Sir Edward Grey's Speech in House of Commons, Aug. 3.
Last week I stated that we were working for peace not only for this
country, but to preserve the peace of Europe. Today events move so
rapidly that it is exceedingly difficult to state with technical
accuracy the actual state of affairs, but it is clear that the peace of
Europe cannot be preserved. Russia and Germany, at any rate, have
declared war upon each other.
Before I proceed to state the position of his Majesty's Government I
would like to clear the ground so that, before I come to state to the
House what our attitude is with regard to the present crisis, the House
may know exactly under what obligations the Government is, or the House
can be said to be, in coming to a decision on the matter. First of all,
let me say, very shortly, that we have consistently worked with a single
mind, with all the earnestness in our power, to preserve peace. The
House may be satisfied on that point. We have always done it. During
these last years, as far as his Majesty's Government are concerned, we
would have no difficulty in proving that we have done so. Throughout the
Balkan crisis, by general admission, we worked for peace. The
co-operation of the great powers of Europe was successful in working for
peace in the Balkan crisis. It is true that some of the powers had great
difficulty in adjusting their points of view. It took much time and
labor and discussion before they could settle their differences, but
peace was secured, because peace was their main object, and they were
willing to give time and trouble rather than accentuate differences
rapidly.
In the present crisis it has not been possible to secure the peace of
Europe; because there has been little time, and there has been a
disposition--at any rate in some quarters on which I will not dwell--to
force things rapidly to an issue, at any rate to the great risk of
peace, and, as we now know, the result of that is that the policy of
peace as far as the great powers generally are concerned is in danger. I
do not want to dwell on that, and to comment on it, and to say where the
blame seems to us to lie, which powers were most in favor of peace,
which were most disposed to risk war or endanger peace, because I would
like the House to approach this crisis in which we are now from the
point of view of British interests, British honor, and British
obligations, free from all passion as to why peace has not been
preserved.
We shall publish papers as soon as we can regarding what took place last
week when we were working for peace, and when those papers are published
I have no doubt that to every human being they will make it clear how
strenuous and genuine and whole-hearted our efforts for peace were, and
that they will enable people to form their own judgment as to what
forces were at work which operated against peace.
I come first, now, to the question of British obligations. I have
assured the House--and the Prime Minister has assured the House more
than once--that if any crisis such as this arose we should come before
the House of Commons and be able to say to the House that it was free to
decide what the British attitude should be, that we would have no secret
engagement which we should spring upon the House, and tell the House
that because we had entered into that engagement there was an obligation
of honor upon the country. I will deal with that point to clear the
ground first.
There have been in Europe two diplomatic groups, the Triple Alliance and
what came to be called the Triple Entente, for some years past. The
Triple Entente was not an alliance--it was a diplomatic group. The House
will remember that in 1908 there was a crisis--also a Balkan
crisis--originating in the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The
Russian Minister, M. Isvolsky, came to London, or happened to come to
London, because his visit was planned before the crisis broke out. I
told him definitely then, this being a Balkan crisis, a Balkan affair, I
did not consider that public opinion in this country would justify us in
promising to give anything more than diplomatic support. More was never
asked from us, more was never given, and more was never promised.
In this present crisis, up till yesterday, we have also given no promise
of anything more than diplomatic support--up till yesterday no promise
of more than diplomatic support. Now I must make this question of
obligation clear to the House. I must go back to the first Moroccan
crisis of 1906. That was the time of the Algeciras Conference, and it
came at a time of very great difficulty to his Majesty's Government when
a general election was in progress, and Ministers were scattered over
the country, and I--spending three days a week in my constituency and
three days at the Foreign Office--was asked the question whether, if
that crisis developed into war between France and Germany, we would give
armed support. I said then that I could promise nothing to any foreign
power unless it was subsequently to receive the whole-hearted support of
public opinion here if the occasion arose. I said, in my opinion, if war
was forced upon France then on the question of Morocco--a question which
had just been the subject of agreement between this country and France,
an agreement exceedingly popular on both sides--that if out of that
agreement war was forced on France at that time, in my view public
opinion in this country would have rallied to the material support of
France.
