German forepost line appear on the scene. Till within a short time the
observatories had been able to report nothing but "thick fog;" but
reports from the right and left wings announced that a serious attack
was threatened on the whole front from St. Cloud to Bougival. The Vth
Corps was now alarmed, and General von Kirchbach betook himself to the
9th Division. On the German right, in the park of St. Cloud, stood the
17th Brigade; on the left, behind the Porte de Longboyau, the 20th; the
other troops of the Corps marched from their quarters in Versailles and
the villages to its north, to Jardy and Beauregard. The Crown Prince
ordered six battalions of the Guard Landwehr and a Bavarian Brigade to
Versailles, and himself rode to the Hospice of Brezin; the King went to
Marly.
The French meanwhile had seized the foremost houses of Garches, and made
their eastward way here and there through the breaches in the wall into
the park of the Chateau of Buzanval. The 5th Jaeger Battalion, supported
by single companies of the 58th and 59th Regiments, hurried forward and
drove the enemy back out of Garches, occupied the cemetery on its north,
and still reached the advanced post of La Bergerie just at the right
time. The other bodies under General von Bothmer (commanding 17th
Brigade, 9th Division, Vth Corps), by order from the commanding General,
maintained a stationary fight on the skirts of the park of St. Cloud, to
gain time. About half-past nine they repulsed an attack by Bellemare's
column, arrested the advance of the enemy along the Rue Imperiale of St.
Cloud, and themselves took the offensive from the Grille d'Orleans and
the Porte Jaune. Five French battalions unsuccessfully assaulted La
Bergerie. A section of Engineers tried with great devotion to demolish
the wall surrounding the court, but the frozen dynamite did not explode,
and the Jaegers held the position steadfastly throughout the day.
The attacks of the French had hitherto been undertaken without
assistance from their artillery. The batteries of General Vinoy's
advance had been seriously delayed by crossing with the centre column,
and were now detained at Briqueterie to meet the contingency of a
repulse. General Bellemare's batteries tried to get up the slope of the
height of Garches, but the exhaustion of the teams made it necessary to
take up a position at Fouilleuse. Meanwhile the batteries of the German
9th Division came up by degrees, and by noon thirty-six guns had opened
fire. In St. Cloud a hot street-fight was going on.
Only General Ducrot on the French right wing had opened the battle with
his strong force of artillery, which came into position on both sides of
Rueil. The tirailleurs then advanced and made their way through the park
of Buzanval to its western boundary-wall, but were driven back by the
50th Fusilier Regiment which had hastened forward.
At half-past ten the chief attack ensued at this point, supported by
part of the central column. It found only an under-officer's post at
Malmaison, but at the eastern exit from Bougival near La Jouchere and
Porte de Longboyau, it encountered the already reinforced line of posts
of the 20th Infantry Brigade. General von Schmidt (commanding 10th
Infantry Division) still held back at Beauregard the reserve of the 10th
Division. A murderous fire from the well-covered German infantry broke
the onset of the French, and converted it by mid-day into a stationary
fire fight, in which the German artillery also took part with great
effect. Two batteries of the 10th Division at St. Michel were reinforced
by two Guard batteries brought up from St. Germain to Louvenciennes; a
third came into action near Chatou and forced an armour-plated train
halted at the railway station north of Rueil to retire rapidly to
Nanterre. Four batteries of the IVth Corps finally opened fire from
Carrieres, heedless of the fire of Valerien, and shelled the dense
masses of hostile infantry halted in rear of Rueil.
At two o'clock the French decided on renewing the attack. When two of
their batteries had shelled Porte de Longboyau a brigade marched on that
point, and a second on the western wall of the park of the Chateau
Buzanval; a third followed in support. Not less bold than unsuccessful
was the attempt of a section of Engineers, one officer and ten men, to
blow up part of the wall; they all fell together. The attacking columns
had advanced to within 200 paces, when thirteen German companies at the
moment met them, broke and stopped their rush by pouring fire into them
at short range, and presently routed the hostile columns in disorder, in
spite of the devoted exertions of the officers.
The French, however, still found a strong protection in the park-wall,
which had been prepared for defence with great skill and with the utmost
rapidity; and the advance of several companies from Brezin and La
Bergerie on this wall was repulsed with heavy loss.
But the strength of the French attack was already broken. So early as
three o'clock a movement of retreat was observable in their left wing,
and as dusk fell the French centre began to withdraw from the heights of
Maison du Cure. When Colonel von Koethen pursued, with a small force,
several battalions indeed fronted, and even threatened a sharp
counter-attack; but timely support arrived from La Bergerie, Garches,
and Porte Jaune, and, backed by the fire of the batteries, the pursuit
was followed up. The King's Grenadiers drove back the enemy to the
vicinity of Fouilleuse.
The Germans, however, had not yet succeeded in repossessing themselves
of the Montretout redoubt. The chief hindrance arose from their having
been unable to advance through the town of St. Cloud. As, however, the
possession of this position was indispensable for the protection of the
right wing, General von Kirchbach gave orders that it was to be retaken
either that evening or early next morning.
General von Sandrart (commanding 9th Infantry Division) decided on
immediate action, and at eight that evening five battalions went forward
on this duty. Only a few French were found in the redoubt and were
taken prisoners; but in the town the struggle was severe. Finally the
Germans had to restrict themselves to blockading the houses held
temporarily by the enemy. The French also clung to the outer park-wall
of Buzanval throughout the night. The Guard Landwehr and the Bavarian
Brigade were therefore assigned quarters in Versailles, to form a strong
reserve at hand in case of need on the following day. The remainder of
the troops withdrew into their former quarters.
At half-past five General Trochu had issued the order for a retreat. He
perceived that the prolongation of the struggle could afford no success,
especially as the National Guards were becoming insubordinate. The brave
defenders of St. Cloud were forgotten in these directions. They did not
surrender till the day after, when artillery was brought against the
houses they occupied. And the park-wall was not relinquished till the
following morning.
The French attack of January 19th was wrecked even before it had reached
the main position of the defenders. The reserves in readiness on the
German side had not needed to be brought into action. The Vth Corps
alone had driven back an enemy of four times its own strength. It lost
40 officers and 570 men; the loss of the French in killed and wounded
was 145 officers and 3423 men, besides 44 officers and 458 men taken
prisoners.
When the fog lifted at about eleven o'clock on the morning of the 20th,
their long columns were seen retreating on Paris across the peninsula of
Gennevilliers.
PROSECUTION OF THE ARTILLERY ATTACK ON PARIS UP TO THE ARMISTICE.
After the repulse of this last struggle for release on the part of the
garrison, the extension of the artillery attack to the north front of
the defensive position was now determined on. The siege guns no longer
needed against the minor French fortresses and on the Marne had been
parked for this object at Villiers le Bel. The Army of the Meuse had
prepared abundant material for the construction of batteries, and had
collected a waggon park of above 600 vehicles. Twelve batteries had
already been built in the lines between Le Bourget and the Lake of
Enghien, the arming of which followed, for the most part, under cover of
night. On January 21st eighty-one heavy guns were ready for action, and
Colonel Bartsch opened fire at nine that morning on Forts La Briche,
Double Couronne, and de l'Est.
The forts, which opposed the attack with 143 heavy guns, replied
vigorously, and on the following day the thick weather prevented the
German batteries from resuming their fire till the afternoon. But the
ground in front was abandoned by the French, and the outposts of the
Guards and IVth Corps took possession of Villetaneuse and Temps Perdu.
During the nights the fire was directed on St. Denis, with every
endeavour to spare the Cathedral, and many conflagrations occurred. By
the 23rd the vigorous prosecution of the cannonade had materially
subdued the fire of the defence. La Briche was wholly silenced, and the
other forts only fired occasional salvos. During the night of the 25th
four batteries were advanced to within 1300 and 950 yards respectively
of the enemy's main works. The engineer attack also could now be
undertaken, and a series of new batteries was constructed, which,
however, were never used.
The effect of this bombardment of only six days' duration was decisive.
The forts had suffered extraordinarily. In contrast to those of the
south front they were destitute of the powerful backing of the enceinte,
and they lacked, too, bomb-proof shelter. The provisional bomb-proofs
were pierced by shells, the powder-magazines were in the greatest
danger, and the garrisons had nowhere any more cover. The inhabitants of
St. Denis fled to Paris in crowds, and the impaired immunity from storm
of the sorely battered works was an insuperable obstacle to a longer
maintenance of the defence. This northern attack cost the Germans one
officer and 25 men; the French stated their loss at 180.
The fire of the forts on the east front was kept under, and the
Wuertemberg Field Artillery sufficed to prevent the enemy from renewing
his foothold on the peninsula of St. Maur.
The south front meanwhile suffered more and more from the steady
bombardment. The enceinte and the sunken mortar batteries behind the
ceinture railway were still active, but in the forts the barracks were
reduced to ruins, partly battered in and partly burnt down, and the
garrisons had to take shelter in the emptied powder-magazines. The
covered ways could no longer be traversed safely, the parapets afforded
no protection. In Vanves the embrasures were filled up with sandbags; in
the southern curtain of Issy five blocks of casemates had been pierced
by shells penetrating the shielding walls. Even the detached gorge-walls
of Vanves and Montrouge were destroyed, forty guns were dismounted, and
seventy gun carriages wrecked.
The whole condition of France, political and military, and above all the
situation in Paris, was such as to cause the Government the gravest
anxiety.
Since the return of Monsieur Thiers from his diplomatic tour, it was
certain that no mediatory interposition by any foreign power could be
expected. The distress of the capital had become more and more severe.
Scarcity and high prices had long borne heavily on its population;
provisions were exhausted, and even the stores of the garrison had been
seriously encroached on. Fuel was lacking in the lasting cold, and
petroleum was an inefficient substitute for gas. When the long-deferred
bombardment of the south side of Paris was had recourse to, the people
took refuge in the cellars or fled to the remoter quarters of the city;
and when it was also begun on the northern side the inhabitants of St.
Denis crowded into the capital.
The great sortie of the 19th had proved a total failure, and no relief
was to be hoped for from outside since Gambetta had sent news of the
disaster at Le Mans. The Paris Army, of whose inactivity he complained,
was reduced to a third of its original strength by cold, sickness, and
desertion, and the heart taken out of it by repeated miscarriages. Its
horses had to be slaughtered to provide meat for the inhabitants, and
General Trochu declared any further offensive movements to be quite
hopeless; the means even of passive resistance were exhausted.
Hitherto the Government had been able to keep the populace in good
humour by highly-coloured reports, but now the disastrous state of
affairs could no longer be concealed. All its projects were now
denounced.
There was a large class of people in Paris who were but little affected
by the general distress. Numbers of civilians had been armed for the
defence of their country and were fed and well paid by the authorities,
without having too much to do in return. They were joined by all the
dubious social elements, which found their reckoning in the disorganized
situation. These had been quite satisfied with the condition which the
4th of September had created, and a little later they displayed
themselves in the hideous form of the Commune. Already some popular
gatherings had been dispersed only by force of arms, and even a part of
the National Guard were not free from mutinous tendencies. The
revolutionary clubs, too, supported by the press, clamoured for further
enterprises, even a sortie _en masse_ of all the inhabitants of Paris.
Thus the feeble Government, dependent as it was on popular favour alone,
was under pressure from the impossible demands of an ignorant mob on the
one hand, and, on the other, the inexorable force of actual facts.
There was absolutely no expedient possible but the capitulation of the
capital; every delay intensified the necessity, and enforced the
acceptance of harder terms. Unless all the railways were at once thrown
open for the transport of supplies from a very wide area, the horrors of
famine would inevitably fall on a population of more than two million
souls; and later it might not be practicable to cope with the emergency.
Yet no one dared utter the fatal word "capitulation," no one would
undertake the responsibility for the inevitable.
A great council of war was held on the 21st. In it all the elder
Generals pronounced any further offensive measures to be quite
impossible. It was proposed that a council of the younger officers
should also be held, but no decision was arrived at. As, however, some
one must be made answerable for every misfortune, General Trochu,
originally the most popular member of the Government, was dismissed from
his position as Governor, and the chief military command was entrusted
to General Vinoy. General Ducrot resigned his command.
All this did nothing to improve the situation, so on the 23rd, Monsieur
Jules Favre made his appearance at Versailles to negotiate in the first
instance for an armistice.
