. The inevitable rivalry
between the two powers reached an acute crisis in 1893, the British
ambassador in Paris being Lord Dufferin, who well understood the
question, upper Burma having been annexed to India under his
viceroyalty in 1885. The matter was not settled until 1894, when not
only was the French claim to the left bank of the Mekong allowed, but
the neutrality of a 25-kilometre zone on the Siamese bank was conceded
as open to French trade. It is said that at one moment in July 1893
England and France were more nearly at war than at any other
international crisis under the Third Republic, not excluding that of
Fashoda, though the acute tension between the governments was unknown to
the public.
The Panama affair had left French public opinion in a nervous condition.
Fantastic charges were brought not only in the press, but in the chamber
of deputies, against newspapers and politicians of having accepted
bribes from the British government. At the general election in August
and September 1893 M. Clemenceau was pursued into his distant
constituency in the Var by a crowd of Parisian politicians, who brought
about his defeat less by alleging his connexion with the Panama scandal
than by propagating the legend that he was the paid agent of England.
The official republic, which changed its prime minister three times and
its foreign minister twice in 1893, M. Develle filling that post in the
Ribot and Dupuy ministries and M. Casimir-Perier in his own, repudiated
with energy the calumnies as to the attempted interference of England in
French domestic affairs. But the successive governments were not in a
mood to make concessions in foreign questions, as all France was under
the glamour of the preliminary manifestations of the Russian alliance.
This was seen, a few weeks after the elections, in the wild enthusiasm
with which Paris received Admiral Avelane and his officers, who had
brought the Russian fleet to Toulon to return the visit of the French
fleet to Kronstadt in 1891. The death of Marshal MacMahon, who had won
his first renown in the Crimea, and his funeral at the Invalides while
the Russians were in Paris, were used to emphasize the fact that the
allies before Sebastopol were no longer friends. The projector of the
French empire in the Far East did not live to see this phase of the
seeming justification of the policy which had cost him place and
popularity. Jules Ferry had died on the 17th of March 1893, only three
weeks after his triumphant rehabilitation in the political world by his
election to the presidency of the Senate, the second post in the state.
The year he died it seemed as though with the active aid of Russia and
the sympathy of Germany the possessions of France in south-eastern Asia
might have indefinitely expanded into southern China. A few years later
the defeat of Russia by Japan and the rise of the sea-power of the
Japanese practically ended the French empire in Indo-China. What the
French already had at the end of the last century is virtually
guaranteed to them only by the Anglo-Japanese alliance. It is in the
irony of things that these possessions which were a sign of French
rivalry with England should now be secured to France by England's
friendliness. For it is now recognized by the French that the defence of
Indo-China is impossible.
African policy.
French and English rivalry.
Upper Nile exploration.
Marchand mission.
Fashoda.
Convention of 1898.
Had the French dream been realized of a large expansion of territory
into southern China, the success of the new empire would have been based
on free Chinese labour. This might have counterbalanced an initial
obstacle to all French colonial schemes, more important than those which
arise from international difficulties--the reluctance of the French to
establish themselves as serious colonists in their oversea possessions.
We have noted how Algeria, which is nearer to Toulon and Marseilles than
are Paris and Havre, has been comparatively neglected by the French,
after eighty years of occupation, in spite of the amenity of its climate
and its soil for European settlers. The new French colonial school
advocates the withdrawal of France from adventures in distant tropical
countries which can be reached only by long sea voyages, and the
concentration of French activity in the northern half of the African
continent. Madagascar is, as we have seen, counted as Africa in
computing the area of French colonial territory. But it lies entirely
outside the scheme of African colonization, and in spite of the loss of
life and money incurred in its conquest, its retention is not popular
with the new school, although the first claim of France to it was as
long ago as the reign of Louis XIII., when in 1642 a company was founded
under the protection of Richelieu for the colonization of the island.
The French of the 19th and 20th centuries may well be considered less
enterprising in both hemispheres than were their ancestors of the 17th,
and Madagascar, after having been the cause of much ill-feeling between
England and France under the Third Republic down to the time of its
formal annexation, by the law of the 9th of August 1896, is not now the
object of much interest among French politicians. On the African
continent it is different. When the Republic succeeded to the Second
Empire the French African possessions outside Algiers were
inconsiderable in area. The chief was Senegal, which though founded as a
French station under Louis XIII., was virtually the creation of
Faidherbe under the Second Empire, even in a greater degree than were
Tunis and Tongking of Jules Ferry under the Third Republic. There was
also Gabun, which is now included in French Congo. Those outposts in the
tropics became the starting-points for the expansion of a French sphere
of influence in north Africa, which by the beginning of the 20th century
made France the nominal possessor of a vast territory stretching from
the equatorial region on the gulf of Guinea to the Mediterranean. A
large portion of it is of no importance, including the once mysterious
Timbuktu and the wilds of the waterless Sahara desert. But the steps
whereby these wide tracts of wilderness and of valuable territory came
to be marked on the maps in French colours, by international agreement,
are important, as they were associated with the last serious official
dispute between England and France before the period of _entente_. M.
Hanotaux, who was foreign minister for the then unprecedented term of
four years, from 1894 to 1898, with one short interval of a few months,
has thrown an instructive light on the feeling with which French
politicians up to the end of the 19th century regarded England. He
declared in 1909, with the high authority of one who was during years of
Anglo-French tension the mouthpiece of the Republic in its relations
with other powers, that every move in the direction of colonial
expansion made by France disquieted and irritated England. He complained
that when France, under the stimulating guidance of Jules Ferry,
undertook the reconstitution of an oversea domain, England barred the
way--in Egypt, in Tunis, in Madagascar, in Indo-China, in the Congo, in
Oceania. Writing with the knowledge of an ex-foreign minister, who had
enjoyed many years of retirement to enable him to weigh his words, M.
