outworks of Metz. At one o'clock the French garrison marched out by six
roads in perfect silence and correct military formation.[36] At each
specified position a Prussian Army Corps stood to receive the prisoners,
who were immediately placed in bivouacs previously prepared, and
supplied with food. The officers were allowed to keep their swords and
to return to Metz; provisions were immediately sent in.
Marshal Bazaine set out for Cassel.
In the course of the day the 26th Brigade occupied Metz. The city had
suffered no injury, but the state of the camps showed what the troops
had suffered during the siege of seventy-two days.
The Germans during that time had lost 240 officers and 5500 men in
killed and wounded.
Six thousand French officers and 167,000 men were taken prisoners,
beside 20,000 sick who could not be at once removed, about 200,000 in
all.[37] Fifty-six Imperial eagles, 622 field and 876 fortress guns, 72
mitrailleuses and 260,000 rifles fell into the hands of the Germans.
The prisoners were transported by way of Treves and Saarbruecken,
escorted by Landwehr battalions, and as these would have also to guard
them when in Germany, their return to field service was not to be
reckoned on.
FOOTNOTES:
[35] The Protocol embodying the terms of capitulation was signed on the
evening of the 27th; its provisions came into effect at and after 10
a.m. of the 29th.
[36] On the contrary, there were much drunkenness and disorder.
[37] The 20,000 sick were included in the total of 173,000 officers and
men surrendered.
NEW DISTRIBUTION OF THE ARMY.
The capitulation of Metz, which Prince Frederick Charles had brought
about under such serious difficulties, materially improved the prospects
of the war for Germany.
At the Royal Headquarter at Versailles, even before the catastrophe but
in confident anticipation of it, decisions had been arrived at as to the
respective destinations of the forces it would release for service, and
communicated in advance to the superior Commanders.
The Ist, VIIth and VIIIth Corps, with the 3rd Cavalry Division, were
thenceforth to constitute the Ist Army, under the command of General von
Manteuffel. Its orders were to advance into the Compiegne region and
cover the investment of Paris on the north. But apart from these orders
it had various other duties to fulfil; it was to occupy Metz and lay
siege to Thionville and Montmedy.
The IInd, IIIrd, IXth and Xth Corps, with the 1st Cavalry Division, were
to constitute the IInd Army under the command of Prince Frederick
Charles, which was ordered to advance on the Middle Loire.
OPERATIONS OF THE XIVTH CORPS IN THE SOUTH-EAST.
(October.)
Since the fall of Strasburg the newly-formed XIVth Corps had been
employed in safe-guarding the communications between the German armies
standing fast respectively before Metz and before Paris. General von
Werder had no great battle to look forward to, but a succession of
small engagements. To prepare his four infantry brigades for independent
action under such circumstances, he detailed artillery and cavalry to
each. In this formation the Corps crossed the Vosges by the two roads
through Schirmeck and Barr, driving swarms of hostile Franctireurs out
of the narrow passes without material delay. But on emerging from the
mountains it at once met with serious opposition.
The French General Cambriels had been at Epinal with about 30,000 men
ever since the beginning of October, and under cover of this force
numerous battalions of National Guards and Gardes-Mobiles had been
formed in the south of France.
On the 6th, General von Degenfeld[38] with the advanced guard of the
Baden force approached St. Die, marching on both banks of the Meurthe.
The weak column was beset on all sides by far superior forces, yet after
repeated attacks it succeeded in taking the villages which the enemy had
been holding.
The struggle, which lasted seven hours, ended with the eccentric retreat
of the enemy to Rambervillers and Bruyeres. It had cost the Germans 400
and the French 1400 men. The Baden force bivouacked on the field, and
presently found that the French had evacuated St. Die. General Cambriels
had, in fact, collected all his available forces in intrenched positions
about Bruyeres. The Baden Brigade advanced on these on the 11th, drove
the Gardes-Mobiles and volunteers from the outlying villages, climbed
the heights on both sides of the town, and forced its way into it with
inconsiderable loss. The enemy retired to the southward on Remiremont.
From the small resistance hitherto made by the French, though so far
superior in numbers, General von Werder assumed that they would hardly
make a stand before reaching Besancon, so he immediately countermanded
further pursuit, though somewhat early in the day, and concentrated his
forces on Epinal, which place was taken possession of by the Germans
after insignificant fighting. From thence an etappen-route and
telegraph-line were opened to Luneville and Nancy, magazines were
formed, and the trains, which were following the Corps from Saverne by
Blamont to Baccarat, were brought up. The railway along the Moselle
remained, however, useless for a long time, in consequence of injury
done to it by the enemy.
General von Werder was now anxious, in accordance with his instructions
of September 30th, to march on the Upper Seine by Neufchateau, but a
telegram from the supreme Headquarter directed him in the first instance
to complete the rout of the enemy in his vicinity under General
Cambriels.
The Corps accordingly put itself in motion forthwith through Conflans
and Luxeuil on Vesoul, and information was received that the enemy had
in fact halted at the Ognon, taken up quarters there, and received
reinforcements. General von Werder determined to attack at once. He
ordered that the passages over the river should be secured on the 22nd;
further decisions were postponed till reports should be brought in. The
1st Baden Brigade came up on the right by nine o'clock, reaching Marnay
and Pin without having encountered the French; it secured the bridges
there, and then halted to await further orders. On the left flank the
franctireurs were driven out of the woods by the 3rd Brigade, which also
stormed Perrouse, and at about half-past two seized the bridge over the
Ognon at Voray. In the centre the head of the advanced guard of the 2nd
Brigade entered Etuz after a slight skirmish, but had to withdraw at
eleven o'clock to the northern bank, before the enemy's flank attack
from out the woods. Afterwards, when the main force came up and the
artillery opened fire, the place was taken for the second time at one
o'clock. But a prolonged fire-fight ensued, the French making an
obstinate stand in front of the passage over the river at Cussey. Orders
had already been sent to the 1st Brigade to move up on the southern bank
from Pin on the enemy's flank and rear. But it could not reach the
ground until six o'clock, when the battle was over. When two batteries
had made good the possession of the bridge over the Ognon under a heavy
fire, the enemy hastily retired, pursued by the Badeners; he was again
driven out of his rearward positions, but when night fell he still
remained in possession of several points in front of Besancon.
The Germans had lost 120 men, the French 150 and 200 prisoners. In
opposition to Gambetta, who was himself in Besancon, General Cambriels
obstinately resisted every order to renew the advance, and would only
consent to maintain his strong position under the walls of the fortress.
Parties sent out to reconnoitre on the right reported the presence of
French forces at Dole and Auxonne, the advance-guard probably of an
"Army of the Vosges" under Garibaldi, which was assembling on the Doubs.
General von Werder disregarded it, and on the 26th moved his Corps to
Dampierre and Gray. Beyond the Saone all the roads were broken up, the
woods choked with abatis, and the whole population in arms. But the
franctireurs and Gardes-Mobiles were dispersed without difficulty, and a
column marching without any precautions was driven back on the Vingeanne
brook, where 15 officers and 430 men laid down their arms.
From further reports and the information of the prisoners it was known
that Dijon was strongly garrisoned. In expectation, therefore, of an
attack from that side, the XIVth Corps was assembled behind the
Vingeanne, whence early on October 30th General von Beyer[39] marched on
Dijon with the 1st and 3rd Brigades. Filled with apprehension by recent
events, the National Guards in Dijon had already laid down their arms,
the Gardes-Mobiles and the line troops of the garrison had retreated
southwards; but the inhabitants were assured that the forces would be
brought back to defend them. About 8000 men were available, but they
insisted on their commander pledging himself to fight only outside the
city.
The advanced posts on the Tille were driven in by the Baden advanced
guard; the village of St. Apollinaire and the neighbouring heights were
taken with a rush at noon, in spite of a hot fire. Meanwhile the main
body had come up, and at three o'clock six German batteries opened fire.
The vineyards and numerous farmsteads in the neighbourhood of Dijon, and
especially the strongly barricaded park south of the city, gave the
defence a great advantage. Nevertheless, the Baden infantry continued
its steady advance and closed in on the northern and eastern suburbs by
a wide encircling movement.
Here a fierce combat ensued, in which the inhabitants took part. House
after house had to be stormed, but the attack came to a stand at the
deep-cut bed of the Suzon brook, which borders the city on the east. It
was four o'clock, and the impending struggle could not be ended before
dark. General von Beyer therefore broke off the fight; the battalions
were withdrawn and retired to quarters in the adjacent villages; only
the artillery still kept up its fire.
The Germans had lost about 150 and the French 100 men; but of the latter
200 were taken prisoners.
In the course of the night a deputation came out to beg that the town
might be spared; its members undertook to furnish supplies for 20,000
men, and to guarantee the good behaviour of the inhabitants. The Baden
troops took possession of Dijon on the 31st.
Meanwhile fresh instructions had reached General von Werder. They
prescribed that he was to protect the left flank of the IInd Army
advancing to the Loire and at the same time to cover Alsace and the
troops besieging Belfort, where two reserve Divisions had now arrived.
It was intended that the XIVth Corps, while retaining its hold on Dijon,
should also move to Vesoul and hold in check from there the gathering of
hostile troops round Besancon and at Langres. Some offensive movement on
Chalons[40] and Dole was also insisted on.
General von Werder's position was more difficult than was recognized at
Versailles. At Besancon alone there were 45,000 French troops, under the
command of a new leader, General Crouzat. Garibaldi had collected 12,000
between Dole and Auxonne; lower down the Saone valley a new Corps was
being formed of 18,000 men, and 12,000 National Guards and
Gardes-Mobiles threatened from Langres the flank of the isolated German
Corps. But the French, instead of attacking this slender force with
overwhelming numbers--spread out as it was over a distance of fifty-six
miles from Lure to Dijon and Gray--were haunted by the apprehension that
the Germans, reinforced from Metz, might be intending an attack on
Lyons. General Crouzat, leaving a strong garrison in Besancon,
consequently marched to Chagny, where up to November 12th he was
reinforced from the south to a strength of 50,000 men. The Garibaldian
volunteers moved up to Autun to protect Bourges.
General von Werder meanwhile had occupied Vesoul, and had the south face
of the city put in a state of defence.
The only event of importance during the course of October which remains
to be mentioned was the action taken against the French forts lying
rearward of the German armies.
At the beginning of the month the newly constituted 4th Reserve
Division, of fifteen battalions, eight squadrons, thirty-six guns, and
a company of fortress-pioneers, had assembled in Baden, and crossed the
Rhine at Neuenburg. The vicinity was first cleared of franctireurs,
Muelhausen was occupied, and, by the express desire of its municipal
authorities, the excited artisan inhabitants were disarmed. General von
Schmeling (commanding the Division) was instructed to besiege
Neu-Breisach and Schlettstadt, and at once set about the investment of
each of these places with a brigade. On October 7th the East Prussian
Landwehr invested Breisach, and the field-batteries shelled the place,
but without effect. The other brigade, having been forced to detach
considerably, reached Schlettstadt very weak, but was reinforced by
Etappen troops to such extent that the place was invested with 8
battalions, 2 squadrons, and 2 batteries. At the same time 12 companies
of fortress-artillery and 4 companies of pioneers arrived from Strasburg
with the necessary siege material, and an artillery park of fifty-six
heavy guns was established at St. Pilt; the engineer park was located at
Kinzheim.
FOOTNOTES:
[38] Commanding 2nd Baden Brigade.
[39] Commanding Baden Division.
[40] Chalons-sur-Saone.
REDUCTION OF SCHLETTSTADT.
(October 24th.)