On the German side there was readiness to meet this request; but of
course some guarantee had to be forthcoming that the capital, after
having been reprovisioned, would not renew its resistance. The surrender
of the forts, inclusive of Mont Valerien and the town of St. Denis, as
well as the disarmament of the enceinte was demanded and acceded to.
Hostilities were to be suspended on the evening of the 26th, so far as
Paris was concerned, and all supplies to be freely given. A general
armistice of twenty-one days was then to come in force on the 31st of
January, exclusive, however, of the departments of Doubs, Jura, and Cote
d'Or, and the fortress of Belfort, where for the time operations were
still being carried on, in which both sides were hopeful of success.
This armistice gave the Government of National Defence the time
necessary for assembling a freely-elected National Assembly at Bordeaux,
which should decide whether the war should be continued, or on what
conditions peace should be concluded. The election of the deputies was
unimpeded and uninfluenced even in the parts of the country occupied by
the Germans.
The regular forces of the Paris garrison, troops of the line, marines,
and Gardes-Mobiles, had to lay down their arms at once; only 12,000 men
and the National Guard were allowed to retain them for the preservation
of order inside the city. The troops of the garrison were interned there
during the armistice; on its expiry they were to be regarded as
prisoners. As to their subsequent transfer to Germany, where every
available place was already overflowing with prisoners, the question was
postponed in expectation of a probable peace.
The forts were occupied on the 29th without opposition.
There were taken over from the Field Army of Paris 602 guns, 1,770,000
stand of arms, and above 1000 ammunition waggons; from the fortress 1362
heavy guns, 1680 gun-carriages, 860 limbers, 3,500,000 cartridges, 4000
hundred-weight of powder, 200,000 shells, and 100,000 bombs.
The blockade of Paris, which had lasted 132 days, was over, and the
greater part of the German forces which had so long stood fast under its
walls, was released to end the war in the open field.
THE OPERATIONS OF THE ARMY OF THE SOUTH UNDER GENERAL VON MANTEUFFEL.
The two Army Corps under General von Manteuffel consisted altogether of
fifty-six battalions, twenty squadrons, and 168 guns. When it arrived at
Chatillon sur Seine on January 12th, the IInd Corps was on the right,
and the VIIth on the left on an extension from Noyers Montigny of about
forty-five miles. One brigade, under General von Dannenberg, which had
already several times been in contact with portions of the French Army
of the Vosges, was pushed forward to Vilaines and was charged with the
duty of covering the right flank.
Several good roads led from the quarters specified in the direction of
Dijon; to Vesoul, on the contrary, there were only bad tracks deep in
snow over the southern slope of the wild plateau of Langres. The
Commander-in-Chief, nevertheless, chose this direction, that he might as
soon as possible afford General von Werder at least indirect assistance
by approaching in the rear of the enemy threatening his brother-officer.
The march had to pass midway between the towns of Dijon and Langres,
both points strongly occupied by the French. Wooded heights and deep
ravines separated the columns and precluded mutual support; each body
had to provide for its individual safety in every direction. The troops
had previously undergone severe fatigues, and badly as they needed rest
not one halt-day could be granted, nor could the evil plight of their
boots and the horses' shoes be in any way remedied. On January 14th the
march was begun in a thick fog and bitter cold, along roads frozen as
smooth as glass.
The maintenance of supplies required special attention, and at first the
8th Brigade had to be left behind to secure the all-important
railway-line Tonnerre--Nuits--Chatillon, until connections could be
established by way of Epinal.
On the very first day's march the advanced guard of the VIIth Corps had
a fight before Langres. A force from the garrison of 15,000 men was
driven in on the fortress with the loss of a flag, and a detachment had
to be left behind in observation of the place. Under cover of it the
VIIth Corps marched past the fortress next day, while the IInd advanced
to the Ignon Brook.
The weather changed during the night of the 15th. As a change from
fourteen degrees of frost there came storm and rain. The water lay on
the frozen roads, and it was with the greatest difficulty that the VIIth
Corps reached Prauthoy, and the IInd Moloy, closing in to the left.
On the 18th the left wing advanced South-East on Frettes and Champlitte,
the right assembled at Is sur Tille, and its advanced guard, after a
march of thirty-one miles, reached the bridges at Gray. On the flank and
rear of the Corps there had been some trivial fighting, but the cruel
march across the mountains had been accomplished, and the cultivated
valley of the Saone was reached.
General von Manteuffel had already received news of the satisfactory
course of the first day's fighting on the Lisaine. Later telegrams from
General von Werder reported that the French Army of the East would
probably be obliged to retire under difficulties, and the German
commander at once determined to cut off its retreat by advancing to the
Doubs below Besancon.
The defeated French army was still numerically greatly superior to the
German force. The troops had to be again called upon for severe
exertions. They were required once more to cross a thinly-populated
mountainous region, where it would be a matter of great difficulty to
procure food and the shelter needful during the bitter winter nights.
Strong hostile forces had to be left in the rear at Langres, Dijon, and
Auxonne, and that under very insufficient observation. However, in spite
of every obstacle the advance in this new direction was begun on the
19th.
The first difficulty would have been the crossing of the Saone, here
very deep and about sixty-six yards wide, and full of drifting ice, had
not the advanced guard of the IInd Corps found Gray abandoned by the
French and both the bridges uninjured; whereupon it occupied the town.
The head of the VIIth Corps crossed the river by the intact
railway-bridge at Savayeux, and by a pontoon bridge thrown across by the
pioneers higher up.
On the following day both Corps advanced in a southerly direction, the
VIIth to Gy, the IInd to Pesmes. Here the latter also now crossed the
Ognon after driving off by artillery fire a French detachment which
tried to oppose the construction of the bridges.
On the 21st, at half past two, the advanced guard of the IInd Corps
found Dole occupied by the enemy. General von Koblinski (commanding 5th
Infantry Brigade) attacked at once. In spite of a violent street-fight
in which the townspeople took part, the Grenadiers of the 2nd Regiment
made their way through the town and on the further side seized a train
of 230 waggons of provisions and military necessaries, intended for
Besancon and left standing in the railway-station.
While the Doubs was thus crossed by the IInd Corps at this point, so the
VIIth Corps opened itself a passage across the Ognon at Marmay and Pin.
General von Werder had been instructed to follow close on the heels of
the retreating enemy, and while the latter still maintained his position
on the front of the XIVth Corps, the 2nd Baden Brigade on the right wing
had advanced to Etobon, while Colonel von Willisen with his twelve
squadrons had moved out beyond Lure. On the left, Colonel von Zimmermann
with the East-Prussian Landwehr had driven the French out of Ste. Marie.
These detachments everywhere found cast-away arms and portions of
equipment, and hundreds willingly gave themselves up as prisoners.
During the next few days General von Werder effected a general
left-wheel to the south. The right wing held Villersexel, and it was the
left wing only that met the enemy in great masses at L'Isle sur le
Doubs, and afterwards at Clerval and Baume les Dames.
General Bourbaki had withdrawn from the Lisaine on the 18th. The XXIVth
Corps only was left on the left bank of the Doubs, with orders to defend
toward the north the defiles in the steep mountain-paths of the Lomont
range eastward of Clerval; all the other troops withdrew between the
Doubs and the Ognon, with the Division Cremer as rearguard. The Ognon
might have formed a natural protection for the right flank of the French
army, and orders had been given for the destruction of all the bridges
over it; but we have seen how little they had been obeyed.
On the 21st the XVth and XXth Corps arrived in the neighbourhood of
Baume les Dames, the XVIIIth at Marchaux; and here, having the
stronghold of Besancon close at his back, General Bourbaki desired to
await for the present the further movements of the enemy. In order that
his forces should still muster in full strength, the commandant of
Besancon was instructed to send forward to Blamont all the battalions of
Mobiles-Guards he could spare so as to relieve the XXIVth Corps. Nine
battalions of mobilized National Guards had actually previously reached
Besancon, which might have been substituted as desired, but they came
armed with Enfield rifles, for which there was no ammunition in the
fortress. Thus they would there only have added to the mouths to be
filled, and General Rolland had simply sent them back again. The
Intendant-General declared it impossible any longer to bring up the
supplies ordered by him for the maintenance of the army; but what proved
decisive was the news received this day that not only was the line of
the Ognon lost, but that the Germans had already crossed the Doubs.
Under these circumstances the French Commander-in-Chief determined to
continue his retreat on Besancon and there cross to the southern bank of
the Doubs, so as not to be compelled to give battle with the river in
his rear. The trains were sent off during the night, but above all
things the XVth Corps was ordered at once to occupy Quingey with a whole
division, and defend that position to extremity, in order to keep open
the communications of the Corps with the interior. All the other Corps
were to concentrate round Besancon, even the XXIVth, which consequently
gave up the defence of the Lomont passes.
General Bourbaki reported his situation to the Minister of War, who held
out hopes of supporting him with the portion of the XVth Corps still
remaining on the Loire. Assistance could have been more quickly and
effectually given from Dijon.
The Government had assembled there a very considerable force to replace
the Division Cremer gone to join the Army of the East, for the defence
of the ancient capital of Burgundy and to constitute a point of support
to the operations of General Bourbaki. A Corps of 20,000 men was
assigned to the local defence; a very inappropriately-named Army of the
Vosges, more than 40,000 strong, was to do duty in the field. But this
was of little effect in hindering the toilsome advance of the Germans
over the mountains. The detachments in observation allowed themselves to
be driven in by General von Kettler (commanding 8th Infantry Brigade),
who followed the movement of both Corps on the right flank; and they
retired on Dijon. Colonel Bombonnel, stationed at Gray, urgently begged
for reinforcements to enable him to defend the passages of the Saone;
his applications were refused because Dijon was in too great peril, and
it was not till the Prussians had already crossed the river that
"General" Garibaldi began to move.
He set out on the 19th in three columns in the direction of Is sur
Tille, where there still remained only part of the (German) 4th Infantry
Division. But he advanced little more than four miles. Garibaldi
subsequently confined himself to watching reconnoitring parties which
advanced to meet him from the heights of Messigny, and he then retired
on Dijon with his troops marching to the strains of the Marseillaise.
Nevertheless, the enemy was held in too small estimation in General
Manteuffel's headquarter, when General von Kettler was simply ordered to
go and take Dijon.
The greatest care had been bestowed in strengthening the place. Numerous
earthworks, and other erections specially constructed for defence
protected it to the northward; more especially had Talant and Fontaine
les Dijon been transformed into two detached forts and armed with heavy
guns which commanded all the approaches on that side. The whole
constituted a position which could be held against a much larger force
than the five and a half battalions of the 8th Brigade with which
General Kettler advanced to the attack.
FIGHTING AT DIJON, JANUARY 21ST AND 22ND.--This force had reached Turcey
and St. Seine, and on the 21st advanced in two columns from the west on
Dijon, still distant some fourteen miles. Major von Conta from Is sur
Tille on the north was approaching with a small reinforcement. The
"Franctireurs de la Mort," the "Compagnie de la Revanche," and other
volunteer bands as well as Mobiles-Guards were without much difficulty
driven out of the villages on the way, and beyond the deep ravine of the
Suzon; the village of Plombieres on the right, which was defended with
spirit, was stormed, and Daix was carried on the left; but in front of
the fortified position of the French, and within reach of the fire of
their heavy batteries, the bold advance was forced to come to a stand.
Major von Conta had also pushed on with continuous fighting, but failed
to effect a junction with the brigade before dark. General von Kettler,
recognizing the overwhelming superiority of the French, finally
restricted himself to repulsing their sorties.
The French lost seven officers and 430 men in prisoners alone; but the
fighting also cost the brigade nineteen officers and 322 men. The troops
had performed a severe march in bad weather along heavy roads, and had
not been able to cook either before or after the fight; the ammunition
could only be replenished from a convoy which was expected next day.
Nevertheless General von Kettler did not hesitate to remain for the
night in the positions he had gained immediately in front of the enemy,
and then to seek shelter-quarters in the nearest villages.
The French allowed him to do so without any serious opposition.
Inactivity so utter caused General von Kettler the suspicion that the
main body of the enemy had probably withdrawn by Auxonne to the support
of the Army of the East, and he determined to bring it back on Dijon by
a renewed attack.
