In a public speech, delivered Sept. 19, the Secretary of the Treasury,
Mr. Lloyd George, according to the report of The Westminster Gazette,
which may be considered as his organ, characterized the quarrel between
Germany and Russia in the picturesque manner which this statesman
prefers, as follows:
GERMANY--I insist that you stand aside with crossed arms while
Austria strangles your little brother, (Servia.)
RUSSIA--Just you touch this little fellow and I will tear
your ramshackle empire limb from limb.
We will not waste words in considering the flippant form here used in a
discussion of an unspeakably bloody and world-historic conflict. But
this expression in very pregnant form makes Russia appear in the light
in which the London powers-that-be desire to show the empire of the Czar
to the British people, viz., in the role of the noble-hearted protector
of persecuted innocence, while Germany, supporting and egging on
Austria-Hungary, is shown as morally responsible for the war.
Cites English Documents.
This, also, is the chain of thought in the speech of the British Prime
Minister in the House of Commons on Aug. 4. Translations of this speech
have been spread by the British Government in neutral countries in
hundreds of thousands of copies under the title: "The Power Responsible
for War Is Germany."
Now, we claim that the British "White Paper" itself furnishes
irrefutable proof that not Germany, which up to the last moment offered
the hand of mediation, but Russia is responsible for the war, and that
the Foreign Office at London was fully cognizant of this fact.
Furthermore, the "White Paper" shows that England's claim that she
entered this war solely as a protector of the small nations is a fable.
The documents reproduced in the "White Paper" do not begin until July
20, and only a few introductory dispatches before the 24th are given.
The first of the very important reports of the British Ambassador at St.
Petersburg, Sir George Buchanan, to the Secretary of State, Grey, is
dated on that day; on the same day the note addressed by Austria-Hungary
to the Servian Government had been brought to the knowledge of the
European Cabinets, and the British Ambassador conferred with the Russian
Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Sazonof, over this matter. The French
Minister also took part in this conference. When the latter and M.
Sazonof, in the most insistent way, tried to prove to Buchanan that
England, together with Russia and France, must assume a threatening
attitude toward Austria-Hungary and Germany, the British Ambassador
replied:
I said that I would telegraph a full report to you of what their
Excellencies had just said to me. I could not, of course, speak in
the name of his Majesty's Government, but personally I saw no
reason to expect any declaration of solidarity from his Majesty's
Government that would entail an unconditional engagement on their
part to support Russia and France by force of arms. Direct British
interests in Servia were nil, and a war on behalf of that country
would never be sanctioned by British public opinion.--(British
"White Paper" No. 6.)
The British Ambassador thereupon asked the question whether Russia was
thinking of eventually declaring war on Austria. The following was the
answer:
M. Sazonof said that he himself thought that Russian mobilization
would at any rate have to be carried out; but a council of
Ministers was being held this afternoon to consider the whole
question....
The dispatch continues:
French Ambassador and M. Sazonof both continue to press me for a
declaration of complete solidarity of his Majesty's Government with
French and Russian Governments.... (British "White Paper" No. 6.)
This shows plainly that the Russian mobilization must have been planned
even before July 24, for otherwise M. Sazonof could not have spoken of
the necessity of carrying it through.
It is furthermore very remarkable that the Russian Minister on this
early day spoke of the mobilization in general and not of the partial
mobilization against Austria-Hungary.
Finally we find that the British Government was fully informed at the
very latest on July 24--it may have had before it previous documents,
but they are not contained in the "White Paper"--concerning Russian
mobilization and thereby the development of Russian and French politics
that had to be anticipated.
Russian Aggression.
Had there been any doubts concerning these matters on the part of the
British Government, the continual urging of Russian and French
diplomatists must have made things plain. Russia's aggressive
policy, and not the Austrian declaration of war on Servia, which did not
come until five days later, led to the European war. Servia meant so
little to England, although England traditionally poses as a protector
of small nations, that the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg was able
to describe England's interest in the kingdom on the Save as "nil." Only
later, after the beginning of the war, England warmed up to Servia, and
in the aforementioned speech Mr. Lloyd George found the most hearty
tones in speaking of the heroic fight of this "little nation," although
he was obliged to admit simultaneously that its' history is not
untainted.
On the day following that conversation, on July 25, the British
Ambassador had another talk with M. Sasonof, during the course of which
he felt obliged to express to the Russian Government a serious warning
concerning its mobilization.