At the beginning of the blockade, inundations and marsh-land rendered
Schlettstadt, a fortified town of 10,000 inhabitants, unapproachable on
the east and south, and partly on the north. The place itself, perfectly
safe from storm, with high walls and a wet ditch, was armed with 120
guns, but garrisoned with only 2000 men, for the most part
Gardes-Mobiles. There was a deficiency of safe casemates, and on the
west front vineyards and hedgerows favoured the near approach of
assaults, while the railway embankment was a ready-made protecting wall
for the construction of the first parallel. To divert the attention of
the besieged from this front of attack, a battery was constructed on the
20th at the Kappel Mill on the south-east, from which fire was opened on
the barracks and magazine in the town, and on the sluice which
maintained the inundation. By the evening of the 21st, the infantry
posts had advanced to within 400 paces of the glacis, and the
construction of the first parallel was proceeded with that night,
immediately behind the railway, as well as of emplacements for six
batteries within 1230 feet from the ramparts. The garrison fired in the
dark on the entire field of attack, but almost without effect. By the
morning the trenches were two feet wide and three and a half feet deep,
and 20 heavy guns and 8 mortars were ready to open fire. A hot artillery
duel now began with the fortress, which replied very steadily. The
battery at the mill subjected the west front to a telling reverse fire,
and several guns and embrasures were severely damaged. The town was
fired at several points, and the defenders' fire gradually ceased.
During the night, which was very stormy, the batteries of the attack
kept up their fire, the parallel was widened and two new batteries were
begun.
At daybreak of the 24th the white flag was seen flying, and a
capitulation was forthwith signed, by which Schlettstadt surrendered
with its garrison and war-material. The commandant begged the Germans to
take possession at once, as the greatest disorder reigned within the
town. The public buildings were being plundered by the mob and the
drunken soldiery, and a powder-magazine was actually on fire. The German
battalions promptly restored order, extinguished the flames, and took
away the prisoners. Seven thousand stand of arms fell into German
hands, besides the fortress artillery and a large quantity of stores.
The siege had cost the victors only twenty men. Schlettstadt was
occupied by Etappen troops, and the battalions released from duty there
marched into southern Alsace, three of them going to strengthen the
siege of Breisach, which was now being proceeded with.
REDUCTION OF BREISACH.
(November 10th.)
This fortress, lying in the plain and of very symmetrical shape, was
proof against a coup-de-main because of its ditches, which were dry
indeed, but faced with solid masonry. The garrison of over 5000 men had
well-protected quarters in the bomb-proof casemates of the ravelins.
Fort Mortier, standing near the Rhine, and constructed for independent
defence, effectually commanded the ground over which the intended attack
must be made on the north-west front of the fortress. Therefore 12 heavy
guns were brought up from Rastatt to Alt Breisach, where the right bank
of the Rhine commands the fort at effective range.
It was not till near the end of October that the siege-guns arrived
before New Breisach from Schlettstadt, and when the infantry had closed
up and all preparations were complete, fire from 24 heavy guns was
opened on the fortress on November 2nd from Wolfgantzen, Biesheim and
Alt Breisach.
By three o'clock a large part of the town was on fire, and detachments
of infantry were skirmishing with the French posts at the foot of the
glacis. Fort Mortier had suffered exceptionally severely. Nevertheless,
an attempt to storm it was repulsed, but at six o'clock it capitulated,
an utter ruin. Only one gun remained in serviceable condition. Two new
mortar batteries were erected to shell the main fortress, the defence
became perceptibly more feeble, and on November 10th Breisach
surrendered on the same terms as Schlettstadt, but the garrison was
allowed to march out with the honours of war. The fortifications were
almost uninjured, but the town was for the most part burnt down or
severely damaged. The success had cost the Germans only 70 men; 108
guns, 6000 small arms and large quantities of stores fell into their
hands.
While these strongholds in Alsace-Lorraine were thus being reduced,
Verdun still intercepted the line of railway which formed the shortest
line of communication with Germany.
TAKING OF VERDUN.
(November 9th.)
This place, too, was made quite storm-free by high walls and deep wet
ditches; but, on the other hand, it was surrounded by a ring of heights
whence it could be seen into, and at the foot of these heights villages
and vineyards favoured an approach to within a short distance of the
outworks.
The fortress was armed with 140 guns and abundantly victualled, and the
garrison, which had been supplemented by escaped prisoners, was 6000
strong. A bombardment by field-artillery had already proved perfectly
ineffectual. For a long time Verdun was only under observation, at first
by cavalry, and afterwards by a small mixed force. At the end of
September the 65th Regiment and twelve companies of Landwehr assembled
under General von Gayl before the east face of the place. It was not
till October 9th that two companies of fortress-artillery brought up
some French heavy guns from Toul and Sedan. The infantry now advanced to
within a few hundred paces of the west and north fronts and there
established itself. Under this cover the construction of the batteries
was begun on the evening of October 12th.
The heavy ground after the rain, and the rocky subsoil very thinly
covered, made the work uncommonly difficult, yet by next morning
fifty-two guns were able to open fire. But the fortress replied with
such effect that before noon two batteries on the Cote de Hayvaux on the
westward were reduced to inaction.
In the course of this three days' artillery engagement, 15 German guns
were placed out of action, the artillery lost 60 men and the infantry
40. The disabled guns on the walls of the enemy were constantly replaced
by fresh ones.
The garrison, which was far stronger than the besiegers, now assumed the
offensive. During the stormy night of the 19th--20th, the picquets on
the Hayvaux were overpowered, and the guns in the battery there were
spiked. On the 28th a sortie in greater force was made. The French
climbed up Mont St. Michel, lying northward of Verdun, and destroyed the
breast-works and bomb-proofs of the batteries, from which, however, the
guns had been withdrawn. Another body pushed up the Hayvaux, and as the
soaked state of the ground prevented the guns from being withdrawn, they
were totally disabled. The villages in the neighbourhood were also
occupied by the French.
It was now evident that the means hitherto brought to bear on the
reduction of Verdun were quite inadequate. But after the fall of Metz
the Ist Army was able to send up reinforcements. At the end of the month
5 battalions and 2 companies of pioneers and several of artillery
arrived, and also a quantity of German material.
The siege park now numbered 102 guns with abundant ammunition, and
preparations were at once made for a regular attack.
But for this the garrison did not wait. After an armistice had been
granted, the place capitulated on November 8th, in virtue of which the
garrison, with exception of the local National Guards, became prisoners
of war. The officers were dismissed on parole with their swords and
personal property, and it was agreed that the war-material in store
should be given back on the conclusion of peace.
ADVANCE OF IST AND IIND ARMIES UP TO MID NOVEMBER.
The Ist Army having in addition undertaken the siege of Mezieres, the
1st Infantry Division moved on that place, and the 3rd Brigade, sent
forward by railway to Soissons, on November 15th set about the siege of
the small fortress of La Fere. The rest of the Ist Corps reached Rethel
on the same day, the VIIIth Rheims, and the 3rd Cavalry Division Tagnon,
between the two places named. The VIIth Corps was still fully engaged in
guarding the prisoners and in besieging Thionville and Montmedy.
Of the IInd Army the IXth Corps and 1st Cavalry Division reached Troyes
on the 10th, the IIIrd Vendeuvre, the Xth Neufchateau and Chaumont. The
important railway connections there and at Bologne were occupied, and
the injury done to the line to Blesme was repaired, so as to open up a
new line of communication. The health of the German forces had been
materially improved by short marches along good roads and by abundant
supplies; but a telegram from Versailles now ordered an accelerated
advance.
The Government in Paris being powerless, the Delegation at Tours was
displaying increased activity. Gambetta, as Minister both of War and of
the Interior, was exercising the power almost of a Dictator, and the
fiery energy of this remarkable man had achieved the feat of placing
600,000 armed men and 1400 guns in the field in the course of a few
weeks.
In the Arrondissements the National Guards were formed into companies
and battalions; then in each Department these were consolidated into
brigades; and finally the brigades were incorporated along with the
nearest troops of the line and Gardes-Mobiles into the larger
Army-Corps.
Thus, in the course of October, under cover of the troops of General
d'Aurelle de Paladines which had re-crossed the Loire, a new XVIIth
Corps was made up at Blois, another, the XVIIIth, at Gien, and a third,
under Admiral Jaures, at Nogent le Rotrou. A large force was in Picardy
under General Bourbaki, another at Rouen under Briand, and a third on
the left bank of the Seine under Fiereck.
The detachments of the army investing Paris, which were pushed forward
to the south, west, and north, already met in all directions strong
forces of the enemy, which they indeed repulsed in many small
encounters, but could not follow up to the places of their origin. For
such purposes the arrival of the army released from the siege of Metz
was needed, and this was not to be looked for before some time in
November, while now in October there was threatened a general advance of
the French forces on Paris.
Having regard to the inferior strength of General von Tann's Division
holding Orleans, at a French council of war held at Tours it was decided
to recover that important place. The attack was to be delivered chiefly
from the west. The French XVth Corps--two Infantry Divisions and one of
Cavalry--therefore assembled at Mer on the northern bank of the Lower
Loire, and the main body of the XVIth behind the forest of Marchenoir.
The remaining portions of both Corps were to co-operate on the Upper
Loire by way of Gien. Any further advance was not projected, at any rate
for the present; on the contrary, General d'Aurelle's instructions were
to form an intrenched camp about Orleans for 200,000 men.
General von Tann's reconnoitring parties to the westward everywhere met
hostile detachments, which were indeed driven back by restraining
skirmishes into the forest of Marchenoir without much difficulty, but
which betrayed the vicinity of large forces of the enemy. On the whole
an attack from the south-west on the investing army before Paris seemed
the likeliest event, since this would threaten both the German
Head-quarter in Versailles and the siege-park at Villacoublay; while the
German reinforcements from the eastward would have the furthest distance
to reach the quarter indicated.
The French forces to the west of Orleans were already extended over a
wide stretch of country from Beaugency to Chateaudun. The volunteers
grew bolder every day, and the people more hostile.
At last, in quest of some more accurate information, Count Stolberg
(commanding 2nd Cavalry Division) on November 7th made a reconnaissance
in force. Three regiments of the 2nd Cavalry Division, two batteries,
and some companies of Bavarian Infantry advanced by Ouzouer and drove
the enemy out of Marolles, but they found the skirts of the forest
strongly held.
General Chanzy had brought up all his immediately available troops to
St. Laurent des Bois. A sharp fire-fight ensued, lasting about half an
hour, which caused severe losses in the Bavarian infantry; and then, as
the great superiority of the French was evident, the engagement was
broken off.
As a matter of fact, both the French Corps were already in full march on
Orleans. Reaching the forest on the 8th, they occupied it firmly, their
right wing at Messas and Meung, their left at Ouzouer. The XVth Corps
was next to move to the right to the Mauve and the XVIth to the left on
Coulmiers. The heads of those Corps showed themselves at Bardon and
Charsonville respectively. Both the French Cavalry Divisions were
directed northward on Prenouvellon to turn the right wing of the
Bavarians with a force of ten regiments, six batteries, and numerous
volunteer bands, and thus to cut off their retreat on Paris.
To counteract this attempt the Bavarian Cuirassier Brigade started for
St. Peravy, the 2nd Cavalry Division for Baccon, and, further south, the
2nd Bavarian Infantry Division advancing from Orleans held the country
about Huisseau and St. Ay.
But an attack was also threatening the German rear from the considerable
force at Gien. General von der Tann realized that it was now the last
moment when he could hope to extricate himself from so hazardous a
position; and that same evening he issued the necessary orders. However
desirable it was to keep possession of Orleans, he could not accept
battle in so thickly wooded country, where the action of his relatively
strong artillery and cavalry would be seriously impeded, and where
indeed he might be entirely hemmed in. The General, however, determined
to strike at the most immediately threatening hostile force in the open
country about Coulmiers, where he would at the same time be nearer to
the 22nd Division at Chartres, on which he could call for support.
General von Wittich had already asked and obtained permission to fall
back on Orleans, but on the 9th he had only reached Voves, with his
cavalry at Orgeres; thus he could not take any direct part in that day's
fighting.
The IInd Army was in full march from Metz, but on this day its head had
but just arrived at Troyes.
ENGAGEMENT AT COULMIERS.
(November 9th.)
Left thus to its own resources, the Ist Bavarian Corps moved out in the
night, and on the morning of the 9th stood concentrated on the skirts of
the forest between Chateau Montpipeau and Rosieres, with the village of
Coulmiers in its front. The Bavarian Cuirassiers on the right wing
protected the line of retreat by St. Sigismond; the 2nd Cavalry Division
was distributed by brigades along the whole front, with detachments well
in advance and infantry posts ready in support. Only a small detachment
remained in Orleans after the bridge over the Loiret had been destroyed,
to protect the numerous sick and wounded in the field hospitals, and
occupy the city at any rate till the result of the fight was decided.