On the 23rd at eleven o'clock, by a flank march along the enemy's front,
after his advanced guard had routed a detachment of Gardes-Mobiles, he
reached the farm of Valmy on the Langres road, and advanced with his two
batteries against the walled and strongly-held village of Pouilly.
Here, as was almost always the case when engaged in the defence of
buildings, the French made a stout resistance. The 61st Regiment had to
storm each house in turn, and it was not till the chateau was in flames
that the strong body of defenders who had taken refuge in the upper
floors, surrendered.
Beyond this place the enemy were found deployed in an entrenched
position between Talant, which had been converted into a fort, and a
large factory-building on the high-road. Here the advance was checked
till the remainder of the regiment came up from Valmy, and the defenders
at various points were driven back on the suburb.
It was evident that the French were still at Dijon in full force, and
the object of the undertaking had therefore been attained. But now
unfortunately a tragic episode occurred, for the storming of the factory
was absolutely insisted on--a great building, almost impregnable against
infantry unaided. When all the senior officers had been killed, a
first-lieutenant, whose horse had been shot and he himself wounded, took
the command of the 2nd battalion. No sooner had the 5th company, only
forty strong, advanced from the neighbouring quarry, than it came under
a hot fire from all sides. The leader was at once wounded, and the
sergeant who carried the colour fell dead after a few steps; so did the
second-lieutenant and the battalion adjutant, who had again raised the
standard. It was passed from hand to hand, carried first by the officers
then by the men; every bearer fell. The brave Pomeranians[81]
nevertheless rushed on the building, but there was no entrance anywhere
on that side, and at last the under-officer retreated on the quarry with
the remnant of the little band. Here, for the first time, the colour
was missed. Volunteers went out again in the darkness to search for it,
but only one man returned unwounded. It was not till afterwards that the
French found the banner, shot to ribbons, in a pool of blood under the
dead. This was the only German colour lost throughout the war, and only
thus was this one lost.
The enemy took prisoners eight officers and 150 men, and the brigade
sustained a fresh loss of sixteen officers and 362 men. It mustered at
Pouilly, and remained under arms till eight o'clock to meet possible
pursuit; only then were quarters taken in the neighbouring villages.
OPERATIONS OF THE ARMY OF THE SOUTH.--The commission to take Dijon could
not be executed; but the bold advance of this weak brigade cowed the
hostile army into inactivity, so that General von Manteuffel was able to
pursue his march unopposed.
He had given to both his corps as their objective the enemy's line of
retreat south of Besancon.
From this fortress there were but few roads to the south of France
available for troops, through the riven and rugged regions of the
western Jura. The most direct connection was by the road and railway to
Lons le Saulnier, on which Quingey and Byans were the most important
barriers. Further to the east, but by a wide detour, a road runs by
Ornans, Salins and Champagnole to St. Laurent and Morez. Several ways,
however, radiate from Besancon and converge in Pontarlier, by using the
passes peculiar to this range, called "Cluses," which pierce
transversely the mountain chains and afford the valleys
intercommunication. From Pontarlier one road only runs past Mouthe, and
along the Swiss frontier in awkward proximity thereto.
_January 22nd._--On this day the advanced guard of the 13th Division
marched from Audeux to St. Vit, and after breaking up the railway and
plundering a number of loaded waggons, down the riverside to Dampierre.
On the way four bridges over the Doubs were found uninjured and were
taken possession of. The advanced guard of the 14th Division moved from
Emagny to observe Besancon. The IInd Corps closed on Dole and pushed
reconnoitring parties across the river.
_January 23rd._--The concentric movement of all the bodies of the German
army was continued.
General Debschitz, approaching from the north, in passing Roches found
only the abandoned camping ground of the French XXIVth Corps. The 4th
Reserve Division occupied L'Isle without opposition, and met no
resistance till it reached Clerval and Baume.
On the Ognon the Baden Division drove the French out of Montbozon.
In the centre of the army the VIIth Corps pushed the advanced guard of
the 14th Division forward on Dannemarie, near Besancon. A fight ensued
there in the form only of a cannonade which lasted till night. The 13th
Division, again, which had crossed the Doubs at Dampierre, advanced on
Quingey.
For want of rolling stock it had been possible to forward only one
French brigade by railway, and the last trains were received at the
Byans station with Prussian shells. These troops were in so bad case
that they were unable even to place outposts. They abandoned Quingey
almost without a struggle, and their hurried retreat on Besancon and
beyond the Loue, stopped the advance of reinforcements already on the
way. Thus 800 prisoners and a train of 400 convalescents fell into the
hands of the Prussian advanced guard, who at once broke up the railway
at Abbans-dessous.
On the right wing, the head of the IInd Corps advanced by the valley of
the Loue on the southern bank. Several cuttings on this road had been
prepared for defence, but were found undefended. It was at Villers
Farlay that it first encountered a strong body of the enemy.
On the evening of this day, of the French forces the XXth Corps was on
the north and the XVIIIth on the west of Besancon, at the distance of
about four miles. Cavalry, artillery and the train were passing through
the town or encamped on the glacis of the fortress. The XXIVth Corps was
on the march thither, and the 2nd and 3rd Divisions of the XVth were in
possession of the southern bank of the Doubs about Baume and Larnod; but
the 1st Division had not succeeded in holding Quingey. Thus the most
direct and important line of communications of the French army was cut,
and its position, by this fresh mischance, seriously compromised.
Impracticable projects and counsels from Bordeaux poured in freely, but
did not mend matters; and on the 24th General Bourbaki summoned the
superior officers to a council of war.
_January 24th._--The Generals declared that they had scarcely more than
half their men under arms, and these were more inclined to fly than to
fight. General Pallu alone thought he might answer for the men of the
army reserve. The Intendant-General reported that, without trenching on
the magazines of the place, the supplies in hand would last for four
days at most. General Billot was in favour of attempting to fight a way
through to Auxonne, but he declined to take the command in chief which
was offered him. The exhaustion of the troops and their evidently
increasing insubordination gave little hope of the success of offensive
operations. So there was no alternative but to retire on Pontarlier, as
the Commander-in-Chief had proposed.
This recourse, even, was seriously threatened. To relieve himself from
pressure on the north, General Bourbaki ordered the XXIVth Corps to
advance once more and hold the Lomont passes. On the south the XVth was
to defend the deep mountain-ravine of the Loue, and General Cremer was
more especially to cover the retreat of the army on the right flank,
which was most seriously threatened. For this difficult task, in
addition to his own Division, a Division of the XXth Corps and the army
reserve as the most trustworthy troops were placed under his command.
The XVIIIth and the remainder of the XXth were to await marching-orders
at Besancon.
In the German Head-quarter, where of course the plans of the French
could not be known, various possibilities had to be reckoned with.
If the French remained at Besancon there would be no need to attack them
there; the place was not suited for the accommodation of a large army,
and its supplies could not long hold out. That they would again attempt
to advance northwards was scarcely likely; by doing so they would be
cutting loose from all their resources, and must encounter the larger
part of the XIVth German Corps on the Ognon.
An attempt to break through to Dijon seemed more possible. But this
would be opposed at St. Vit by the 13th Division, at Pesmes by Colonel
von Willisen's detachment, and finally by General von Kettler.
Thus a retreat on Pontarlier seemed the most likely course; and to
hinder their further march from that place would in the first instance
be the duty of the IInd Corps, while in the meantime the VIIth was
observing the enemy massed in Besancon, and opposing his sorties on both
sides of the river.
The Commander-in-Chief therefore confined himself to giving general
directions to his Generals, expressly authorizing them to act on their
own judgment in eventualities which could not be foreseen.
General von Werder was instructed to advance by Marnay, and to place the
14th Division in touch with the Baden Division and Von der Goltz's
Brigade, and then to distribute these bodies along the right bank of the
Doubs. The 4th Reserve Division restored the bridges at L'Isle and
Baume, and crossed over to the left bank. Colonel von Willisen was to
join the VIIth Corps to supply its lack of cavalry. The IInd Corps was
assembled behind Villers Farlay.
_January 25th._--Reconnaissances on a large scale were arranged for next
day. The reconnaissance of the VIIth Corps resulted in a sharp fight at
Vorges. The head of the IInd Corps met the enemy in front of Salins and
at Arbois, but found that the latter had not yet reached Poligny.
_January 26th._--The advanced guard of the IInd Corps advanced on
Salins. The fronts of the high-perched forts of St. Andre and Belin near
the town, looked toward Switzerland, but their fire commanded also on
flank and rear the plain to the south and west on the enemy's line of
march. Salins constituted a strong barrier on the road to St. Laurent,
and as long as it was held would cover the line of retreat of columns
marching from Besancon to Pontarlier.
The two field-batteries of the advanced guard could, of course, do
little against the heavy guns of the forts; but the Fusiliers of the 2nd
Regiment advanced in rushes of small detachments up the narrow ravine,
scaled its rugged faces, and, supported by the two Grenadier battalions,
forced their way, about half-past two, into the railway-station and
suburb of St. Pierre; but with the loss of 3 officers and 109 men.
Soon after General von Koblinski arrived by way of St. Thiebaud with the
42nd Regiment. As in consequence of the representations of the Mayor the
commandant refrained from bombarding the town, the advanced guard was
able to take up its quarters therein; the main body of the 3rd Division
retreated from under the fire of the forts on Mouchard, and the defile
remained closed again to further penetration. It was necessary to turn
it by the south.
In that direction the 4th Division had already marched to Arbois, its
head further forward up to Pont d'Hery; it found Poligny and Champagnole
on the right still unoccupied.
The VIIth Corps reconnoitred both banks of the Doubs, and found the
enemy in strong positions at Busy and at Vorges.
The 4th Reserve Division advanced along the southern bank as far as St.
Juan d'Adam, near Besancon; the remainder of the XIVth Corps marched on
Etuz and Marnay.
General von Kettler's report of the fighting on the 21st and 23rd
determined General von Manteuffel to make a renewed attempt on Dijon. He
detailed to this duty General Hann von Weyhern (commanding 4th Infantry
Division, IInd Corps), placing him in command of the 8th Brigade, with
Colonel von Willisen's troops and Degenfeld's Baden Brigade.
On the French side, General Bressoles had started on the 24th, in
obedience to orders, to take renewed possession of the passages of the
Doubs and the Lomont defiles. He had, in the first instance, turned
against Baume with d'Aries' Division; but as he did not succeed even in
driving the German outposts out of Pont les Moulins, he retired to
Vercel. In consequence of this, on the morning of the 26th, Carre's
Division, which had found the passes of the Lomont unoccupied, also
moved to Pierre Fontaine. Comagny's Division had already retreated to
Morteau, and was making its way unmolested to Pontarlier.
General Bourbaki was greatly disturbed by this failure of his right
wing; more perhaps than was needful, since, in fact, only one German
division stood north of him, which at most could drive his rearguard on
Pontarlier, while the main force of the enemy threatened him far more
seriously on the west. He nevertheless ordered a renewed advance, on the
26th, of the XXIVth Corps, which was now to be supported by the XVIIIth.
But the march through Besancon of the latter, through streets covered
with ice, took up the whole of the day which should have been devoted to
the attack, so that nothing came of the scheme.
The Army Reserve had reached Ornans, and stood there in readiness. The
two other Divisions advanced on the road to Salins, but heard while on
the march that the Germans had just carried that place. They then
occupied in Deservillers and Villeneuve d'Amont, the roads leading from
thence to Pontarlier.
The War Minister, meanwhile, had decisively refused permission for the
general retreat of the army, without any regard to the imperative
necessities of the case.
The military dilettanteism which fancied it could direct the movements
of the army from Bordeaux is characterized in a telegram of the
afternoon of the 25th. Monsieur de Freycinet gives it as his "firm
conviction"[82] that General Bourbaki, if he would concentrate his
troops, and, if necessary come to an understanding with Garibaldi, would
be strong enough to fight his way out, "either by Dole, or by Mouchard,
or by Gray, or by Pontailler" (north of Auxonne). The choice was left to
him.
Still more amazing was the further suggestion that if indeed the state
of the army prohibited a long march, it should be embarked on the
railway at Chagey, under the eye, no doubt, of the pursuing enemy.
Such communications could only avail to shatter the brave commander's
self-confidence. The disastrous reports which poured in from all sides,
and the state of the troops which he had seen for himself as the XVIIIth
Corps marched through the town, crushed his last hope and led him to
attempt his own life.