I gave no promise, but I expressed that opinion during the crisis, as
far as I remember almost in the same words, to the French Ambassador
and the German Ambassador at the time. I made no promise and I used no
threats; but I expressed that opinion. That position was accepted by the
French Government, but they said to me at the time, and I think very
reasonably, "If you think it possible that the public opinion of Great
Britain might, should a sudden crisis arise, justify you in giving to
France the armed support which you cannot promise in advance, you will
not be able to give that support, even if you wish it, when the time
comes, unless some conversations have already taken place between naval
and military experts." There was force in that. I agreed to it, and
authorized those conversations to take place, but on the distinct
understanding that nothing which passed between military or naval
experts should bind either Government or restrict in any way their
freedom to make a decision as to whether or not they would give that
support when the time arose.
As I have told the House, upon that occasion a general election was in
prospect; I had to take the responsibility of doing that without the
Cabinet. It could not be summoned. An answer had to be given. I
consulted Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, the Prime Minister; I consulted,
I remember, Lord Haldane, who was then Secretary of State for War, and
the present Prime Minister, who was then Chancellor of the Exchequer.
That was the most I could do, and they authorized that, on the distinct
understanding that it left the hands of the Government free whenever the
crisis arose. The fact that conversations between military and naval
experts took place was later on--I think much later on, because that
crisis passed, and the thing ceased to be of importance--but later on it
was brought to the knowledge of the Cabinet.
The Agadir crisis came--another Morocco crisis--and throughout that I
took precisely the same line that had been taken in 1906. But
subsequently, in 1912, after discussion and consideration in the
Cabinet, it was decided that we ought to have a definite understanding
in writing, which was to be only in the form of an unofficial letter,
that these conversations which took place were not binding upon the
freedom of either Government; and on the 22d November, 1912, I wrote to
the French Ambassador the letter which I will now read to the House, and
I received from him a letter in similar terms in reply. The letter which
I have to read to the House is this, and it will be known to the public
now as the record that, whatever took place between military and naval
experts, they were not binding engagements upon the Government:
My dear Ambassador:
From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and
military experts have consulted together. It has always been
understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of
either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to
assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation
between experts is not, and ought not, to be regarded as an
engagement that commits either Government to action in a
contingency that has not yet arisen and may never arise. The
disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets
respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement
to co-operate in war.
You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave
reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third power, it might
become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon
the armed assistance of the other.
I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an
unprovoked attack by a third power, or something that threatened
the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other
whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression
and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be
prepared to take in common.
_Lord Charles Beresford_--What is the date of that?
_Sir E. Grey_--The 22nd November, 1912. That is the starting point for
the Government with regard to the present crisis. I think it makes it
clear that what the Prime Minister and I said to the House of Commons
was perfectly justified, and that, as regards our freedom to decide in a
crisis what our line should be, whether we should intervene or whether
we should abstain, the Government remained perfectly free, and, a
fortiori, the House of Commons remains perfectly free. That I say to
clear the ground from the point of view of obligation. I think it was
due to prove our good faith to the House of Commons that I should give
that full information to the House now, and say what I think is obvious
from the letter I have just read, that we do not construe anything which
has previously taken place in our diplomatic relations with other powers
in this matter as restricting the freedom of the Government to decide
what attitude they should take now, or restrict the freedom of the House
of Commons to decide what their attitude should be.
Well, Sir, I will go further, and I will say this: The situation in the
present crisis is not precisely the same as it was in the Morocco
question. In the Morocco question it was primarily a dispute which
concerned France--a dispute which concerned France and France
primarily--a dispute, as it seemed to us, affecting France out of an
agreement subsisting between us and France, and published to the whole
world, in which we engaged to give France diplomatic support. No doubt
we were pledged to give nothing but diplomatic support; we were, at any
rate, pledged by a definite public agreement to stand with France
diplomatically in that question.
