consideration of the important question, What is the true sense of the
proposition that the rational soul is the form of the human body? This
proposition, maintained by Aristotle and received by sound scholastic
philosophy, has been defined as Catholic doctrine by the Council of
Vienne and by Pius IX. Father Ramière refers to Father Palmieri, S.J.,
the author of a recent philosophical text-book of high repute, who
“proves that the Council of Vienne by no means intended to condemn a
doctrine maintained at that time and since by perfectly orthodox
theologians. The error proscribed by the council is that which ascribes
to the human body another vital principle besides the rational soul.”
The Catholic doctrine is that the soul is _forma corporis_, in the
sense that it is the life-giving principle of the composite, corporeal,
organic structure which constitutes the human body in its physical
though incomplete nature, as one compart of the total human composite,
or complete human nature. Father Palmieri calls the bodily part a
complete substance but an incomplete nature, as likewise the spiritual
part, which is the soul. Father Ramière adheres to the common
terminology which denominates each part an incomplete substance. As
considered in distinction from the soul, it lacks its due complement,
the vital principle which makes it a living body and sentient. The soul
also, as distinct from the body, lacks the complement of its inferior
vital force, which is an eminent kind of sensitive and vegetative
principle contained in the same subject to which the attribute of
rationality belongs, and giving to the subject—that is, to the soul—an
exigency for a body as its essential compart. The soul and body
complete each other in the human essence or nature. The body is passive
and inert in respect to every vital force and function, without the
soul. The soul remains in a merely potential state in respect to its
inferior faculties, when separate from the body. In the composite
essence, the human nature composed of soul and body, the body stands in
the relation of _materia_ to the soul, the soul in the relation of
_forma_ to the body. Thus is constituted the human, rational
_suppositum_ or _persona_, and the specific essence and unity of the
human being, of man, according to his logical definition as _animal
rationale_. We will let Father Ramière speak for himself, and explain
at length in his own language what his own view is on this important
topic:
“Between spiritual substance and body there is a complete
opposition, and it is consequently absurd to suppose that a
body can borrow from a spirit that by which it becomes body.
Since the substantial form of a being is that which makes it
formally to exist as such, the soul cannot be the substantial
form by which a body exists as body, unless it is itself
corporeal. It is the same with all forms essentially material,
and consequently with all those which belong to the essence of
the elementary substances. These forces, not being in the soul,
cannot be destroyed when the elements pass into the body;[82]
yet they no longer exist in their former state of independence.
They are seized upon and controlled by the superior force of
the soul, elevated in a certain sort above their natural
condition, and employed as instruments of the vivification of
the matter of the body. Heretofore these elements formed so
many independent unities; henceforth they become fractions of a
whole to which the soul must give the specific determination.
Their entire force continues to subsist; their being is not
destroyed; but, under the domination of a new form, it acquires
a new formal existence. It is thus that the soul is the
principle of the substantial unity of man. It does not destroy
the variety of the elements, but it unites them; it does not
suppress completely their mutual opposition, but tempers it so
far as to establish a condition of harmony. There is really but
one substantial form in man—the reasonable soul, because this
soul alone gives to the entire totality of the human being its
substantial determination; it alone reduces the diversity of
elements to unity. It confers upon the body, by its union with
the same, something which is not a mere accident but a new
being, the being of humanity, which raises it above all purely
corporeal beings, and constitutes it within the generic class
of rational substances.
“The modern theory, understood in this sense, is in perfect
agreement as to its substance with the peripatetic doctrine,
and safe from all the dangerous tendencies imputed to it. There
is no just cause for repeating any longer the accusation
heretofore made against this theory that it suppresses the
substantial unity of bodies, since, as we have shown, so far
from destroying this unity it presents it as it subsists in
various grades, proportioned to the relative degrees of
perfection in substances, much better than the other systems.