On my expressing the earnest hope that Russia would not precipitate
war by mobilizing until you had had time to use your influence in
favor of peace his Excellency assured me that Russia had no
aggressive intentions and she would take no action until it was
forced on her. Austria's action was in reality directed against
Russia. She aimed at overthrowing the present status quo in the
Balkans and establishing her own hegemony there. He did not believe
that Germany really wanted war, but her attitude was decided by
ours. If we took our stand firmly with France and Russia there
would be no war. If we failed them now rivers of blood would flow
and we would in the end be dragged into war....
I said all I could to impress prudence on the Minister for Foreign
Affairs and warned him that if Russia mobilized Germany would not
be content with mere mobilization or give Russia time to carry out
hers, but would probably declare war at once! His Excellency
replied that Russia could not allow Austria to crush Servia and
become the predominant power in the Balkans, and, if she feels
secure of the support of France, she will face all the risks of
war. He assured me once more that he did not wish to precipitate a
conflict, but that unless Germany could restrain Austria I could
regard the situation as desperate.--(British "White Paper" No. 17.)
A more convincing contradiction of the claim that Germany fell upon
unexpectant Russia can hardly be imagined. Sazonof's conversation with
the British Ambassador shows that Russia had decided from the beginning
to bring about the war, unless Austria would subject itself to Russia's
dictation.
Now, Russia was not alone concerned about Servia, but from its viewpoint
Austria-Hungary must not maintain the preponderant position in the
Balkans.
Sure of French help, Russia was determined to work against this. The
reports of the British representative do not suggest with a word that
Germany was responsible for the war; on the contrary, Sir Buchanan
again, on his own account, warned the Russian Government to keep aloof
from military measures, in his conversation with M. Sazonof on July 27,
although the "White Paper" does not show that he had received any
instructions by Sir Edward Grey.
His Excellency must not, if our efforts were to be successful, do
anything to precipitate a conflict. In these circumstances I
trusted that the Russian Government would defer the mobilization
ukase for as long as possible, and that troops would not be allowed
to cross the frontier even when it was issued.--(British "White
Paper," No, 44.)
Just as its own Ambassador in Petersburg pointed out to the British
Government the dangers of Russian mobilization, England did not lack
German warnings. On July 28 the British Ambassador in Berlin, Sir E.
Goschen, reported as follows by wire concerning a conversation with the
Imperial Chancellor:
... but if the news were true which he had just read in the papers,
that Russia had mobilized fourteen army corps in the South, he
thought the situation was very serious, and he himself would be in
a very difficult position, as in these circumstances it would be
out of his power to continue to preach moderation at Vienna. He
added that Austria, who as yet was only partially mobilizing, would
have to take similar measures, and if war were to result Russia
would be entirely responsible.--(British "White Paper" No. 71.)
In a telegram of Mr. Goschen's of July 30, reporting a conversation with
the Secretary of State, von Jagow, it is stated:
He begged me to impress on you difficulty of Germany's
position in view of Russian mobilization and military measures
which he hears are being taken in France.--(British "White Paper"
No. 98.)
The British Government has added a few further publications to its
"White Paper." Among these is a report of the hitherto British
Ambassador in Vienna, Sir Maurice de Bunsen. The document is dated Sept.
1; that is, a full month after the outbreak of the war. The tendency of
this publication is not only to unburden Russia and England from all
blame and to put it upon German and Austro-Hungarian politics, but it
attempts to make Germany responsible for the war to greater extent than
Austria-Hungary in trying to sow dissension between the two allies.
Ambassador de Bunsen represents matters as if Germany, through its
ultimatum to Russia on July 31, had roughly interrupted negotiations
promising success then going on between Vienna and Petersburg. In this
report it is stated:
(Retranslated.) M. Schebeko [the Russian Ambassador at Vienna] on
July 28th attempted to induce the Austrian Government to authorize
Count Scapary to continue negotiations which he had been carrying
on with M. Sazonof and which appeared very promising. Count
Berchtold on this day declined, but two days later, July 30th,
although Russia then had already started partial mobilization
against Austria, he received M. Schebeko again in the most
courteous manner and gave his consent to continuation of the pour
parleurs.... On Aug. 1st M. Schebeko informed me that Austria was
ready to submit to mediation those parts of its note to Servia
which appeared to be irreconcilable to the independence of
Servia.... Unfortunately these pour parleurs in St. Petersburg and
Vienna were suddenly broken off by the quarrel being removed to the
more dangerous territory of a direct conflict between Germany and
Russia. Germany on July 31 stepped between the two with its double
ultimatum addressed to St. Petersburg and Paris.... A delay of a
few days in all probability would have spared Europe one of the
greatest wars in history.
On the other hand, be it remembered that the fact that any negotiations
between Austria and Russia were carried on up to the last hour was
solely the result of the uninterrupted German efforts to maintain
peace, which fact Sir Maurice de Bunsen very wisely buries in silence.