The present crisis has originated differently. It has not originated
with regard to Morocco. It has not originated as regards anything with
which we had a special agreement with France; it has not originated with
anything which primarily concerned France. It has originated in a
dispute between Austria and Servia. I can say this with the most
absolute confidence--no Government and no country has less desire to be
involved in war over a dispute with Austria and Servia than the
Government and the Country of France. They are involved in it because of
their obligation of honor under a definite alliance with Russia. Well,
it is only fair to say to the House that that obligation of honor cannot
apply in the same way to us. We are not parties to the Franco-Russian
alliance. We do not even know the terms of that alliance. So far I
have, I think, faithfully and completely cleared the ground with regard
to the question of obligation.
I now come to what we think the situation requires of us. For many years
we have had a long-standing friendship with France. I remember well the
feeling in the House--and my own feeling--for I spoke on the subject, I
think, when the late Government made their agreement with France--the
warm and cordial feeling resulting from the fact that these two nations,
who had had perpetual differences in the past, had cleared these
differences away; I remember saying, I think, that it seemed to me that
some benign influence had been at work to produce the cordial atmosphere
that had made that possible. But how far that friendship entails
obligation--it has been a friendship between the nations and ratified by
the nations--how far that entails an obligation, let every man look into
his own heart, and his own feelings, and construe the extent of the
obligation for himself. I construe it myself as I feel it, but I do not
wish to urge upon any one else more than their feelings dictate as to
what they should feel about the obligation. The House, individually and
collectively, may judge for itself. I speak my personal view, and I have
given the House my own feeling in the matter.
The French fleet is now in the Mediterranean, and the northern and
western coasts of France are absolutely undefended. The French fleet
being concentrated in the Mediterranean, the situation is very different
from what it used to be, because the friendship which has grown up
between the two countries has given them a sense of security that there
was nothing to be feared from us.
The French coasts are absolutely undefended. The French fleet is in the
Mediterranean, and has for some years been concentrated there because of
the feeling of confidence and friendship which has existed between the
two countries. My own feeling is that if a foreign fleet, engaged in a
war which France had not sought, and in which she had not been the
aggressor, came down the English Channel and bombarded and battered the
undefended coasts of France, we could not stand aside, and see this
going on practically within sight of our eyes, with our arms folded,
looking on dispassionately, doing nothing. I believe that would be the
feeling of this country. There are times when one feels that if these
circumstances actually did arise, it would be a feeling which would
spread with irresistible force throughout the land.
But I also want to look at the matter without sentiment, and from the
point of view of British interests, and it is on that that I am going to
base and justify what I am presently going to say to the House. If we
say nothing at this moment, what is France to do with her fleet in the
Mediterranean? If she leaves it there, with no statement from us as to
what we will do, she leaves her northern and western coasts absolutely
undefended, at the mercy of a German fleet coming down the Channel to do
as it pleases in a war which is a war of life and death between them. If
we say nothing, it may be that the French fleet is withdrawn from the
Mediterranean. We are in the presence of a European conflagration; can
anybody set limits to the consequences that may arise out of it? Let us
assume that today we stand aside in an attitude of neutrality, saying,
"No, we cannot undertake and engage to help either party in this
conflict." Let us suppose the French fleet is withdrawn from the
Mediterranean; and let us assume that the consequences--which are
already tremendous in what has happened in Europe even to countries
which are at peace--in fact, equally whether countries are at peace or
at war--let us assume that out of that come consequences unforeseen,
which make it necessary at a sudden moment that, in defense of vital
British interests, we shall go to war; and let us assume--which is quite
possible--that Italy, who is now neutral--because, as I understand, she
considers that this war is an aggressive war, and the Triple Alliance
being a defensive alliance her obligation did not arise--let us assume
that consequences which are not yet foreseen and which, perfectly
legitimately consulting her own interests, make Italy depart from her
attitude of neutrality at a time when we are forced in defense of vital
British interests ourselves to fight--what then will be the position in
the Mediterranean? It might be that at some critical moment those
consequences would be forced upon us because our trade routes in the
Mediterranean might be vital to this country.