The Commander had of course to bear the blame of the total failure of a
campaign planned by Freycinet; his dismissal from the command was
already on its way. General Clinchant was appointed in his stead, and
under these disastrous circumstances took the command of the army.
All the Generals were, no doubt, extremely reluctant to bring their
weary and dispirited troops into serious contact with the enemy. Every
line of retreat was closely threatened, excepting only that on
Pontarlier. The new Commander-in-Chief had no choice but to carry out
the plans of his predecessor. He at once ordered the further march. He
himself proceeded to Pontarlier. In that strong position he hoped to be
able at least to give the troops a short rest. No large bodies of the
Germans had been met with so far, the ammunition columns had got safely
through, and if the defiles of Vaux, Les Planches, and St. Laurent could
be reached and held in advance of the enemy there was still a
possibility of escape to the southwards.
On the evening of the 27th, the Division Poullet was at Levier, nearest
to the Germans; the two other Divisions under General Cremer, with the
XVth and XXth Corps, were echeloned on the road from Ornans to
Sombacourt; the XVIIIth Corps alone was on the eastern road through
Nods. The XXIVth, in a miserable condition, had reached Montbenoit with
its head at Pontarlier; two Divisions were still in Besancon.
On this same day General von Fransecky collected the main body of the
IInd Corps at Arbois, and reinforced General du Trossel's posts at Pont
d'Hery.
The XIVth Corps relieved the 14th Division of the VIIth Corps at St.
Vit; the latter advanced to the right of the 13th Division into the Loue
angle, which the French had already abandoned.
On the north, General von Debschitz held Blamont and Pont du Roide,
while General von Schmeling watched Besancon from St. Juan, and General
von der Goltz marched on Arbois to form a reserve.
_January 28th._--Suspecting that the French were already on the march by
Champagnole on St. Laurent, General Fransecky, to cut off from them that
line of retreat, advanced on the following day in a southerly direction
with the IInd Corps.
General du Trossel reached Champagnole without opposition, and thence
sent his cavalry along the road to Pontarlier. Lieutenant-Colonel von
Guretzky arrived at Nozeroy with a squadron of the 11th Dragoons, and
found the place occupied; but he made prize of fifty-six
provision-waggons and the military-chest, taking the escort prisoners.
The 5th and 6th Brigades advanced on Poligny and Pont du Navoy.
The 13th Division of the VIIth Corps, having been relieved at Quingey by
the Baden troops, assembled at La Chapelle, while the 14th advanced on
Deservillers. Its head found no enemy in Bolandoz, although his
camp-fires were still smouldering; so that the main hostile army was not
overtaken on that day.
General Clinchant had in fact moved his Corps closer on Pontarlier. But
it soon became evident that supplies were not procurable for any long
stay there. General Cremer received orders that night to move forward at
once to Les Planches and St. Laurent with three cavalry regiments
standing already on the road to Mouthe. The mountain-roads were deep in
snow, but by forced marching he reached the points designated on the
following afternoon. The XXIVth Corps and a brigade of the Division
Poullett followed next day, and the latter also occupied with two
battalions the village of Bonneveaux at the entrance to the defiles of
Vaux. On the evening of the 28th the rest of the French army stood as
follows: the XVIIIth Corps was behind the Drugeon at Houtaud close
before Pontarlier; the 1st Division of the XVth had advanced over the
brook to Sombacourt, the 3rd Division was in the town. On the left the
2nd and 3rd Divisions of the XXth Corps held the villages from Chaffois
to Frasne, and on the right the army reserve occupied Byans.
General von Manteuffel had ordered for the 29th a general advance on
Pontarlier, where at last the French must certainly be found.
_January 29th._--Of the IInd Corps General Koblinsky had set out from
Poligny in the night. When he reached Champagnole and had assembled the
whole of the 5th Brigade he moved forward therefrom at about seven
o'clock. General du Trossel with the 7th Brigade also reached Censeau
without finding the enemy.
On the right Colonel von Wedell marched from Pont du Navoy on Les
Planches with four battalions of the 6th Brigade. He found only
dismounted troopers, posts probably left by General Cremer which were
easily dispersed by the Jaegers. Detachments were then sent out in
different directions, and everywhere met with scattered troops; but at
Foncine le Bas the head of the XXIVth Corps was found, and Colonel von
Wedell now blocked the last line of retreat which had remained to the
French.
With the rest of the IInd Corps General von Hartmann marched unopposed
on Nozeroy.
The 14th Division of the VIIth Corps had not received the order to
advance on Pontarlier till somewhat late; it did not start from
Deservillers until noon, and only reached Levier at three o'clock,
where, at the same hour, the head of the 13th Division also arrived from
Villeneuve d'Amont, the state of the roads having greatly delayed its
march.
The advanced guard of three battalions, half a squadron, and one
battery, had met only stragglers on the way, and General von Zastrow
commanded it to push forward to the Drugeon brook. In the forest on the
left of the road closed detachments of the enemy were retiring on
Sombacourt, and Major von Brederlow with the 1st battalion of the 77th
Regiment turned off to attack that village lying on the flank. The 2nd
company under Captain von Vietinghof dashed into it through Sept
Fontaines with loud cheers, and was at once closely surrounded by strong
bodies of the enemy; but the other companies soon came to its
assistance. The first Division of the XVth French Corps was here
completely routed without the Army Reserve close at hand in Byans
having come to its support. Fifty officers, including two generals, and
2700 men were taken prisoners; ten guns, seven mitrailleuses,
forty-eight waggons, 319 horses and 3500 stand of arms fell into the
hands of the Hanoverian battalion[83] which was left in occupation of
Sombacourt.
The rest of the advanced guard had meanwhile approached Chaffois, where
the road opens out from the mountains into the wide valley of the
Drugeon. That village, as we have seen, was occupied by the 2nd Division
of the XXth Corps.
Colonel von Cosel passed at once to the attack. Three companies of the
53rd Regiment surprised the French field-posts and took possession of
the first houses of the village, but then the whole mass of the French
XVIIIth Corps barred his further progress. By degrees all the available
forces had to join in the fighting, and also reinforcements had to be
brought up from the main body of the 14th Division. The fight lasted
with great obstinacy for an hour and a half, when suddenly the French
ceased firing and laid down their arms. They claimed that an armistice
had already been agreed on.
Monsieur Jules Favre had, in fact, telegraphed to Bordeaux at a
quarter-past eleven on the night of the 28th, that an armistice of
twenty-one days had been concluded, without adding, however, that, with
his consent, the three eastern departments had been excluded from its
operations. The information, in this imperfect form, was transmitted to
the civil authorities by the Delegation at 12.15 of the 29th; but
Monsieur Freycinet did not forward it to the military authorities, whom
the matter principally concerned, till 3.30 in the afternoon.
Thus could General Clinchant in all good faith transmit to General
Thornton, in command of the Divisions at Chaffois, a message which, as
regarded the Army of the East, was altogether incorrect. The latter at
once sent his staff officer to the Prussian advanced guard, which was
still in action, who demanded the cessation of the firing in recognition
of the official communication.
General von Manteuffel had received in Arbois at five in the morning,
full particulars from the supreme Head-quarter of the terms of the
armistice, according to which the army of the South was to prosecute its
operations to a final issue. An army order announcing this to all the
troops was at once sent out, but did not reach the VIIth Corps till
evening.
Nothing was known there of any armistice; however, the tidings might be
on the way, and General von Zastrow granted the temporary cessation of
hostilities, and even sanctioned the release of his prisoners, but
without their arms.
Chaffois, with the exception of a couple of farmsteads, remained in
possession of the 14th Division, which found such quarters there as
might be; the 13th occupied the villages from Sept Fontaines back to
Deservillers.
_January 30th._--In full confidence in the news from the seat of
Government, General Clinchant, on the 30th, suspended the movements of
his army. The newly-appointed Commander of the XXIVth Corps, General
Comagny, also gave up his intended attempt to cut his way with 10,000
men at Foncine through Colonel von Wedell's weak brigade. The other
Corps, after the unfortunate course of the fighting on the previous
evening, had drawn in close on Pontarlier; but detachments of cavalry
were sent out on the roads to Besancon and St. Laurent, to establish a
line of demarcation and also to keep up communications with the fortress
and with Southern France.
On receiving the army order at about eleven o'clock, General Zastrow
gave notice to the enemy in his front of the resumption of hostilities,
but restricted his immediate demands to the complete evacuation of
Chaffois, which was complied with. Otherwise the Corps remained inactive
where it was.
Of the IInd Corps General du Trossel had set out very early from
Censeau, but the appearance of a French flag of truce, and his fear of
offending against the law of nations, here too occasioned considerable
hesitation. The forest of Frasne was not clear of the French till
evening. Lieutenant-Colonel von Guretzky made his way into the village
with quite a small force, and took prisoners twelve officers and 1500
men who held it, with two colours. The 5th Brigade then also moved up
into Frasne; the rest of the Corps occupied the same quarters as on the
previous day.
A flag of truce had presented itself at Les Planches, but Colonel von
Wedell had simply dismissed the bearer. The outposts of the XIVth Corps
did the same.
On the north of Pontarlier, General von Schmeling advanced to Pierre
Fontaine, General von Debschitz to Maiche.
_January 31st._--Early in the morning of this day the French Colonel
Varaigne made his appearance at General von Manteuffel's head-quarters
at Villeneuve, with the proposal that a cessation of hostilities for
thirty-six hours should be agreed upon, till the existing condition of
uncertainty should be removed; but this proposal was refused, as on the
German side there were no doubts whatsoever. Permission was granted for
the despatch of an application to Versailles, but it was at the same
time explained that the movements of the Army of the South would not be
suspended pending the arrival of the answer.
On this day, however, the IInd Army Corps marched only to Dompierre on a
parallel front with the VIIth, its advanced guard pushing forward on the
Drugeon to Ste. Colombe and La Riviere. Thence, in the evening, a
company of the Colberg Grenadiers crossed the steep mountain ridge and
descended on La Planee, where it took 500 prisoners. A right-flank
detachment of two battalions and one battery under Lieutenant-Colonel
Liebe marched unopposed up the long pass of Bonnevaux to Vaux, and took
prisoners 2 officers and 688 men. The enemy then abandoned the defile of
Granges Ste. Marie and retired to St. Antoine in the mountains.
The Corps had found every road strewn with cast-away arms and camp
utensils, and had taken in all 4000 prisoners.
Of the VIIth Corps, as soon as the enemy had been informed of the
resumption of hostilities, the 14th Division bent leftward on the
Drugeon and up to La Vrine, whence a connection was effected with the
4th Reserve Division of the XIVth Corps in St. Gorgon. The 13th Division
advanced to Sept Fontaines. Pontarlier was now completely surrounded,
and General von Manteuffel fixed February 1st for the general attack
thereon. The IInd Corps was to advance from the south-west, the VIIth
from the north-west; General von der Goltz was to establish himself in
front of Levier in reserve.
Meanwhile the French Commander-in-Chief had conceived doubts whether
everything was quite right with the communications from his Government.
All the mountain-passes leading to the south were now lost, and an
escape in that direction was no longer to be hoped for. General
Clinchant had already sent rearward the baggage and ammunition columns,
the sick and worn-out men, through La Cluse under shelter of the forts
of Joux and Neuv. And when in the afternoon a message from Bordeaux
brought the intelligence that in fact the Army of the East had been
excluded from the armistice, the Commander-in-Chief summoned his
generals to a council of war. Every General present declared that he
could no longer answer for his troops. General Clinchant himself
therefore went out the same evening to Les Verrieres, to conclude
negotiations he had already opened, in virtue of which on the following
day, February 1st, the army was to cross the Swiss frontier by three
roads.
To cover this retreat, the Army Reserve was to hold Pontarlier till all
the baggage-trains should have passed La Cluse, while the XVIIIth Corps
was to take up a covering position between the two forts. Defensive
works there were at once set about. What of the XVth Corps on the way by
Morez had failed in getting through with the cavalry was to try to cross
into Switzerland at any available point.
