We have seen from the "Blue Book" that the Secretary of State in London
was informed at the very latest on July 24 by his Ambassador in St.
Petersburg of the plan of the Russian mobilization and consequently of
the tremendous seriousness of the European situation. Yet eight to nine
days had to elapse before the beginning of the war. Let us see whether
Sir Edward Grey used this time to preserve peace, according to his
own documents.
From this testimony it appears that even at the beginning of the last
and decisive part of the European crisis, which began on June 28, 1914,
with the assassination of the Austrian heir to the throne, Sir Edward
Grey refrained from considering a direct participation of his country in
the possible world war. At least, this must be the impression gained
from his remarks to the representatives of the two powers with whom
England is today at war. Thus, he said to the Austro-Hungarian
Ambassador, Count Mensdorff, on July 23:
The possible consequences of the present situation were terrible.
If as many as four great powers of Europe--let us say Austria,
France, Russia, and Germany--were engaged in war, it seemed to me
that it must involve the expenditure of so vast a sum of money and
such an interference with trade that a war would be accompanied or
followed by a complete collapse of European credit and
industry.--(British "White Paper" No. 3.)
Here Grey speaks only of four of the big powers at most that may go to
war, without even hinting at the fifth, namely, England. On July 24 he
had another conversation with the Austrian Ambassador, the theme of
which was the note--meanwhile presented to Servia. It caused
apprehensions on his part, but he declared again:
The merits of the dispute between Austria and Servia were not the
concern of his Majesty's Government....
I [Grey] ended by saying that doubtless we should enter into an
exchange of views with other powers, and that I must await their
views as to what could be done to mitigate the difficulties of the
situation.--(British "White Paper" No. 5.)
We are already striking the fateful peculiarity of Grey's policy to
hesitate where prompt action, or at least a clear and open conduct,
would have been his duty. This weakness of his nature has been used with
great art by French and Russian diplomacy. This is illustrated by the
conversation of July 24 between him and the French Ambassador, Cambon,
in London:
M. Cambon said that, if there was a chance of mediation by the four
powers he had no doubt that his Government would be glad to join
in it; but he pointed out that we could not say anything in St.
Petersburg till Russia had expressed some opinion or taken some
action. But, when two days were over, Austria would march into
Servia, for the Servians could not possibly accept the Austrian
demand. Russia would be compelled by her public opinion to take
action as soon as Austria attacked Servia, and, therefore, once the
Austrians had attacked Servia it would be too late for any
mediation.--(British "White Paper" No. 10.)
Thus, England must not give any advice to Russia before it knows
Russia's intent and even its measures. But inasmuch as Austria will have
proceeded against Servia by that time Russia must make war, and the
conclusion is that even on July 24 the catastrophe is considered
unavoidable. Grey shows himself more and more hypnotized by the
fatalistic view that it is too late. Hence he reports also on July 24 a
conversation of the German Ambassador, Prince Lichnowsky:
I reminded the German Ambassador that some days ago he had
expressed a personal hope that if need arose I would endeavor to
exercise moderating influence at St. Petersburg, but now I said
that, in view of the extraordinarily stiff character of the
Austrian note, the shortness of time allowed, and the wide scope of
the demands upon Servia, I felt quite helpless as far as Russia was
concerned, and I did not believe any power could exercise influence
alone.--(British "White Paper" No. 11.)
From a conversation of Grey with the Prince Lichnowsky, the German
Ambassador, on July 25:
Alone we could do nothing. The French Government were traveling
[this refers to the visit at St. Petersburg by Messrs. Poincaré and
Viviani] at the moment, and I had had no time to consult them, and
could not, therefore, be sure of their views.--(British "White
Paper" No. 25.)
If Sir Edward Grey sincerely desired the maintenance of peace, he must
have had to use his entire influence at St. Petersburg to bring about
the stopping of the threatening military measures taken by Russia,
whereas he was waiting for the opinion of the French Government. He was
bound to do this, so much the more in view of the fact that he demanded
from Germany that it should exert its influence with Austria.