Hanotaux asserted without any qualification that when he took office
England "had conceived a triple design, to assume the position of heir
to the Portuguese possessions in Africa, to destroy the independence of
the South African republics, and to remain in perpetuity in Egypt." We
have not to discuss the truth of those propositions, we have only to
note the tendency of French policy; and in so doing it is useful to
remark that the official belief of the Third Republic in the last period
of the 19th century was that England was the enemy of French colonial
expansion all over the globe, and that in the so-called scramble for
Africa English ambition was the chief obstacle to the schemes of France.
M. Hanotaux, with the authority of official knowledge, indicated that
the English project of a railway from the Cape of Good Hope to Cairo was
the provocation which stimulated the French to essay a similar
adventure; though he denied that the Marchand mission and other similar
expeditions about to be mentioned were conceived with the specific
object of preventing the accomplishment of the British plan. The
explorations of Stanley had demonstrated that access to the Great Lakes
and the Upper Nile could be effected as easily from the west coast of
Africa as from other directions. The French, from their ancient
possession of Gabun, had extended their operations far to the east, and
had by treaties with European powers obtained the right bank of the
Ubanghi, a great affluent of the Congo, as a frontier between their
territory and that of the Congo Independent State. They thus found
themselves, with respect to Europe, in possession of a region which
approached the valley of the Upper Nile. Between the fall of Jules Ferry
in 1885 and the beginning of the Russian alliance came a period of
decreased activity in French colonial expansion. The unpopularity of the
Tongking expedition was one of the causes of the popularity of General
Boulanger, who diverted the French public from distant enterprises to a
contemplation of the German frontier, and when Boulangism came to an end
the Panama affair took its place in the interest it excited. But the
colonial party in France did not lose sight of the possibility of
establishing a position on the Upper Nile. The partition of Africa
seemed to offer an occasion for France to take compensation for the
English occupation of Egypt. In 1892 the Budget Commission, on the
proposal of M. Etienne, deputy for Oran, who had three times been
colonial under secretary, voted 300,000 francs for the despatch of a
mission to explore and report on those regions, which had not had much
attention since the days of Emin. But the project was not then carried
out. Later, parliament voted a sum six times larger for strengthening
the French positions on the Upper Ubanghi and their means of
communication with the coast. But Colonel Monteil's expedition, which
was the consequence of this vote, was diverted, and the 1,800,000 francs
were spent at Loango, the southern port of French Congo, and on the
Ivory Coast, the French territory which lies between Liberia and the
British Gold Coast Colony, where a prolonged war ensued with Samory, a
Nigerian chieftain. In September 1894, M. Delcasse being colonial
minister, M. Liotard was appointed commissioner of the Upper Ubanghi
with instructions to extend French influence in the Bahr-el-Ghazal up to
the Nile. In addition to official missions, numerous expeditions of
French explorers took place in Central Africa during this period, and
negotiations were continually going on between the British and French
governments. Towards the end of 1895 Lord Salisbury, who had succeeded
Lord Kimberley at the foreign office, informed Baron de Courcel, the
French ambassador, that an expedition to the Upper Nile was projected
for the purpose of putting an end to Mahdism. M. Hanotaux was not at
this moment minister of foreign affairs. He had been succeeded by M.
Berthelot, the eminent chemist, who resigned that office on the 26th of
March 1896, a month before the fall of the Bourgeois cabinet of which he
was a member, in consequence of a question raised in the chamber on this
subject of the English expedition to the Soudan. According to M.
Hanotaux, who returned to the Quai d'Orsay, in the Meline ministry, on
the 29th of April 1896, Lord Salisbury at the end of the previous year,
in announcing the expedition confidentially to M. de Courcel, had
assured him that it would not go beyond Dongola without a preliminary
understanding with France. There must have been a misunderstanding on
this point, as after reaching Dongola in September 1896 the
Anglo-Egyptian army proceeded up the Nile in the direction of Khartoum.
Before M. Hanotaux resumed office the Marchand mission had been formally
planned. On the 24th of February 1896 M. Guieysse, colonial minister in
the Bourgeois ministry, had signed Captain Marchand's instructions to
the effect that he must march through the Upper Ubanghi, in order to
extend French influence as far as the Nile, and try to reach that river
before Colonel Colvile, who was leading an expedition from the East. He
was also advised to conciliate the Mahdi if the aim of the mission could
be benefited thereby. M. Liotard was raised to the rank of governor of
the Upper Ubanghi, and in a despatch to him the new colonial minister,
M. Andre Lebon, wrote that the Marchand mission was not to be considered
a military enterprise, it being sent out with the intention of
maintaining the political line which for two years M. Liotard had
persistently been following, and of which the establishment of France in
the basin of the Nile ought to be the crowning reward. Two days later,
on the 25th of June 1896, Captain Marchand embarked for Africa. This is
not the place for a description of his adventures in crossing the
continent or when he encountered General Kitchener at Fashoda, two
months after his arrival there in July 1898 and a fortnight after the
battle of Omdurman and the capture of Khartoum. The news was made known
to Europe by the sirdar's telegrams to the British government in
September announcing the presence of the French mission at Fashoda. Then
ensued a period of acute tension between the French and English
governments, which gave the impression to the public that war between
the two countries was inevitable. But those who were watching the
situation in France on the spot knew that there was no question of
fighting. France was unprepared, and was also involved in the toils of
the Dreyfus affair. Had the situation been that of a year later, when
the French domestic controversy was ending and the Transvaal War
beginning, England might have been in a very difficult position. General
Kitchener declined to recognize a French occupation of any part of the
Nile valley. A long discussion ensued between the British and French
governments, which was ended by the latter deciding on the 6th of
November 1898 not to maintain the Marchand mission at Fashoda. Captain
Marchand refused to return to Europe by way of the Nile and Lower Egypt,
marching across Abyssinia to Jibuti in French Somaliland, where he
embarked for France. He was received with well-merited enthusiasm in
Paris. But the most remarkable feature of his reception was that the
ministry became so alarmed lest the popularity of the hero of Fashoda
should be at the expense of that of the parliamentary republic, that it
put an end to the public acclamations by despatching him secretly from
the capital--a somewhat similar treatment having been accorded to
General Dodds in 1893 on his return to France after conquering Dahomey.