There is even less foundation for the pretext that the theory
in question is in opposition to the definitions of the church
regarding the union of soul and body in man. What, in fact, do
these definitions affirm? That the soul is the true form of the
human body, which it informs and vivifies, not accidentally or
mediately, but immediately and essentially. Now, all this is
perfectly verified in our theory, which supposes that the body
receives its life, its specific nature, its existence as human
body, without any interposing medium, from the soul. Moreover,
its union with the soul, so far from being regarded as
accidental, is shown to be, on the contrary, substantial, in
whatever aspect it is considered, whether on the side of the
soul or on the side of the body: on the side of the soul, which
without this union would be unable to exercise several
faculties proceeding from its essence; on the side of the body,
which receives from this union the substantial complement of
its elements. When, therefore, we examine closely that argument
which is the strongest, if not the only, one sustaining the
contrary theory,[83] we perceive that it resolves itself into a
mere equivocation. The partisans of this theory, who sometimes
reproach their adversaries with equivocating in respect to the
words ‘substantial and accidental,’ do not perceive that they
themselves commit this fault. They confound that which is
indispensable to a being that it may exist, with that which is
indispensable to it that it may possess the integrity of its
nature. Union with the body is not essential to the soul in the
former sense, as all acknowledge, but it is certainly not
allowable to conclude from this that it is purely accidental to
it. We may very justly call substantial, and even essential,
all that which is exacted by the nature of anything. Now, union
with the body is certainly exacted by the nature of the soul,
which differs mainly from pure spirits by this exigency.
Nothing could be more contrary to the principles of scholastic
philosophy than to regard that property pertaining to the soul
which adapts it to be the form of the body as a simple
accident; but if this is an essential property, union with the
body cannot be considered as purely accidental, even admitting
that the body is composed of elements endowed with their proper
forms. Let us apply the same reasoning to the elements, which
are themselves made in order to unite themselves with other
elements, as the soul is made in order to unite itself with the
body; and by this simple distinction of the two senses of the
word _substantial_ we shall eliminate the doctrinal
misunderstanding which makes a division between us.
“How, then, could it happen that this division has been so long
continued? It is because the distrust of the defenders of
traditional philosophy has been provoked by the presentation of
the theory at the present day generally adopted by scientists,
as an innovation. This distrust will have no longer any object,
and harmony cannot fail to be re-established, from the moment
when it shall be recognized that the modern experimental
science is in perfect harmony with the principles laid down by
Aristotle and accepted by St. Thomas.”
The professor of physics who prepared the _Exposé_ given in Father
Ramière’s appendix presents very distinctly and strongly what is the
common sentiment, especially of those who are devoted to the study of
physical science, in our modern Catholic schools:
“The peripatetic system on the composition of bodies is
rejected by the greater number of Catholic philosophers,
because this system, considered metaphysically, sustains itself
solely on _equivocations and the begging of questions_ (Card.
Tolomei), and _has no demonstrative_ _force_ (P. Zigliara);
considered psychologically, it gives a handle to materialism;
considered in the aspect of the chemical sciences, it is in
evident contradiction to their experimental facts; considered
historically, it has been, so far as its psychological part is
concerned, always combated by the school of Alexander de Halès,
St. Bonaventure, Scotus, and the Franciscans; was condemned in
the thirteenth century by all the doctors of the English
universities, together with a majority of those of the
Sorbonne; and in the eighteenth century was commonly repudiated
by all the schools, with the exception of the most rigid
Thomists.”
There is certainly no chance whatever that this theory will ever regain
any considerable sway from the mere weight of authority which belongs
to it from the traditions of the past. As Father Ramière justly
remarks:
“We must not forget that the present discussion appertains to
the purely scientific order, and must consequently be
definitively decided _not by authority but by reason_. So long
as the rational arguments which overturn the theory contrary to
our own have not been refuted, nothing will be gained by the
effort to prove from a literal interpretation of some texts
that this theory belongs to St. Thomas. The only interpretation
admissible in this case is the rational interpretation, which
clears up obscure texts by the perfectly clear principles which
the holy doctor loudly proclaimed. It is thus that we explain
many difficult passages in the works of the eagle of Hippo; and
those who act otherwise, far from proving in this way their
respect for him, really inflict an outrage on his memory by
putting him in opposition to himself and to the truth. Let us
not do a similar wrong to St. Thomas. As he was always
attentive to correct himself even to the end of his short
career, we can be sure that, if his mortal existence had been
prolonged to our day, he would not have failed to clear up that
which remained in obscurity in his writings, and to complete,
by the aid of new discoveries in science, what was necessarily
incomplete in his theories. Let us act in the same manner, and
not fear to show ourselves more faithful to the spirit of the
doctrine of St. Thomas than to the letter of a certain number
of texts found in his writings.”