That this request of Grey's was complied with by Germany in so far as
it was in any way in accord with the alliance with Austria-Hungary, and
that in Vienna every effort was made to conciliate matters, is shown by
the assurance of the Chancellor; he declares:
In spite of this [the Austro-Hungarian Government having remarked
with full appreciation of our action that it had come too late] we
continued our mediatory efforts to the utmost and advised Vienna to
make any possible compromise consistent with the dignity of the
monarchy.--(German "White Paper," Page 17, of NEW YORK TIMES
reprint.)
Grey well knew that Germany was doing all it could to mediate in Vienna.
He expressed his recognition and his joy over it on July 28 ("Blue
Book," Page 67):
It is very satisfactory to hear from the German Ambassador here
that the German Government have taken action at Vienna in the sense
of the conversation recorded in my telegram of yesterday to
you.--(British "White Paper" No. 67.)[02]
Neither has Grey been left in the dark by the German side concerning the
difficulties, which by the Russian mobilization made every attempt to
mediate in Vienna abortive. Even on July 31 the British Ambassador in
Berlin telegraphed:
The Chancellor informs me that his efforts to preach peace and
moderation at Vienna have been seriously handicapped by the Russian
mobilization against Austria. He has done everything possible to
obtain his object at Vienna, perhaps even rather more than was
altogether palatable at the Ballplatz.--(British "White Paper" No.
108.)
England and Russia.
How, on the other hand, about Grey's action with Russia? From the very
beginning one should have had a right to expect that, as Germany acted
in Vienna, thus France, if it was active in Grey's spirit, would be
working in St. Petersburg for peace. Of this no trace whatsoever can be
found. The French Government thus far has not published any series of
documents concerning its activity during the crisis, and neither in the
Russian "Orange Book" nor in the English "Blue Book" is anything
mentioned of the mediating activity on the part of France.
On the contrary, the latter power, wherever she puts in an
appearance--as for instance in the conversation of the English
Ambassador in St. Petersburg with his French colleague and M. Sazonof,
as mentioned above--appears as fully identical with Russia.
It is also stated on July 24:
The French Ambassador gave me to understand that France would
fulfill all the obligations entailed by her alliance with Russia if
necessity arose, besides supporting Russia strongly in all
diplomatic negotiations.... It seems to me from the language held,
by French Ambassador that even if we decline to join them, France
and Russia are determined to make a strong stand.--(British "White
Paper" No. 6.)
One should think that Grey, who in view of this could not possibly
expect an influence for peace being brought to bear by France, but only
a strengthening of the Russian desire for aggression, now would have
acted in the most energetic manner in St. Petersburg for the maintenance
of peace.
In reality, however, during the days that still remained, aside from a
weak and in St. Petersburg absolutely ineffective advice to postpone
mobilization, he did nothing whatsoever, and later placed himself in a
manner constantly more recognizable on the side of Russia.
The claim that the time limit given by the Austrian note to Servia was
the cause of the war, that Grey's mediation had only miscarried owing to
the haste of Germany, is disproved by the British documents
themselves. De Bunsen on July 26 telegraphed to Grey from Vienna:
Russian Ambassador just returned from leave, thinks that
Austro-Hungarian Government are determined on war and that it is
impossible for Russia to remain indifferent. He does not propose to
press for more time in the sense of your telegram of the 25th
inst.--(British "White Paper" No. 40.)
Therefore Russia has paid little attention to the very shy and timid
efforts to maintain peace by the London Secretary of State, even where
these were concerned in the attempt to change the position taken by
Austria.
Another proof: Sazonof on July 27 sent a telegram to the Russian
Ambassador in London which the latter transmitted to Grey, and which
concerns itself with the much mentioned proposition of the latter to
have the conflict investigated by a conference of the four great powers
not immediately concerned.
Russian Sincerity Questioned.