The Marchand mission had little effect on African questions at issue
between France and Great Britain, as a great settlement had been
effected while it was on its way across the continent. On the 14th of
June 1898, the day before the fall of the Meline ministry, when M.
Hanotaux finally quitted the Quai d'Orsay, a convention of general
delimitation was signed at Paris by that minister and by the British
ambassador, Sir Edmund Monson, which as regards the respective claims of
England and France covered in its scope the whole of the northern half
of Africa from Senegambia and the Congo to the valley of the Nile.
Comparatively little attention was paid to it amid the exciting events
which followed, so little that M. de Courcel has officially recorded
that three months later, on the eve of the Fashoda incident, Lord
Salisbury declared to him that he was not sufficiently acquainted with
the geography of Africa to express an opinion on certain questions of
delimitation arising out of the success of the British expedition on the
Upper Nile. The convention of June 1898 was, however, of the highest
importance, as it affirmed the junction into one vast territory of the
three chief African domains of France, Algeria and Tunis, Senegal and
the Niger, Chad and the Congo, thus conceding to France the whole of the
north-western continent with the exception of Morocco, Liberia and the
European colonies on the Atlantic. This arrangement, which was completed
by an additional convention on the 21st of March 1899, made Morocco a
legitimate object of French ambition.
The entente with England.
The other questions which caused mutual animosity between England and
France in the decline of the 19th century had nothing whatever to do
with their conflicting international interests. The offensive attitude
of the English press towards France on account of the Dreyfus affair was
repaid by the French in their criticism of the Boer War. When those
sentimental causes of mutual irritation had become less acute, the press
of the two countries was moved by certain influences to recognize that
it was in their interest to be on good terms with one another. The
importance of their commercial relations was brought into relief as
though it were a new fact. At last in 1903 state visits between the
rulers of England and of France took place in their respective capitals,
for the first time since the early days of the Second Empire, followed
by an Anglo-French convention signed on the 8th of April 1904. By this
an arrangement was come to on outstanding questions of controversy
between England and France in various parts of the world. France
undertook not to interfere with the action of England in Egypt, while
England made a like undertaking as to French influence in Morocco.
France conceded certain of its fishing rights in Newfoundland which had
been a perpetual source of irritation between the two countries for
nearly two hundred years since the treaty of Utrecht of 1713. In return
England made several concessions to France in Africa, including that of
the Los Islands off Sierra Leone and some rectifications of frontier on
the Gambia and between the Niger and Lake Chad. Other points of
difference were arranged as to Siam, the New Hebrides and Madagascar.
The convention of 1904 was on the whole more advantageous for England
than for France. The free hand which England conceded to France in
dealing with Morocco was a somewhat burdensome gift owing to German
interference; but the incidents which arose from the Franco-German
conflict in that country are as yet too recent for any estimate of their
possible consequences.
The work of M. Delcasse.
One result was the retirement of M. Delcasse from the foreign office on
the 6th of June 1905. He had been foreign minister for seven years, a
consecutive period of rare length, only once exceeded in England since
the creation of the office, when Castlereagh held it for ten years, and
one of prodigious duration in the history of the Third Republic. He
first went to the Quai d'Orsay in the Brisson ministry of June 1898,
remained there during the Dupuy ministry of the same year, was
reappointed by M. Waldeck-Rousseau in his cabinet which lasted from June
1899 to June 1902, was retained in the post by M. Combes till his
ministry fell in January 1905, and again by his successor M. Rouvier
till his own resignation in June of that year. M. Delcasse had thus an
uninterrupted reign at the foreign office during a long critical period
of transition both in the interior politics of France and in its
exterior relations. He went to the Quai d'Orsay when the Dreyfus
agitation was most acute, and left it when parliament was absorbed in
discussing the separation of church and state. He saw the Franco-Russian
alliance lose its popularity in the country even before the Russian
defeat by the Japanese in the last days of his ministry. Although in the
course of his official duties at the colonial office he had been partly
responsible for some of the expeditions sent to Africa for the purpose
of checking British influence, he was fully disposed to pursue a policy
which might lead to a friendly understanding with England. In this he
differed from M. Hanotaux, who was essentially the man of the
Franco-Russian alliance, owing to it much of his prestige, including his
election to the French Academy, and Russia, to which he gave exclusive
allegiance, was then deemed to be primarily the enemy of England. M.