Father Ramière could not have expected to put an end to the controversy
by his short essay, and, in fact, the only immediate result of Dr.
Frédault’s larger work and his own briefer piece of argument has been
to call forth rejoinders from the _Scienza Italiana_ and the _Civiltà
Cattolica_. Some of the advocates of the peripatetic theory are
unquestionably as well versed in the physical sciences as their
opponents. Their studies in chemistry and other branches of science
have made them dissatisfied with the prevalent modern theories on the
constitution of bodies, and they have for this very reason sought for a
more philosophical doctrine in the ancient metaphysics. It is not to be
supposed that they will yield to anything short of cogent reasoning, or
that any agreement in unity of doctrine can be produced, unless some
really solid, satisfactory, and conclusive theory is presented with
such convincing proof and evidence that it must command general assent.
Until this is done there is no choice except to continue the
discussion. If it is interminable, then all sides must agree to differ,
and in such a case it is quite natural to fall back on the authority of
great men who are supposed to have been gifted with extraordinary
perspicacity of intellect, and to have seen into things more clearly
and deeply than modern men are able to do, perhaps by the aid of
supernatural light. If the constitution of bodies is an impenetrable
mystery, we must be content to remain in our ignorance, and accept
whatever formulas of metaphysical or physical statement seem to us the
best expression of the vague and confused notions we possess. We are
not quite prepared to accept this situation as inevitable, and it is
certain that not only on the European continent, but in England and
America also, the reviving interest in metaphysical studies and the
necessity of combating materialism will stimulate an effort toward a
more perfect evolution of the truth contained in the ancient philosophy
by the help of mathematical and experimental science. It may be asked
what metaphysics and theology have to do with these matters, which seem
to belong to the domain of physics. We reply to this question in the
words of Father Ramière:
“The question what is in general the nature of material beings,
and what is in particular the nature of man as appertaining by
his corporeal part to the material world, does not belong, at
least exclusively, to physics; it is also within the domain of
philosophy and theology. The special object of physics is the
study of the sensible properties of bodies, the observation of
the phenomena by which the different forces with which they are
endowed manifest themselves, and the determination of the laws
which regulate the exercise of these forces. The investigation
of the essential properties which enter into the very idea of
body and distinguish it from spiritual being belongs to
metaphysics. And since, in man, the body, united with the
spirit, participates in its destiny; since, in Jesus Christ,
the corporeal world has been associated to the divine dignity,
theology cannot give us a perfect knowledge of our destiny and
our deification by the divine Person who assumed humanity,
without availing itself of the aid which is furnished by an
exact notion of the nature of bodies.”