_February 1st._--When the advanced guard of the IInd Corps now advanced
on Pontarlier from Ste. Colombe, it met with but slight resistance at
the railway station. The Colberg Grenadiers took possession of the town
without a struggle, and captured many prisoners, but then found the road
on the further side entirely blocked by guns and waggons. They could
pass beyond on either side of the road only with difficulty through deep
snow. Just in front of La Cluse the road winds between high rocky
precipices into the wide basin of the Doubs, completely commanded by the
isolated fortalice of Joux perched on the solid rock. On debouching into
the open the foremost companies were received by a hot fire. Four guns,
dragged up thither with the greatest exertions, could make no head
against the heavy guns of the fort, and the French themselves here
passed to the attack.
The Colberg Fusiliers had meanwhile climbed the heights to the left,
followed by the 2nd Battalion of the Regiment and a battalion of the
49th Regiment, which drove the French out of the farmsteads on the
rifted upland. The steep cliff on the right was also scaled, several
rifle sub-divisions of the 49th climbed the acclivity up to La Cluse,
and the Colberg Grenadiers advanced to the foot of Fort Neuv.
To take the strong fortalices by storm was obviously impossible, and
furthermore because of the nature of the ground the fugitive enemy could
scarcely be overtaken in force. Of the French, 23 officers and 1600 men
were taken prisoners, with 400 loaded waggons; of the Germans, 19
officers and 365 men had fallen, mostly of the Colberg Regiment. The
troops spent the night on the field of the fighting.
As no large force could come into action at La Cluse, General von
Fransecky had ordered the main body of the Corps to march further
southward to Ste. Marie. To avoid the necessity of crossing the steep
chain of the Jura, General von Hartmann first betook himself to
Pontarlier to avail himself of the better roads from thence, but his
progress was stopped, the fight at La Cluse having assumed unexpected
proportions. The VIIth Corps and the 4th Reserve Division, which had
reached the Doubs at noon, were equally unable to get at the enemy.
During the whole day the French columns were crossing the Swiss
frontier. The Army Reserve in Pontarlier was at the beginning swept away
by the tide of baggage-waggons and drivers, and only joined the XVIIIth
Corps on reaching La Cluse. During the night they both followed the
general line of retreat. Only the cavalry and the 1st Division of the
XXIVth Corps reached the neighbouring department of l'Ain to the
southward, the latter force reduced to a few hundred men. There crossed
the frontier on to Swiss soil some 80,000 Frenchmen.
General Manteuffel had transferred his headquarters to Pontarlier.
There, in the course of the night, he first heard through Berlin of the
convention arranged between General Clinchant and Colonel Herzog of the
Swiss Confederation.
General von Manteuffel had achieved the important success of his three
weeks' campaign by hard marching and constant fighting, although there
had been no pitched battle since that of the Lisaine. These marches,
indeed, had been such as none but well-seasoned troops could have
accomplished under bold and skilful leadership, under every form of
fatigue and hardship, in the worst season and through a difficult
country.
Thus two French armies were now prisoners in Germany, a third interned
in the capital, and the fourth disarmed on foreign soil.
FOOTNOTES:
[81] Men of the 2nd Battalion, 61st Regiment, 8th Brigade, 4th Division,
IInd Corps, which Corps consisted exclusively of Pomeranians.
[82] "Conviction bien arretee."
[83] The 77th Hanoverian Fusilier Regiment, of which this was the 2nd
battalion, belonged to the 25th Brigade, 13th Division, VIIth
(Westphalian) Army Corps.
GENERAL HANN VON WEYHERN'S MARCH ON DIJON.
It only remains to cast a backward glance on the advance on Dijon, with
the conduct of which General Hann von Weyhern was charged on January
26th.
On that same day Garibaldi received instructions there to take energetic
measures against Dole and Mouchard.
To support him, the Government, indefatigable in the evolution of new
forces, was to put in march 15,000 Gardes-Mobiles under General Crouzat
from Lyons to Lons le Saulnier, and a XXVIth Corps in course of
formation at Chatellerault was to be sent from thence to Beaune. As it
was beyond doubt that General von Manteuffel had moved with a strong
force on the communications of the Army of the East, the specific order
was transmitted on the 27th to the Commander of the Army of the Vosges,
to leave only from 8000 to 10,000 men in Dijon and to advance at once
with his main force beyond Dole.
But the General was always greatly concerned for the safety of Dijon; he
occupied the principal positions on the slopes of the Cote d'Or and
detached a small force to St. Jean de Losne, behind the canal of
Bourgogne. Of 700 volunteers who had marched on Dole, no trace was ever
found there.
Langres had shown more energy; several and often successful attacks on
small outpost companies and etappen troops had been made from it from
time to time.
General Hann von Weyhern's purpose of attacking Dijon from the south had
to be abandoned, because the bridge over the Saone at St. Jean de Losne
had been destroyed. He therefore on the 29th crossed the river at
Apremont, and on the 31st assembled his detachments at Arc sur Tille.
Here again General Bordone, the Chief of the general staff of the Army
of the Vosges, vainly insisted that an armistice was in force. On the
31st General von Kettler marched with an advanced guard on Varois. To
cut off the enemy's communications with Auxonne a left-flank detachment
made itself master of the bridge over the Ouche at Fauverney. The first
shells drove the French back on their intrenched position on the line
St. Apollinaire--Mirande.
When the attempt to establish an armistice failed, General Bordone
determined to evacuate Dijon in the course of the night and retire upon
assured neutral ground. Thus, on February 1st, the head of the advanced
guard found the position in front of the city abandoned, and General von
Kettler marched in without encountering any opposition, just as the last
train of French troops moved out of the railway-station. Sombernon and
Nuits were also occupied on the 2nd.
OCCUPATION OF THE DEPARTMENTS OF THE DOUBS, JURA, AND COTE D'OR.
Nothing now remained for General von Manteuffel but to establish the
military occupation of the three Departments which he had won, and to
guard them from without.
General Pelissier was still in the open field within their bounds,
having reached Lons le Saulnier with the 15,000 Gardes-Mobiles who had
come up from Lyons and had been joined by the battalions sent back from
Besancon by General Rolland, by no means an insignificant force
numerically, but practically of no great efficiency. The commanders were
recommended to retire and avoid further bloodshed; and they did so, as
soon as some detachments of the IInd German Corps advanced on Lons le
Saulnier and St. Laurent. Others occupied Mouthe and Les Allemands,
where were found twenty-eight field-guns which had been abandoned by the
French. As a measure of precaution, the Swiss frontier was watched by
eight battalions. The fortalices of Salins, the little fortress of
Auxonne, and Besancon, were kept under observation from the eastward.
Although the Department of Haute-Marne was included in the armistice,
the commandant of Langres had refused to recognize the authority of his
Government. So this place had to be invested, and probably besieged.
General von der Goltz was promptly ordered to advance once more on it,
and General von Krenski was already on the march thither with seven
battalions, two squadrons and two batteries, and a siege train from
Longwy, which he had brought to capitulate on January 25th, after a
bombardment of six days' duration. But it was not called into
requisition at Langres. General von Manteuffel aimed at no further
tactical results; he was anxious to save his troops from further losses,
and to afford them all possible relief after their exceptional
exertions. Not till now were the baggage-waggons brought up, even those
of the superior staff officers having been necessarily left behind
during the advance into the Jura. The troops were distributed for the
sake of comfort in roomy quarters, but in readiness for action at any
moment, the IInd Corps in the Jura, the VIIth in the Cote d'Or, the
XIVth in the department of the Doubs. But the siege of Belfort was still
to be vigorously carried on.
PROSECUTION OF THE SIEGE OF BELFORT.
Immediately after the battle on the Lisaine the forces investing Belfort
were increased to 27 battalions, 6 squadrons, 6 field batteries, 24
companies of fortress artillery, and 6 companies of fortress pioneers;
17,602 infantry, 4699 artillerymen, and 1166 pioneers, in all 23,467
men, with 707 horses and 34 field-guns.
The place was invested on the north and west by only a few battalions,
and the main force was assembled to the south and east.
On January 20th the eastern batteries opened a heavy fire on Perouse.
Colonel Denfert concluded that an attack was imminent, and placed four
battalions of his most trusted troops in the village, which had been
prepared for an obstinate defence.
At about midnight, two battalions of the 67th Regiment advanced from
Chevremont on the Haut Taillis wood without firing a shot. Once inside
it there was a determined struggle, but the French were driven back on
the village, and the pioneers immediately intrenched the skirt of the
wood towards Perouse under a heavy fire from the forts. Half an hour
later two Landwehr battalions advanced from Bessoncourt to the copse on
the north of the village. They were received with a heavy fire, but made
their way onward over abatis, pits and wire-entanglements, driving the
enemy back into the quarries. A stationary fight now ensued, but the
67th presently renewed the attack, and without allowing themselves to be
checked by the earthworks forced their way into Perouse. They took
possession of the eastern half of the straggling village at about
half-past two, and the detachment defending the quarries, finding itself
threatened, retreated. At five o'clock, Colonel Denfert abandoned the
western part of the village, which was now completely occupied by the
Germans. The losses on the German side were 8 officers and 178 men; the
French left 5 officers and 93 men prisoners.
_January 21st to 27th._--The next day the construction of the first
parallel was undertaken, extending about 2000 yards from Donjoutin to
Haut Taillis. Five battalions and two companies of Sappers were employed
in this work, and were undisturbed by the French; but the rocky soil
prevented its being constructed of the prescribed width.
General von Tresckow considered that he might thus early succeed in
carrying both the Perches forts by a determined assault. Two half
redoubts with ditches more than three yards deep cut perpendicularly in
the solid rock, casemated traverses and bomb-proof blockhouses in the
gorge, afforded protection to the defenders. Each work was armed with
seven 12-cm. cannon, and they were connected by trenches, behind which
reserves were in readiness. On the right flank this position was
protected by a battalion and a sortie-battery in Le Fourneau; on the
left the adjacent wood was cleared, cut down to a distance of 650 yards,
and wire-entanglements between the stumps formed an almost impenetrable
obstacle. In front the gentle slope of the ridge was under the
cross-fire of the two forts.
When on the previous evening of the 26th the construction of the
parallel was sufficiently advanced to allow of its being occupied by
larger detachments, the assault was fixed for the 27th. Two columns,
each of one battalion, one company of Sappers, and two guns, passed to
the attack at daybreak on that morning. Two companies of Schneidemuehl's
Landwehr Battalion advanced against the front of Basses Perches and
threw themselves on the ground within from 65 to 110 yards of the work.
A sub-division of sharp-shooters and a few pioneers reached the ditch
and unhesitatingly leaped in; the two other (Landwehr) companies, going
round the fort by the left, got into its rear, and here too the men
jumped into the ditch of the gorge. But the French who had been driven
out of their shelter-trenches were now assembled, and the battalion from
Le Fourneau came up. All the forts of the place opened fire on the bare
and unprotected space in front of the parallel, and an attempt of
reinforcements to cross it failed. The 7th Company of the Landwehr
Battalion was surrounded by greatly superior numbers, and after a brave
struggle was for the most part made captive. Most of the men in the
ditch were still able to escape.
The advance of the right column against Hautes-Perches also failed. It
had to cross 1100 yards of open ground. The encompassment of the fort
was attempted, but it was impossible to force through the abatis and
other obstacles under the destructive fire of the enemy.
This abortive attempt cost 10 officers and 427 men; and the slower
process of an engineer attack had to be resumed.
_January 28th to February 15th._--As the approaches to the forts
progressed the flying sap could be carried forward about 330 yards every
night unopposed by the enemy. In spite of all the difficulties caused by
the nature of the soil, on February 1st the second parallel was thrown
up at half distance from the Perches.
As the Fort of la Justice was a special hindrance to the operations, two
new batteries had to be constructed to the east of Perouse against it.
Four mortar-batteries on the flanks of the parallel now directed their
fire on the Perches at very short range. Three batteries were also
constructed in the Bois des Perches to fire on the citadel, and one on
the skirt of the wood near Bavilliers against the defences of the city.
Henceforward 1500 shells a day were fired on the fortress and its
outworks.
But further the prosecution of the attack became more and more
difficult. The withdrawal of General Debschitz had seriously reduced the
working strength of the besieging force. There were only nine
battalions for the exhausting service in the trenches. Specially serious
was the heavy loss in pioneers, and two fresh companies had to be
brought up from Strasburg. The bright moonlight illuminating the fields
of snow far and wide made it impossible to proceed with the flying saps.