Nobody can say that in the course of the next few weeks there is any
particular trade route, the keeping open of which may not be vital to
this country. What will be our position then? We have not kept a fleet
in the Mediterranean which is equal to dealing alone with a combination
of other fleets in the Mediterranean. It would be the very moment when
we could not detach more ships to the Mediterranean, and we might have
exposed this country from our negative attitude at the present moment to
the most appalling risk. I say that from the point of view of British
interests. We feel strongly that France was entitled to know--and to
know at once--whether or not in the event of attack upon her unprotected
northern and western coasts she could depend upon British support. In
that emergency, and in these compelling circumstances, yesterday
afternoon I gave to the French Ambassador the following statement:
I am authorized to give an assurance that if the German fleet comes
into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile
operations against the French coasts or shipping, the British fleet
will give all the protection in its power. This assurance is, of
course, subject to the policy of his Majesty's Government receiving
the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding his
Majesty's Government to take any action until the above contingency
of action by the German fleet takes place.
I read that to the House, not as a declaration of war on our part, not
as entailing immediate aggressive action on our part, but as binding us
to take aggressive action should that contingency arise. Things move
very hurriedly from hour to hour. Fresh news comes in, and I cannot give
this in any very formal way; but I understand that the German
Government would be prepared, if we would pledge ourselves to
neutrality, to agree that its fleet would not attack the northern coast
of France. I have only heard that shortly before I came to the House,
but it is far too narrow an engagement for us. And, Sir, there is the
more serious consideration--becoming more serious every hour--there is
the question of the neutrality of Belgium.
I shall have to put before the House at some length what is our position
in regard to Belgium. The governing factor is the Treaty of 1839, but
this is a treaty with a history--a history accumulated since. In 1870,
when there was war between France and Germany, the question of the
neutrality of Belgium arose, and various things were said. Among other
things, Prince Bismarck gave an assurance to Belgium that--confirming
his verbal assurance, he gave in writing a declaration which he said was
superfluous in reference to the treaty in existence--that the German
Confederation and its allies would respect the neutrality of Belgium, it
being always understood that that neutrality would be respected by the
other belligerent powers. That is valuable as a recognition in 1870 on
the part of Germany of the sacredness of these treaty rights.
What was our own attitude? The people who laid down the attitude of the
British Government were Lord Granville in the House of Lords and Mr.
Gladstone in the House of Commons. Lord Granville on the 8th August,
1870, used these words. He said:
We might have explained to the country and to foreign nations that
we could not think this country was bound either morally or
internationally, or that its interests were concerned in the
maintenance of the neutrality of Belgium; though this course might
have had some conveniences, though it might have been easy to
adhere to it, though it might have saved us from some immediate
danger, it is a course which her Majesty's Government thought it
impossible to adopt in the name of the country with any due regard
to the country's honor or to the country's interests.
Mr. Gladstone, spoke as follows two days later:
There is, I admit, the obligation of the treaty. It is not
necessary, nor would time permit me, to enter into the complicated
question of the nature of the obligations of that treaty; but I am
not able to subscribe to the doctrine of those who have held in
this House what plainly amounts to an assertion, that the simple
fact of the existence of a guarantee is binding on every party to
it, irrespectively altogether of the particular position in which
it may find itself at the time when the occasion for acting on the
guarantee arises. The great authorities upon foreign policy to whom
I have been accustomed to listen, such as Lord Aberdeen and Lord
Palmerston, never to my knowledge took that rigid and, if I may
venture to say so, that impracticable view of the guarantee. The
circumstance, that there is already an existing guarantee in force,
is, of necessity, an important fact, and a weighty element in the
case, to which we are bound to give full and ample consideration.