The first reports brought in that morning were of the advance of a
strong hostile column from Cravant on Fontaines and Le Bardon. This was
Rebillard's Brigade, which, as it seemed, aimed at turning the Bavarian
left flank and marching direct on Orleans. To oppose it on the bank of
the Mauve, General von der Tann at about nine o'clock sent the 3rd
Brigade in a southerly direction to Prefort, a little over two miles
distant, and as at the same time a sharp contest had now begun at the
outposts near Baccon, the 1st Brigade marched to La Renardiere. The
remainder of the Corps remained in and behind Coulmiers. The General's
intention was to assume the offensive from this point against the
enemy's left flank, if, as seemed probable, the latter should attempt to
push his chief attack across the Mauve. In furtherance of this intention
the cavalry of the right flank was ordered to close in to Coulmiers.
But the superior strength of the French allowed of their fetching a much
wider compass to the left. While General d'Aurelle with the XVth Corps
detained the Bavarians southward of the road from Ouzouer to Orleans,
General Chanzy advanced with Barry's Division against their centre and
directed Jaureguiberry's Division northward against their right; and
finally the strong force of French cavalry under General Reyau moved in
the direction of Patay, thus threatening the German communication with
Paris.
This movement of the French XVIth Corps compelled General von Tann, at
the very beginning of the engagement, to despatch the 2nd Brigade, which
had constituted his reserve, to prolong his right wing northwards
towards Champs, and thus obtain touch with the 4th Cavalry Brigade. The
Bavarian Cuirassiers, retiring according to orders from St. Peravy to
the southward, about eleven o'clock encountered Reyau's cavalry, which,
however, restricted itself to a mere cannonade.
Meanwhile, after a stout resistance, the advanced posts of the Bavarians
had been driven in by the enemy's superior strength. The 1st Rifle
Battalion, after having retarded the advance of the French
horse-batteries through Champdry for a long time, retreated from Baccon
to La Riviere,[41] where it expected to be received by the 2nd (Rifle
Battalion). But the situation of the latter soon became very critical.
Peytavin's Division closely followed up through Baccon, beset La Riviere
with five batteries, and then attacked the burning village from three
sides at once. After energetic reprisals the Riflemen retired in good
order on the 1st Brigade in Renardiere, where General Dietl had taken up
a position for defence.
After the evacuation of Baccon by the Bavarians, Barry's Division had
continued its advance through Champdry, and its batteries deployed
opposite Coulmiers and in front of Saintry, in preparation for an
assault by strong lines of tirailleurs.
The 4th Bavarian Brigade occupied the park extending to the west; the
quarries further in front were occupied by two battalions, two others
were sent to the right to the farmsteads of Ormeteau and Vaurichard, so
as to keep up some sort of communication with the 2nd Brigade. One
battery to the south and four batteries to the north of Coulmiers were
supported by the 5th Cavalry Brigade.
Thus at noon the Bavarian Corps, with only three brigades, held the
ground from Renardiere to the front of Gemigny, its front
disproportionately extended to a length of more than four miles. But the
French right wing remained quite inactive, so that the 3rd Brigade which
had been sent to Prefort was recalled to Renardiere.
When the French Corps had made good its foothold opposite the thin
Bavarian line, it attacked in earnest at about one o'clock.
The Riflemen in Renardiere had indeed repulsed the enemy's first rush,
but this position was no longer tenable with only four battalions
against the whole of Peytavin's Division. At about one o'clock General
Dietl retired unmolested, under cover of an intermediate position, on
the wood of Montpipeau, and occupied its border. Here he was joined by
the 3rd Brigade, which on its retirement from Prefort had found
Renardiere already evacuated. The French had followed up from thence but
hesitatingly, came under the fire of six batteries between the points of
the forests at La Planche and Coulmiers, and made no further advance
with their right wing.
In the centre Barry's Division about one o'clock had driven the Bavarian
Riflemen out of the stone-quarries in front of Coulmiers. Not till three
o'clock did it advance to a renewed general attack on the 4th Brigade,
which was repulsed by the fire of the German guns and the repeated
charges of the 5th Cavalry Brigade.
Meanwhile, d'Aries' Brigade of the XVth French Corps, after leaving
Renardiere, arrived southward of Coulmiers, and its batteries
strengthened the fire which was being directed on that village. The
Bavarian guns were compelled before the rush of the French tirailleurs
to take ground further in rear, where they resumed their activity, while
the infantry drove the French out of the park at the point of the
bayonet.
But after four hours' fighting the resistance of this single brigade
against three French brigades had become extremely arduous. Of the whole
Corps only two battalions remained intact as a reserve at Bonneville, no
reinforcement was to be looked for from anywhere, and on the right flank
the French threatened the communications with Chartres as well as with
Paris. At four in the afternoon General von der Tann gave orders to
break off the fight and to retire by brigades from the left wing on
Artenay.
Fresh troops of the enemy at this moment forced their way into the park
of Coulmiers. Colonel Count von Ysenburg held the eastern outlets of the
village, and withdrew his troops by alternate echelons through Gemigmy
in good order.
It now proved of the greatest importance that the 2nd Brigade should
have been able to maintain its position in front of this village, thus
covering the further retreat.
At noon, General von Orff (in command of the Brigade), on approaching
Champs and Cheminiers, had found these villages occupied by Deplanque's
French Brigade. First he silenced its artillery, then he deployed his
four battalions for action, with the 4th Cavalry Brigade on the right
flank.
Reyau's Cavalry ere long came up between these two villages, after it
had given up its two hours' cannonade against the Bavarian Cuirassiers
and had been driven out of St. Sigismond by dismounted hussars. But this
body of horse soon got out from under the fire of the Bavarian guns and
moved off to the westward, it was said because it mistook Lipkowski's
volunteers, skirmishing further to the north, for German reinforcements
advancing. And when the Bavarian horse-batteries opened fire on Champs
from the north-east, the French abandoned the place at about two
o'clock, in great disorder.
General von Orff now brought the artillery up to within 500 paces of
Cheminiers, and marched the infantry up through the intervals.
Admiral Jaureguiberry, however, arriving in person, succeeded in
rallying the wavering troops, and this attack failed. The French
batteries soon compelled the Bavarian horse-batteries to retire.
When, at about three o'clock, Bourdillon's Brigade and the reserve
artillery of the XVIth French Corps also arrived at Champs, and news was
brought of the state of the fighting at Coulmiers, General von Orff
determined to refrain from all further attack, and confined himself to
maintaining his position in front of Gemigny to the last extremity.
Unshaken by the fire of the numerous hostile batteries, the weak brigade
repulsed the repeated attacks of the enemy.
Thus the 4th Brigade was enabled unmolested to retire from Coulmiers by
Gemigny and St. Peravy, and the 1st, from Montpipeau further eastward,
on Coinces. The 2nd Brigade followed to Coinces, and finally the 3rd
formed the rear-guard as far as St. Sigismond, where it halted and
bivouacked. The cavalry covered the retreat on all sides.
After a short rest the retreat of the main body was continued during the
night, by very bad roads. Artenay was reached by the morning. Orleans
was evacuated, and the garrison which had been left there rejoined its
Corps. The stores were conveyed by railway back to Toury; but one
ammunition column, 150 prisoners, and the sick who could not be moved,
fell into the hands of the French.
This contest of 20,000 Germans against 70,000 French cost the former
about 800 in killed and wounded; the enemy's loss was nearly double.
From Artenay, on November 10th, the 2nd Brigade undertook the duty of
covering the further march on Toury, where close quarters were
available. Thither, too, came the 22nd Division from Chartres, and took
up a position at Janville close to the Bavarians. General von der Tann
had extricated himself from a difficult position with much skill and
good fortune. The enemy did not attempt a pursuit. General d'Aurelle
restricted himself to awaiting further reinforcements in a strong
position before Orleans. The French preparations were, however, in
greater activity on the Upper Loir and the Eure.
On the German side the IInd Army Corps arrived before Paris on the 5th
of November; the 3rd Division was included in the investing line between
the Seine and Marne; the 4th moved on to Longjumeau.
When the Guard Landwehr took possession of the peninsula of Argenteuil,
a brigade of the IVth Corps became available for service on the north
side of the capital. On the south side, the 17th Division at
Rambouillet, the 22nd at Chartres, and the Bavarian Corps, which had
moved to Ablis, with the 4th and 6th Cavalry Divisions, were ultimately
formed into a separate Army-Detachment of the IIIrd Army, under the
command of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg, and it was ordered to betake
itself in the first instance to Dreux.
FOOTNOTE:
[41] According to the _Staff History_, on La Renardiere and La Grande
Motte.
OPERATIONS OF THE GRAND DUKE OF MECKLENBURG.
On the 17th of November the 17th Division advanced by Maintenon. On the
left, a French detachment was driven back across the Blaise; and when a
few companies of marines, who attempted to block the high-road, had been
disposed of, General von Tresckow (commanding the Division) marched into
Dreux that evening. The combat had cost the Germans 50 men, the French
150 and 50 prisoners.
Prince Frederick Charles, whose forces were now at length assembled
before Orleans in face of the enemy, expressed the wish that the (Grand
Duke's) Detachment should advance on Tours by way of Le Mans. The Grand
Duke accordingly marched on Nogent le Rotrou, which place, being the
central rendezvous of the French levies, promised to be the scene of an
obstinate resistance.
After several skirmishes the Detachment approached the place, but when
on the 22nd preparations were being made to storm it from three sides,
it was found that the enemy had already evacuated it. At the same time
orders arrived from the supreme Headquarter, instructing the Grand Duke
to fall back at once on Beaugency to join the right wing of the IInd
Army, which it was necessary should immediately be reinforced in view of
the superior strength of the enemy. "The force now massing before
Orleans is to postpone all hostilities until the arrival of the
Detachment. The slight opposition offered by the French on the Eure and
Huisne sufficiently shows that no serious danger threatens on that side;
the enemy in that quarter need only be kept under observation by
cavalry." The Detachment was not to be permitted even a single rest day,
and its march was to be conducted with the utmost speed.
On the 23rd, the Divisions had closed up on their respective heads, and
the Grand Duke on the 24th moved on Chateaudun and Vendome; but the
Bavarian Corps only got as far as Vibraye, while the two Prussian
Divisions withdrew from the difficult country of the Perche, and the
cavalry found the whole line of the Loir held by the enemy.
In fact, the French had sent a brigade of the troops massed behind the
forest of Marchenoir by railway to Vendome, expressly to protect the
Government at Tours, while General de Sonis had advanced with the rest
of the XVIIth Corps on Brou. Here on the 25th his advance met an
ammunition column and bridge-train of the Bavarian Corps. At first only
the 10th Cavalry Brigade could engage the enemy, but when presently two
companies and eight guns had occupied the bridge over the Loir at
Yevres, the waggons were got through Brou in safety, and the enemy could
not enter that place till the cavalry had continued its march.
The Bavarian Corps was meanwhile advancing on Mondoubleau and St.
Calais, not certainly the shortest route to Beaugency, but, on the
contrary, on the direct road to Tours. The two Divisions only reached
the vicinity of Vibraye and Authon.
The appearance of a hostile force at Brou was deemed of sufficient
importance to justify a detour by that place, postponing for the moment
the prescribed march on the Loire. But when the 22nd Division approached
Brou on the 26th, it found that the enemy had already retired during the
night. The Government at Tours had ordered the whole of the XVIIth
Corps to concentrate at Vendome for their protection. But when the
German cavalry made its appearance at Cloyes and Freteval, General Sonis
considered that he could not pursue his march further along the Loir,
and made a detour by Marchenoir. But two night-marches so shattered the
levies for the first time collected in mass that whole swarms of
stragglers wandered about the neighbourhood all day and could only with
difficulty be re-assembled at Beaugency.
To imbue the operations with unity of command, the Grand Duke was now,
by instruction from the supreme Head-quarter, placed under Prince
Frederick Charles's orders, and General von Stosch[42] was despatched to
undertake the duties of Chief of the Staff to the Detachment. That force
by the Prince's orders was to come in with all speed to Janville,
whither troops of the IXth Corps would be sent to meet it by way of
Orgeres.
