mind_. The original means this, and so it should have been rendered; and
if it had been so rendered, it would have set this controversy at rest."
But what if we should grant (what I do not believe) that the original
word means this, and this only, still it would not follow that the
change of mind called the new birth is meant by this term. A change of
judgment is a change of mind--a change of purpose is a change of
mind--any change of the general current of feeling, such as that from
carelessness and stupidity in to a state of anxiety and earnest inquiry,
what shall I do to be saved? is a change of mind.--And such a change of
mind indispensably precedes regeneration. No person ever, from being a
careless, hardened sinner, becomes an anxious and earnest inquirer after
salvation, without an important change in his judgment, moral feeling,
and volitions. Hence this definition does not at all help the objector,
unless he can prove that the Scriptures always mean by this term that
change which they elsewhere call the new birth. Indeed, since we have
already shown that repentance is our work, and the renewing of the heart
exclusively God's work, it follows incontrovertibly, that the change of
mind called repentance is not the new birth.
If repentance meant that change of mind called the new birth, then the
regenerate would be _often born again_, and that, too, without
backsliding; for those who are growing the fastest in grace repent the
most constantly and the most deeply.
Again: it is objected, that "faith is not a voluntary state of mind, and
therefore cannot be considered a condition, performed by the sinner, in
order to regeneration." To believe is doubtless, in many instances,
perfectly involuntary. There are numerous cases in which a man is
obliged to believe, both against his will and against his desires. There
are other cases, again, in which the will is not only much concerned in
believing, but in which its action is indispensable in order to believe.
And the faith of the Gospel is pre-eminently an instance of this kind.
"Faith," saith the word, "cometh by hearing." But hearing implies
attention; and every deliberate act of attention implies an act of the
will. A man can no more leap, by one transition, from a state of entire
carelessness into the faith that justifies the soul, than he can make a
world. But he can take the steps that lead to this result. To believe to
the saving of the soul requires _consideration_, _self examination_, a
_knowledge_ of the object of faith, or the truth to be believed,
_earnest looking_, and _prayerful seeking_. But is there no act of the
will in all these? It is said that "the Spirit takes of the things of
Jesus Christ, and shows them unto us." And it is doubtless true, that
the soul cannot get such a view of Christ as encourages him to throw
himself unreservedly upon the mercy of the Saviour, until the Spirit
makes, to the mind's eye, this special exhibition of the "things of
Christ." But when does he do this? Does he come to the sinner when he is
careless and inattentive, and show him the _things of Christ?_ No! it is
only to the inquiring and self-despairing sinner, who is earnestly
groaning out the sentiment in the bitterness of his heart, "Who shall
deliver me from the body of this death?" And is there no voluntary
action in all this?
But it will perhaps be wearisome to the reader to pursue these
objections farther. I should not have gone so fully into this part of
the subject, but for the fact, that this sentiment of unconditional
regeneration is considered the strong hold of Calvinism. This point
moreover appears to have been but slightly handled by most of the
anti-Calvinistic writers; and therefore I have felt it the more
necessary to attempt an answer to all the most important arguments that
are adduced in opposition to our view of this doctrine. I am far from
thinking I have done the subject justice, and may have cause perhaps
hereafter to acknowledge that some of my minor positions are untenable,
and that some of my expressions need modifying or explaining, although I
have used what care and circumspection my time and circumstances would
permit in reference not only to the doctrine itself, but also in
reference to the forms of expression. And as it respects the leading
doctrines here inculcated, I repose upon them with entire confidence.
However the theory clashes with that of many great and good men, it is
believed to be the only theory that will consistently explain the
practice and preaching of these very men. It is, in my view, the only
theory that will satisfactorily and consistently explain those great and
leading principles by which evangelical Christians expect to convert the
world to Christ. And, if this be true, the sooner the Christian Church
is established on this foundation, the better. We have already seen that
a mixture of error in the essential doctrines leads to various mutations
from extreme to extreme of dangerous heresy. How long before the Church
shall be _rooted and grounded in the truth!_ May He who said, LET LIGHT
BE; AND LIGHT WAS, hasten that glorious day!
THE END.
Footnotes
[1] Many objections have been made, by the reviewers, to my manner of
stating the doctrine of predestination. It is objected, that the great
body of Calvinists believe, no more than the Arminians, that God
"efficiently controls and actuates the human will." On a careful, and I
hope, candid revision of the subject, however, I cannot satisfy myself
that the objection is valid. I am quite sure God must control the will,
or he cannot, as Calvinists teach, secure the proposed end, by the
prescribed means. It is readily granted that Calvinists deny _such a
control_ as destroys the freedom of the will. But it is the object of
the sermon and of the following controversy to show that Calvinistic
predestination is, on any ground of consistency, utterly irreconcilable
with mental freedom. How far this has been done, of course, each will
judge for himself.
[2] It seems, to the author of the sermon, but little better than
trifling, to object, as some have, to this argument on foreknowledge,
that "God must predetermine his works before he could certainly know
what would take place; and hence, in the order of cause and effect, he
must decree in order to know." It is readily conceded, that, in the
order of nature, the Divine Being could not foreknow that a world would
certainly exist, until he had determined to create it. But was there no
prescience back of this? Did he determine to create a universe,
independent of a view of all the bearings in the case? If so, he created
at random and in ignorance. If not, then a view of all the results
preceded his determination to create; and thus we are led irresistibly
to the doctrine of the sermon, that "God foreknows in order to
predestinate."
[3] The review of the sermon, in the Christian Spectator, is understood
to be from the pen of Doctor Fitch, professor of divinity in Yale
College.
[4] See Christian Spectator, Vol. iv, No. 3.
[5] A part of this sermon has lately been published, in a tract form,
and circulated with the _avowed_ purpose of counteracting the influence
of the sermon "on predestination."
[6] A man was afflicted with the hydrophobia. When his paroxysms were
coming on he was aware of it, and gave warning to his friends to be on
their guard, that he might not injure them. Suppose, however, he knew of
a sure remedy, but voluntarily neglected to avail himself of it. Would
he not in that case be guilty, not only of all the evils that might
result to others from his malady; but also of self murder? And yet this
man's madness was entirely beyond the direct control of his will.