Sap-rollers had to be used; the heads of the saps had to be protected by
sandbags and the sides by gabions, while the earth for filling had often
to be brought from a long distance in the rear.
On the head of all this, on February 3rd, a thaw set in, and the water
from the heights filled the trenches, so that all communication had to
be carried on across the open ground. Torrents of rain damaged the
finished works; the parapet of the first parallel gave way altogether in
places, and the banquette was washed away. The bottomless tracks made
the arming of the batteries unspeakably difficult, and the teams of the
columns and field artillery had to be employed in bringing up the
ammunition. Many guns had become useless by overheating, while the enemy
understood, by rapidly running out their guns, firing, and then running
them back again, how to interrupt the work. Not merely was it necessary
to continue the shelling of the Perches during the night, but a brisk
rifle fire had to be kept up against them. Only now and then did the
batteries newly placed in the parallels succeed in entirely silencing
the guns of Hautes Perches. Epaulments had to be erected against Fort
Bellevue and the defences of the railway-station, and Fort des Barres
resumed activity. That under such exertions and the abominable weather
the health of the troops suffered severely, need not be said; the
battalions could often only muster 300 men for duty.
Meanwhile, however, the artillery of the attack had unquestionably
become very much superior to that of the defence, and, in spite of every
obstacle, the saps were pushed on to the edge of the ditch of Les
Perches.
On February 8th, at one in the afternoon, Captain Roese had gabions
flung into the ditch of Hautes Perches, sprang into it with five
sappers, and rapidly scaled the parapet by the steps hewn in the scarp.
He was immediately followed by the trench guard, but only a few of the
French were surprised in the casemated traverses. The situation of the
garrison of the forts had in fact become extremely difficult. Ammunition
had to be brought up under the enemy's fire, water could only be had
from the pond at Vernier, and cooking could only be done inside the
works. Colonel Denfert had already given orders to bury the material.
Unseen by the besiegers the guns of which the carriages could still be
moved had been withdrawn, and only one company left in each fort, which
in case of a surprise was to fire and fly. Nothing was to be found in
the abandoned work but wrecked gun-carriages and four damaged guns. This
fort was at once reversed so that its front faced the fortress, but at
three o'clock the latter opened so heavy a fire on the lost positions
that the working parties had to take shelter in the ditches.
The garrison in Basses Perches attempted some resistance, but under
cover of a reserve it soon retired to Le Fourneau, leaving five guns and
much shattered material. Here also the fire of the place at first
compelled the working parties to break off, but four 15-cm. mortars were
at length brought into the fort, and two 9-cm. guns were placed on the
spur of the hill to the westward, which directed their fire on Le
Fourneau and Bellevue. During the night of the 9th the two works were
connected by a shelter-trench 680 yards long, and thus the third
parallel was established.
The position was now such that the attack could immediately be directed
on the citadel, and on it the batteries in the Bois des Perches and
presently those in the second parallel opened fire. Moitte, Justice, and
Bellevue were shelled simultaneously. General von Debschitz had
returned, so that the investing corps was thus again brought up to its
full strength, and all the conditions were improved by the return of the
frost. By the 13th ninety-seven guns were ready in the third parallel.
The town had suffered terribly from the prolonged bombardment. Nearly
all the buildings were damaged, fifteen completely burnt down, and in
the adjoining villages 164 houses had been destroyed by the defenders
themselves. The fortifications showed not less visible indications of
serious damage, particularly the citadel. The hewn-stone facing of its
front-wall had crumbled into the ditch. Half of the mantleted embrasures
had been shattered, the expense powder magazines had been blown up, and
a number of casemated traverses pierced. The guns in the upper batteries
could only be reached by ladders. The garrison, of its original strength
of 372 officers and 17,322 men, had lost 32 officers and 4713 men,
besides 336 citizens. The place was no longer tenable; besides there now
came the news that the army from which alone relief was to be expected,
had laid down its arms.
Under these circumstances General von Tresckow summoned the commandant
after a defence so brave to surrender the fortress, with free withdrawal
for the garrison, this concession having the sanction of his Majesty.
The French Government itself authorized the commandant to accept these
terms. Colonel Denfert, however, insisted that he must be given a more
direct order. To procure this an officer was sent to Basle, pending
whose return there was a provisional armistice.
On the 15th a convention was signed at Versailles, which extended the
armistice to the three departments which till then had been excluded
from it, and also to Belfort; but the 1st article demanded the
surrender of that place.
After the conclusion of the definitive treaty, the garrison, in the
course of the 17th and 18th, with its arms and trains, left the
precincts of the fortress and withdrew by way of L'Isle sur Doubs and
St. Hippolyte into the country occupied by French troops. The march was
effected in detachments of 1000 men at intervals of 5 km., the last of
which Colonel Denfert accompanied. The supplies which remained in the
fortress were conveyed in rear of the departing troops in 150 Prussian
proviant waggons. At 3 o'clock in the afternoon of February 18th
Lieutenant-General von Tresckow entered the place at the head of
detachments from all the troops of the investing corps.
There were found 341 guns, of which 56 were useless, 356 gun-carriages,
of which 119 were shot to pieces, and 22,000 stand of arms, besides
considerable supplies of ammunition and provisions.
The siege had cost the Germans 88 officers and 2049 men, 245 of whom
were released from imprisonment by the capitulation. Immediately was set
about the work of restoring and arming the fortress, and of the
levelling of the siege works.
THE ARMISTICE.
On the basis of the agreement of January 28th a line of demarcation was
drawn, from which both parties were to withdraw their outposts to a
distance of 10 km. The line ran south from the mouth of the Seine as far
as the Sarthe, crossed the Loire at Saumur, followed the Creuse, turned
eastward past Vierzon, Clamecy and Chagny, and then met the Swiss
frontier, after bending to the north of Chalons sur Saone and south of
Lons le Saulnier and St. Laurent. The two departments of Pas de Calais
and du Nord, as well as the promontory of Havre, were particularly
excluded.
The fortresses still held by French troops in the districts occupied by
the Germans were assigned a rayon in proportion to their importance.
In carrying out the details of the agreement a liberal interpretation
was in most instances allowed. The arrangements had the sanction of
those members of the Government of National Defence who were in Paris;
while the delegates at Bordeaux, who had hitherto conducted the war, at
first held aloof, and indeed, as yet had not been made acquainted with
the detailed conditions. Gambetta, it is true, allowed the suspension of
operations, but could not give the commanders more precise instructions.
General Faidherbe was thus without orders with regard to the evacuation
of Dieppe and Abbeville. General von Goeben, however, refrained from
taking immediate possession of these places. On the west of the Seine,
the Grand Duke was forced to proclaim that the non-recognition of the
line of demarcation would be followed by an immediate recommencement of
hostilities.
The commandant of the garrison at Langres also raised difficulties, and
only withdrew within his rayon on February 7th, as did General Rolland
later at Besancon. Auxonne was at first unwilling to give up control of
the railway. Bitsch, which had not been worth the trouble of a serious
attack, repudiated the convention; the investment had therefore to be
strengthened, and only in March, when threatened with a determined
attack, did the garrison abandon its peak of rock.
Nor did the volunteers acquiesce at once, and there were collisions with
them at various points. But after the conditions were finally settled,
no more serious quarrels occurred between the inhabitants and the
German troops during the whole course of the armistice.
All the German corps before Paris occupied the forts lying in their
front, more specifically the Vth took over Mont Valerien, and the IVth
the town of St. Denis. Between the forts and the enceinte there lay a
neutral zone, which civilians were allowed to cross only by specified
roads placed under control of German examining troops.
Apprehensive as it was of the indignation of the populace, the French
Government had hesitated so long to utter the word "capitulation," that
now, even with the resumption of free communication, Paris was
threatened with an outbreak of actual famine. The superfluous
stores in the German magazines were therefore placed at the disposal
of its authorities. The respective chief-Commands, the local
Governments-General, and the Etappen-Inspections received instructions
to place no difficulties in the way of the repair of the railways and
roads in their districts, and the French authorities were even allowed
to make use, under German supervision, of the repaired railroads which
the invaders used to supply their own army. Nevertheless, the first
provision-train only arrived in Paris on February 3rd, and it was the
middle of the month before the French had succeeded in remedying the
prevalent distress in the capital.
The German prisoners were at once given up. The surrender of arms and
war-material followed by degrees, also the payment of the 200 million
francs war-contribution imposed on the city.
But it was still doubtful if the party of "war to the bitter end" in
Bordeaux would fall in with the arrangements made by the Paris
Government, and whether the National Assembly about to be convened would
finally ratify the conditions of peace imposed by the conquerors. The
necessary measures in case of the resumption of hostilities were
therefore taken on the French as well as on the German side.
The distribution of the French forces at the establishment of the
armistice was not favourable.
By General Faidherbe's advice the Army of the North was wholly
disbanded, as being too weak to face the strength opposing it. After the
XXIInd Corps had been transported by sea to Cherbourg, the Army of
Brittany under General de Colomb was composed of it, the XXVIIth and
part of the XIXth Corps, and, including Lipowski's volunteers,
Cathelineau's and other details, its strength was some 150,000 men.
General Loysel with 30,000 ill-armed and raw Gardes-Mobiles remained in
the trenches of Havre.
General Chanzy, after his retreat on Mayenne, had made a movement to the
left, preparatory to a new operation with the IInd Army of the Loire
from the Caen base, which, however, was never carried out. The XVIIIth,
XXIst, XVIth, and XXVIth Corps stood between the lower Loire and the
Cher from Angers to Chateauroux, in a strength of about 160,000 men
strong, the XXVth under General Pourcet was at Bourges, and General de
Pointe's Corps at Nevers. The Army of the Vosges had withdrawn southward
of Chalons sur Saone, and the remains of the Army of the East assembled
under General Cremer at Chambery as the XXIVth Corps.
The total of all the field-troops amounted to 534,452 men. The
volunteers, even those most to be relied on, were dismissed, and the
National Guard was designated as for the present "incapable of rendering
any military service." In the depots, the camps of instruction, and in
Algiers there were still 354,000 men, and 132,000 recruits were on the
lists as the contingent for 1871, but had not yet been called up.
In case the war should be persisted in, a plan for limiting it to the
defensive in the south-east of France was under consideration, for
which, however, according to the report sent on February 8th by the
Committee of Inquiry to the National Assembly, scarcely more than
252,000 men in fighting condition were available. The fleet, besides,
had given up so considerable a number of its men and guns for service on
land, that it was no longer able for any great undertaking at sea.
On the German side the first consideration was to reinforce the troops
to their full war-strength, and replenish the magazines.
The forts round Paris were at once armed on their fronts facing the
enceinte. In and between these were 680 guns, 145 of which were captured
French pieces; more than enough to keep the restless population under
control. A part of the forces previously occupied in the siege, being no
longer required, were removed, in order that the remaining troops should
have better accommodation. Besides, it seemed desirable to strengthen
the IInd Army, which had in its front the enemy's principal force. In
consequence the IVth Corps marched to Nogent le Rotrou, the Vth to
Orleans, and the IXth, relieved there, to Vendome; so that now the
quarters of this army extended from Alencon to Tours, and up the Loire
as far as Gien and Auxerre.
The Ist Army was in the north with the VIIIth Corps on the Somme, and
the Ist on both sides of the Lower Seine; in the south the Army of the
South occupied the line of demarcation from Baume to Switzerland, and
the country in the rear.
At the end of February the German field-army on French soil consisted
of:--
Infantry 464,221 men with 1674 guns.
Cavalry 55,562 horses.
Troops in garrison:--
Infantry 105,272 men with 68 guns.
Cavalry 5681 horses.
-------
Total 630,736 men and 1742 guns.
Reserve forces remaining in Germany:--
3288 officers.
204,684 men.
26,603 horses.
Arrangements were so made, that in case of a recommencement of
hostilities, the strongest resistance could be made at all points. The
armistice had nearly reached its end, and the troops had already been
more closely collected to be ready to take the initiative of the
offensive towards the south, when the Chancellor of the Confederation
announced the extension of the armistice to the 24th, which was again
prolonged to midnight on the 26th.
