Only in the light of the developments concerning England's relation to
France, given at the beginning of the war, Grey's policy, swaying
between indecision and precipitate action, becomes apparent.
In all the explanations which the British Government in the course of
eight years had presented to the British Parliament concerning the
relations to other large powers, the assurance had been repeated that no
binding agreements with the two partners of the Franco-Russian alliance
had been made, above all, that no agreement with France existed. Only in
his speech in the House of Commons on Aug, 3, 1914, which meant the war
with Germany, Grey gave to the representatives of the people news of
certain agreements which made it a duty for Great Britain to work
together with France in any European crisis.
The fateful document, which in the form of an apparently private letter
to the French Ambassador, dealt with one of the most important compacts
of modern history, was written toward the end of the year 1912, and is
published in the British "White Paper" No. 105, Annex 1:
London Foreign Office, Nov. 22, 1912.
My Dear Ambassador:
From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and
military experts have consulted together. It has always been
understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of
either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to
assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation
between experts is not, and ought not to be, regarded as an
engagement that commits either Government to action in a
contingency that has not arisen and may never arise. The
disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets
respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement
to co-operate in war.
You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave
reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third power, it might
become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon
the armed assistance of the other.
I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an
unprovoked attack by a third power, or something that threatened
the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other
whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression
and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be
prepared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the
plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into
consideration, and the Governments would then decide what effect
should be given to them.
Yours, &c.,