The Grand Duke therefore marched, on the 27th, with both his (Prussian)
Divisions (17th and 22nd) to Bonneval, where there was already a
squadron of the 2nd Cavalry Division. The Bavarian Corps, which, after
finding Brou abandoned, had been directed on Courtalin, marched to
Chateaudun. Having thus accomplished a junction with the IInd Army, the
sorely fatigued troops of the Detachment were allowed a day's rest on
the 28th, in quarters on the Loir.
FOOTNOTE:
[42] Until then Commissary-General. He succeeded Colonel von Krenski as
the Grand Duke's Chief of Staff.
SITUATION OF IIND ARMY.
(Second half of November.)
Prince Frederick Charles had hastened the advance of his army as much as
possible, but it had met with many hindrances. The roads were broken
up, National Guards and franctireurs stood watchful for mischief, and
even the country people had taken up arms. However, by November 14th the
IXth Corps with the 1st Cavalry Division reached Fontainebleau, whence
it pursued its march to Angerville. The IIIrd Corps was following on
Pithiviers. Of the Xth Corps the 40th Brigade was left at Chaumont, to
make connection with the XIVth Corps; the 36th reached Montargis and
Beaune la Rolande on the 21st.[43] The two brigades following in rear
(37th and 39th) had a sharp encounter on the 24th at Ladon and
Maizieres. In this combat 170 French prisoners were taken, who belonged
to a corps which, as General von Werder had already reported, was
proceeding under General Crouzat's command from Chagny to Gien by
railway. The order of battle was found on an officer who was among the
prisoners.
That while the Grand Duke's Detachment was marching to join it, the IInd
Army, only now fully concentrated, was in very close proximity to
considerable forces of the enemy, was ascertained beyond doubt by
several reconnoissances.
On the 24th troops of the IXth Corps advanced along the great high-road.
A few shells caused the enemy to evacuate Artenay, pursued by the
cavalry as far as Croix Briquet. Early in the same day a mixed
detachment of all arms from the IIIrd Corps reached Neuville aux Bois.
Two detachments of the 38th Brigade marched on Bois Commun and
Bellegarde, but everywhere those inquisitive reconnaissances were met by
very superior numbers of the enemy.
It was ascertained that the position of the French before Orleans
extended for about 37 miles from the Conie to Loing; and the massing of
troops, especially on their (right) flank, made it highly probable that
they proposed advancing by Fontainebleau on the rear of the besieging
army. Still, this intention was not so evident as to justify Prince
Frederick Charles in leaving the great highways from Orleans to Paris
unguarded. However, to enable him to lend his left wing timely support
in case of need, he moved the 5th Infantry Division of the IIIrd Corps
and the 1st Cavalry Division to Boynes, nearer to the Xth Corps which
was weak, and the 6th Division occupied Pithiviers in their stead. The
quarters at Bazoches vacated by the 6th Division, were assigned to the
IXth Corps. Finally, the Grand Duke received orders to reach Toury with
his heads of columns by the 29th at latest. These dispositions were all
carried out in due course.
Immediately after its success at Coulmiers the French Army of the Loire
seemed for the moment only to have thought of securing itself against a
counter-blow. It retired on Orleans, threw up extensive entrenchments,
for which marine artillery was even brought up from Cherbourg, and
awaited the arrival of further reinforcements. The XXth Corps, already
mentioned, 40,000 strong, joined the XVth, XVIth, and XVIIth at Gien, in
addition to one Division of the XVIIIth newly assembled at Nevers, and
finally the volunteer bands under Cathelineau and Lipowski.
Thus the French Army round Orleans numbered 200,000; the German infantry
opposed to this host for the time reached a strength of not more than
45,000 men.
Gambetta soon became urgent for renewed offensive operations. As General
d'Aurelle raised objections to an advance by Pithiviers and Malesherbes,
the Dictator himself took in hand the dispositions. In the night of the
22nd--23rd he telegraphed orders from Tours that the XVth Corps was at
once to assemble at Chilleurs aux Bois and reach Pithiviers on the 24th;
the XXth to march to Beaune la Rolande; and that then both Corps were to
advance by way of Fontainebleau on Paris. The General pointed out that,
according to his reckoning, 80,000 Germans must be encountered in an
open country, and that it would be more advisable to await their attack
in an intrenched position. Further, that this movement could be of no
service in affording succour to the distressed capital, and that
meanwhile there would remain unperformed the strengthening of the right
wing, where on the 24th the unsteadiness of the XVIIIth and XXth Corps
had caused the loss of the already mentioned fight at Ladon and
Maizieres.
In accordance with instructions received from Tours on the 26th, General
Crouzat ordered the advance for the 28th of the two Corps he
commanded--the XVIIIth by the right through Juranville, the XXth by the
left through Bois Commun--for an encompassing attack on Beaune la
Rolande. The XVth Corps in addition was moved up to Chambon in support,
and Cathelineau's volunteers went forward to Courcelles.
As we have seen, on this same day the Grand Duke's Detachment had come
up on the extreme right of the IInd German Army. On the left stood the
Xth Corps with the 38th Brigade at Beaune, the 39th at Les Cotelles; the
37th, with the Corps artillery, had advanced to Marcilly between these
two places.
FOOTNOTE:
[43] There seems some confusion here. The 36th Brigade belonged, not to
the Xth, but to the IXth Corps. The 38th Brigade is stated in the _Staff
History_ to have reached Beaune la Rolande on 23rd, the rest of the
Corps (exclusive of the 40th Brigade) still behind at Montargis.
BATTLE OF BEAUNE LA ROLANDE.
(November 28th.)
The French attack on November 28th failed because of the miscarriage of
the projected combination, the two separate attempts exerting little
reciprocal influence. On the right, the head of the XVIIIth Corps struck
the outposts of the 39th Brigade at an early hour, in front of
Juranville and Lorcy. Not until after a stout resistance were these
driven in by about nine o'clock on Les Cotelles and behind the
railway-embankment at Corbeilles, where they took possession of the
park.
The French could now deploy in the open country in front of Juranville,
and following up with strong lines of tirailleurs preceding them, they
forced their way into Corbeilles and drove the garrison out to the north
and west. But meanwhile, on the other side, a reinforcement from the
reserve at Marcilly reached Les Cotelles, and now Colonel von Valentini
passed to the attack of Juranville with the 56th Regiment. The artillery
could afford no co-operation, the enemy made an obstinate resistance,
and not till noon did he begin to retreat, while bitter fighting still
continued round some detached houses. But when strong columns came up
from Maizieres and Corbeilles, the Germans were compelled to abandon the
conquered village, carrying off with them 300 prisoners.
About two o'clock the greater portion of the French Corps deployed near
Juranville for an attack on the position at Long Cour, into which the
39th Brigade had retired. But since the attack had not been prepared by
artillery, it came to nothing under the fire of five Prussian batteries.
The first attack on Les Cotelles was also repulsed, but when it was
repeated an hour later, the Germans had to abandon the place with the
loss of fifty men taken prisoners. A gun, seven of the gunners of which
had fallen, sank so deep in the soft ground that the few men left could
not drag it out.
The XVIIIth French Corps, however, made no further way, but, as dusk
came on, contented itself with an ineffective cannonade, and finally the
39th Brigade was able to maintain its position abreast of Beaune.
On the left wing of the French line of battle the attack had also from
the first been of an encompassing tendency, the 2nd Division of the XXth
Corps having advanced on Beaune, and the 1st on Batilly. But it was near
noon before the arrival of part of its 3rd Division, which had remained
in reserve, enabled the enemy to drive in the German advanced posts from
Bois de la Leu to the cross-roads north-west of Beaune. And here also
the 38th Brigade soon found itself under the artillery and infantry fire
from Pierre Percee, the enemy continually gaining ground from the
northward. The retreat had to be continued along the Caesar road, whereon
a gun, of which the men and horses had for the most part perished, fell
into the enemy's hands. About the same time the 2nd French Division
ascended the heights to the east of Beaune, and Colonel von Cranach was
first enabled to rally the 57th Regiment further rearward, near La Rue
Boussier, whereby the withdrawal of the batteries hurrying away from
Marcilly was covered, and the further advance of the enemy was then
arrested. Any such effort on his part entirely ceased when he was
suddenly threatened on his own flank by the 1st Prussian Cavalry
Division advancing from Boynes, and came under fire of its
horse-batteries.
Meanwhile the 16th Regiment found itself completely isolated in Beaune,
and surrounded on three sides by the enemy.
The town, which was surrounded by the remains of a high wall, and the
churchyard were as far as possible prepared for defence. The enemy,
after his first onset by strong swarms of riflemen had been driven back,
set about bombarding the town. His shells burst through the walls of the
churchyard and set a few buildings on fire, but every attempt at an
assault was steadfastly repulsed.
In the meantime, General von Woyna had replenished the ammunition of his
batteries, and while occupying Romainville on the right, he also took up
a position opposite the copses of Pierre Percee, so that by three
o'clock he was able to bring up seven companies on the east side of
Beaune.
About this time assistance came with the arrival of the IIIrd Army
Corps. While the 6th Division was still pressing on towards Pithiviers,
the 5th had already that morning stood to arms in front of that place.
The first news from Beaune had sounded so far from alarming, that the
Corps-artillery retired to its quarters. Nevertheless, in consequence of
the increasing cannon thunder and later information of a serious
encounter, General von Alvensleben gave the word for the Corps to
advance, with the 5th Division of which General von Stuelpnagel had
already set out of his own initiative. The 6th followed, and detached a
battalion to observe towards Courcelles; wherein, however, Cathelineau's
volunteers remained inactive.
Part of the 52nd Regiment, which was marching at the head of the column,
turned off to the right, and, supported by artillery, began a fire-fight
about 4.30 against Arconville and Batilly. Another part penetrated into
the Bois de la Leu and the copses near La Pierre Percee, where it
recaptured the gun which had been lost there earlier. Four batteries in
position on the road from Pithiviers, behind Fosse des Pres, directed
their fire on the enemy still holding his ground on the west side of
Beaune, from which he was finally driven by the 12th Regiment, and
pursued as far as Mont Barrois.
After dark the Xth Corps encamped about Long Cour, Beaune and Batilly,
and the 5th Division in its rear; the 6th remained at Boynes, where the
1st Division of Cavalry also found accommodation.
In the battle of Beaune la Rolande General von Voigts-Rhetz had to hold
his ground against the enemy with 11,000 men against 60,000, with three
brigades against six Divisions, until help reached him towards evening.
This action cost the Germans 900 and the French 1300 men in killed and
wounded; and 1800 unwounded prisoners fell into the hands of the
Germans.
In the evening the French XXth Corps had retreated as far as Bois Commun
and Bellegarde; the XVIIIth, on the contrary, had taken up its position
near Vernouille and Juranville, in fact, directly in front of the Xth
German Corps, on the ground which the former had won. The expectation
was therefore not unnatural that the fighting would recommence on the
morrow.
Prince Frederick Charles, therefore, directed the Xth and IIIrd Corps to
assemble on the 29th in full preparedness. The IXth received orders to
advance with two brigades towards Boynes and Bazoches, and the remaining
troops were to follow as soon as the Grand Duke's Detachment should have
reached the main road to Paris. Of it in the course of the day the heads
arrived, the 4th Cavalry Division at Toury, the infantry at Allaines and
Orgeres. The 6th Cavalry Division, which was marching on the right
flank, met first with opposition at Tournoisis.
Meanwhile General Crouzat had been instructed from Tours by a message
which reached him on the evening of the 28th, to desist for the present
from further offensive attack, and the French right wing was thereupon
drawn further back. On the 30th both Corps moved leftward, in order to
be again nearer to the XVth. For the purpose of disguising this lateral
movement, detachments were sent in a northerly direction and met
reconnoitring parties of the German Xth and IIIrd Corps, with which
skirmishes took place at Maizieres, St. Loup and Mont Barrois; and the
movement of the French was soon detected, in the first instance on their
left flank.
The Government at Tours had received news from Paris that General Ducrot
would attempt on the 29th to break through the German investing lines
with 100,000 men and 400 guns, and endeavour to connect with the Army
of the Loire in a southerly direction. The balloon which carried this
despatch had descended in Norway, whence the message had been forwarded.
