leads to materialism. The doctrine, it will be recollected, is this:
When the mind is brought into connection with objects of choice, it is
_inevitably_ led, by a law of its nature, to the selection of one rather
than of the other, unless there is a _perfect equality_ between them; in
which case I suppose, of course, the mind must remain in equilibrium;
for if it moves only by the influence of motives, and to the same degree
and in the same direction with motive influence, of course when it is
equally attracted in opposite directions it must be at rest! It is on
this ground that Leibnitz maintained that God could not make two
particles of matter in all respects alike; because, in that case, being
"inevitably" governed by motives in his decisions, he could not
determine where to place them, both having the same influence on his
mind for a location in the same place! The same writer represents this
motive influence, also, as frequently imperceptible, but not the less
effectual, and not the less voluntary! And to illustrate it makes the
following comparison:--"It is as if a needle, touched with a loadstone,
were sensible of and pleased with its turning to the north, for it would
believe that it turned itself independent of any other cause, not
perceiving the insensible motions of the magnetic power." This statement
of Leibnitz, who had paid great attention to this philosophical theory,
is important in several respects. It is, in the first place, an
acknowledgment that consciousness is against the doctrine; and it is
also a concession that the mind is _imposed upon_, in this matter, by
the Creator. But with respect to the argument, that this doctrine leads
to materialism, this quotation is important, because it shows that one
of the most _philosophical_, if not one of the most _evangelical_ of the
defenders of this doctrine, considered the law of motive influence
similar to the law of magnetic attraction, differing only in being
accompanied by sensation and a deceptive consciousness. And what says
its great evangelical champion in this country, Dr. Edwards? He compares
our volitions to the vibrations of a scale beam, the different ends of
which are respectively elevated or depressed as the opposite weights may
chance to vary. What is this but teaching that motions of mind are
governed by the same fixed laws as those of matter, and that volitions
are perfectly mechanical states of mind? What the advocates of this
doctrine charge on the opposite theory belongs, by their own showing, to
their own system.--_They_, not we, make choices the result of animal
instinct, or senseless mechanism. I know Professor Stuart, in his late
exposition of the Romans, seems to reprobate these comparisons; and
while he contends, as I should think, as strenuously as Dr. Edwards, for
a complete and efficient control of the Divine Being over all our
volitions, he appears to think that there is a great difference between
the laws of intellectual and material action. So, indeed, do we think.
But we think that difference consists in the mind's being free from that
control for which the professor contends; and we believe when he
contends for that control in the volitions of the mind, he contends for
that which, from the nature of the case, entirely destroys the other
part of his hypothesis, viz. that the operations of the mind are free,
and essentially different from mechanical motion or the laws of
attractive influence in the material world. If the attractive power of
motives over the mind is any thing different from the law of gravitation
or magnetic attraction, what is that difference? Should any one say, I
cannot tell; I ask then, How does he know but it is _that very power_
for which Arminians contend? Most probably it is that power. Or will it
be said, the difference between motive influence and gravity is
consciousness? I reply, Consciousness is no part of the relation between
motives and the power of choice. I see not indeed how it affects that
relation at all. And this the comparison of Leibnitz, already alluded
to, clearly illustrates. Look at that flowing stream; it hastens on most
freely, and by the law of its own nature down the gentle declivities or
more precipitous slopes of its meandering channel. Suppose now that
Omnipotence should impart consciousness to the particles of the
continuous current, it would then wake up to perceive the action and
feel the pleasure of its own delightful motions. It would roll on still
by the law of its own nature, and would feel that it was free to move
according to its own _inclination_ and voluntary tendency, for its will
would of course be in the direction of its _motive_, or in other phrase,
its _gravitating_ influence. But could it turn its course and roll back
its waters to their fountains? It could if it was so _inclined_. But its
present _inclination_ is toward the bottom of the valley or the bosom of
the ocean, and thither, by the relation that exists between its
particles and the gravitating influence of the earth, it rolls on _with
the utmost freedom_, though with the utter impossibility of changing its
own course, without an inversion of the gravitating power. Let the hand
of Omnipotence invert the slope of the mountain, and to! with the same
freedom these very waters roll back again to their original fountains!