There is also this further consideration, the force of which we
must all feel most deeply, and that is, the common interests
against the unmeasured aggrandizement of any power whatever.
The treaty is an old treaty--1839--and that was the view taken of it in
1870. It is one of those treaties which are founded, not only on
consideration for Belgium, which benefits under the treaty, but in the
interests of those who guarantee the neutrality of Belgium. The honor
and interests are, at least, as strong today as in 1870, and we cannot
take a more narrow view or a less serious view of our obligations, and
of the importance of those obligations, than was taken by Mr.
Gladstone's Government in 1870.
I will read to the House what took place last week on this subject. When
mobilization was beginning, I knew that this question must be a most
important element in our policy--a most important subject for the House
of Commons. I telegraphed at the same time in similar terms to both
Paris and Berlin to say that it was essential for us to know whether the
French and German Governments respectively were prepared to undertake an
engagement to respect the neutrality of Belgium. These are the replies.
I got from the French Government this reply:
The French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of
Belgium, and it would only be in the event of some other power
violating that neutrality that France might find herself under the
necessity, in order to assure the defense of her security, to act
otherwise. This assurance has been given several times. The
President of the Republic spoke of it to the King of the Belgians,
and the French Minister at Brussels has spontaneously renewed the
assurance to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs today.
From the German Government the reply was:
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs could not possibly give
an answer before consulting the Emperor and the Imperial
Chancellor.
Sir Edward Goschen, to whom I had said it was important to have an
answer soon, said he hoped the answer would not be too long delayed. The
German Minister for Foreign Affairs then gave Sir Edward Goschen to
understand that he rather doubted whether they could answer at all, as
any reply they might give could not fail, in the event of war, to have
the undesirable effect of disclosing, to a certain extent, part of their
plan of campaign. I telegraphed at the same time to Brussels to the
Belgian Government, and I got the following reply from Sir Francis
Villiers:
Belgium expects and desires that other powers will observe and
uphold her neutrality, which she intends to maintain to the utmost
of her power. In so informing me, Minister for Foreign Affairs
said, that, in the event of the violation of the neutrality of
their territory, they believed that they were in a position to
defend themselves against intrusion. The relations between Belgium
and her neighbors were excellent, and there was no reason to
suspect their intentions; but he thought it well, nevertheless, to
be prepared against emergencies.
It now appears from the news I have received today--which has come quite
recently, and I am not yet quite sure how far it has reached me in an
accurate form--that an ultimatum has been given to Belgium by Germany,
the object of which was to offer Belgium friendly relations with Germany
on condition that she would facilitate the passage of German troops
through Belgium. Well, Sir, until one has these things absolutely
definitely, up to the last moment, I do not wish to say all that one
would say if one were in a position to give the House full, complete,
and absolute information upon the point. We were sounded in the course
of last week as to whether, if a guarantee were given that, after the
war, Belgian integrity would be preserved, that would content us. We
replied that we could not bargain away whatever interests or obligations
we had in Belgian neutrality.
Shortly before I reached the House I was informed that the following
telegram had been received from the King of the Belgians by our
King--King George:
Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship and
that of your predecessors, and the friendly attitude of England in
1870, and the poof of friendship she has just given us again, I
make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your
Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium.
Diplomatic intervention took place last week on our part. What can
diplomatic intervention do now? We have great and vital interests in the
independence--and integrity is the least part--of Belgium. If Belgium is
compelled to submit to allow her neutrality to be violated, of course
the situation is clear. Even if by agreement she admitted the violation
of her neutrality, it is clear she could only do so under duress. The
smaller States in that region of Europe ask but one thing. Their one
desire is that they should be left alone and independent. The one thing
they fear is, I think, not so much that their integrity but that their
independence should be interfered with. If in this war which is before
Europe the neutrality of one of those countries is violated, if the
troops of one of the combatants violate its neutrality and no action be
taken to resent it, at the end of the war, whatever the integrity may
be, the independence will be gone.