It was concluded from this that the General was already vigorously
engaged, and that help must be no longer delayed. Commissioned by
Gambetta, M. Freycinet submitted to a council of war called by General
d'Aurelle, a scheme for the advance of the whole army on Pithiviers. In
the event of a refusal by the Commander-in-Chief to accept the same, M.
Freycinet carried an order for his supersession.
It was decided in the first place to execute a wheel to the right with
the left wing, Chilleurs aux Bois forming the pivot of the movement.
While a front was thus being formed against Pithiviers, the Corps of the
right wing on a parallel front were to await the order to move until
this was accomplished. The XXIst Corps was to be sent to Vendome to
cover the left flank.
THE ADVANCE OF THE ARMY OF THE LOIRE TO THE RELIEF OF PARIS.
As the result of those dispositions, on the 1st of December the XVIth
Corps moved on Orgeres, in the direction of the railway; the XVIIth
followed to Patay and St. Peravy.
Opposite to these forces, on the right wing of the IInd German Army the
17th Division of the Grand Duke's Detachment had arrived at Bazoches,
the 22nd at Toury, and the Bavarian Corps reached the vicinity of
Orgeres. Thus the hostile shock fell first on the last body. Attacked in
front by a far superior force, and threatened in flank by Michel's
Cavalry Division, the 1st Bavarian Brigade was forced to retreat at
three o'clock to Villepion. The 2nd Brigade approaching from Orgeres,
halted to the west of Nonneville, and the 4th marched up to between
Villepion and Faverolles, which position the Bavarians, in spite of
heavy losses, succeeded in holding for a long time. On their right wing
Prince Leopold of Bavaria, with the four guns of his battery still
serviceable, arrested the enemy's advance on Nonneville, but under the
personal leadership of Admiral Jaureguiberry the French forced their way
into Villepion. As night drew on, and the want of ammunition was
becoming serious, the 1st Bavarian Brigade went to Loigny; the 2nd,
however, did not retreat until five o'clock to Orgeres, where also the
3rd arrived in the evening, whilst the 4th joined the 1st at Loigny.
The engagement cost both sides about 1000 men, and only the foremost
Bavarian detachments were forced back for a short distance.
This measure of success, and the news from Paris, rekindled in Tours
ardent hopes of victory. As will be seen further on, a sortie from Paris
on 30th November had certainly so far succeeded that the village of
Epinay on the northern section of the line of investment was occupied
for a short time. Thereupon it was summarily concluded that this was the
village of the same name which lay to the south near Longjumeau, and
that there was now scarcely any obstacle to the junction of the Army of
Orleans with that of Paris. Cathelineau's volunteer Corps was directed
at once to occupy the forest of Fontainebleau, and the imminent
annihilation of the Germans was announced to the country.
The head of the Army of Orleans, nevertheless, had barely made half a
day's march in the direction of Paris, and the right wheel of the left
wing remained to be accomplished. The XVIth Corps was to attempt to
reach the line Allaines-Toury by the 2nd of December; the XVIIth was to
follow, and the XVth, marching from Chilleurs through Artenay, was to
close to the right. The Grand Duke, on the report of the great force in
which the enemy was approaching, determined to march to meet him with
the whole strength of the Detachment. The requisite orders were issued
at eight o'clock in the morning to the Divisions, which were already
standing prepared on their respective assembling-grounds. The Bavarian
Corps was directed to take up a position opposite Loigny with its left
wing at Chateau-Goury; the 17th Division to march immediately from
Santilly to Lumeau, and the 22nd from Tivernon to Baigneaux. The cavalry
was to undertake the protection of both wings.
BATTLE OF LOIGNY--POUPRY.
(December 2nd.)
The Bavarian Corps was still engaged in the advance from Maladerie when
the French ascended the heights to the west of Loigny. The 1st Division,
therefore, marched towards Villeprevost, and the 2nd held the line
Beauvilliers-Goury.
At 8 a.m. General Chanzy set out with his 2nd and 3rd Divisions from
Terminiers, for Loigny and Lumeau. The 1st followed in reserve, and
Michel's Cavalry Division covered the left flank. In spite of the strong
fire of the defenders, the 2nd Division by nine o'clock advanced close
upon Beauvilliers, but then it had to give way before the onset of the
Bavarians, who now on their side attacked Loigny. When, however, at
10.30 the whole French Corps advanced, deployed on a broad front from
Nonneville to Neuvilliers, they had to fall back with great losses.
They, however, found a rallying point at Beauvilliers, where the fire of
the Corps artillery gave pause to the advance of the enemy.
The combat surged backwards and forwards until, at 11.30, the 2nd
Bavarian Brigade joined in the fray. The 4th Cavalry Division charged
the left flank of the enemy; and Michel's Division fell back on the
XVIIth Corps, numerous prisoners thus falling into the hands of the
German troopers. In the meantime the Bavarian infantry had marched to
Ferme Morale with intent to renew the attack, but there found itself
under fire so destructive that it was forced to turn back. Thereupon the
horse-batteries on the flank enfiladed the enemy's wing with such
effect, that the farm was set on fire and General von Orff found himself
able to take possession of it.
At Beauvilliers, meanwhile, the 2nd Division had only with great
difficulty resisted the vigorous onslaughts of the French, whose
rifle-swarms were already so close that the batteries were compelled to
retire to positions further back. But the success of the right wing soon
extended to the left. Breaking out from Beauvilliers, as well as from
Chateau Goury, the Bavarians drove Jaureguiberry's Division back to
Loigny.
Shortly after noon the firing of the French became again remarkably
energetic, especially against Chateau Goury. The battalions of the
Bavarian left wing were forced back upon the park.
During these events the two Prussian Divisions had continued their
advance. The artillery of the 17th pressed on in order to engage the
enemy, while the head of the infantry reached Lumeau in time to prevent
its occupation by the opposing forces. Strong swarms of French riflemen
fought their way up quite close to the place, but they were finally
driven back by a well-directed fire of musketry and shell; whereupon the
Division assailed the right flank of the French attack.
The 22nd Division also marched through Baigneaux to Anneux, and joined
in the pursuit of the retreating enemy. A number of prisoners and a
battery were captured, and the enemy, after a vain attempt to make
another stand near Neuvilliers, at last fled towards Terminiers in utter
disorder.
After this result of the fighting about Lumeau, General von Tresckow was
able to go to the assistance of the hard-pressed left wing of the
Bavarians. Under cover of the fire of eight batteries the 33rd Brigade
moved against the flank of the French masses which were now making a
fierce attack on Chateau Goury. Taken by surprise, these retired upon
Loigny. But there, too, the Mecklenburg battalions forced in, shoulder
to shoulder with the Bavarians, and it was only in the churchyard on
high ground at the west end of the village, that an obstinate resistance
was made for some time longer. The French, as they retired on Villepion,
suffered from a destructive fire from eighty guns massed near Loigny.
At 2.30 General von der Tann caused the whole of his 1st Division, after
the replenishment of its ammunition, to advance once more; this
movement, however, was arrested by the fire of the enemy.
Michel's Division moved up to oppose the advance of the German cavalry
on the right flank, but went about as soon as it came within range of
the horse-batteries.
Because of the exposed condition of his right flank, General Chanzy had
sent a few battalions to form a refused flank[44] near Terre-noire.
Behind this a brigade of the XVIIth Corps came up near Faverolles, and
to the right of Villepion the Papal Zouaves advanced against Villours.
General von Tresckow now threw in his last reserves. Two battalions of
the 75th Regiment broke into the place at the first charge, and in
conjunction with all the troops fighting in the vicinity, drove back the
French columns to Villepion.
The approach of darkness brought the fighting here to a close.
While the French XVIth Corps had been fighting single-handed with great
persistence all day, the XVth, according to orders, had advanced through
Artenay along the Paris high-road. There it was opposed only by the 3rd
Cavalry Brigade. That force was attacked about mid-day near Dambron by
the 3rd French Division, which formed the left-flank column, while the
other two Divisions held much further to the right.
So soon as this information came in from the cavalry, General von
Wittich moved off with the whole of the 22nd Division from Anneux in the
direction of Poupry. The head of the column reached that place at the
double, and succeeded in driving back the enemy, who had already broken
in there and occupied the forest belts to the north. Six batteries then
came into action, resting on Morale to the south. The French deployed
between Dambron and Autroches, and maintained a persistent fire while
their remaining Divisions came up. After an encounter with the troops
from Poupry, they occupied with their right wing the small copses which
lay near, in front of the forest-land to the north, placed the artillery
in the intervals, and began at three o'clock an attack from thence.
This, however, withered under a fire of grape-shot from the defenders,
and the menace of a charge by the 3rd Cavalry Brigade, which General von
Colomb had set in motion in the open country to the west of Dambron. An
attack on Morale by the left wing from Autroches likewise miscarried.
But at four o'clock the French advanced along their whole front,
preceded by great swarms of tirailleurs. They were repulsed at Poupry,
and likewise at Morale, at which latter place two companies of pioneers
joined in the fight; on the other hand, their right wing pushed into the
forest, and compelled its defenders to retreat. But Prussian battalions
yet remaining in reserve, advanced from Poupry, and drove the enemy back
into the copses, where he had still to defend himself against an attack
by the cavalry.
The fighting was now stopped by the approach of night. The 22nd Division
remained under arms till eleven o'clock in the position which it had
seized, and only then withdrew to Anneux. The 3rd Cavalry Division
quartered for the night in Baigneaux. The 17th Division remained in
position near Lumeau, having Loigny in its front, which it occupied in
concert with the Bavarians, who extended further to the right as far as
Orgeres.
The day had cost the French 4000 killed and wounded, and the Germans
fully as many, but 2500 unwounded prisoners, eight guns, one
mitrailleuse and a standard belonging to the enemy were left in
possession of the latter.
On the French side, the XVth Corps retired to Artenay and received
orders, under cover of a Division to be left there, to occupy the
defensive position previously held on the skirt of the forest.
Thus the intended further advance of the left wing of the Army of
Orleans had not succeeded. The XVIth Corps, lacking the support of the
XVIIth, had indeed lost ground, but still maintained itself with its
most advanced line on Villepion, Faverolles and Terminiers. General
Chanzy therefore considered himself justified in making yet another
effort against the German right wing on the following day.
The German strength consisted of five Corps, and stood close in front of
the enemy; further reinforcements could not be immediately expected, but
by the supreme Command it was judged that the moment had now come to put
an end to the standing menace from the south against the investment of
Paris.
At mid-day of the 2nd, the order came from the Royal Head-quarter to
undertake an attack on Orleans in full strength, and in the course of
that day Prince Frederick Charles gave the requisite instructions to
this end.
It is here necessary to go back a little in order to see how
circumstances developed events during November at various other points.
FOOTNOTE:
[44] To the German term "Haken-stellung" there is perhaps no precisely
equivalent expression in our military vocabulary. "Refused flank" is
probably approximate.
PARIS IN NOVEMBER.
The tidings, which became known on the 14th November, of the happy
result of the action at Coulmiers on the 9th, had rekindled in Paris
universal hope. No one doubted that the enemy would find it necessary to
send large forces in the Orleans direction, which would considerably
weaken the investment line, particularly in its southern section.
In order to contribute towards the hoped-for approaching relief by
active co-operation, three separate armies were formed out of the
garrison of Paris.
The first, under General Clement Thomas, consisted of 226 battalions of
the National Guard, in round numbers 130,000 men. Its duty was the
defence of the enceinte and the maintenance of quietude within the city.
The second, under General Ducrot, constituted the most trustworthy
element, especially the troops of the former XIIIth and XIVth Corps.
This army was apportioned into three (Infantry) Corps and one Cavalry
Division, and it consisted of fully 100,000 men and more than 300 guns.
It was designed for active service in the field, and for making sorties
on the investing forces. The third army, under General Vinoy, 70,000
strong, was made up of six Divisions of Gardes-Mobiles and one Cavalry
Division; and to it also Maud'huy's Division of the line was assigned.
It was to aid the more important sorties by diversions on subordinate
fronts. In addition to all these details, 80,000 Gardes-Mobiles were in
the forts, and 35,000 more in St. Denis under Admiral de la Ronciere.