Thus it is with the human mind. It is conscious of being free to move in
the direction of its inclinations, but require it to turn its course and
move in the current of its volitions, in an opposite direction, and it
would be utterly impossible, until Omnipotence himself should change the
motive influence.--"God is the determiner of perceptions, and
perceptions are the determiners of choices."
We see, therefore, that this doctrine of motive influence leads to
materialism, for it makes the analogy between mental and material action
so complete that it destroys all idea of _intellectual power_.
Philosophically speaking, there is no _power_ in the laws of nature.
What we express by the _power_ of attraction, or repulsion, or
decomposition, is nothing more than the uniformity of the Divine agency.
Does the earth attract elevated bodies to its surface?--This is not an
energy inherent in nature; it is the God of nature acting by a uniform
law. This is all that any intelligent man can mean by the power of
nature. We, however, use the word _power_ in an accommodated sense in
these cases, but always I think in connection with that portion of
matter that _appears_ to act, and not _that_ which is acted upon. The
magnet, we say, has power to attract iron, because iron is attracted
toward the magnet, and not the magnet toward the iron. The antecedent,
or that which takes the lead in the motion, is more properly said to
have the power, or is the efficient cause. If then we allow of the use
of the term power at all, to express the relation of cause and effect,
growing out of a philosophical constitution of things, the term should
be applied to the antecedent, and not to the consequent. In the case
before us, mental action is not the cause of the motive, but the motive
is the cause of the mental action: therefore we should say motives have
_power_ to act upon the mind, and the mind has a _susceptibility_ of
being acted upon. Dr. Reid has well observed, that a power to be acted
upon is no power, or "it is a _powerless power_," which is
philosophically absurd. Therefore we come to the conclusion that the
mind has no _power_ of _choice_, but has a _susceptibility_ of being
drawn into a state called volition by the power of motives. It will
avail nothing, as I conceive, to say that there is evidently a
difference between the susceptibility of the mind in this case, and the
susceptibility of matter in other cases, unless it be shown what that
difference is: for when that difference is pointed out, it will
doubtless be found to be what is in direct opposition to the motive
theory. It is the misfortune of the Calvinistic system that it often has
to assume positions to keep itself in countenance, which positions
themselves are a virtual abandonment of the system. So the New-Haven
divines have done to support predestination, and to this all Calvinists
are driven in their attempts to reconcile free will, or the power of
choice, with their doctrine of motives, dependence &c. We may be told in
the case before us, that "when the mind is acted upon it is then excited
to action." But how excited to action? Is the action any stronger than
the motive influence?--Is it carried beyond this influence? or in a
different direction? To answer any _one_ of these questions in the
affirmative is to give up the theory; but to answer them in the negative
is to attribute to the mind nothing more than the inertia of matter. The
_motives_ are (under God) the _agent_, the _mind_ is the _passive
object_, and the _volition_ is the _effect_. Can any one say then, on
this theory, that the mind has the power of choice? It has no power in
the first place, because its volitions are the result of philosophical
necessity; and it has no power, secondly, because it is not the cause of
its own volitions, but in these volitions it is the passive subject of
foreign influences. Now, so far as moral action is concerned, how does
this differ from materialism? It is true mental action differs from
material action in some associated circumstances; it is accompanied by
consciousness; but as consciousness of itself cannot give
accountability, and as it gains nothing in this respect by being
associated with such kind of mental action as results from philosophical
necessity, it appears plain that man is not accountable; and if not
accountable, it is more than probable that he has no future existence,
and thus again we are driven to materialism and to deism, if not to
atheism.
That man is not _accountable_ upon the principle we are opposing, might
have been made a distinct argument; but I have connected it with the
argument that this doctrine leads to materialism because they imply each
other. If materialism is true, we are not accountable, and if we are not
accountable, materialism is probably true; and both are true, as I
conceive, if the Calvinistic doctrine of motives is true.
It may, however, be urged by the advocates of this theory, that the mind
is not wholly passive, because we are conscious of putting forth a
mental energy and making a responsible volition; _that_ I am ready to
grant, but then our consciousness is a fallacy if this system be true;
and on the contrary, if consciousness be true, this system is false. I
believe no one who pays attention to his own mind will doubt of having
this consciousness. But does that prove the truth of this theory? It is
one thing to be conscious of having this energy of mind and responsible
volition, and another to be conscious that the theory in question is
true; indeed this consciousness destroys the theory.