The conference plan was declined without much hesitation and openly by
Germany, because it was compelled to see therein an attempt to place
Austria before a European court of arbitration, and because it knew the
serious determination of its ally in this matter. But did Russia really
want the conference? Minister Sazonof declares:
I replied to the [British] Ambassador that I have begun
conversations with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, under
conditions which I hope may be favorable. I have not, however,
received as yet any reply to the proposal made by me for revising
the note between the two Cabinets.--(British "White Paper" No.
53.)
Here it is shown plainly how little the conference plan was after the
heart of the Russians. Had they accepted it it would have had to be done
immediately. As soon as the situation had grown very much more serious
by the failure of the negotiations with Austria-Hungary there would have
been no more time for this.[03]
A telegram of the English Ambassador in St. Petersburg, dated July 27,
(British "White Paper" No. 55,) shows how this conference was expected
to be conducted in St. Petersburg:
His Excellency [Sazonof] said he was perfectly ready to stand aside
if the powers accepted the proposal for a conference, but he
trusted that you would keep in touch with the Russian Ambassador in
the event of its taking place.--(British "White Paper" No. 55.)
Russian shrewdness evidently expected to control the conference by
keeping in touch with Grey, who of course would have been the Chairman.
The dispatches of his own Ambassadors lying before him should have
enabled the Secretary of State to see the perfidy of the Russian policy.
Buchanan wrote on the 28th from St. Petersburg:
... and asked him whether he would be satisfied with the assurance
which the Austrian Ambassador had, I understood, been instructed to
give in respect to Servia's integrity and independence.... In reply
his Excellency stated that if Servia were attacked Russia would not
be satisfied with any engagement which Austria might take on these
two points....--(British "White Paper" No. 72.)
Entirely in contrast herewith is one report of the British
representative in Vienna, dated Aug. 1, and speaking of a conversation
with the Russian Ambassador there:
Russia would, according to the Russian Ambassador, be satisfied
even now with assurance respecting Servian integrity and
independence. He said that Russia had no intention to attack
Austria.--(British "White Paper" No. 141.)
What, then, may one ask, was the opinion which Sir Edward Grey had
formed concerning Russia's real intentions? He learns from Russian
sources and notes faithfully that Russia will accept Austrian guarantees
for independence of Servia, and also that it will not accept such
guarantees. It is the same duplicity which Russia, when its own
mobilization was concerned, showed toward Germany. Did Sir Edward not
notice this duplicity, or did he not wish to notice it? If the documents
of the English Government have not been selected with the purpose to
confuse, then in London the decision to take part in the war does not
seem to have been a certainty at the beginning. We have seen that
Ambassador Buchanan in St. Petersburg on July 24 gave the Russian
Minister to understand that England was not of a mind to go to war on
account of Servia. This position, taken by the Ambassador, was approved
by Sir Edward Grey on the following day in the following words:
I entirely approve what you said ... and I cannot promise more on
behalf of the Government.--(British "White Paper" No. 24.)
Based upon these instructions, Sir George Buchanan, even on July 27,
stated to M. Sazonof, who continued to urge England to unconditionally
join Russia and France:
I added that you [Grey] could not promise to do anything more, and
that his Excellency was mistaken if he believed that the cause of
peace could be promoted by our telling the German Government that
they would have to deal with us as well as with Russia and France
if she supported Austria by force of arms. Their [the German]
attitude would merely be stiffened by such a menace.--(British
"White Paper" No. 44.)
But on this same 27th day of July, Grey, submitting to the intrigues of
Russian and French diplomacy, had committed one very fateful step
(Telegram to Buchanan, July 27):
I have been told by the Russian Ambassador that in German and
Austrian circles impression prevails that in any event we would
stand aside. His Excellency deplored the effect that such an
impression must produce. This impression ought, as I have pointed
out, to be dispelled by the orders we have given to the first fleet
which is concentrated, as it happens, at Portland not to disperse
for manoeuvre leave. But I explained to the Russian Ambassador that
my reference to it must not be taken to mean that anything more
than diplomatic action was promised.--(British "White Paper" No.