I have one further quotation from Mr. Gladstone as to what he thought
about the independence of Belgium. It will be found in "Hansard," Vol.
203, Page 1,787. I have not had time to read the whole speech and verify
the context, but the thing seems to me so clear that no context could
make any difference to the meaning of it. Mr. Gladstone said:
We have an interest in the independence of Belgium which is wider
than that which we may have in the literal operation of the
guarantee. It is found in the answer to the question whether, under
the circumstances of the case, this country, endowed as it is with
influence and power, would quietly stand by and witness the
perpetration of the direst crime that ever stained the pages of
history, and thus become participators in the sin.
No, Sir, if it be the case that there has been anything in the nature of
an ultimatum to Belgium, asking her to compromise or violate her
neutrality, whatever may have been offered to her in return, her
independence is gone if that holds. If her independence goes, the
independence of Holland will follow. I ask the House from the point of
view of British interests to consider what may be at stake. If France is
beaten in a struggle of life and death, beaten to her knees, loses her
position as a great power, becomes subordinate to the will and power of
one greater than herself--consequences which I do not anticipate,
because I am sure that France has the power to defend herself with all
the energy and ability and patriotism which she has shown so
often--still, if that were to happen, and if Belgium fell under the same
dominating influence, and then Holland, and then Denmark, then would not
Mr. Gladstone's words come true, that just opposite to us there would be
a common interest against the unmeasured aggrandizement of any power?
It may be said, I suppose, that we might stand aside, husband our
strength, and that, whatever happened in the course of this war, at the
end of it intervene with effect to put things right, and to adjust them
to our own point of view. If, in a crisis like this, we run away from
those obligations of honor and interest as regards the Belgian treaty, I
doubt whether, whatever material force we might have at the end, it
would be of very much value in face of the respect that we should have
lost. And do not believe, whether a great power stands outside this war
or not, it is going to be in a position at the end of it to exert its
superior strength. For us, with a powerful fleet, which we believe able
to protect our commerce, to protect our shores, and to protect our
interests, if we are engaged in war, we shall suffer but little more
than we shall suffer even if we stand aside.
We are going to suffer, I am afraid, terribly in this war, whether we
are in it or whether we stand aside. Foreign trade is going to stop, not
because the trade routes are closed, but because there is no trade at
the other end. Continental nations engaged in war--all their
populations, all their energies, all their wealth, engaged in a
desperate struggle--they cannot carry on the trade with us that they are
carrying on in times of peace, whether we are parties to the war or
whether we are not. I do not believe for a moment that at the end of
this war, even if we stood aside and remained aside, we should be in a
position, a material position, to use our force decisively to undo what
had happened in the course of the war, to prevent the whole of the west
of Europe opposite to us--if that had been the result of the
war--falling under the domination of a single power, and I am quite sure
that our moral position would be such as to have lost us all respect. I
can only say that I have put the question of Belgium somewhat
hypothetically, because I am not yet sure of all the facts, but, if the
facts turn out to be as they have reached us at present, it is quite
clear that there is an obligation on this country to do its utmost to
prevent the consequences to which those facts will lead if they are
undisputed.
I have read to the House the only engagements that we have yet taken
definitely with regard to the use of force. I think it is due to the
House to say that we have taken no engagement yet with regard to sending
an expeditionary armed force out of the country. Mobilization of the
fleet has taken place; mobilization of the army is taking place; but we
have as yet taken no engagement, because I feel that--in the case of a
European conflagration such as this, unprecedented, with our enormous
responsibilities in India and other parts of the empire, or in countries
in British occupation, with all the unknown factors--we must take very
carefully into consideration the use which we make of sending an
expeditionary force out of the country until we know how we stand. One
thing I would say.
The one bright spot in the whole of this, terrible situation is Ireland.
The general feeling throughout Ireland--and I would like this to be
clearly understood abroad--does not make the Irish question a
consideration which we feel we have now to take into account. I have
told the House how far we have at present gone in commitments and the
conditions which influence our policy, and I have put to the House and
dwelt at length upon how vital is the condition of the neutrality of
Belgium.