The available military strength consequently amounted to above 400,000
men.
The garrison exhibited a lively activity in petty nocturnal enterprises.
The heavy guns of the defences carried to Choisy le Roi, and even as far
as Beauregard, near Versailles. On the peninsula of Gennevilliers
trenchwork was energetically set about, and the task of bridge-building
was undertaken. Many signs pointed to an intended effort on the part of
the French to break out in a westerly direction. But since, as long as
the IInd Army was still incomplete, the greatest danger threatened from
the south, the supreme Command in Versailles, as already mentioned,
ordered the IInd Corps into the position behind the Yvette from
Villeneuve to Saclay. On the north of Paris the Guard Corps extended
itself leftward as far as Aulnay, the XIIth sent one brigade across to
the south bank of the Marne, and the Wuertemberg Division moved into the
interval between the Marne and the Seine caused by the shifting of the
IInd Corps.
On November 18th the summons from Tours reached Paris, calling on the
latter with all promptitude to reach the hand to the Army of the Loire;
certainly somewhat prematurely, since, as we know, that army was at the
time concerning itself only in regard to defensive measures.
In Paris all preparations were actually made for a great sortie. But as
the earlier attacks on the front of the VIth Corps had shown that this
section of the investment was materially strengthened by fortifications
about Thiais and Chevilly, it was decided in the first instance to gain
the plateau east of Joinville and from thence to bend rightward towards
the south. The attention of the Germans was to be distracted by attacks
in the opposite direction.
On the 18th,[45] the day on which the Army of Orleans had vainly striven
to press forward to Beaune la Rolande, General Ducrot assembled the IInd
Army of Paris in the neighbourhood of Vincennes, and Mont Avron was
occupied on the following day by Hugues' Division of the IIIrd Army. As,
however, the construction of the bridges (over the Marne) at Champigny
and Bry was delayed, the battle was postponed till the 30th; but it was
left to the commanders of the subordinate affairs to carry them out
simultaneously with the chief enterprise or in advance of it.
Accordingly, Maud'huy's Division assembled in the night of 28th--29th
behind the redoubt of Hautes Bruyeres, and advanced against L'Hay before
daybreak.
Warned by the heavy firing from the southern forts, General von Tuempling
(commanding VIth Corps) had early ordered the 12th Division to get under
arms in its fighting positions, and the 11th to assemble at Fresnes.
The French, favoured by the darkness, made their way through the
vineyards into L'Hay; but were successfully driven back by the Germans
with the bayonet and clubbed arms.
After a prolonged fire-fight, the French renewed their onslaught at
8.30, but without success; and then the defenders, reinforced from the
reserve, retaliated with a vigorous counterstroke. At ten o'clock the
enemy retreated to Villejuif.
Admiral Pothuau at the same time had moved up the Seine with Marines and
National Guards. An outpost at Gare aux Boeufs was surprised and
captured, and Choisy le Roi was fired upon by field-guns, fortress
artillery, and gunboats which appeared on the Seine. Just as the
Grenadiers of the 10th (Prussian) Regiment were on the point of making
an attack, General Vinoy broke off the fight.
This demonstration cost the French 1000 men and 300 uninjured prisoners;
the Prussians, remaining under cover, lost only 140 men. The fortress
kept up its fire till mid-day, and then the enemy was allowed a short
truce, to remove his numerous wounded.
Against the front of the Vth Corps also, a strong infantry force
advanced at eight o'clock upon Garches and Malmaison, and drove in part
of the outposts. But it soon found itself opposed by closed battalions,
and at noon retreated to Valerien.
FOOTNOTE:
[45] Obvious misprint for 28th.
THE ATTEMPT OF THE ARMY OF PARIS TO BREAK OUT.
(November 30th and December 2nd.)
On November 30th the IInd Paris Army opened the battle which was to
decide the fate of the capital.
To hinder the reinforcement of the Germans towards the real point of
attack, almost every section of their line of investment was again
engrossed by sorties.
To the duty of pushing an attack against the southern front, General
Ducrot assigned Susbielle's Division of his IInd Corps. It reached Rosny
so early as three o'clock in the morning, crossed the Marne at Creteil
by a field-bridge, and from thence, briskly supported by the nearest
forts, opened fire on the outpost line of the Wuertemberg Division, which
had been pushed forward to Bonneuil and Mesly.
General von Obernitz (commanding the Division) had an extended position
to maintain. His 1st Brigade was at Villiers on the peninsula of
Joinville, his 2nd at Sucy en Brie, and his 3rd at Brevannes. The
Division was placed under the Commander of the Army of the Meuse, who
had been instructed from Versailles to reinforce it strongly by the
XIIth Corps, or even by troops of the Guard Corps.
From the great accumulation of hostile forces on Mont Avron, the Saxon
Corps believed itself directly threatened on the right bank of the
Marne, and requested to be immediately transferred to the left; the
Crown Prince of Saxony gave the order that the whole 24th Division
should assemble there on the following day.
Thus for the present the only aid that could be rendered to the
Wuertembergers was from the wing of the IInd Corps at Villeneuve, of
which the 7th Infantry Brigade moved up near Brevannes to Valenton.
The fire of its three batteries hurrying thither, first brought the
advance of the French Division to a stand. The attempt of the
Wuertembergers to seize Mont-Mesly failed at first; but after a strenuous
artillery fire they succeeded in carrying the hill by twelve o'clock,
and the Prussian battalions forced their way into Mesly. The Wuertemberg
horse cut in upon the enemy's retreating guns with great success. At
1.30 the re-opening of the fire from the forts proclaimed the end of
this sortie. It cost the Germans 350 men, and the French 1200.
During this time the front of the VIth Corps had not been at all
molested. General Vinoy, who had not been informed of the advance of
Susbielle's Division, when its retreat was noticed caused to be opened
from Fort Ivry and the adjoining works a brisk fire, which was augmented
by gunboats on the Seine and armour-plated batteries on the railway.
Then Admiral Pothuau advanced against Choisy le Roi and Thiais. His
Marines, after driving out the Prussian fore-posts, again settled
themselves firmly in Gare aux Boeufs. But the further advance failed,
and General Vinoy recalled his troops, after which the fighting at Mesly
ceased, and only the thunder of artillery continued till five o'clock.
After a preliminary cannonade from Valerien the Gardes-Mobiles advanced
against the front of the Vth Corps about seven o'clock. They were,
however, repulsed by the outposts and supporting troops in readiness,
and retired at eleven o'clock.
On the northern front of Paris there occurred also a sharp fight. At
mid-day Fort de la Briche, supported by field-guns and a floating
battery, opened a heavy fire on the low-lying village of Epinay on the
right bank of the Seine. At two o'clock Haurion's Brigade advanced, two
companies of marines pressed into the place along the bank of the river,
and drove out the garrison, which consisted of only one company. A
second also retired from the defence-works in a northerly direction
towards Ormesson. At three o'clock in the afternoon, the village, up to
some still obstinately defended farms on the further side of the
mill-race, fell into the hands of the French.
Meanwhile the troops of the IVth Corps had assembled, and seven
batteries came into action on the overhanging heights. The infantry
rushed upon the village from all sides with loud cheers, and about four
o'clock, after a fierce street-fight, recovered possession of the posts
which had been lost; and it was this transitory conquest that was to
raise so great hopes in Tours. The losses on both sides amounted to 300
men.
Those affairs were all mere feints to facilitate the chief action; and
whilst the investing troops were thus engaged and held fast at all
points, two Corps of the IInd French Army at 6.30 in the morning crossed
the bridges at Joinville and Nogent which had been completed during the
night. After repulsing the German outposts they both deployed, and
stretched completely across the peninsula between Champigny and Bry. The
IIIrd Corps had taken the road along the north bank of the Marne,
towards Neuilly, to cross the river there, thus threatening to
compromise the position of the Saxon Corps, which therefore still
detained the 47th Brigade on the right bank, though it had been assigned
to the assistance of the Wuertembergers. Consequently there were
available to oppose the two French Corps on the left bank, only two
German brigades extended over about four miles, the Saxon 48th about
Noisy, and the Wuertemberg 1st from Villiers to Chennevieres.
At ten o'clock Maussion's Division advanced against the Park of
Villiers. Supported by Saxon detachments from Noisy, the Wuertembergers
repulsed a first attack, but in following it up met with heavy losses.
The French batteries of two Divisions and those of the Artillery Reserve
formed line in front of the park. On their right Faron's Division, not
without heavy losses, succeeded in gaining possession of Champigny, and
had then established itself in front of that village to defend the
occupation of it.
General Ducrot's original idea had been to maintain a stationary fight
on the peninsula until he should be joined at Noisy by his IIIrd Corps.
But as news arrived that at eleven o'clock it was still on the northern
side of the Marne, he ordered an immediate general attack by both his
other Corps.
On the left the advance was checked for a considerable time by the
German batteries which had been pushed forward between Noisy and
Villiers, and when Colonel von Abendroth moved out from both villages
with six companies of the 48th Brigade to an attack in close formation,
the French fell back into the vineyards on the western slope of the
plateau, leaving behind two guns, which, however, the Saxons could not
carry away for want of teams.
In the centre of the line of fight, Berthaut's Division tried to push
forward south of Villiers, but by the fire of five batteries in position
there and at Coeuilly its ranks were so severely thinned that it gave
ground before the advance of a Saxon battalion.
On the right wing, the guns which had been brought up into position in
front of Champigny had at last been compelled by the German artillery to
withdraw, and had sought cover further north, near the lime-kilns. A
body of French infantry had advanced along the riverside to Maison
Blanche, but meanwhile the 2nd Wuertemberg Brigade, although itself
attacked at Sucy, despatched a reinforcement of two companies and a
battery to Chennevieres. Advancing from the Hunting-lodge, the
Wuertembergers took 200 French prisoners at Maison Blanche; though, on
the other hand, an attempt to carry the heights in front of Champigny
with the companies assembled at Coeuilly failed with heavy loss. As the
result, however, of a renewed flank-attack from the Hunting-lodge,
Faron's Division, which had already been severely shaken, was obliged to
retreat to Champigny.
General Ducrot decided to be content, for that day, with having
established a firm footing on the left bank of the Marne, and he brought
up sixteen batteries to a position in his front, to secure the wedge of
ground he had gained. On the following day the attack was to be renewed
by all the three Corps.
The Germans, on their part, had to congratulate themselves on having
maintained their ground against greatly superior numbers. And so in the
afternoon the fight gradually died away, until it broke out again in the
north.
The French IIIrd Corps, marching up the right bank of the Marne, had
occupied Neuilly in force, and had driven in the outposts of the Saxon
47th Brigade. Under cover of six batteries the construction of two
military bridges below Neuilly was begun at ten o'clock, and finished by
noon. But just at this time it happened, as we have seen, that the
French were in retreat from the plateau, so the crossing did not occur
until two o'clock in the afternoon. Bellemare's Division marched down
the valley to Bry, where it closed on the left flank of the IInd Corps.
A regiment of Zouaves, trying to ascend the plateau from Bry, lost half
its men and all its officers. Notwithstanding, General Ducrot decided to
employ his reinforced strength in the immediate renewal of the attack on
Villiers.
Strengthened by four battalions, the Division advanced in this
direction, although the artillery had not succeeded in battering down
the park wall; repeated onslaughts by rifle-swarms were repulsed, and
finally the French retreated into the valley. The simultaneous attacks
of Berthaut's Division along the railway line and of Faron's Division on
the Hunting-lodge also miscarried. Not till darkness had set in did the
firing cease on both sides.
Near Chelles, on the line in which the French IIIrd Corps had been
advancing in the morning, the Crown Prince of Saxony had collected the
23rd Division; but as soon as the enemy's real objective was
penetrated, he despatched part of the 47th Brigade and a portion of the
Corps Artillery to the threatened position held by the Wuertembergers.
Not less opportunely had General von Obernitz, as soon as the fighting
at Mesly was over, sent three battalions to the Hunting-lodge. In the
night orders came from the supreme Head-quarter for the IInd and VIth
Corps to send reinforcements to the endangered points of the line of
investment, and the 7th and 21st Brigades arrived at Sucy on the
following day, the 1st of December.
