sermon on predestination and election it was natural and fair that the
first inquiry should be, Are the definitions correct? The definition of
predestination assumed in the sermon was, that unalterable purpose and
efficient decree of God, by which the moral character and responsible
acts of man were definitely fixed and efficiently produced. On this
point the sermon joined issue. To this definition most of the notices
and reviews, to the number of six or seven, which I have seen, have
taken exceptions. The review in the Boston Telegraph, however, is not of
this number.--That, as has already been noticed, agrees with the charge
in the sermon, that "the _fiat_ of God brought forth sin as directly as
it made the world." We have only to leave those Calvinists, who accord
to that sentiment, to struggle, as they can, against the arguments of
the sermon--against the common sense of the world--against their own
convictions of right and wrong--and, I may add, against their own
brethren of "the class," some of whom have already publicly denounced
the sentiment as "horrid blasphemy." At this day of light, in which
_naked Calvinism_ is abhorred by most of those who bear the name of
Calvinists, it is hardly necessary to give a formal answer to such a
review. We approve of the _logical consistency_ of these men--we admire
the moral courage that, from assumed premises, pushes out a theory to
its legitimate results without flinching; but we are astonished at the
_moral nerve_ that can contemplate such results with complacency. For
myself I confess when I see this naked system of Calvinism fulminating
the curse of reprobation in the teeth of the miserable wretch whose only
crime is, that his God has made him a sinner, my heart recoils with
indescribable horror! Let him contemplate this picture who can. I covet
not his head or his heart.
Of others who have expressed their views of the sermon there are two
classes: 1. The conductors of the Christian Spectator and those who
favour their views; and 2. Those who in a former number were called
Reformed Hopkinsians. The latter comprehend the larger portion of
Calvinists in New-England, and probably in the United States. Their
views on predestination shall be noticed in another number. At present I
shall direct my remarks to the letters of Mr. Metcalf and to the first
and second notices of the sermon in the Christian Spectator. And here
let me say, once for all, that I do not consider either of these
gentlemen, or any who think with them, responsible for the doctrine of
predestination as stated and opposed in the sermon. This I hope will be
satisfactory. If these gentlemen should ask me why I published my sermon
in terms that included Calvinists generally, without making the
exception in their favour, I answer, 1. The views of Dr. Taylor and
"those who believe with him," on this particular point, were unknown to
me at the time. Nor is this strange, for it is but lately that those
views have been fully developed--never so fully before, probably, as in
Dr. Fitch's review of my sermon, already alluded to. 2. It never
occurred to me that any man or any set of men holding, in respect to
predestination, the doctrine of James Arminius, John Wesley, and the
whole body of Methodists, would call themselves Calvinists!! This is all
the apology I have, and whether or not it is sufficient, the public must
judge. By acknowledging the views of these gentlemen to be Methodistical
on the subject of predestination, I by no means would be understood to
say this of their system as a whole--the objectionable parts will be
noticed in their place. But whatever is true is none the less so for
being mixed with error. There are some things, however, to be regretted
and exposed in the manner in which these reviewers have expressed their
doctrine of predestination, and also in the manner in which they have
opposed the sermon and Arminianism generally. They complain of my
definition of predestination. Mr. M. thinks it is bearing false witness.
The reviewer thinks it is obviously erroneous and unjust. And yet they
themselves acknowledge that the sermon is an unanswerable refutation of
predestination as held by Dr. Tyler and others who oppose their views.
But what is a matter of the greatest surprise is the determination with
which these gentlemen persist in holding up the idea that their views
essentially differ from ours. Dr. Fitch, in his answer to my reply,
says:--
"There are three views, and only three, which can be taken of the Divine
purposes in relation to a moral kingdom:--
1. That God, foreseeing the certainty of the conduct of his creatures,
purposes merely to _treat them in a corresponding manner_.
2. That he, first of all, resolves _what the conduct of his creatures
shall be_, and next resolves on such measures as _shall bring_ them to
that conduct.
3. That, foreseeing the conduct which will certainly ensue on the
different measures it is possible for him to take, he purposes to
_pursue those measures which will certainly lead to the best possible
results_."
