Going down the other day to the Kerameikos, I met my friend Philogeorgos,
who is at present one of those who desire to hold office in the city.
And I said to him--
"Philogeorgos, you look sad; is it because you fear lest you should not
be elected Archon?"
"No, Socrates," he replied. "It is not that which saddens me; it is the
baseness of those who try to prevent the people from choosing me."
"In what way do they act basely?" I asked.
"There is a certain wine-seller," he said, "who is offering what the
Hyperboreans call Free Drinks (that is, you know, draughts of wine
without payment) to all those who will vote for Misogeorgos, but not for
me."
"That is very unkind of the wine-seller. But why do you say that the
transaction is base?"
"Why, of course it is base. How can it be anything else?"
"When we predicate baseness of a transaction," I said, "we must also
predicate baseness of those who are concerned in it, or at least of one
of them. Now, Philogeorgos, let me ask you a question; for you are
accustomed by this time to answer questions. When you wish for a pair of
shoes or a flute, how do you obtain one?"
"How else," he said, "except by buying it from a shoemaker or a maker of
flutes?"
"How else, indeed?" I replied. "So, then, the tradesman gives you
something which he possesses; and you give the tradesman in return
something which you possess. And this exchange is advantageous to both
of you, and honourable; is it not?"
"I suppose so."
"And neither of you becomes base?"
"Neither."
"Then it is not a base transaction?"
"No."
"Now consider in this way; Does a vote belong to the man who possesses a
vote?"
"Yes, Socrates; but I am afraid that you are going to quibble, as usual."
"It is only by dialectic," I replied, "that we can arrive at the truth.
And the wine belongs, I suppose, to the wine-seller?"
"It would seem so, at least."
"Then when the wine-seller gets the voter's vote in exchange for his own
wine, they simply give each other what each possesses; and such a
transaction, as you have said, is advantageous to both parties, and
honourable, and not base at all."
"I said," he replied, rather angrily, "that you were going to quibble.
Of course, the case is quite different. A vote is a sacred thing; and it
ought not to be exchanged for the satisfaction of mere bodily desires,
such as the desire for drink."
"Nor for any other material comfort?" I asked.
"Certainly not," he replied.
"Nobly spoken, indeed!" I said. "But I confess, all the same, that you
rather surprise me; for only this morning I heard the herald proclaiming
in your name that all the citizens would have Free Food if they voted for
Philogeorgos. And I remember how some years ago either Phaidrolithos or
one of those around him used to promise at elections that everyone should
have three acres of land and a cow, on condition that the city kept him
and his party in power. You do not mean to tell me that what
Phaidrolithos or his friends did was base?"
"No, indeed," he replied. "But surely, Socrates, even you must see that
this is a different matter altogether."
"How different? You say that votes must not be exchanged for material
comforts; yet Free Food is a material comfort; and so are three acres,
because they produce food; and so, I presume, is a cow. And these things
were offered to the voter in exchange for his vote, just as the
wine-seller now is offering draughts of wine."
"No, Socrates, it is not the same thing at all. When I talk of Free
Food, and when men like Phaidrolithos talk of land and cows, we do not
give these things immediately in exchange for votes. We could not; they
are not ours to give; we have not got them."
"That is very true," I said. "For I remember when Phaidrolithos and his
party were put in power many people used to come to those in authority
and demand that they should now receive three acres of land each and a
cow; and when they did not receive these things they were indignant, as
having been deceived. And I daresay that when you are in power men will
come expecting to receive Free Food, and will not get it. But, as far as
I can understand your argument, it is honourable to promise in return for
a vote that which you cannot give; but when one promises that which he
_can_ give, as the wine-seller does, that is base, and that makes you
sad. Is it not so? And the reason seems to be that when the wine-seller
offers Free Drinks for a vote, then the vote is sold; but when you offer
Free Food for a vote, then it is not the vote which is sold, but only the
voter."
"Socrates," said Philogeorgos, "you are a philosopher; and no philosopher
ever understood politics. But I am busy, and have really no more time to
waste upon you and your dialectics."
"Farewell, then, Philogeorgos," I said; "but please do not be angry with
me for being so stupid. And if I were you," I continued, "I do not think
I would be angry with the wine-seller either; for perhaps the draughts of
wine will make the citizens drunk, especially when they need not be paid
for; and when a citizen is drunk he will run the risk of voting for you
rather than for Misogeorgos. Do you not think so?"
But Philogeorgos was already out of hearing.