These negotiations, by the way, hardly were as promising of success as
is made to appear. The Austrian version of it is found in the Vienna
Fremdenblatt of Sept. 25, 1914. There the most important spots of
Bunsen's report, that Austria-Hungary had been ready to moderate several
points of its note to Servia, are mentioned, as follows:
As we are told by a well-informed source, these assertions do not
at all correspond to the facts; furthermore, from the very nature
of the steps undertaken by the dual monarchy in Belgrade, this
would have been entirely inconceivable.
A glance at the date shows that the Bunsen report is misleading, for he
himself tells that Count Berchtold, on July 30, had expressed his
consent to a continuation of the exchange of thought in Petersburg; the
latter, therefore, could not begin before the 31st, while in the night
from July 30 to 31 the mobilization of the entire Russian Army against
Germany was ordered in Petersburg, finally making impossible the
continuation of the last German attempt at mediation in Vienna.
The truth is, in spite of Russian and English twistings, that without
the interval caused by Germany's efforts in Vienna, which interval
England allowed to pass unused in Petersburg, the war would have broken
out a few days sooner.
Let us consider how the fact of the Russian mobilization, the dimensions
and tendency of which was brought to the knowledge of the London Cabinet
at the very latest on July 24, must affect Germany.
On July 24 the Russian Government declared, in an official communiqué,
it would be impossible for it to remain indifferent in an Austro-Servian
conflict.
Germany's Hand Forced.
This declaration was followed immediately by military measures which
represented the beginning of Russian mobilization long planned. But even
on July 27 the Russian Minister of War, Suchomlinof, assured
the German Military Attaché upon word of honor (Annex 11 of the German
"White Paper") that no order for mobilization had been given and no
reservists had been drawn and no horse had been commandeered.
Although in this conversation there had been left no doubt to the
Russian Minister of War concerning the fact that measures of
mobilization against Austria must be considered by Germany also as very
threatening toward itself, during the next days news of the Russian
mobilization arrived in quick succession.
On the 29th mobilization of Southern and Southwestern Russia was
ordered, which was extended on the 30th to twenty-three provinces.
On the night of the 30th to the 31st, while the efforts of the Kaiser to
maintain peace were continuing and were receiving friendly attention in
Vienna, in St. Petersburg the mobilization of the entire Russian Army
was ordered. Even as late as 2 P.M. on the 31st, however, (German "White
Paper," Page 18, of NEW YORK TIMES reprint,) the Czar telegraphed the
Kaiser that the military measures now being taken were meant for
defensive purposes against Austria's preparations, and he gave his
pledge as far away from desiring war.
In the face of such evident duplicity of Russian politics, a further
delay such as was desired by Sir Maurice de Bunsen would have been for
every German statesman a crime against the security of his own country.
On the other hand, upon what German measures did the Russian Government
base its order for mobilization? The British "White Paper" proves how
frivolously steps leading to the most serious results were ordered in
St. Petersburg. On July 30 Sir George Buchanan telegraphed:
M. Sazonof told us that absolute proof was in possession of the
Russian Government that Germany was making military and naval
preparations against Russia, more particularly in the direction of
the Gulf of Finland,--(British "White Paper" No. 97.)
Proofs Lacking.
On the other hand, Buchanan's telegram of July 31 (British "White
Paper" No. 113) states:
Russia has also reason to believe that Germany is making active
military preparations, and she cannot afford to let her get a
start.--(British "White Paper" No. 113.)
So, from one day to the next the "absolute proof" changed to a reason
for the assumption. In reality, both were assertions that lack all
proof.
The finishing part of a telegram sent by the British Ambassador in
Berlin to Sir Edward Grey on July 31 deserves special mention:
He [the German Secretary of State] again assured me that both the
Emperor William, at the request of the Emperor of Russia and the
German Foreign Office, had even up till last night been urging
Austria to show willingness to continue discussion--and telephonic
communications from Vienna had been of a promising nature--but
Russia's mobilization had spoiled everything.--(British "White
Paper" No. 121.)
Therefore, the German Chancellor, in his memorandum placed before the
Reichstag, stated with full justification:
The Russian Government has smashed the laborious attempts at
mediation on the part of the European State Chancelleries, on the
eve of success, by the mobilization, endangering the safety of the
empire. The measures for a mobilization, about whose seriousness
the Russian Government was fully acquainted from the beginning, in
connection with their constant denial, show clearly that Russia
wanted war.
To this is to be added that the English Government also was made
fully cognizant of the intentions of the Russian mobilization, by a
witness that could not be suspected, namely, its own representative
in St. Petersburg, and therefore must bear full responsibility.
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