It seems to us that the real point of difficulty and of controversy
respecting the “nature of bodies” lies deeper than any of the questions
proposed by Father Ramière, and that the whole discussion must start
from this point in order to be thorough and decisive. It is no solution
at all of the question, What is the nature of corporeal being? to tell
us that bodies are material substances endowed with determinate forces,
or composites of such substances. The drop of water, mechanically
divided, gives us only minuter and minuter molecules of water. But
since, chemically divided, it gives oxygen and hydrogen in composition
with each other to form these minutest molecules, there must be in each
of these molecules others of such minute quantity as to elude
experiment, which are composed of still smaller distinct molecules of
oxygen and hydrogen. One of these molecules of oxygen, considered apart
from all other corporeal beings, must be itself constituted by smaller
molecules or of some more simple elements. We must come at last to
these simple elements, and ask the question, What constitutes the
entity and first actuality of these elements? Boscovich and Leibnitz,
two of the most original thinkers of modern times, both of them well
versed in mathematics as well as eminent in metaphysics, have presented
the theory of simple monads, which are dynamic centres radiating in
space upon each other the active forces which produce extension,
quality, motion, and every kind of material substance with all their
specific differences. Father Bayma, in his remarkable work _Molecular
Mechanics_, has presented the hypothesis that these simple elements are
each separately endowed with only one force—that is, either the
attractive or repulsive. The laws of molecular mechanics have been
exposed in this treatise with rigid and complicated mathematical
demonstrations. The metaphysical part of this hypothesis has been fully
developed, so far as its primary and essential principles are
concerned, in the pages of this magazine. The arguments by which this
hypothesis is sustained and the contrary ones overturned we have never
seen fairly and distinctly answered. Certain objections are made, such
as these: that a force is not a being in itself, but needs a substance
to support it; that dynamism takes away the reality of matter, that it
makes material substance like spiritual substance, that it gives no
basis for extension and continuous quantity, etc. We think there is
some misunderstanding of terms and concepts in the minds of those who
make these objections. We understand in this theory such terms as
“active force” to denote not an attribute or product without subject or
cause, but a principle from which force proceeds, which is also a
passive principle upon which active force terminates. It is a real
being, simple, unextended, not a body or a spirit, having position but
not quantity, marking by its existence a point in space, the first
element of the primary composite body or molecule, distinguishable in
respect to its matter and form, but not separable, any more than the
centre and circumference of a circle are separable. It is a substance,
standing _in se et per se_, in respect to existence, but expressly
created for entering into composition with similar entities, in order
to make bodies with the various attributes and accidents, active powers
and passive potencies, which experience shows them to possess. It is
not a spirit, because it has no capability of consciousness,
intelligence, or volition, but is simply determined by its grade of
being to act in space by means of motion. It is _ens mobile_, and the
beginning of physical quantity, as the point is the beginning of
abstract quantity in geometrical science. As to the difficulty of
conceiving how extension arises without a first material _continuum_ to
begin with, we think this objection is counteracted by the arguments
proving that such a _continuum_ is an absurdity and an impossibility.
The great desideratum in the question of matter is to find the
invariable and indestructible element, which remains, and will forever
remain, the same amid all transmutations of bodies, the ultimate
substance endowed with a perpetual existence _in se_, and competent
from its potency and active power to be the principle of every possible
combination and mode of being within the limits of the purely corporeal
essence. Such a principle seems to be furnished by the theory of
Boscovich and Leibnitz, as corrected and developed by Father Bayma. The
simple beings endowed with attractive or repulsive force proceeding
from a centre which marks a point in space, and having both a form and
a material principle which are naturally inseparable, are capable of
existing, each one alone by itself, and absolutely indestructible,
except by annihilation. Though utterly useless and inoperative, except
as existing in multitude and mutually acting on each other in their
chemical and mechanical combinations they furnish the substratum of
every kind of matter and form which can be predicated of corporeal
being as _ens mobile_. The primary molecules of the simple bodies
formed by the first combinations of simple elements are so firmly bound
together that no power of which man can avail himself suffices to
separate them, and we may suppose there is no power in nature which can
break up their unity. Nor is there any difficulty in supposing that God
can make bodies of any magnitude or composite perfection which are
likewise incorruptible, in accordance with the ancient conception of
_materia quinta_, or celestial, incorruptible bodies. The reasoning by
which this dynamic hypothesis is sustained and contrary theories
refuted seems to be extremely probable, and even, in certain parts,
demonstrative, from its premises and _data_. If these include all which
must be included, and nothing pertaining to the essence and integrity
of the matter of demonstration is left out, the hypothesis is
sufficient to account for all which must be accounted for, and by its
simplicity recommends itself to the mind as proposing enough, and no
more than enough, for a distinct notion of the nature of body and its
specific difference from soul and spirit. Just here, it seems to us,
comes in the need for more full explanation and evolution of the
theory, and a more minute discussion between its advocates and those
who advocate the theories of the rigid peripatetic system or the system
favored by Father Ramière. We would like to see a more complete proof
given that all which can be predicated of material substance, as such,
can be referred to its nature as _ens mobile_, and accounted for by the
two primitive forces of attraction and repulsion.