Delcasse on the contrary, from the first, desired to assist a
_rapprochement_ between England and Russia as preliminary to the
arrangement he proposed between England and France. He was foreign
minister when the tsar paid his second visit to France, but there was no
longer the national unanimity which welcomed him in 1896, M. Delcasse
also accompanied President Loubet to Russia when he returned the tsar's
second visit in 1902. But exchange of compliments between France and
Russia were no longer to be the sole international ceremonials within
the attributes of the French foreign office; M. Delcasse was minister
when the procession of European sovereigns headed by the kings of
England and of Italy in 1903 came officially to Paris, and he went with
M. Loubet to London and to Rome on the president's return visits to
those capitals--the latter being the immediate cause of the rupture of
the concordat with the Vatican, though M. Delcasse was essentially a
concordatory minister. His retirement from the Rouvier ministry in June
1905 was due to pressure from Germany in consequence of his opposition
to German interference in Morocco. His resignation took place just a
week after the news had arrived of the destruction of the Russian fleet
by the Japanese, which completed the disablement of the one ally of
France. The impression was current in France that Germany wished to give
the French nation a fright before the understanding with England had
reached an effective stage, and it was actually believed that the
resignation of M. Delcasse averted a declaration of war. Although that
belief revived to some extent the fading enmity of the French towards
the conquerors of Alsace-Lorraine, the fear which accompanied it moved a
considerable section of the nation to favour an understanding with
Germany in preference to, or even at the expense of, friendly relations
with England. M. Clemenceau, who only late in life came into office, and
attained it at the moment when a better understanding with England was
progressing, had been throughout his long career, of all French public
men in all political groups, the most consistent friend of England. His
presence at the head of affairs was a guarantee of amicable Anglo-French
relations, so far as they could be protected by statesmanship.
By reason of the increased duration and stability of ministries, the
personal influence of ministers in directing the foreign policy of
France has in one sense become greater in the 20th century than in those
earlier periods when France had first to recuperate its strength after
the war and then to take its exterior policy from Germany. Moreover, not
only have cabinets lasted longer, but the foreign minister has often
been retained in a succession of them. Of the thirty years which in 1909
had elapsed since Marshal MacMahon retired and the republic was governed
by republicans, in the first fifteen years from 1879 to 1894 fourteen
different persons held the office of minister of foreign affairs, while
six sufficed for the fifteen years succeeding the latter date. One must
not, however, exaggerate the effect of this greater stability in
office-holding upon continuity of policy, which was well maintained even
in the days when there was on an average a new foreign minister every
year. Indeed the most marked breach in the continuity of the foreign
policy of France has been made in that later period of long terms of
office, which, with the repudiation of the Concordat, has seen the
withdrawal of the French protectorate over Roman Catholic missions in
the East--though it is too soon to estimate the result. In another
respect France has under the republic departed a long way from a
tradition of the Quai d'Orsay. It no longer troubles itself on the
subject of nationalities. Napoleon III., who had more French temperament
than French blood in his constitution, was an idealist on this question,
and one of the causes of his own downfall and the defeat of France was
his sympathy in this direction with German unity. Since Sedan little has
been done in France to further the doctrine of nationalities. A faint
echo of it was heard during the Boer war, but French sympathy with the
struggling Dutch republics of South Africa was based rather on
anti-English sentiment than on any abstract theory. (J. E. C. B.)
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF FRENCH HISTORY.--The scientific study of the history
of France only begins with the 16th century. It was hampered at first
by the traditions of the middle ages and by a servile imitation of
antiquity. Paulus Aemilius of Verona (_De rebus gestis Francorum_,
1517), who may be called the first of modern historians, merely
applies the oratorical methods of the Latin historiographers. It is
not till the second half of the century that history emancipates
itself; Catholics and Protestants alike turn to it for arguments in
their religious and political controversies. Francois Hotman published
(1574) his _Franco-Gallia_; Claude Fauchet his _Antiquites gauloises
et francoises_ (1579); Etienne Pasquier his _Recherches de la France_
(1611), "the only work of erudition of the 16th century which one can
read through without being bored." Amateurs like Petau, A. de Thou,
Bongars and Peiresc collected libraries to which men of learning went
to draw their knowledge of the past; Pierre Pithou, one of the authors
of the _Satire Menippee_, published the earliest annals of France
(_Annales Francorum_, 1588, and _Historiae Francorum scriptores
coetanei XI._, 1596), Jacques Bongars collected in his _Gesta Dei per
Francos_ (1611-1617) the principal chroniclers of the Crusades. Others
made a study of chronology like J.J. Scaliger (_De emendatione
temporum_, 1583; _Thesaurus temporum_, 1606), sketched the history of
literature, like Francois Grude, sieur of La Croix in Maine
(_Bibliotheque francoise_, 1584), and Antoine du Verdier (_Catalogue
de tous les auteurs qui ont ecrit ou traduit en francais_, 1585), or
discussed the actual principles of historical research, like Jean
Bodin (_Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem_, 1566) and Henri
Lancelot Voisin de La Popeliniere (_Histoire des histoires_, 1599).