Considerable difficulties had arisen from the differences of opinion
with regard to the election of the National Assembly, between the
Government in Paris and the Delegation at Bordeaux. The Germans wished
to see carried out the choice, not of a party, but of the whole nation,
expressed by a free suffrage. But Gambetta had ruled, in violation of
the conditions of the armistice, that all who after December 2nd, 1851,
had held any position in the Imperial Government should be ineligible to
vote. It was not till the Parisian Government had obtained a majority by
sending several of its members to Bordeaux, and after the dictator had
resigned on February 6th, that the elections proceeded quickly and
unhindered.
The deputies duly assembled in Bordeaux by the 12th, the appointed day.
M. Thiers was elected chief of the executive, and went to Paris on the
19th with Jules Favre, determined to end the aimless war at any cost.
Negotiations for peace were opened, and after five days' vigorous
discussion, when at last on the German side the concession to restore
Belfort was made, the preliminaries were signed on the afternoon of the
26th.
France bound herself to give up in favour of Germany a part of Lorraine,
and the province of Alsace with the exception of Belfort, and also to
pay a war indemnity of five milliards of francs.
The evacuation of the districts in occupation of the German armies was
to begin immediately on the ratification of the treaty, and be continued
by degrees in proportion as the money was paid. While the German troops
remained on French soil they were to be maintained at the charge of the
country. On the other hand all requisitioning on the part of the Germans
was to cease. Immediately on the first instalment of evacuation the
French forces were to retire behind the Loire, with the exception of
20,000 men in Paris and the necessary garrisons in the fortresses.
After the ratification of these preliminaries, further terms were to be
discussed in Brussels, and the return of the French prisoners would
begin. The armistice was prolonged to March 12th; but it was in the
option of either of the belligerent powers to end it after March 3rd by
giving three days' notice.
Finally, it was stipulated that the German Army should have the
satisfaction of marching into Paris, and remaining there till the
ratification of the treaty; but would be restricted to the section of
the city from Point du Jour to the Rue du Faubourg St. Honore. The entry
was made on March 1st, after a parade at Longchamps before his Majesty
of 30,000 men, consisting of 11,000 of the VIth, 11,000 of the IInd
Bavarian, and 8000 of the XIth Army Corps. On the 3rd and 5th of March
this force was to have been relieved by successive bodies of the same
strength, but M. Thiers succeeded by March 1st in getting the National
Assembly at Bordeaux to accept the treaty, after the deposition of the
Napoleonic dynasty had been decreed. The exchange of ratifications took
place in the afternoon of the 2nd, and on the 3rd the first instalment
of troops of occupation marched out of Paris back into its quarters.
THE HOMEWARD MARCH OF THE GERMAN ARMY.
By the IIIrd Article, the whole territory between the Seine and the
Loire, excepting Paris, was to be evacuated with as little delay as
possible by the troops of both sides; the right bank of the former
river, on the other hand, was only to be cleared on the conclusion of
the definitive treaty of peace. Even then the six eastern departments
were still to remain in German possession as a pledge for the last three
milliards; not, however, to be occupied by more than 50,000 men.
The marching directions were drawn up in the supreme Headquarter, with a
view as well to the comfort of the troops as to the reconstitution of
the original order of battle, and the possibility of rapid assembly in
case of need.
The forces detailed for permanent occupation of the ceded provinces
marched thither at once.
The Reserve and Landwehr troops at home were to be disbanded, as well as
the Baden Division, which, however, for the present was to remain there
as a mobilized force. The Governments-General in Lorraine, Rheims, and
Versailles were to be done away with, and their powers taken over by the
local Commanding-Generals. In the maintenance of order in the rear of
the army, the VIth and XIIth Corps, as well as the Wuertemberg Field
Division, were placed at the direct disposition of the supreme
Headquarter.
By March 31st the Army had taken full possession of the new territory
assigned to it, bounded on the west by the course of the Seine from its
source to its mouth.
The Ist Army was in the departments of Seine-Inferieure and Somme, the
IInd in front of Paris in the departments of Oise and Seine et Marne,
the IIIrd in the departments of Aube and Haute Marne, the Army of the
South in the districts most lately hostile. The forts of Paris on the
left bank were given up to the French authorities; the siege park and
the captured war material had been removed. In consideration of the
desire of the French Government that the National Assembly might be
allowed as early as possible to sit at Versailles, the supreme
Headquarter was removed to Ferrieres, even sooner than had been agreed.
On March 15th his Majesty left Nancy for Berlin.
All the troops that were left before Paris were placed under the command
of the Crown Prince of Saxony, and General von Manteuffel was nominated
Commander of the Army of Occupation.
At the moment when France had freed herself by a heavy sacrifice, an
enemy of the most dangerous character appeared from within, in the
Commune of Paris.
The 40,000 men left there proved themselves unequal to the task of
keeping the rebellious agitation under control; which even during the
siege had on several occasions betrayed its existence, and now actually
broke out in open civil war. Large masses of people, fraternizing with
the National and Mobile Guards, possessed themselves of the guns and set
themselves in armed resistance to the Government. M. Thiers had already,
by March 18th, summoned to Versailles such regiments as could still be
trusted, to withdraw them from the disquieting influence of party
impulses, and for the protection of the National Assembly there. The
French capital was a prey to revolution, and now became an object of
pillage by French troops.
The Germans could easily have put a speedy end to the matter, but what
Government could allow its rights to be vindicated by foreign bayonets?
The German Commanders consequently limited themselves to forbidding at
least within their own districts any movement of disturbance, and to
preventing all further ingress into Paris from outside. The disarmament
operations which had commenced were interrupted; the troops of the IIIrd
Army were drawn closer to the forts, and the outposts were replaced
along the line of demarcation, whereon 200,000 men could now be
collected within two days. The authorities in Paris were also warned
that any attempt to arm the fronts facing the Germans would be followed
by the immediate bombardment of the city. The insurgents however, were
fully occupied in destroying and burning, and in executing their
commanders in the interior of Paris. They did not turn against their
foreign enemy, but against the Government chosen by the nation, and
prepared for an attack on Versailles.
The high officers of State there, bound by the conditions of the
armistice treaty, were almost defenceless; meanwhile the Germans were
prepared and willing to allow a reinforcement of 80,000 French troops to
be moved up from Besancon, Auxerre and Cambrai, the transport of whom
would be furthered by the German troops in occupation of the districts
through which they would have to pass.
The release of the prisoners on the other hand was temporarily
restricted. These were, for the most part, disciplined regulars; but
they might not improbably join the hostile party, so in the first
instance only 20,000 troops of the line were set free.
On April 4th General MacMahon advanced with the Government troops
against Paris, and entered the city on the 21st. As he was then engaged
for eight days in barricade fighting, and as great bands of fugitives
threatened to break through the German lines, the IIIrd Army was ordered
to take closer order. The outposts advanced almost to the gates of the
city, and barred all communication through them until, at the end of the
month, Paris was again in the control of the French Government.
In the meantime, the negotiations commenced in Brussels and continued in
Frankfort were making rapid progress, and on May 10th the definitive
treaty of peace based on the preliminaries was signed. The mutual
ratification followed within the appointed time of ten days.
* * * * *
Thus a war, carried on with such a vast expenditure of force on both
sides, was brought to an end by incessant and restless energy in the
short period of seven months.
Even in the first four weeks eight battles were fought, under which the
French Empire crumbled, and the French Army was swept from the field.
Fresh forces, numerous but incompetent, equalized the original numerical
superiority of the Germans, and twelve more battles needed to be fought,
to safeguard the decisive siege of the enemy's capital.
Twenty fortified places were taken, and not a single day passed on which
there was not fighting somewhere, on a larger or smaller scale.
The war cost the Germans heavy sacrifice; they lost 6247 officers,
123,453 men, 1 colour, 6 guns.
The total losses of the French were incalculable; in prisoners only they
amounted to:--
In Germany 11,860 officers, 371,981 men.
In Paris 7,456 " 241,686 "
Disarmed in Switzerland. 2,192 " 88,381 "
------ -------
21,508 officers, 702,048 men.
There were captured 107 colours and eagles, 1915 field-guns, 5526
fortress guns.
Strasburg and Metz, which had been alienated from the Fatherland in a
time of weakness, were recovered, and the German Empire had risen anew.
THE END.
APPENDIX.
APPENDIX.
MEMORANDUM ON THE PRETENDED COUNCIL OF WAR IN THE WARS
OF KING WILLIAM I.
In the accounts of historical events, as they are handed down to
posterity, mistakes assume the form of legends which it is not always
easy subsequently to disprove.
Among others is the fable which ascribes, with particular zest and as a
matter of regular custom, the great decisions taken in the course of our
latest campaigns, to the deliberations of a council of war previously
convened.
For instance, the battle of Koeniggraetz.
I can relate in a few lines the circumstances under which an event of
such far-reaching importance had birth.
Feldzeugmeister Benedek had, in his advance to the northward, to secure
himself against the IInd Prussian Army marching on the east over the
mountains of Silesia. To this end four of his Corps had one after
another been pushed forward on his right flank, and had all been beaten
within three days. They now joined the main body of the Austrian Army,
which had meanwhile reached the vicinity of Dubenetz.
Here, then, on June 30th, almost the whole of the Austrian forces were
standing actually inside the line of operations between the two Prussian
armies; of which the Ist was already fighting its way to Gitschin,
designated from Berlin as the common point of concentration, and the
IInd had also advanced close on the Upper Elbe; thus they were both so
near that the enemy could not attack the one without the other falling
on his rear. The strategic advantage was nullified by the tactical
disadvantage.
In these circumstances, and having already lost 40,000 men in previous
battles, General Benedek gave up the advance, and during the night of
June 30th began his retreat on Koeniggraetz.
The movement of six Army Corps and four Cavalry Divisions, marching in
only four columns, which were necessarily very deep, could not be
accomplished in the course of a single day. They halted very closely
concentrated between Trotina and Lipa; but when on July 2nd they still
remained there, it was owing to the extreme fatigue of the troops, and
the difficulty, nay, impossibility, of withdrawing so large a body of
men beyond the Elbe, under the eyes of an active enemy and by a limited
number of passages. In fact, the Austrian general could no longer
manoeuvre; he had no alternative but to fight.
It is a noteworthy fact that neither his advance on Dubenetz nor his
retreat on Lipa was known to the Prussians. These movements were
concealed from the IInd Army by the Elbe, and the cavalry of the Ist was
a mass of more than 8000 horse collected in one unwieldy Corps. The four
squadrons attached to each Infantry Division were of course not able to
undertake reconnoissances, as subsequently was later done in 1870 by a
more advantageous plan of formation.
Thus in the Royal head-quarters at Gitschin nothing certain was known.
It was supposed that the main body of the hostile army was still
advancing, and that it would take up a position with the Elbe in its
front and its flanks resting on the fortresses of Josephstadt and
Koeniggraetz. There were, then, these alternatives--either to turn this
extremely strong position, or attack it in front.
By the adoption of the first the communications of the Austrian Army
with Pardubitz would be so seriously threatened that it might probably
be compelled to retreat. But to secure the safety of such a movement our
IInd Army must relieve our Ist and cross over to the right bank of the
Elbe. And in this case the flank march of the latter close past the
enemy's front might easily be interfered with, if passages enough across
the river had been prepared by him.
In the second case, success could only be hoped for if an advance of the
IInd Army on the right flank of the enemy's position could be combined
with the attack in front. For this it must be kept on the left bank.
The separation of the two armies, which was for the present
intentionally maintained, allowed of either plan being followed; but
mine was the serious responsibility of advising his Majesty which should
be chosen.
To keep both alternatives open for the present, General von Herwarth was
ordered to occupy Pardubitz, and the Crown Prince to remain on the left
bank of the Elbe, to reconnoitre that river as well as the Aupa and the
Metau, and to remove all obstacles which might oppose a crossing in one
or the other direction. At length, on July 2nd, Prince Frederick Charles
was ordered, in the event of his finding a large force in front of the
Elbe, to attack it at once. But, on the evening of that day, it came to
the knowledge of the Prince that the whole Austrian Army had marched to
and was in position on the Bistritz; and in obedience to instructions
received, he at once ordered the Ist Army and the Army of the Elbe to
assemble close in front of the enemy by daybreak next morning.
General von Voigts-Rhetz brought the news at eleven o'clock in the
evening to the King at Gitschin, and his Majesty sent him over to me.