47.)
For Russia this order to the fleet meant very much more than a
diplomatic action. Sazonof saw that the wind in London was turning in
his favor and he made use of it. Among themselves the Russian
diplomatists seem to have for a long time been clear and open in their
discussion of their real object. You find among the documents of the
Russian "Orange Book" the following telegram of Sazonof of July 25 to
the Russian Ambassador in London:
In case of a new aggravation of the situation, possibly provoking
on the part of the great powers' united action, [des actions
conformes,] we count that England will not delay placing herself
clearly on the side of Russia and France, with the view to
maintaining the equilibrium of Europe, in favor of which she has
constantly intervened in the past, and which would without doubt be
compromised in the case of the triumph of Austria.--(Russian
"Orange Paper" No. 17.)
There is no mention of Servia here, but Austria should not triumph.
Russia's real intention, of course, was not placed so nakedly before the
British Secretary of State, hence to him the appearance was maintained
that the little State of the Sawe was the only consideration, although
the Russian Army was already being mobilized with all energy.
On the 28th he wires to the Russian Ambassador, Count Benckendorff, to
London to inform the British Government:
It seems to me that England is in a better position than any other
power to make another attempt at Berlin to induce the German
Government to take the necessary action. There is no doubt
that the key of the situation is to be found at Berlin.--(British
"White Paper" No. 54.)
The opinion subtly suggested upon him by Paris and Petersburg diplomacy,
namely, that he should not use any pressure upon Russia, but upon
Germany, now takes hold of Grey more and more. On July 29 he writes to
the German Ambassador as follows:
In fact, mediation was ready to come into operation by any method
that Germany thought possible if only Germany would "press the
button in the interests of peace."--(British "White Paper" No. 84.)
Petersburg, now assured of the support of Grey, becomes more and more
outspoken for war. On the 28th Grey again expressed one of his
softhearted propositions for peace. Mr. Sazonof hardly made the effort
to hide his contempt. Buchanan telegraphs on the 29th as follows:
The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that proposal referred to in
your telegram of the 28th inst. was one of secondary importance.
Under altered circumstances of situation he did not attach weight
to it.... Minister for Foreign Affairs had given me to understand
that Russia would not precipitate war by crossing frontier
immediately, and a week or more would in any case elapse before
mobilization was completed. In order to find an issue out of a
dangerous situation it was necessary that we should in the
meanwhile all work together.--(British "White Paper" No. 78.)
Naivete or Cynicism?
Here it really becomes impossible to judge where the naïveté of the
British Secretary of State ends and cynicism begins, for Sazonof could
not have told to him more plainly than in these lines that all Russia's
ostensible readiness for peace served no other purpose than to win time
to complete the strategical location of the Russian troops.
This point is emphasized by one document coming from a writer presumably
unbiased, but presumably distrustful of Germany, wherein the
confirmation is found that England and Russia had come to a full
agreement during these days.
On July 30 the Belgian Chargé d'Affaires de l'Escaille in Petersburg
reported to the Belgian Government upon the European crisis. Owing to
the fast developing events of a warlike nature, this letter did not
reach its address by mail, and it was published later on. The Belgian
diplomatist writes:
It is undeniable that Germany tried hard here [that is, in
Petersburg] and in Vienna to find any means whatsoever in order to
forestall a general conflict....
And after M. de l'Escaille has told that Russia--what the Czar and his
War Minister with their highest assurances toward Germany had
denied--was mobilizing its own army, he continues:
Today at Petersburg one is absolutely convinced, yes, they have
even received assurances in that direction, that England and France
will stay by them. This assistance is of decisive importance and
has contributed much to the victory of the [Russian] war party.
This settles Grey's pretended "attempts at mediation." The truth is that
British politics decided to prevent a diplomatic success of Germany and
Austria, now worked openly toward the Russian aim. "The exertion of
pressure upon Berlin" included already a certain threat, mingled with
good advice.