But the writers of history are as yet very inexpert; the _Histoire
generale des rois de France_ of Bernard de Girard, seigneur de Haillan
(1576), the _Grandes Annales de France_ of Francois de Belleforest
(1579), the _Inventaire general de l'histoire de France_ of Jean de
Serres (1597), the _Histoire generale de France depuis Pharamond_ of
Scipion Dupleix (1621-1645), the _Histoire de France_ (1643-1651) of
Francois Eudes de Mezeray, and above all his _Abrege chronologique de
l'histoire de France_ (1668), are compilations which were eagerly
read when they appeared, but are worthless nowadays. Historical
research lacked method, leaders and trained workers; it found them all
in the 17th century, the golden age of learning which was honoured
alike by laymen, priests and members of the monastic orders,
especially the Benedictines of the congregation of St Maur. The
publication of original documents was carried on with enthusiasm. To
Andre Duchesne we owe two great collections of chronicles: the
_Historiae Normannorum scriptores antiqui_ (1619) and the _Historiae
Francorum scriptores_, continued by his son Francois (5 vols.,
1636-1649). These publications were due to a part only of his
prodigious activity; his papers and manuscripts, preserved in the
Bibliotheque Nationale at Paris, are an inexhaustible mine. Charles du
Fresne, seigneur du Cange, published Villehardouin (1657) and
Joinville (1668); Etienne Baluze, the _Capitularia regum Francorum_
(1674), the _Nova collectio conciliorum_ (1677), the _Vitae paparum
Avenionensium_ (1693). The clergy were very much aided in their work
by their private libraries and by their co-operation; Pere Philippe
Labbe published his _Bibliotheca nova manuscriptorum_ (1657), and
began (1671) his _Collection des conciles_, which was successfully
completed by his colleague Pere Cossart (18 vols.). In 1643 the Jesuit
Jean Bolland brought out vol. i. of the _Acta sanctorum_, a vast
collection of stories and legends which has not yet been completed
beyond the 4th of November. (See BOLLANDISTS.) The Benedictines, for
their part, published the _Acta sanctorum ordinis sancti Benedicti_ (9
vols., 1668-1701). One of the chief editors of this collection, Dom
Jean Mabillon, published on his own account the Vetera analecta (4
vols., 1675-1685) and prepared the _Annales ordinis sancti Benedicti_
(6 vols., 1703-1793). To Dom Thierri Ruinart we owe good editions of
Gregory of Tours and Fredegarius (1699). The learning of the 17th
century further inaugurated those specialized studies which are
important aids to history. Mabillon in his _De re diplomatica_ (1681)
creates the science of documents or diplomatics. Adrien de Valois lays
a sound foundation for historical geography by his critical edition of
the _Notitia Galliarum_ (1675). Numismatics finds an enlightened
pioneer in Francois Leblanc (_Traite historique des monnaies de
France_, 1690). Du Cange, one of the greatest of the French scholars
who have studied the middle ages, has defined terms bearing on
institutions in his _Glossarium mediae et infimae latinitatis_ (1678),
recast by the Benedictines (1733), with an important supplement by Dom
Carpentier (1768), republished twice during the 19th century, with
additions, by F. Didot (1840-1850), and by L. Favre at Niort
(1883-1888); this work is still indispensable to every student of
medieval history. Finally, great biographical or bibliographical works
were undertaken; the _Gallia christiana_, which gave a chronological
list of the archbishops, bishops and abbots of the Gauls and of
France, was compiled by two twin brothers, Scevole and Louis de
Sainte-Marthe, and by the two sons of Louis (4 vols., 1656); a fresh
edition, on a better plan, and with great additions, was begun in 1715
by Denys de Sainte-Marthe, continued throughout the 18th century by
the Benedictines, and finished in the 19th century by Barthelemy
Haureau (1856-1861).
As to the nobility, a series of researches and publications, begun by
Pierre d'Hozier (d. 1660) and continued well on into the 19th century
by several of his descendants, developed into the _Armorial general de
la France_, which was remodelled several times. A similar work, of a
more critical nature, was carried out by Pere Anselme (_Histoire
genealogique de la maison de France et des grands officiers de la
couronne_, 1674) and by Pere Ange and Pere Simplicien, who completed
the work (3rd ed. in 9 vols., 1726-1733). Critical bibliography is
especially represented by certain Protestants, expelled from France by
the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. Pierre Bayle, the sceptic,
famous for his _Dictionnaire critique_ (1699), which is in part a
refutation of the _Dictionnaire historique et geographique_ published
in 1673 by the Abbe Louis Moreri, was the first to publish the
_Nouvelles de la republique des lettres_ (1684-1687), which was
continued by Henri Basnage de Beauval under the title of _Histoire des
ouvrages des savants_ (24 vols.). In imitation of this, Jean Le Clerc
successively edited a _Bibliotheque universelle et historique_
(1686-1693), a _Bibliotheque choisie_ (1703-1713), and a _Bibliotheque
ancienne et moderne_ (1714-1727). These were the first of our
"periodicals."
The 18th century continues the traditions of the 17th. The
Benedictines still for some time hold the first place. Dom Edmond
Martene visited numerous archives (which were then closed) in France
and neighbouring countries, and drew from them the material for two
important collections: _Thesaurus novus anecdotorum_ (9 vols., 1717,
in collaboration with Dom Ursin Durand) and _Veterum scriptorum
collectio_ (9 vols., 1724-1733). Dom Bernard de Montfaucon also
travelled in search of illustrated records of antiquity; private
collections, among others the celebrated collection of Gaignieres (now
in the Bibliotheque Nationale), provided him with the illustrations
which he published in his _Monuments de la monarchie francoise_ (5
vols., 1729-1733). The text is in two languages, Latin and French. Dom
Martin Bouquet took up the work begun by the two Duchesnes, and in
1738 published vol. i. of the Historians of France (_Rerum Gallicarum
et Francicarum scriptores_), an enormous collection which was intended
to include all the sources of the history of France, grouped under
centuries and reigns. He produced the first eight volumes himself; his
work was continued by several collaborators, the most active of whom
was Dom Michel J. Brial, and already comprised thirteen volumes when
it was interrupted by the Revolution. In 1733, Antoine Rivet de La
Grange produced vol. i. of the _Histoire litteraire de la France_,
which in 1789 numbered twelve volumes. While Dom C. Francois Toustaint
and Dom Rene Prosper Tassin published a _Nouveau Traite de
diplomatique_ (6 vols., 1750-1765), others were undertaking the _Art
de verifier les dates_ (1750; new and much enlarged edition in 1770).