What other policy Is there before the House? There is but one way in
which the Government could make certain at the present moment of keeping
outside this war, and that would be that it should immediately issue a
proclamation of unconditional neutrality. We cannot do that. We have
made the commitment to France that I have read to the House which
prevents us doing that. We have got the consideration of Belgium which
prevents us also from any unconditional neutrality, and, without these
conditions absolutely satisfied and satisfactory, we are bound not to
shrink from proceeding to the use of all the forces in our power. If we
did take that line by saying, "We will have nothing whatever to do with
this matter" under no conditions--the Belgian treaty obligations, the
possible position in the Mediterranean, with damage to British
interests, and what may happen to France from our failure to support
France--if we were to say that all those things mattered nothing, were
as nothing, and to say we would stand aside, we should, I believe,
sacrifice our respect and good name and reputation before the world, and
should not escape the most serious and grave economic consequences.
My object has been to explain the view of the Government, and to place
before the House the issue and the choice. I do not for a moment
conceal, after what I have said, and after the information, incomplete
as it is, that I have given to the House with regard to Belgium, that
we must be prepared, and we are prepared, for the consequences of having
to use all the strength we have at any moment--we know not how soon--to
defend ourselves and to take our part. We know, if the facts all be as I
have stated them, though I have announced no intending aggressive action
on our part, no final decision to resort to force at a moment's notice,
until we know the whole of the case, that the use of it may be forced
upon us. As far as the forces of the Crown are concerned, we are ready.
I believe the Prime Minister and my right honorable friend the First
Lord of the Admiralty have no doubt whatever that the readiness and the
efficiency of those forces were never at a higher mark than they are
today, and never was there a time when confidence was more justified in
the power of the navy to protect our commerce and to protect our shores.
The thought is with us always of the suffering and misery entailed, from
which no country in Europe will escape by abstention, and from which no
neutrality will save us. The amount of harm that can be done by an enemy
ship to our trade is infinitesimal, compared with the amount of harm
that must be done by the economic condition that is caused on the
Continent.
The most awful responsibility is resting upon the Government in deciding
what to advise the House of Commons to do. We have disclosed our minds
to the House of Commons. We have disclosed the issue, the information
which we have, and made clear to the House, I trust, that we are
prepared to face that situation, and that should it develop, as probably
it may develop, we will face it. We worked for peace up to the last
moment, and beyond the last moment. How hard, how persistently, and how
earnestly we strove for peace last week the House will see from the
papers that will be before it.
But that is over, as far as the peace of Europe is concerned. We are now
face to face with a situation and all the consequences which it may yet
have to unfold. We believe we shall have the support of the House at
large in proceeding to whatever the consequences may be and whatever
measures may be forced upon us by the development of facts or action
taken by others. I believe the country, so quickly has the situation
been forced upon it, has not had time to realize the issue. It perhaps
is still thinking of the quarrel between Austria and Servia, and not the
complications of this matter which have grown out of the quarrel between
Austria and Servia. Russia and Germany we know are at war. We do not yet
know officially that Austria, the ally whom Germany is to support, is
yet at war with Russia. We know that a good deal has been happening on
the French frontier. We do not know that the German Ambassador has left
Paris.
The situation has developed so rapidly that technically, as regards the
condition of the war, it is most difficult to describe what has actually
happened. I wanted to bring out the underlying issues which would affect
our own conduct, and our own policy, and to put them clearly. I have now
put the vital facts before the House, and if, as seems not improbable,
we are forced, and rapidly forced, to take our stand upon those issues,
then I believe, when the country realizes what is at stake, what the
real issues are, the magnitude of the impending dangers in the west of
Europe, which I have endeavored to describe to the House, we shall be
supported throughout, not only by the House of Commons, but by the
determination, the resolution, the courage, and the endurance of the
whole country.
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