On July 23 Grey had only spoken of four possible powers in war; hence
when on the German side some hope of England maintaining neutrality was
indulged in, this impression rested upon Grey's own explanations. On
July 29, however, after a political conversation with Prince Lichnowsky,
German Ambassador in London, he adds an important personal bit of
information. He wires concerning it to Berlin, to Goschen:
After speaking to the German Ambassador this afternoon about the
European situation, I said that I wished to say to him, in a quite
private and friendly way, something that was on my mind. The
situation was very grave.... But if we failed in our efforts to
keep the peace, and if the issue spread so that it involved every
European interest, I did not wish to be open to any reproach from
him, that the friendly tone of all our conversations had misled him
or his Government into supposing that we should not take action....
But we knew very well that if the issue did become such that we
thought that British interests required us to intervene, we must
intervene at once and the decision would have to be very
rapid.--(British "White Paper" No. 89.)
But what is especially wrong is that Grey brought this warning,
which only could have any effect if it remained an absolute,
confidential secret between the English and German Governments, also to
the French Ambassador, so that the entire Entente could mischievously
look on and see whether Germany really would give in to British
pressure. Of course, in his manner of swaying to and fro, he did not
wish either that Cambon should not accept this information to the German
Ambassador as a decided taking of a position on the part of England:
I thought it necessary [speaking to M. Cambon] to say that because
as he knew we were taking all precautions with regard to our fleet
and I was about to warn Prince Lichnowsky not to count on our
standing aside, but it would not be fair that I should let M.
Cambon be misled into supposing that we had decided what to do in a
contingency that I still hoped might not arise....--(British "White
Paper" No. 87.)
Stirring Up Trouble.
On the German side Grey's open threat, which was presented, however,
with smooth and friendly sounding words, was received with quiet
politeness. Goschen telegraphed on the 30th concerning a talk with State
Secretary von Jagow:
His Excellency added that telegram received from Prince Lichnowsky
last night contains matter which he had heard with regret, but not
exactly with surprise, and, at all events, he thoroughly
appreciated the frankness and loyalty with which you had
spoken.--(British "White Paper" No. 98.)
Now the work of stirring up trouble is continued unceasingly. On July 30
the British Ambassador in Paris, Sir F. Bertie, concerning a
conversation with the President of the Republic, reports:
He [Poincaré] is convinced that peace between the powers is in the
hands of Great Britain. If his Majesty's Government announced that
England would come to the aid of France in the event of a conflict
between France and Germany ... there would be no war, for Germany
would at once modify her attitude.--(British "White Paper" No. 99.)
Did Grey really think for one moment that the German Empire would
change its position immediately, in other words, would suddenly leave
its ally in need, or is all this only a mass of diplomatic
blandishments?
On the same day Grey steps from the personal warning which he had given
to the German Ambassador to the sharpest official threat. In a telegram
to the Ambassador in Berlin upon the question placed before him by the
Chancellor of the empire on the day prior, (British "White Paper" No.
85,) whether England would remain neutral if Germany would bind itself,
after possible war, to claim no French territory in Europe whatever,
while in lieu of the French colonies a like guarantee could not be
accepted, Grey answers with thundering words:
His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the
Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to
neutrality on such terms. What he asks us in effect is to engage to
stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten, so
long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the
colonies. From a material point of view such a proposal is
unacceptable, for France without further territory in Europe being
taken from her could be so crushed as to lose her position as a
great power and become subordinate to German policy. Altogether
apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain
with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the
good name of this country could never recover.--(British "White
Paper" No. 101.)
With this telegram the war on Germany was practically declared, for as a
price of British neutrality an open humiliation of Germany was demanded.
If France--the question of French colonies is of very minor importance
in this connection--must not be defeated by Germany, then England
forbade the German Government to make war. It was furthermore stated
that Germany was absolutely compelled to accept Russian-French dictates,
and would have to leave Austria to its own resources. This would have
meant Germany's retirement from the position of a great power, even if
she had backed down before such a challenge.
* * * * *