The highest representatives of the German Empire with emphatic
seriousness declared that it was with a heavy heart and only following
the law of self-preservation that they decided to violate the neutrality
of the Kingdom of Belgium, guaranteed by the great powers in the
treaties of 1831 and 1839.
The German Secretary of State on Aug. 4 informed the English Government
through the embassy in London that Germany intended to retain no Belgian
territory, and added:
Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that German Army could not be
exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned,
according to absolutely unimpeachable information. Germany had
consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being with her a
question of life or death to prevent French advance.--(British
"White Paper" No. 157.)
In answer Grey caused the English Ambassador in Berlin to demand his
passports and to tell the German Government that England would
take all steps for defense of Belgian neutrality. This, therefore,
represents, in the view which very cleverly has been spread broadcast by
British publicity, the real reason for the war. But in spite of the
moral indignation that is apparent against Germany, the consideration
for Belgium, up until very late, does not seem in any way to have been
in the foreground. We find on July 31 Grey stated to Cambon:
The preservation of the neutrality of Belgium might be, I would not
say a decisive, but an important, factor in determining our
attitude.--(British "White Paper" No. 119.)
Here, therefore, there was no talk about England grasping the sword on
account of Belgium. Now no one will claim that the assumption that the
German troops could march through Belgium would be new or unheard of.
For years this possibility had been discussed in military
literature.[04]
This expression on the part of the historical Faculty is very
interesting. It shows that a plan of campaign between the English and
French had long been considered, and that the Belgian entry into the
alliance against Germany was a matter agreed upon.
A Sudden Decision.
It must also be assumed that the Belgian Government knew toward the end
of July at the latest that the war between Germany and France was
probable and the march of Germans through Belgium very possible.
If England had not taken part in the war against Germany, it may be
assumed that it would have given Belgium the advice to permit the
marching through of the German Army, somewhat in the same manner as the
Grand Duchy of Luxemburg did, with a protest. In doing so the Belgian
people would have been spared a great deal of misery and loss of blood.
On Aug. 3 the Belgian Government replied to an offer of military help by
France as follows:
We are sincerely grateful to the French Government for offering
eventual support. In the actual circumstances, however, we do not
propose to appeal to the guarantee of the powers. Belgian
Government will decide later on the action which they may think
necessary to take.--(British "White Paper" No. 151.)
One day later London decided to make Belgian neutrality the cause of the
war against Germany before the eyes of the world. The Ambassador in
Brussels received the following orders:
You should inform Belgian Government that if pressure is applied to
them by Germany to induce them to depart from neutrality, his
Majesty's Government expects that they will resist by any means in
their power and that his Majesty's Government will support them in
offering such resistance, and that his Majesty's Government in this
event are prepared to join Russia and France.--(British "White
Paper" No. 155.)
Not until England thus stirred Belgium up, holding out the deceptive
hope of effective French and English help, did Belgian fanaticism break
loose against Germany. Without the intervention of England in Brussels
the events in Belgium, one may safely assert, would have taken an
entirely different course, which would have been far more favorable to
Belgium.
But, of course, England had thus found a very useful reason for war
against Germany. Even on the 31st of July Grey had spoken of the
violation of Belgian neutrality as not a decisive factor. On Aug. 1 he
declined to promise Prince Lichnowsky England's neutrality, even if
Germany would not violate Belgium's neutrality. On Aug. 4, however, the
Belgian question was the cause that suddenly drove England to maintain
the moral fabric of the world and to draw the sword.
This suddenly became the new development, which was still
lacking for Grey in order to justify this war before public opinion in
England.
Another English Advantage.
And something else was secured by the drawing of Belgium into the war by
the British Government, which had decided to make war on Germany for
entirely different reasons: the thankful part of the protector of the
weak and the oppressed.
As an English diplomat, when Russia was mobilizing, openly stated, the
interests of his country in Servia were nil, so for Grey even Belgium,
immediately before the break with Germany, was not decisive. However,
when England had irrevocably decided to enter the war it stepped out
before the limelight of the world as the champion of--the small nations.
* * * * *
[02] Recently a book entitled "Why We Make War," in defense of Great
Britain, appeared at Oxford, as the authors of which "Members of the
Faculty for Modern History in Oxford" are mentioned. This work
undertakes, on the ground of the official publications, to whitewash
Grey's policy, and of course incidentally the Russian policy. All
together this publication, parading in the gown of science, is
contradicted by our own presentation of the facts; it may be mentioned
also that this work contains in part positive untruths. Thus it states
on Page 70 (retranslation):
No diplomatic pressure whatever was exerted [by Germany] on Vienna,
which, under the protection of Berlin, was permitted to do with
Servia as she liked.
Grey's own words contradict this assertion.
[03] In the aforementioned book of the Oxford historians there is
stated on Page 69 (retranslation):
This mediation [namely, Grey's mediation proposition] had already
been accepted, by Russia on July 25th.
We have shown in the foregoing that the Russian Government did in no
manner subscribe to the conference plan in binding terms. As an
additional proof, a part of Buchanan's dispatch of the 25th may be
mentioned:
He [Sazonof] would like to see the question placed on international
footing.... If Servia should appeal to the powers, Russia would be
quite ready to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of
England, France, Germany, and Italy. It would be possible in his
opinion that Servia might propose to submit the question to
arbitration.--(British "White Paper" No. 17.)
Hence, not if England, but only if Servia would propose arbitration by
the powers, Mr. Sazonof was willing! The most amusing part of this is
that the Russian Minister himself considers such a proposition on the
part of Servia merely as "possible"; evidently it would have appeared as
a great condescension on the part of the Government at Belgrade if it,
standing on the same basis as Austria-Hungary, would appear before a
European tribunal! For us there is no additional proof necessary that a
mediation conference, which for Austria was not acceptable even when
proposed by England, would be unthinkable if the move for such came from
Servia. In expressing such an idea. Mr. Sazonof proved that it was his
intention to bring war about.
[04] The book, which appeared at Oxford, "Why We Are at War," mentioned
previously states on Page 27 (retranslation):
That such a plan [the marching through Luxemburg and Belgium] had
been taken into consideration by the Germans has been known in
England generally for several years; and it has also been generally
accepted that the attempt to carry out this plan would bring about
the active resistance of the British armed forces: one assumed that
these would be given the task of assisting the left wing of the
French, which would have to resist German advance from Belgian
territory.
* * * * *
"Truth About Germany"
* * * * *