On the French side the attempt to break through without help from
outside was already considered as well-nigh hopeless, and it was only
the fear of popular indignation which caused the IIIrd Army to remain
longer on the left bank of the Marne. Instead of attacking, the French
began to intrench themselves, and in order to clear the battle-field a
truce was arranged. The thunder of the cannon from Mont Avron had to
serve for the present to keep up the spirits of the Parisians. The
Germans also worked at the strengthening of their positions, but,
suffering from the sudden and extreme cold, part at least of the troops
withdrew into quarters further rearward.
The command of the whole of the German Army between the Marne and the
Seine was assumed by General von Fransecky (commanding IInd Corps). The
Head-quarter of the Army of the Meuse had already given instructions
that Prince George (of Saxony) with all the available troops of the
XIIth Corps, should make surprise-attacks on Bry and Champigny in the
early morning of the 2nd.
With this object, on the morning specified the 24th Division assembled
at Noisy, the 1st Wuertemberg Brigade at Villiers, and the 7th Prussian
Brigade at the Hunting-lodge.
The foremost battalions of the Saxon Division drove back the enemy's
outposts by a sudden rush, took 100 prisoners, and after storming a
barricade entered Bry. Here ensued an embittered fight in the streets
and houses, in which the 2nd Battalion of the 107th Regiment lost nearly
all its officers. Nevertheless it maintained its hold on the northern
part of the village, in spite of the heavy fire of the forts.
The Wuertembergers also forced an entrance into Champigny, but soon met
with fierce resistance from the enemy sheltered in the buildings. The
previously occupied Bois de la Lande had to be abandoned, and General
Ducrot now determined to resort to the offensive. The strong artillery
line on his front came into action at about nine o'clock, and two
Divisions deployed in rear of it.
Meanwhile the Fusilier battalion of the Colberg Regiment marched once
more from the Hunting-lodge on Bois de la Lande, and carried it with the
first onslaught. The French, firing heavily from the railway
embankments, struck down the Pomeranians with clubbed rifles and at the
point of the bayonet. A fierce fight was carried on at the same time at
the lime-pits, where at noon 160 French laid down their arms. When six
Wuertemberg and nine Prussian batteries had been by degrees brought into
action against Champigny, General Hartmann[46] succeeded in getting as
far as the road leading to Bry. As, however, the batteries were now
being masked by their own infantry, and were suffering, too, under the
heavy projectiles fired from the forts, they were withdrawn into the
hollow of the Hunting-lodge. At two o'clock the 1st Wuertemberg and 7th
Prussian Brigades established themselves firmly in the line from the
churchyard of Champigny to the Bois de la Lande.
Meanwhile the French divisions of Bellemare and Susbielle had reached
the battle-field from the right bank of the Marne. The two Saxon
battalions in Bry, having already lost 36 officers and 638 men, were
compelled by the approach of the enemy in very superior force, to
evacuate the village and retire on Noisy, but not without taking 300
prisoners with them. The rest of the Saxon forces held Villiers, where
the still available batteries also were in position.
While, at two o'clock, the French were bringing up a strong artillery
mass against this point, four batteries of the IInd Corps rushed out of
the hollow near the Hunting-lodge at a gallop upon their flank, and
opened fire at a range of 2000 paces. In less than ten minutes the
French batteries fell back and the Prussian batteries returned to their
sheltered position. Several hostile battalions which, at about three
o'clock, attempted a renewed assault on Villiers, were repulsed with no
difficulty, and at five o'clock the fighting ceased. The French merely
kept up a fire of field and fortress artillery until dark.
General Ducrot had received information in the course of the day, that
the Army of the Loire was marching on Fontainebleau, and he was,
therefore, very anxious to continue to maintain his position outside
Paris.
During the night of December 2nd--3rd, provisions were procured, and the
teams and ammunition of the batteries were made up; but the approach of
support from without was in no wise confirmed.
The troops were completely exhausted by the previous disastrous
fighting, and the Commander-in-Chief was justified in apprehending a
repulse on the Marne by the enemy's invigorated forces. He therefore
ordered a retreat, the troops being informed that the attack should be
renewed as soon as their preparedness for fighting should have been
re-established.
Soon after midnight the divisions were assembled behind the outposts,
and the trains were sent back first. At noon the troops were able to
follow over the bridges at Neuilly, Bry, and Joinville. Only one brigade
remained in position to cover the passage.
The retreat was very skilfully covered by a series of small attacks on
the German outposts. The French batteries had opened fire at Le Plant
and Bry by daybreak, and the withdrawal of the enemy's army was
completely hidden by the thick mist.
General Fransecky assembled the Saxon and the Wuertemberg Divisions in a
fighting position at Villiers and Coeuilly, the 7th Brigade with the
Corps-Artillery of the IInd Corps and two regiments of the VIth at
Chennevieres, intending to wait for the expected reinforcement which the
VIth Corps had agreed to furnish for the 4th. The 23rd Division also
received orders from the Crown Prince of Saxony to cross to the left
bank of the Marne, whilst the Guard Corps had meanwhile extended its
outposts to Chelles.
So remained matters on the 3rd, with the exception of petty frays, and
at four o'clock in the afternoon the troops were able to return to
quarters. When early on the 4th patrols rode forward towards Bry and
Champigny, they found these places vacated, and the peninsula of
Joinville deserted by the enemy.
The IInd French Army, which had been severely reduced and its internal
cohesion much shaken, returned to Paris; on its own report it had lost
12,000 men. The German troops engaged had lost 6200 men, but resumed
their former positions in the investing line.
This energetic attempt on the part of General Ducrot was the most
serious effort that was made for the relief of Paris. It was directed
towards what was at the moment the weakest point of the investment, but
met with any success only at the outset.[47]
FOOTNOTES:
[46] Commanding 3rd Infantry Division.
[47] A legend was subsequently circulated that the voice of one general
in a German council of war had, in opposition to all the others,
prevented the removal of the chief head-quarters from Versailles. Apart
from the fact that during the whole course of the invasion no council of
war was ever held, it never occurred to any member of the King's
military suite to set so bad an example to the army. [Moltke.]
THE ADVANCE OF THE IST ARMY IN NOVEMBER.
The newly-formed levies in northern France were not remaining inactive.
Rouen and Lille were their chief centres. In front of the latter place,
the Somme with its fortified passages at Ham, Peronne, Amiens, and
Abbeville afforded a line equally advantageous for attacks to the front
or for secure retreat. Isolated advances had, indeed, on various
occasions, been driven back by detachments of the Army of the Meuse, but
these were too weak to rid themselves of the continued molestation by
pursuit pushed home.
We have already seen how, after the fall of Metz, the IInd Army marched
to the Loire, and the Ist into the northern departments of France.
A large portion of the Ist Army was at first detained on the Moselle by
having had to undertake the transport of the numerous prisoners and the
observation of the fortresses which interrupted the communications with
Germany. The whole VIIth Corps was either in Metz or before Thionville
and Montmedy. Of the Ist Corps, the 1st Division was detached to
Rethel,[48] the 4th Brigade transported by railway through Soissons to
the investment of La Fere, and the 3rd Cavalry Division sent on towards
the forest of Argonnes. The remaining five brigades followed with the
artillery on the 7th November.[49]
Marching on a wide front, the force reached the Oise between Compiegne
and Chauny on the 20th. In front of the right wing the cavalry,
supported by a battalion of Jaegers, came in contact with Gardes-Mobiles
at Ham and Guiscard; in face of the infantry columns the hostile bodies
fell back on Amiens. It was learned that 15,000 men were there, and that
reinforcements were continually joining.
On the 25th the 3rd Brigade reached Le Quesnel. The 15th Division of the
VIIIth Corps advanced beyond Montdidier, and the 16th to Breteuil,
whence it established connection with the Saxon detachments about
Clermont. On the 26th the right wing closed up to Le Quesnel, the left
to Moreuil and Essertaux. The cavalry scouted forward towards the Somme,
the right bank of which it found occupied. The enemy's attitude
indicated that he was confining himself to the defence of that position.
General von Manteuffel thereupon determined to attack, without waiting
for the arrival of the 1st Division, the transport of which from Rethel
was extraordinarily delayed. His intention, in the first instance, was
to utilize the 27th in drawing closer in his forces, which were extended
along a front of some nineteen miles. But the battle was unexpectedly
fought on that same day.
FOOTNOTES:
[48] According to statement on p. 177, to Mezieres.
[49] The "five brigades" mentioned in the text consisted of the 3rd of
Ist Corps, and the four composing the VIIIth Corps, of which, the Ist
and VIIth, the Ist Army was made up. The 1st Cavalry Division,
originally belonging to the Ist Army, was transferred to the IInd Army
by the reorganization following the capitulation of Metz.
BATTLE OF AMIENS.
(November 17th.)
General Farre, with his 17,500 men distributed into three brigades,
stood eastward of Amiens on the south bank of the Somme, about Villers
Bretonneux and Longueau along the road to Peronne, holding also the
villages and copses on his front. Besides these troops there were 8000
Gardes-Mobiles occupying an intrenched position about two and a half
miles in front of the city.
In accordance with instructions from the Army Headquarter, General von
Goeben (commanding the VIIIth Corps) had given orders for the 27th that
the 15th Division should take up quarters at Fouencamps and Sains; the
16th at Rumigny and Plachy and in the villages further back; the
Corps-Artillery at Grattepanche. Consequently the VIIIth Corps was to
be assembled before Amiens between the Celle and the Noye, at the
distance, then, of nearly two and a half miles from the Ist Corps,
and divided from it by the latter brook and the Avre. General von
Bentheim (commanding the 1st Division, Ist Corps[50]) on the other
hand, had sent his advanced guard, the 3rd Brigade, into quarters
north of the Luce.
At an early hour that brigade seized the passages of the brook at
Demuin, Hangard, and Domart. At ten o'clock it moved forward in order to
occupy the appointed quarters, and as the enemy were already in
possession, a fight began which gradually increased in magnitude.
The wooded heights on the north bank of the Luce were taken without any
particular resistance, and maintained in spite of several counter
strokes by the French. The artillery pushed forward through the
intervals of the infantry. On the left the 4th Regiment seized the
village of Gentelles, on the right the 44th Regiment rushed up to
within 300 paces of the left flank of the French position, and by a
vigorous onslaught carried by storm the earthworks at the railway
cutting east of Villers Bretonneux. Soon after mid-day heavy hostile
masses drew up at Bretonneux and in Cachy, directly opposite the 3rd
Brigade, which was extended along a front of some four miles.
On the left wing of the Germans the 16th Division had by eleven
o'clock already reached its assigned quarters, and had driven the enemy
out of Hebecourt, as well as out of the woods north of that village
towards Dury. The 15th Division, in compliance with the enjoined
assemblage of the VIIIth Corps on the left bank of the Noye, moved
westward from Moreuil through Ailly to Dommartin, its advance guard
which had been holding Hailles marching direct on Fouencamps. Thus it
happened that before noon the roads from Roye and Montdidier between the
two Corps were left completely uncovered by troops on the German side,
while a French brigade was standing at the fork of these roads at
Longueau, though, in fact, it remained absolutely inactive. This
interval was at first screened only by the numerous retinue and staff
escort of the Commander-in-Chief; and then it was to some extent filled
by the battalion constituting the guard of the headquarter. As, however,
after ten o'clock the French on their side commenced an attack on the
3rd Brigade, General von Manteuffel ordered the 15th Division to join in
the fight as far as possible toward the right wing.
After a staunch defence the companies of the 4th Regiment were driven
back out of the Bois de Hangard towards the declivity of the height in
front of Demuin, and subsequently, having expended all their ammunition,
the defenders of Gentelles were driven back to Domart.
General von Strubberg (commanding 30th Infantry Brigade, VIIIth Corps),
on instructions from the scene of combat in front of the Luce, had sent
four battalions in that direction, which crossed the Avre, but came
under such a heavy fire from the Bois de Gentelles that their further
advance was prevented, and they had to change front against the wood.
Behind them, however, the other detachments of the 30th Brigade pressed
forward to St. Nicolas on the right bank, and to Boves on the left, and
in co-operation with the 29th Brigade drove the French from the
neighbouring Ruinenberg.