Still others, with more or less success, attempted histories of the
provinces.
In the second half of the 18th century, the ardour of the Benedictines
of St Maur diminished, and scientific work passed more and more into
the hands of laymen. The Academie des Inscriptions et Belles-lettres,
founded in 1663 and reorganized in 1701, became its chief instrument,
numbering among its members Denis Francois Secousse, who continued the
collection of _Ordonnances des rois de France_, begun (1723) by J. de
Lauriere; J.-B. de La Curne de Sainte Palaye (_Memoires sur l'ancienne
chevalerie_, 1759-1781; _Glossaire de la langue francaise depuis son
origine jusqu'a la fin de Louis XIV_, printed only in 1875-1882);
J.-B. d'Anville (_Notice sur l'ancienne Gaule tiree des monuments_,
1760); and L.G. de Brequigny, the greatest of them all, who continued
the publication of the _Ordonnances_, began the _Table chronologique
des diplomes concernant l'histoire de France_ (3 vols., 1769-1783),
published the _Diplomata, chartae, ad res Francicas spectantia_ (1791,
with the collaboration of La Porte du Theil), and directed fruitful
researches in the archives in London, to enrich the _Cabinet des
chartes_, where Henri Bertin (1719-1792), an enlightened minister of
Louis XV., had in 1764 set himself the task of collecting the
documentary sources of the national history. The example set by the
religious orders and the government bore fruit. The general assembly
of the clergy gave orders that its _Proces verbaux_ (9 vols.,
1767-1789) should be printed; some of the provinces decided to have
their history written, and mostly applied to the Benedictines to have
this done. Brittany was treated by Dom Lobineau (1707) and Dom Morice
(1742); the duchy of Burgundy by Dom Urbain Plancher (1739-1748);
Languedoc by Dom Dominique Vaissete (1730-1749, in collaboration with
Dom Claude de Vic; new ed. 1873-1893); for Paris, its secular history
was treated by Dom Michel Felibien and Dom Lobineau (1725), and its
ecclesiastical history by the abbe Lebeuf (1745-1760; new ed.
1883-1890).
This ever-increasing stream of new evidence aroused curiosity, gave
rise to pregnant comparisons, developed and sharpened the critical
sense, but further led to a more and more urgent need for exact
information. The Academie des Inscriptions brought out its _Histoire
de l'Academie avec les memoires de litterature tires de ses registres_
(vol. i. 1717; 51 vols. appeared before the Revolution, with five
indexes; _vide_ the _Bibliographie_ of Lasteyrie, vol. iii. pp. 256 et
seq.). Other collections, mostly of the nature of bibliographies, were
the _Journal des savants_ (111 vols., from 1665 to 1792; _vide_ the
_Table methodique_ by H. Cocheris, 1860); the _Journal de Trevoux_, or
_Memoires pour l'histoire des sciences et des beaux-arts_, edited by
Jesuits (265 vols., 1701-1790); the _Mercure de France_ (977 vols.,
from 1724 to 1791). To these must be added the dictionaries and
encyclopaedias: the _Dictionnaire de Moreri_, the last edition of
which numbers 10 vols. (1759); the _Dictionnaire geographique,
historique et politique des Gaules et de la France_, by the abbe J.J.
Expilly (6 vols., 1762-1770; unfinished); the _Repertoire universel et
raisonne de jurisprudence civile, criminelle, canonique et
beneficiale_, by Guyot (64 vols., 1775-1786; supplement in 17 vols.,
1784-1785), reorganized and continued by Merlin de Douai, who was
afterwards one of the _Montagnards_, a member of the Directory, and a
count under the Empire.
The historians did not use to the greatest advantage the treasures of
learning provided for them; they were for the most part superficial,
and dominated by their political or religious prejudices. Thus works
like that of Pere Gabriel Daniel (_Histoire de France_, 3 vols.,
1713), of President Henault (_Abrege chronologique_, 1744; 25 editions
between 1770 and 1834), of the abbe Paul Francois Velly and those who
completed his work (_Histoire de France_, 33 vols., 1765 to 1783), of
G.H. Gaillard (_Histoire de la rivalite de la France et de
l'Angleterre_, 11 vols., 1771-1777), and of L.P. Anquetil (1805), in
spite of the brilliant success with which they met at first, have
fallen into a just oblivion. A separate place must be given to the
works of the theorists and philosophers: _Histoire de l'ancien
gouvernement de la France_, by the Comte de Boulainvilliers (1727),
_Histoire critique de l'etablissement de la monarchie francoise dans
les deux Gaules_, by the abbe J.B. Dubos (1734); _L'Esprit des lois_,
by the president de Montesquieu (1748); the _Observations sur
l'histoire de France_, by the abbe de Mably (1765); the _Theorie de la
politique de la monarchie francaise_, by Marie Pauline de Lezardiere
(1792). These works have, if nothing else, the merit of provoking
reflection.