Should it be urged in opposition to the alleged tendency of this system
to materialism, that different minds are not uniformly influenced by the
same motives, nor the same minds at different times, and therefore, in
this respect, it is evident that the laws of mind and of matter differ;
I reply, It is precisely so with matter; for _that_ attracts or repels
according to its different magnetic or electrical states; or should it
be urged that mind differs from matter, and shows itself to be possessed
of a peculiar energy, because it has power to suspend its decisions, to
review the subject, to investigate, &c; I answer, this it cannot do
without a motive; and this it _must_ do if the motive preponderate in
that direction, but not otherwise.
To have a proper view of this subject let us go back to the first
perception. Could the mind, according to this doctrine, act otherwise
than in coincidence with the motive influence of this perception; or
could it even suspend the volition this influence was calculated to
produce, until a second and more powerful motive was introduced? If it
could, then this doctrine is false; if it could not, then the mind, like
matter put in motion, must move on invariably in the same direction, and
with the same velocity of thought for ever, or until a new motive should
counteract the influence of the former! This is emphatically the _vis
inertia_ of matter. The bare statement of which seems sufficient to
overthrow the theory.
Another objection to this doctrine of motives is, it leads to the notion
of regeneration by _moral suasion_ merely. There has been much said of
late, by the various writers in the old and the _new_ school, on this
point. The new school are charged with holding that the _truth alone_,
without any immediate agency of the Holy Spirit, converts the sinner.
This is considered by the old school Calvinists as a fatal error. But
why so? If motives _govern_ the mind, with absolute sway, all you _need_
to convert a sinner, is to bring a motive strong enough to induce him to
choose God as his chief good, and he is converted. Until you do this
there is no conversion, it is impossible for the Holy Ghost to convert a
sinner in any other way than by motives, for choice of good we are told
is conversion; there is no choice without a motive, and the strongest
motive governs choice absolutely; therefore motive is the omnipotent
power that changes the sinner's heart. This is the legitimate result of
The Calvinistic premises. We have more than once had occasion to wonder
that Calvinists should revolt at the result of their own doctrines; here
we have another instance of it; here too we have the enigma of "_natural
ability_" unriddled. The human mind, by the constitution of its nature,
has the power of choosing according to the influence of the strongest
motive; and therefore, so far as this can be called a power, it has the
natural power to convert itself; and this is the reason why "_make you a
new heart_" is the burden of almost every sermon and exhortation in
modern preaching; all the sinner has to do is to choose, in view of
motives, and he is converted. And here, too, is unravelled that other
mystery which we have been so puzzled to understand, viz. that although
all possess the natural power to convert themselves, yet no man ever did
convert himself without the special interposition of the Divine agency;
for, observe, God keeps the motives in his own hands; "God is the
determiner of perceptions, and perceptions are the determiners of
_choices;_" that is, of _conversions;_ for to choose in a particular
way, is to be converted. Whenever, therefore, he is disposed to let the
sinner convert himself, according to his natural power; that is, when he
is disposed to overpower the mind by an irresistible motive, he brings
the motive and mind in contact, and _it is done_. Thus the sinner has as
much power to convert himself as he has to resolve to eat when he is
hungry; for all the power he has to do either, is a susceptibility of
being operated upon, and controlled by the strongest motive; and thus
you see, also, that _God_ converts the sinner, because he supplies the
motive that influences the choice; and here, too, is seen the occasion
for misquoting so frequently and misapplying so universally, that
passage in the Psalms: "[My] people shall be [made] willing in the day
of [my] power." That is, when God applies the controlling motive to
influence to a right choice, then shall the sinner, by a law of his
nature, _become willing to be converted_. Such are the wonderful
philosophical discoveries of modern theology! This is the way for man to
convert _himself_ by natural power, and this is the way for _God_ to
convert him, without the aid of _super_ natural power! Well might a
divine of this cast, whom I heard preach not long since, say of
regeneration, "There is nothing supernatural or miraculous in it." For
surely it is one of the most natural things in the world, according to
this theory, to be converted. It is only to be operated upon by a
motive, according to the law of his natural constitution, and the man is
converted.