Meanwhile a part of the approaching 1st Division came up behind the 3rd
Brigade. The artillery positions were considerably strengthened, and the
cannon fire was directed against the earthworks south of Bretonneux. As
the nearest support the Crown Prince's Regiment went forward, and soon
the French were again driven out of the Bois de Hangard. The East
Prussians following them up, took cover in front of the earthworks;
several detachments of the 4th and 44th Regiments gradually collected
there from the neighbouring woods, and the enemy was then driven back
from this position. Thirteen batteries now silenced the French
artillery, and, after they had fired for some time on Bretonneux, the
place was, at four o'clock, seized by the Prussians pouring in from all
sides with drums beating. The French in its interior made only a weak
defence at isolated points; for the most part they hurried over the
Somme at Corbie under cover of the darkness, and with the loss of 180
unwounded prisoners.
When, somewhat later, the French General Lecointe advanced with the
reserve brigade on Domart, he found that crossing point already in
possession of the 1st Division, and turned back. Cachy only was held by
the French till late in the evening.
The troops of the Ist Corps were distributed for the night in the
hamlets to the south of the Luce; but the outposts were established on
the northern bank of the Somme, and Bretonneux also remained occupied.
On the left wing of the battle-field the 16th Division had advanced to
Dury, and had driven the French out of the neighbouring churchyard, but
had been forced to withdraw from an attack on the enemy's extensive and
strongly defended line of intrenchment. It bivouacked behind Dury.
It was night before General von Manteuffel received information which
proved that the enemy had been completely defeated. Early in the morning
of the 28th the patrols of the Ist Corps found the region clear of the
enemy as far as the Somme, and all the bridges across the river
destroyed. At noon General von Goeben entered Amiens, the citadel of
which capitulated two days later with its garrison of 400 men and 30
cannon.
One peculiarity of the battle of the 27th November was the
disproportionately great extent of the battle-field to the number of the
troops engaged. General Farre, with 25,000 men in round numbers, covered
a front of about fourteen miles from Pont de Metz south of Amiens to the
east of Villers Bretonneux, and with the Somme close on his rear. The
Germans attacked on approximately the same breadth of front, with the
result that there was a break in the middle of their line. The danger
caused by this gap was not taken advantage of during the morning through
the inactivity of the enemy, and it was then nullified by the occupation
of St. Nicolas.
The superiority of numbers was on the side of the Germans, for, although
of the approaching 1st Division only the Crown Prince's Regiment could
take part in the fighting, they were 30,000 strong. The 3rd Brigade bore
the brunt of the battle, losing 630 men and 34 officers out of a total
of 1300. The French also lost about 1300, besides 1000 reported missing.
Part of the National Guard threw down their arms and fled to their
homes. The main body of the French Corps retired on Arras.
Immediately after the battle the Ist Army was reinforced by the 4th
Brigade, which had been brought from La Fere.
FOOTNOTE:
[50] In effect commanding the whole Ist Corps, although nominally
Manteuffel was still chief of it, as well as in command of the Ist
Army.
REDUCTION OF LA FERE.
(November 27th.)
This little fortress became of importance since it closed the line of
railway passing through Rheims, both to Amiens and to Paris. Lying in
open, wet, low ground overflowed by the Somme and its tributaries, it
was difficult of approach; otherwise, the fortifications merely
consisted of an isolated wall, with sundry earthworks close in front of
it, and it was entirely seen into from heights on the east at a distance
of not more than 1500 metres.
The brigade (4th of Ist Corps) as a preliminary measure had invested La
Fere on the 15th November, and when the siege-train arrived from
Soissons with thirty-two heavy guns, seven batteries were built and
armed during the night of the 25th on the heights already mentioned. On
the following morning these opened fire, and on the 27th the place
capitulated. Gardes-Mobiles to the number of 2300 were taken prisoners,
and the most serviceable of the 113 guns found were brought away to arm
the citadel of Amiens. The reinforcement of the Ist Army by the VIIth
Corps meanwhile was not yet even in prospect, since the latter still had
further work to do on the Moselle; the greater part of the 14th Division
only arrived before Thionville on November 13th.
REDUCTION OF THIONVILLE.
(November 24th.)
This fortress, shut in on all sides by hills, was entirely without
bomb-proof protection; direct approach from the south was, on the other
hand, rendered difficult by artificial inundations, and on the west and
north by swamps. General von Kameke therefore decided to await the
result of a heavy bombardment before resorting to a regular attack.
Batteries were erected on both banks of the Moselle, and on the morning
of the 22nd eighty-five guns opened fire. At first the fortress answered
briskly. In the following night the infantry detailed to the task of
throwing up the first parallel, advanced to within 600 paces of the
west front, but, in consequence of pouring rain and the condition of the
ground the work made but small progress. However, on the 24th at mid-day
the commandant proposed negotiations for the surrender of the place. The
garrison, 4000 strong, with the exception of the National Guard
belonging to the place, became prisoners and were sent to Germany; and
199 guns, besides a considerable amount of supplies, arms and
ammunition, fell into the hands of the conqueror.
The 14th Division was now required to lay siege to the northern frontier
fortresses, which would occupy it for some time. The 13th Division, by
orders from the supreme Head-quarter, was assigned to the operations in
southern France.
INVESTMENT OF BELFORT IN NOVEMBER.
On the south-east section of the theatre of war Belfort had become the
centre of continual petty enterprises on the part of French flying
detachments in rear of the XIVth Corps, which under General von Werder
stood about Vesoul.
But when the troops previously before Strasburg had been relieved by a
newly formed body from Germany, the troops before Neu-Breisach became
available, and were set in march on Upper Alsace; while the 1st Reserve
Division reached Belfort on the 3rd November, and by the 8th had
effected the preliminary investment of that place. The greater part of
the 4th Reserve Division marched to join the XIVth Corps at Vesoul, a
detachment under General von Debschitz occupied Montbeliard, and the
67th Regiment held Mulhouse and Delle.
Glancing back on the German successes during November and the general
military position at the end of the month, we see the great sortie from
Paris repulsed[51]; in the north the menace to the investment of being
hemmed in done away with by General von Manteuffel's victory at Amiens;
in the east Thionville, Breisach, Verdun, and La Fere taken, Montmedy
and Belfort surrounded; and in the south Prince Frederick Charles ready
to attack the French army before Orleans.
FOOTNOTE:
[51] The great sortie to the east of Paris was not repulsed until
December 2nd.
BATTLE OF ORLEANS.
(December 3rd and 4th.)
When soon after noon of 2nd December the telegraphed order to take the
offensive against Orleans reached the headquarter of the IInd Army, the
Prince on the same day assembled the Xth Corps at Beaune la Rolande and
Boynes, the IIIrd at Pithiviers, and the IXth at Bazoches les
Gallerandes. By evening the collected forces had their marching orders.
The attack was to comprise two days of fighting. The IIIrd Corps was
first to advance on Loury by way of Chilleurs aux Bois; the Xth was to
follow to Chilleurs; and the IXth was to attack Artenay at half-past
nine. The 1st Cavalry Division supported by infantry was to be on
observation on the left flank towards the Yonne; the 6th was to follow
the right wing. The Grand Duke, to whom it had been left to arrange the
details of his own march westward of the Paris main road, ordered the
22nd Division to support the attack on Artenay, the Bavarian Corps to
advance on Lumeau, the 17th Division to remain for the present at
Anneux. The 4th Cavalry Division was charged with the duty of scouting
on the right flank.
So early as nine o'clock in the morning on the 3rd of December the IIIrd
Corps met eight battalions and six batteries of the enemy at Santeau.
The 12th Brigade and the artillery of the 6th Division intercalated in
the columns of march in rear of the foremost battalions, thereupon
deployed about La Brosse. After a few rounds a battery of the left wing
had to be withdrawn from the fight which had now commenced; on the
right, on the other hand, the Corps-Artillery gradually came up, and by
noon seventy-eight Prussian guns were in action.
The French, yielding to strength so overwhelming, retired on Chilleurs;
but, when the German batteries had advanced within 2000 paces of that
place, and the right flank of the former was threatened by an assault of
the Jaeger battalions, they began a retreat towards the forest, and at
three o'clock part of the 5th Division followed them up through the glen
leading to the southward, and the 6th by the high road. As these had
been obstructed in many places, it was six o'clock in the evening before
the clearing by Loury was reached.
On the right, heavy musketry-firing was heard in the region of Neuville,
and tidings also arrived that on the left the French had occupied
Nancray.
In consequence of this, a reinforcement from the reserve remaining in
Chilleurs was brought up; one regiment was thrown out fronting towards
the west, a second towards the east, and under cover of the outposts
extended toward the south the remainder of the troops went into bivouac
and quarters at Loury.
The IXth Corps had first assembled at Chateau Gaillard on the main road
to Paris, and then advanced along the chaussee through Dambron against
Villereau. At Assas it met the enemy, who was soon driven back by its
artillery, and disappeared towards Artenay. At about ten o'clock an
obstinate contest was engaged in against the batteries of the 2nd French
Division in position here, in which part of the Corps-Artillery
presently bore part, seconded later by the batteries of the 22nd
Division, which had come up to Poupry. General Martineau retreated
slowly by successive detachments, his artillery leading, before the
overwhelming fire of ninety guns, on La Croix Briquet and Ferme
d'Arblay.
At twelve o'clock the Germans occupied Artenay, and after half an hour's
rest they renewed the offensive. There occurred a long and obstinate
fire-fight both of infantry and artillery, while the 22nd Division
pushed forward on the enemy's left flank. At two o'clock his guns were
silenced, the left-wing column of the IXth Corps seized the farm of
Arblay, and the centre by hard fighting drove the enemy back along the
high road through La Croix Briquet to Andeglou, where under cover of the
marine artillery resistance was kept up till dark.
General Puttkamer[52] had brought up five batteries to within 800 paces
of Chevilly, and the 22nd Division was advancing on the burning village,
when the chief Command gave the order to halt, the Grand Duke hesitating
to engage in a night attack on the intrenched village. But when, soon
after, a Hussar patrol brought the information that it was already
evacuated, General von Wittich ordered its occupation. The troops
bivouacked in a heavy snowstorm, in and to the rear of La Croix Briquet.
About the time of the first advance the IXth Corps had sent a detachment
of four Hessian battalions leftward against St. Lye. They met with
opposition at La Tour, drove the enemy back on St. Germain, but could
not dislodge him from that place.
When the Xth Corps, marching round by Pithiviers unmolested, about three
o'clock reached the vicinity of Chilleurs in rear of the IIIrd Corps,
part of the 20th Division went on in the direction of the fighting about
Neuville, the noise of which in the evening was also heard at Loury.
Darkness had already come on and precluded the use of artillery, but the
infantry broke into the village at several points. But it found the
streets barricaded, and met with obstinate resistance, so that the
prosecution of the attack had to be postponed till the following day.
The XVth French Corps had sustained single-handed the onslaught of three
Prussian Corps. Strong masses of the Army of Orleans, to right and to
left of that Corps, made but feeble efforts in the course of the day to
support it. General Chanzy alone, when at about two o'clock he heard
heavy firing from Artenay, ordered forward the 2nd Division of the XVIth
Corps, though he had already that morning begun his retreat on St.
Peravy and Boulay. But this reinforcement encountered the Prussian 17th
Division, which, coming up from Anneux, was on the point of joining in
the fight at Andeglou, and with it the Bavarian Corps advancing from
Lumeau. Their strong united artillery in position at Chameul and Sougy,
soon forced the enemy to retire. Douzy and then Huetre were taken, and
the chateau of Chevilly was occupied by the 17th Division. Here too
darkness put an end to the fighting. The troops of the right wing
quartered at Provencheres, Chameul and rearward.
Thus the German army had made its way without very heavy fighting to
within nine miles of Orleans. The French, indeed, had maintained their
ground till evening in the neighbourhood of Neuville, but the forces
holding on there were ordered to retire in the night. They were to gain
the road from Pithiviers by Rebrechien, and make a circuit by Orleans to
Chevilly. But they thus came under the fire of the IIIrd German Corps
quartered in Loury, and fled in disorder back into the forest, whence
they attempted to reach their destination by detachments.