This information dispelled all doubts and lifted a weight from my heart.
With a "Thank God!" I sprang out of bed, and hastened across to the
King, who was lodged on the other side of the Market Place.
His Majesty also had gone to rest in his little camp-bed. After a brief
explanation on my part, he said he fully understood the situation,
decided on giving battle next day with all three armies in co-operation,
and desired me to transmit the necessary orders to the Crown Prince, who
was at once to cross the Elbe.
The whole interview with his Majesty lasted barely ten minutes. No one
else was present.
This was the "Council of War" before Koeniggraetz.
General von Podbielski and Major Count Wartensleben shared my quarters.
The orders to the IInd Army were drawn up forthwith and despatched in
duplicate by two different routes by midnight. One, carried by General
von Voigts-Rhetz, informed Prince Frederick Charles of all the
dispositions; the other was sent direct to Koeniginhof.
In the course of his night-ride of above twenty-eight miles,
Lieutenant-Colonel Count Finckenstein had to pass the rayon of the Ist
Army Corps, which was furthest to the rear. He handed to the officer on
duty a special letter to be forwarded immediately to the general in
command, ordering an immediate assemblage of his troops and an
independent advance, even before orders should reach him from
Koeniginhof.
The position of the Austrians on July 3rd had a front of not more than
4-3/4 miles. Our three armies advanced on it in an encompassing arc of
about twenty-four miles in extent. But while in the centre the Ist and
IInd Corps of the Ist Army stood before daylight close in front of the
enemy, on the right wing General von Herwarth had to advance on the
Bistritz from Smidar in the dark, by very bad roads, above nine miles;
and on the left, the orders from the Royal head-quarter could not even
reach the Crown Prince before four in the morning. It was therefore
decided that the centre would have to maintain a detaining engagement
for several hours. Above all, a possible offensive on the part of the
enemy must here be met, and for this the whole IIIrd Corps and the
cavalry corps stood ready; but the battle could only be decided by the
double flank attack by both the flanking armies.[84]
I had ridden out early to the heights in front of Sadowa with my
officers, and at eight o'clock the King also arrived there.
It was a dull morning, and from time to time a shower fell. The horizon
was dim, yet on the right the white clouds of smoke showed that the
heads of the Ist Army were already fighting some way off, in front of
the villages on the Bistritz. On the left, in the woods of Swip, brisk
rifle-firing was audible. Behind the King, besides his staff, were his
royal guests, with their numerous suites of adjutants, equerries, and
led horses, in number as many as two squadrons. An Austrian battery
seemed to have selected them to aim at, and compelled him to move away
with a smaller following.
Soon afterwards, with Count Wartensleben, I rode through the village of
Sadowa, which the enemy had already abandoned. The advanced guard of the
8th Division had massed its guns behind the wood under cover of the
sharpshooters who had been sent forward, but many shells fell there from
a large battery in front of the exits from the copses. As we rode
further along the road we admired the coolness of a huge ox, which went
on its way, heedless of the shot, and seemed determined to charge the
enemy's position.
The formidable array of the IIIrd and Xth Austrian Corps' Artillery
opposite the wood prevented any attempt to break through it, and I was
in time to countermand an order which had been given to do so.
Meanwhile, further to the left, General von Fransecky had vigorously
passed to the offensive. After a sharp struggle he had driven the enemy
out of the Swip woods, and come through to the further side. Against him
he had the IVth Austrian Corps; but now the IInd and part of the IIIrd
Austrian Corps turned on the 7th Division; 57 battalions against 14. In
the thick brushwood all the bodies had become mixed, personal command
was impossible, and, in spite of our obstinate resistance, isolated
detachments were taken prisoners, and others were dispersed.
Such a rabble rushed out of the wood at the very moment when the King
and his staff rode up; his Majesty looked on with some displeasure,[85]
but the wounded officer, who was trying to keep his little band
together, at once led it back into the fight. In spite of heavy losses
the division got firm possession of the northern side of the wood. It
had drawn on itself very considerable forces of the enemy, which were
subsequently missing from the positions which it was their duty to have
defended.
It was now eleven o'clock. The heads of the Ist Army had crossed the
Bistritz, and taken most of the villages on its further bank; but these
were only the enemy's advanced posts, which he had no intention of
obstinately holding. His Corps held a position behind, whence their 250
guns commanded the open plain which had to be crossed for the delivery
of a further attack. On the right, General von Herwarth had reached the
Bistritz, but on the left nothing was yet to be seen of the Crown
Prince.
The battle had come to a standstill. In the centre the Ist Army was
still fighting about the villages on the Bistritz; the cavalry could not
get forward, and the artillery found no good position to occupy. The
troops had been for five hours under the enemy's lively fire, without
food, to prepare which there had been no time.
Some doubt as to the issue of the battle existed probably in many minds;
perhaps in that of Count Bismarck, as he offered me his cigar case. As I
was subsequently informed, he took it for a good sign that of two cigars
I coolly selected the better one.
The King asked me at about this time what I thought of the prospects of
the battle. I replied, "Your Majesty to-day will not only win the
battle, but decide the war."
It could not be otherwise.
We had the advantage in numbers,[86] which in war is never to be
despised; and it was certain that our IInd Army must finally appear on
the flank and rear of the Austrians.
At about 1.30 a white cloud was seen on the height, crowned with trees,
and visible from afar, on which our field-glasses had been centred. It
was indeed not yet the IInd Army, but the smoke of the fire which,
directed thereon, announced its near approach. The joyful shout, "The
Crown Prince is coming!" ran through the ranks. I sent the wished-for
news to General von Herwarth, who meanwhile had carried Problus, in
spite of the heroic defence of the Saxons.
The IInd Army had started at 7.30 in the morning; only the Ist Corps had
delayed till about 9.15. The advance by bad roads, in part across the
fields, had taken much time. The hill-road stretching from Horenowes to
Trotina, if efficiently held, could not but be a serious obstacle. But
in its eager pressure on Fransecky's Division the enemy's right wing had
made a wheel to the left, so that it lay open to some extent to the
attack on its rear now impending.
The Crown Prince's progress was not yet visible to us, but at about
half-past three the King ordered the advance of the Ist Army also.
As we emerged from the wood of Sadowa into the open we found still a
part of the great battery which had so long prevented us from debouching
here, but the teams and gunners lay stretched by the wrecked guns. There
was nothing else to be seen of the enemy over a wide distance.
The Austrian retreat from the position grasped by us on two sides, had
become inevitable, and had, in fact, been effected some time before.
Their admirable artillery, firing on to the last moment, had screened
their retreat and given the infantry a long start. The crossing of the
Bistritz seriously delayed the advance, especially of the cavalry, so
that only isolated detachments of it yet came up with the enemy.
We rode at a smart gallop across the wide field of battle, without
looking much about us on the scene of horror. Finally, we found our
three armies which had at last pushed on into a circumscribed space from
their several directions, and had got much mixed. It took twenty-four
hours to remedy the confusion and re-form the bodies; an immediate
pursuit was impossible, but the victory was complete.
The exhausted men now sought resting-places in the villages or the open
field as best they might. Anything that came to hand by way of food was
of course taken; my wandering ox probably among the rest. The
death-cries of pigs and geese were heard; but necessity knows no law,
and the baggage-waggons were naturally not on the spot.
The King, too, remained at a hamlet on the field. Only I and my two
officers had to journey some twenty-four miles back to Gitschin, where
the bureaux were.
We had set out thence at four in the morning, and had been fourteen
hours in the saddle. In the hurry of departure no one had thought of
providing himself with food. An Uhlan of the 2nd Regiment had bestowed
on me a slice of sausage, bread he had none himself. On our way back we
met the endless train of provision and ammunition waggons, often
extending all across the road. We did not reach our quarters till
midnight. There was nothing to eat even here at this hour, but I was so
exhausted that I threw myself on my bed in great-coat and sash, and fell
asleep instantly. Next morning new orders had to be prepared and laid
before his Majesty at Horitz.
The Great King[87] had needed to struggle for seven years to reduce the
might of Austria, which his more fortunate and also more powerful
grandson[88] had achieved in as many weeks. The campaign had proved
decisive in the first eight days from June 27th to July 3rd.
The war of 1866 was entered on not as a defensive measure to meet a
threat against the existence of Prussia, nor in obedience to public
opinion and the voice of the people: it was a struggle, long foreseen
and calmly prepared for, recognized as a necessity by the Cabinet, not
for territorial aggrandizement or material advantage, but for an ideal
end--the establishment of power. Not a foot of land was exacted from
defeated Austria, but she had to renounce all part in the hegemony of
Germany.
The Princes of the Reich had themselves to blame that the old Empire had
now for centuries allowed domestic politics to override German national
politics. Austria had exhausted her strength in conquests south of the
Alps while she left the western German provinces unprotected, instead of
following the road pointed out by the course of the Danube. Her centre
of gravity lay outside of Germany; Prussia's lay within it. Prussia felt
her strength, and that it behoved her to assume the leadership of the
German races. The regrettable but unavoidable exclusion of one of them
from the new Reich could only be to a small extent remedied by a
subsequent alliance. But Germany has become immeasurably greater without
Austria, than it was before with Austria.
But all this has nothing to do with the legends of which I am telling.
One of these has been sung in verse, and in fine verse too.
The scene is Versailles. The French are making a sortie from Paris, and
the generals, instead of betaking themselves to their fighting troops,
are assembled to consider whether head-quarters may safely remain any
longer at Versailles. Opinions are divided, no one dares speak out. The
Chief of the General Staff, who is above all called on to express his
views, remains silent. The perplexity seems to be great. Only the War
Minister rises and protests with the greatest emphasis against a measure
so injurious from a political and military point of view as a removal.
He is warmly thanked by the King as being the only man who has the
courage to speak the truth freely and fearlessly.
The truth is that while the King and his whole escort had ridden out to
the Vth Army Corps, the Marshal of the household, in his over-anxiety,
had the horses put to the royal carriages, and this became known in the
town; and indeed may have excited all sorts of hopes in the sanguine
inhabitants.
Versailles was protected by four Army Corps. It never entered anybody's
head to think of evacuating the town.
I can positively assert no Council of War was ever held either in 1866
or 1870--71.
Excepting on the march and on days of battle, an audience was regularly
held by his Majesty at ten o'clock, at which I, accompanied by the
Quartermaster-General, laid the latest reports and information before
him, and made our suggestions on that basis. The Chief of the Military
Cabinet and the Minister of War were also present, and while the
head-quarters of the IIIrd Army were at Versailles, the Crown Prince
also; but all merely as listeners. The King occasionally required them
to give him information on one point or another; but I do not remember
that he ever asked for advice concerning the operations in the field or
the suggestions I made.
These, which I always discussed beforehand with my staff officers, were,
on the contrary, generally maturely weighed by his Majesty himself. He
always pointed out with a military eye and an invariably correct
estimate of the situation, all the objections that might be raised to
their execution; but as in war every step is beset with danger, the
plans laid before him were invariably adopted.
FOOTNOTES:
[84] viz. The IInd Army, commanded by the Crown Prince of Prussia, which
was to strike the Austrian right flank and right rear; and the Army of
the Elbe, commanded by General Herwarth von Bittenfeld, which was to
strike the Austrian left flank.
[85] I have a history of the war, published at Tokio, in the Japanese
language, with very original illustrations. One of these has for its
title, "The King scolding the Army." [MOLTKE.]
[86] During a long peace the sphere of action of the War Minister's
department and the General Staff were not distinctly defined. The
providing for the troops in peace was the function of the former, and in
war time a number of official duties which could be superintended by the
central authorities at home. Thus the place of the Minister of War was
not at head-quarters, but at Berlin. The Chief of the General Staff, on
the other hand, from the moment when the mobilization is ordered,
assumes the whole responsibility for the marching and transport already
prepared for during peace, both for the first assembling of the forces,
and for their subsequent employment, for which he has only to ask the
consent of the Commander-in-Chief--always, with us, the King.
How necessary this disjunction of the two authorities is, I had to
experience in June, 1866. Without my knowledge the order had been given
for the VIIth Corps to remain on the Rhine. It was only by my
representations that the 16th Division was moved up into Bohemia, and
our numerical superiority thus brought up to a decisive strength.
[MOLTKE.]
[87] Frederick the Great.