This _philosophy of Christian experience_ has led modern orthodoxy to
the very borders of natural religion. Another step, and we can do
without a Holy Ghost or a Divine Saviour. We will sit down with the
philosopher in his study, and _work out_ a religious experience, as
philosophically as a skilful casuist can solve a question of morals; we
will show the _rationale_ of the whole process, and demonstrate it so
clearly, that infidels shall lose all their objections to the Gospel,
and be induced to "_submit_" to God with scarcely a change of theory.
Hereafter let no man say, that the work of regeneration is a
mystery--that in this work we cannot tell whence the regenerating
influence comes, or whither it goes; for it comes through the
philosophical channel of motive influence by which it introduces a
"governing purpose" into the mind, and the work is done. Let no man
hereafter say that his "faith stands not in the wisdom of man, but in
the power of God;" or "if any man would be wise let him become a fool
that he may be wise;" or "the wisdom of man is foolishness with God;"
for lo, the philosophy of regeneration is at length explained! and the
whole secret is found to consist in the philosophical relation between
motives and mind!! Can any one wonder, after this, that in Geneva, in
Germany, and in New-England, Calvinism has finally resulted in
Socinianism? And can any one help trembling for a large portion of the
orthodox Churches among us at the present day? Grant that there is an
increase of zeal, a greater stir among the people, more revivals, &c;
all these, with a good foundation, would promise well for the Church;
but we fear there is a worm at the root. By this it is not intended to
insinuate that the work is always spurious and the professed conversions
unsound. In many instances it is undoubtedly the reverse of this. It
might be expected after the people had been lulled for a long time under
the paralyzing opiates of old-fashioned Calvinism, that this new and
_apparently_ opposite theory should rouse many to action. "I had been
taught," said a man not far from this, "that I must wait God's time to
be converted, and I waited many years in vain; but more recently I have
been instructed that I might convert myself; I set about the work, and I
believe it is done!" Now this, which in the relation borders upon the
ludicrous, might have been a genuine conversion. His new views might
only have been sufficient to arouse him to a co-operation with the Holy
Spirit in his conversion; and this may have been the case with
thousands. In their practical effects two opposite errors may, in
individual cases, neutralize each other.--But is either therefore safe?
Will the general effect be salutary? Let the history of the Church
speak; and in view of that record I confess I fear for our common Zion.
But let not the old Calvinists lay this blame, and charge this danger
upon the new school; the new school doctrine is a legitimate scion from
that root which they have cultivated with such assiduity and care. It
grows out of the doctrine of motives, it springs from the idea of the
entire dependence of the human mind for each and all its volitions upon
the directing influence of Omnipotence, whatever may be the theory by
which that influence is explained.
Another argument in opposition to this doctrine is found in the
consideration, that we are constantly liable to disappointment in most
of our calculations respecting human agents.--Though we may judge
something of what will be the conduct of men in given circumstances, yet
our calculations are very far from coming up to mechanical exactness.
Motives have some influence; but that influence is very variable and
uncertain. Why is this? It is not so in matter; the same causes will
produce the same effects to the end of time. But we see many choose,
without being able to give what, _in their own estimation_, is a valid
reason; they did thus because they chose to do so; they act in defiance
of the strongest motives, drawn from whatever source. We see the
greatest possible caprice in the volitions of men; we see their minds
starting aside, and putting on the greatest possible and unaccountable
mental states, in a way and form that baffles all human calculation, and
will for ever baffle it. A man may spend all his life in trying to
reduce to uniformity the phenomena of human volitions, and thereby to
fix, in an unerring code, the laws that govern them, and he may hand his
labours to his successor, and so on to the end of time, and after all,
that living, spontaneous, thought-producing essence which we call the
human soul, will slide from our grasp and elude all our calculations. If
this consideration should have no direct weight in opposition to the
theory I am opposing, it will at least show the absurdity of defending
this system by what is called the _known regularity_ and _uniform
phenomena_ of human volitions. To talk of _uniformity_ here, is to talk
of, to say the least, what does not exist.