At the time of the Revolution this activity was checked. The religious
communities and royal academies were suppressed, and France violently
broke with even her most recent past, which was considered to belong
to the _ancien regime_. When peace was re-established, she began the
task of making good the damage which had been done, but a greater
effort was now necessary in order to revive the spirit of the
institutions which had been overthrown. The new state, which was, in
spite of all, bound by so many ties to the former order of things,
seconded this effort, and during the whole of the 19th century, and
even longer, had a strong influence on historical production. The
section of the Institut de France, which in 1816 assumed the old name
of Academie des Inscriptions et Belles-lettres, began to reissue the
two series of the _Memoires_ and of the _Notices et extraits des
manuscrits tires de la bibliotheque royale_ (the first volume had
appeared in 1787); began (1844) that of the _Memoires presentes par
divers savants_ and the _Comptes rendus_ (subject index 1857-1900, by
G. Ledos, 1906); and continued the _Recueil des historiens de France_,
the plan of which was enlarged by degrees (_Historiens des croisades,
obituaires, pouilles, comptes_, &c.), the _Ordonnances_ and the _Table
chronologique des diplomes_. During the reign of Louis Philippe, the
ministry of the interior reorganized the administration of the
archives of the departments, communes and hospitals, of which the
_Inventaires sommaires_ are a mine of precious information (see the
_Rapport au ministre_, by G. Servois, 1902). In 1834 the ministry of
public instruction founded a committee, which has been called since
1881 the Comite des Travaux historiques et scientifiques, under the
direction of which have been published: (1) the _Collection des
documents inedits relatifs a l'histoire de France_ (more than 260
vols. have appeared since 1836); (2) the _Catalogue general des
manuscrits des bibliotheques de France_; (3) the _Dictionnaires
topographiques_ (25 vols. have appeared); and the _Repertoires
archeologiques_ of the French departments (8 vols. between 1861 and
1888); (4) several series of _Bulletins_, the details of which will be
found in the _Bibliographie_ of Lasteyrie. At the same time were
founded or reorganized, both in Paris and the departments, numerous
societies, devoted sometimes partially and sometimes exclusively to
history and archaeology; the Academie Celtique (1804), which in 1813
became the Societe des Antiquaires de France (general index by M.
Prou, 1894); the Societe de l'Histoire de France (1834); the Societe
de l'Ecole des Chartes (1839); the Societe de l'Histoire de Paris et
de l'Ile-de-France (1874; four decennial indexes), &c. The details
will be found in the excellent _Bibliographie generale des travaux
historiques et archeologiques publies par les societes savantes de
France_, which has appeared since 1885 under the direction of Robert
de Lasteyrie.
Individual scholars also associated themselves with this great
literary movement. Guizot published a _Collection de memoires relatifs
a l'histoire de France_ (31 vols., 1824-1835); Buchon, a _Collection
des chroniques nationales francaises ecrites en langue vulgaire du
XIII^e au XVI^e siecle_ (47 vols., 1824-1829), and a _Choix de
chroniques et memoires sur l'histoire de France_ (14 vols.,
1836-1841); Petitot and Monmerque, a _Collection de memoires relatifs
a l'histoire de France_ (131 vols., 1819-1829); Michaud and Poujoulat,
a _Nouvelle Collection de memoires pour servir a l'histoire de France_
(32 vols., 1836-1839); Barriere and de Lescure, a _Bibliotheque de
memoires relatifs a l'histoire de France pendant le XVIII^e siecle_
(30 vols., 1855-1875); and finally Berville and Barriere, a
_Collection des memoires relatifs a la Revolution Francaise_ (55
vols., 1820-1827). The details are to be found in the _Sources de
l'histoire de France_, by Alfred Franklin (1876). The abbe J.P. Migne
in his _Patrologia Latina_ (221 vols., 1844-1864), re-edited a number
cf texts anterior to the 13th century. Under the second empire, the
administration of the imperial archives at Paris published ten volumes
of documents (_Monuments historiques_, 1866; _Layettes du tresor des
chartes_, 1863, which were afterwards continued up to 1270; _Actes du
parlement de Paris_, 1863-1867), not to mention several volumes of
_Inventaires_. The administration of the Bibliotheque imperiale had
printed the _Catalogue general de l'histoire de France_ (10 vols.,
1855-1870; vol. xi., containing the alphabetical index to the names of
the authors, appeared in 1895). Other countries also supplied a number
of useful texts; there is much in the English Rolls series, in the
collection of _Chroniques belges_, and especially in the _Monumenta
Germaniae historica_.