Especially when we consider the phenomena of organized, living bodies,
vegetable and animal, the most important questions arise, demanding
from each one of the different philosophical schools the answers which
they are able to furnish, and an exposition of the way in which they
seek to harmonize this particular portion of their respective systems
with the first principles of philosophy, of physics, and of theology.
The notions of potential matter and substantial form assume here a new
import and present difficulties of the first magnitude, the solution of
which in one way or another introduces most considerable modifications
into the metaphysics and the theology of each different party in the
controversy.
What is the principle of vegetable life and reproduction? If all the
facts and phenomena of vegetable life can be explained by the laws of
molecular mechanics and chemistry, the need for a distinct, simple
form, vital principle, or vegetable soul, is removed; otherwise the
hypothesis fails to meet the exigency of the case, and the reasoning of
the peripatetic philosophers remains, in this respect, unanswered.
The question of the animal soul stands by itself, and is more
important. Molecular mechanics and chemical combinations cannot produce
a sentient subject or account for the sensible cognition which animals
possess. There is certainly in the animal a distinct form giving to
animal nature a potency and a power not reducible to attraction and
repulsion between molecules, not a modification of mobility and motion.
The ingenious scholastic theory gives us a formula which answers very
well as a verbal statement of the difference between the irrational and
the rational soul, between the brute and man. According to this theory,
the animal soul is not a substance, is not capable of existing _in se_,
depends on the body and is destroyed by its death, is not immediately
created, but is educed, _ex nihilo sui_, from the potentiality of
matter by the physical agencies and laws of generation. What is
startling and puzzling about this theory is that it makes an organized,
material body exercise sensible cognition. The soul is a mere
substantial form, higher than the aqueous or igneous or cadaverous
form, but of the same genus. It is educed from the potentiality of
matter, and therefore matter is in potency to the sentient faculty, as
it is in potency to have quantity, figure, color, and weight. Second
causes suffice to evolve from its potency this new form of being in
which it can see, hear, feel, imagine and remember, simulate many of
the processes and actions of rational beings, enjoy and suffer,
recognize friends and enemies, invent stratagems, play tricks, exercise
courage, fidelity, fortitude, and constancy in affection, and show
forth all those remarkable phenomena which make the animal, in one
point of view, the greatest marvel of creation. If the animal soul is
not a distinct substance, immediately created and having existence _in
se_, the peripatetic theory, pure and simple, with all its
mysteriousness, is preferable to any other, and its failure to give
demonstration and satisfy the _ingenium curiosum_ of many searchers
into the secrets of nature is a necessary consequence of the
impenetrable mystery which shrouds the essence of material being.
If the animal soul is a substance, we must admit a grade of being
between the corporeal and the rational natures, an inferior kind of
spirit, similar to the human soul in respect to that which makes it fit
to be the animating principle of an organic body, destitute of
intelligence and incapable of activity independent of its bodily
organs, yet, as a substance in itself and a simple being, not
destructible by corruption. It is a maxim in philosophy that there is
no destruction of anything once created by annihilation. It continues
to exist, therefore, after the death of its bodily compart. If the
_anima belluina_ is imperishable, what becomes of it when the animal
dies? Even the human spirit, though capable by its intellectual
faculties of living a separate life, has an intrinsic exigency for a
body which it can animate; much more, then, the _anima belluina_, which
is a principle of animal life and activity, and nothing more. There is
nothing superfluous or useless in nature, yet this kind of soul,
continuing to exist without a body, is a useless thing. Moreover,
although the more perfect animals manifest qualities which can easily
be taken to indicate the presence of a vital principle which is a
distinct substance, what shall we say of those which can be divided
into sections, each of which continues to live; and of those which
approach so near to the line of demarcation between animal and
vegetable life that the difference between the two seems to reach a
vanishing-point, and they shade into each other by nearly imperceptible
gradations?