In the examination of this subject, we find that the arguments in favour
of the motive theory are generally of the negative kind; they are not so
much direct proofs of the truth of the theory, as they are attempts to
show the absurdity of denying it. But when statements of this kind are
accompanied by no arguments, they need only be met by a denial. "We are
conscious," say the theorists, "of being controlled by motives:" I
reply, we are not conscious of this control, but we are conscious of the
contrary fact. We know, indeed, that motives have their influence; but
we know also that the mind has an influence over motives, and probably a
greater influence than motives have over _it_. The mind is conscious too
of having an influence over itself, and of possessing a self-directing
energy, a spontaneous power, and its consciousness of responsibility is
predicated on this power of spontaneity. Only let the mind become
clearly conscious that motives beyond its power and influence have an
irresistible power in controlling its decisions, and you would as
certainly remove from man all sense of responsibility, as in those cases
now, where the spasmodic motion of the muscle is not the result of the
will.
It is said again, that to deny this control "involves the absurdity that
our volitions are exerted without any intelligent reasons, and are the
result of a brute or senseless mechanism." It appears to me, however,
that a system which represents the will as mechanically governed by
motives, as weights turn the scale beam, makes man a machine; while the
theory that gives the mind a spontaneous power and energy of its own,
makes him what he is, _an intelligent, responsible agent_.
Since, then, these negative arguments in favour of the theory that
motives control the mind, are _assertions_ and not _proofs;_ and since
the theory itself leads to _fate_, to _atheism_, to _materialism_, to
_conversion_ by mere _moral suasion_, to the subversion of _human
liberty_ and _moral responsibility_, we must believe the theory false.
But against the theory of the spontaneous power of the mind, none of
these objections lie. It accords too with consciousness; and is, in
fact, the only theory on which the responsibility of a moral agent can
be predicated. The opposite view claims our assent to two incongruous
and apparently contradictory propositions, between which there is not
only no agreement, but an evident repugnancy. This is the embarrassment
in the one case, and it is fatal to the theory.
If there are embarrassments in the other case, and what theory of mind
or matter has not its _inexplicables?_--these embarrassments are
evidently of another kind; it is not the want of light to see how two
antagonist principles can agree, the repugnancy of which must be the
more apparent as light increases, but it is from the known limits to
human knowledge. The principal embarrassment to the theory we defend is,
we cannot understand the _manner_ in which this faculty of the mind
operates. But this is no more difficult than to understand the manner in
which other faculties of the mind operate. To make this last statement
clear, the reader is desired to recollect that the mind is not divided
into parts and members like the body. When we talk of the _faculties_ of
the mind, we should understand the power that the entire mind has to act
in this or that way. Thus we say, the mind has the faculties of will and
of memory, that is, the mind, as a whole, has the powers of choosing,
and of calling up its past impressions. Now if any one will tell me
_how_ the mind remembers, I will tell him how it wills; and I have the
same right to ask him what causes the memory to remember, as he has to
ask me what causes the will to will. In both cases it may be said, the
mind _remembers_ and _wills_ because this is its nature--God _made it
so_. When you analyze until you come to the original elements, or when
you trace back effects until you come to first principles, you must
stop.--And if you will not receive these first principles because you
cannot explain them farther, then indeed you must turn universal
skeptic. I frankly acknowledge I cannot tell _how_ the mind acts in its
volitions. And let it be understood that the motive theory, with all its
other embarrassments, has this one in common with ours.--Can its
advocates tell me _how_ motives act upon the mind? True philosophy is an
analysis of constituent principles, or of causes and effects, but the
origin of these relations and combinations is resolvable only into the
will of the Creator. _It is so, because God hath made it so_. And the
nature of these relations is beyond the reach of the human mind. However
impatient we may be at these restrictions, they are limits beyond which
we _cannot_ go; and our only duty in the case is, submission.
I am aware, however, that what I have now said may, without farther
explanation, especially when taken in connection with a principle of
philosophy already recognized, be considered as an important concession
to my opponents. I have before stated, in substance, that in the
material world there is, strictly speaking, no such thing as _power;_
that the efficiency of the laws of nature is, in fact, the Divine energy
operating in a uniform way. "Let it be granted," a Calvinist might say,
"that what we call the operation of second causes is universally the
supreme Intelligence operating in a uniform way, and it is all we ask to
defend our system. Then it will be granted, that in each volition of the
human mind the operation of the will is nothing more than the energy of
the Divine mind operating in a uniform way."