At the same time the scope of history and its auxiliary sciences
becomes more clearly defined; the Ecole des Chartes produces some
excellent palaeographers, as for instance Natalis de Wailly (_Elements
de paleographie_, 1838), and L. Delisle (q.v.), who has also left
traces of his profound researches in the most varied departments of
medieval history (_Bibliographie des travaux de M. Leopold Delisle_,
1902); Anatole de Barthelemy made a study of coins and medals, Douet
d'Arcq and G. Demay of seals. The works of Alexandre Lenoir (_Musee
des monuments francais_, 1800-1822), of Arcisse de Caumont (_Histoire
de l'architecture du moyen age_, 1837; _Abecedaire ou rudiment
d'archeologie_, 1850), of A. Napoleon Didron (_Annales
archeologiques_, 1844), of Jules Quicherat (_Melanges d'archeologie et
d'histoire_, published after his death, 1886), and the dictionaries of
Viollet le Duc (_Dictionnaire raisonne de l'architecture francaise_,
1853-1868; _Dictionnaire du mobilier francais_, 1855) displayed to the
best advantage one of the most brilliant sides of the French
intellect, while other sciences, such as geology, anthropology, the
comparative study of languages, religions and folk-lore, and political
economy, continued to enlarge the horizon of history. The task of
writing the general history of a country became more and more
difficult, especially for one man, but the task was none the less
undertaken by several historians, and by some of eminence. Francois
Guizot treated of the _Histoire de la civilisation en France_
(1828-1830); Augustin Thierry after the _Recits des temps
merovingiens_ (1840) published the _Monuments de l'histoire du tiers
etat_ (1849-1856), the introduction to which was expanded into a book
(1855); Charles Simonde de Sismondi produced a mediocre _Histoire des
francais_ in 31 vols. (1821-1844), and Henri Martin a _Histoire de
France_ in 16 vols. (1847-1854), now of small use except for the two
or three last centuries of the _ancien regime_. Finally J. Michelet,
in his _Histoire de France_ (17 vols., 1833-1856) and his _Histoire de
la Revolution_ (7 vols., 1847-1853), aims at reviving the very soul of
the nation's past.
After the Franco-German War begins a better organization of scientific
studies, modelled on that of Germany. The Ecole des Hautes Etudes,
established in 1868, included in its programme the critical study of
the sources, both Latin and French, of the history of France; and from
the _seminaire_ of Gabriel Monod came men of learning, already
prepared by studying at the Ecole des Chartes: Paul Viollet, who
revived the study of the history of French law; Julien Havet, who
revived that of Merovingian diplomatics; Arthur Giry, who resumed the
study of municipal institutions where it had been left by A. Thierry,
prepared the _Annales carolingiennes_ (written by his pupils, Eckel,
Favre, Lauer, Lot, Poupardin), and brought back into honour the study
of diplomatics (_Manuel de diplomatique_, 1894); Auguste Molinier,
author of the _Sources de l'histoire de France_ (1902-1904; general
index, 1906), &c. Auguste Longnon introduced at the Ecole des Hautes
Etudes the study of historical geography (_Atlas historique de la
France_, in course of publication since 1888). The universities, at
last reorganized, popularized the employment of the new methods. The
books of Fustel de Coulanges and Achille Luchaire on the middle ages,
and those of A. Aulard on the revolution, gave a strong, though
well-regulated, impetus to historical production. The Ecole du Louvre
(1881) increased the value of the museums and placed the history of
art among the studies of higher education, while the Musee
archeologique of St-Germain-en-Laye offered a fruitful field for
research on Gallic and Gallo-Roman antiquities. Rich archives,
hitherto inaccessible, were thrown open to students; at Rome those of
the Vatican (_Registres pontificaux_, published by students at the
French school of archaeology, since 1884); at Paris, those of the
Foreign Office (_Recueil des instructions donnees aux ambassadeurs
depuis le traite de Westphalie_, 16 vols., 1885-1901; besides various
collections of diplomatic papers, inventories, &c.). Those of the War
Office were used by officers who published numerous documents bearing
on the wars of the Revolution and the Empire, and on that of
1870-1871. In 1904 a commission, generously endowed by the French
parlement, was entrusted with the task of publishing the documents
relating to economic and social life of the time of the Revolution,
and four volumes had appeared by 1908. Certain towns, Paris, Bordeaux,
&c., have made it a point of honour to have their chief historical
monuments printed. The work now becomes more and more specialized.
_L'Histoire de France_, by Ernest Lavisse (1900, &c.), is the work of
fifteen different authors. It is therefore more than ever necessary
that the work should be under sound direction. The _Manuel de
bibliographie historique_ of Ch. V. Langlois (2nd edition, 1901-1904)
is a good guide, as is his _Archives de l'histoire de France_ (1891,
in collaboration with H. Stein).
Besides the special bibliographies mentioned above, it will be useful
to consult the _Bibliotheque historique_ of Pere Jacques Lelong (1719;
new ed. by Fevret de Fontette, 5 vols., 1768-1778); the _Geschichte
der historischen Forschung und Kunst_ of Ludwig Wachler (2 vols.,
1812-1816); the _Bibliographie de la France_, established in 1811 (1st
series, 1811-1856, 45 vols.; 2nd series, 1 vol. per annum since 1857);
the publications of the Societe de Bibliographie (_Polybiblion_, from
1868 on, &c.); the _Bibliographie de l'histoire de France_, by Gabriel
Monod (1888); the _Repertoire_ of the abbe Ulysse Chevalier
(_Biobibliographie_; new ed. 1903-1907; and _Topobibliographie_,
1894-1899). Bearing exclusively on the middle ages are the
_Bibliotheca historica medii aevi_ of August Potthast (new ed. 1896)
and the _Manuel_ (_Les Sources de l'histoire de France_, 1901, &c.) of
A. Molinier; but the latter is to be continued up to modern times, the
16th century having already been begun by Henri Hausser (1st part,
1906). Finally, various special reviews, besides teaching historical
method by criticism and by example, try to keep their readers _au
courant_ with literary production; the _Revue critique d'histoire et
de litterature_ (1866 fol.), the _Revue des questions historiques_
(1866 fol.), the _Revue historique_ (1876 fol.), the _Revue d'histoire
moderne et contemporaine_, accompanied annually by a valuable
_Repertoire methodique_ (1898 fol.); the _Revue de synthese
historique_ (1900 fol.), &c. (C. B.*)