He [Cambon] anticipated that the [German] aggression would take the form
of either a demand to cease her preparations or a demand that she should
engage to remain neutral if there was war between Germany and Russia.
Neither of these things would France admit.--(British "White Paper" No.
105.)
Therefore, even the demand addressed to France not to, jointly with
Russia, attack Germany became a German "attack," which obliged England
to come to the aid!
In spite of this, even on July 27 in a conversation with Cambon, Grey
gave himself the appearance as if his hands were free. He told the
Frenchman:
If Germany became involved and France became involved we had not
made up our minds what we should do; it was a case that we should
have to consider.... We were free from engagements and we should
have to decide what British interests required us to do.--(British
"White Paper" No. 87.)
M. Cambon remarked in reply that the Secretary of State had clearly
pictured the situation, but on the very following day the French
Ambassador took the liberty to remind Grey of the letter written in
1912. (British "White Paper" No. 105.)
Grey did not deny the claim implied in this reminder, but even as late
as July 31 he reports as follows concerning the conversation with
Cambon:
Up to the present moment we did not feel and public opinion
did not feel that any treaties or obligations of this country were
involved.... M. Cambon repeated his question whether we would help
France if Germany made an attack on her. I said I could only adhere
to the answer that, as far as things had gone at present, we could
not take any engagement.... I said that the Cabinet would certainly
be summoned as soon as there was some new development; that at the
present moment the only answer I could give was that we could not
undertake any definite engagement.--(British "White Paper" No.
119.)
Now, if we remember that even on the day before Grey had informed the
German Imperial Chancellor that it would be a shame for England to
remain neutral and allow France to be crushed, we here find a new proof
of the unreliability of his conduct. If he has been gullible, the
declaration of 1912, the dangerous character of which is increased by
its apparently undefined tenor, has enmeshed him more and more. Also the
military and naval circles, whose consultations with the representatives
of the French Army and Navy certainly have been continued diligently
since the beginning of the Servian crisis, were forcing toward a
decision.
At all events, it became more impossible with every hour for Germany to
keep England out of the way by any offers whatsoever. This is proved by
Grey's conversation of Aug. 1 with the German Ambassador:
He asked me whether if Germany gave a promise not to violate
Belgian neutrality we would engage to remain neutral. I replied
that I could not say that; our hands were still free, and we were
considering what our attitude should be.... The Ambassador pressed
me as to whether I could not formulate conditions on which we would
remain neutral. I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any
promise.... (British "White Paper" No. 123.)
Belgium Not the Cause.
Hence, only if Germany would permit herself to be humiliated war with
England could be avoided. The violation of Belgium's neutrality was in
no way the cause of England joining Germany's enemies, for while German
troops did not enter Belgium until the night from Aug. 3 to 4, Grey gave
on Aug. 2 the following memorandum to the French Ambassador after a
session of the Cabinet in London:
I am authorized to give an assurance that if the German fleet comes
into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile
operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet
will give all the protection in its power.--(British "White Paper"
No. 148.)
As the aim of this decision, of which M. Cambon was informed verbally,
was to give France an assurance that it would be placed in a position
"to settle the disposition of its own Mediterranean fleet," Grey would
not accept the version of Cambon that England would take part in a war
with Germany. This is a case of splitting hairs in order to put the
blame of starting the war on Germany, for while England promised to
protect the French coast and to make it possible for the French fleet to
stay in the Mediterranean, she almost immediately proceeded to a warlike
action against Germany, especially as the English Minister
simultaneously refused to bind himself to maintain even this peculiar
neutrality.
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