"The first view is that which we understood to be advocated by Dr. Fisk,
in the sermon we reviewed." The writer goes on farther to say that his
objection to this is, "that it is utterly deficient"--"that it passes
over in silence all those acts of God in creation and government by
which he determines character." Of course he means to say that the
_sermon_ advocated a theory which left out of the question all the
Divine influence in determining character. How strangely he has
misunderstood the sermon, let those judge who have read it. It teaches
that God hath fixed the laws of the physical and moral world: that he
has a general plan, suited to all the various circumstances and
contingencies of government; that God gives the sinner power to choose
life; that his grace enlightens and strengthens the sinner to seek after
and obtain salvation. In short, it must be obvious that no man who
believes in the Divine government and in Gospel provisions can leave
this influence out of his system. I will therefore venture upon the
following declaration, which it is presumed Dr. Fitch cannot gainsay,
namely, Dr. F. _never saw a man and never heard of a man_ that was a
believer in revelation, who left out of his creed all that conduct in
God which determines character. That such was not the character of my
creed, the reviewer might have learned in my reply to his first review,
if he could not from the sermon. In the reply it is said, "As God
foresaw men would sin, he also determined upon the plan he would pursue
in reference to them as sinners, and arranged in the counsels of his own
infinite mind the extended concatenation of causes and effects so as to
'make the wrath of man praise him,' and _deduce the greatest possible
good from the best possible system_."--And yet, strange to tell, in his
answer to my reply, the reviewer says as decidedly as if it were an
undisputed truth, "Dr. Fisk advocates the first," (meaning the first
view of the Divine purposes given above.) "We brought forward the
third," (meaning the third view.) "Now since the third upholds the fact
of foreordination, free from the objections of Dr. F., we have succeeded
in upholding the fact which Dr. F., as an Arminian, denies, and which
Calvinists maintain." Whereas he ought to have said, for he had my
statement for it directly before him, "Dr. Fisk advocates the third,"
and then he might have added, "Now since the third destroys the
Calvinistic doctrine of foreordination, therefore in assisting Dr. Fisk
to sustain the third we have succeeded in disproving the doctrine of
foreordination, which Arminians deny, and Calvinists have attempted to
maintain." In fact, as the reviewer says, there can be but those three
views taken of the Divine purposes; and since neither I nor any other
Arminian ever believed in the first, and as Dr. Fitch himself
acknowledges we are directly opposed to the second, it follows that we
must believe the third. But the third is the reviewer's creed: therefore
on this point he is an Arminian, or we are Calvinists.
That the reviewer's theory on predestination is about the same with the
Methodists' appears evident from the following quotations from Mr.
Wesley, in which it will be seen that not only does Mr. Wesley's creed
include all the Divine influence that goes "to determine character," but
also that God "pursues measures which will certainly lead to the best
possible results;" nay, that he does all that he _wisely can_ to exclude
sin from the moral universe. These are points for which the advocates of
the New-Haven theory strongly contend. Let them see, then, how in this
matter they have identified themselves with Arminians.
"To God," says Mr. Wesley, in his sermon on Divine providence, "all
things are possible; and we cannot doubt of his exerting all his power,
as in sustaining so in governing all that he has made. Only he that can
do all things else cannot deny himself--he cannot counteract himself or
oppose his own work. Were it not for this, he would destroy all sin,
with its attendant pain, in a moment. But in so doing he would
counteract himself, and undo all that he has been doing since he created
man upon the earth. For he created man in his own image--a spirit endued
with understanding, with will or affections, and liberty, without which
he would have been incapable of either virtue or vice. He could not be a
moral agent, any more than a tree or a stone. Therefore (with reverence
be it spoken) the Almighty himself cannot do this thing. He cannot thus
contradict himself or undo what he has done. But were he to do this, it
would imply no wisdom at all, but barely a stroke of omnipotence.
Whereas all the manifold wisdom of God (as well as all his power and
goodness) is displayed in governing man as man--as an intelligent and
free spirit, capable of choosing either good or evil."
Again. In the sermon entitled, The Wisdom of God's Counsels: "In the
moral world evil men and evil spirits continually oppose the Divine
will, and create numberless irregularities. Here therefore is full scope
for the exercise of all the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of
God in counteracting all the wickedness and folly of men and all the
subtlety of Satan, to carry on his glorious design, the salvation of
lost mankind." Now let me ask the reviewer, is this leaving out all the
Divine influence that determines character? Is not this maintaining
that, "in view of the measures that it was possible tor God to take, he
purposes to pursue those measures that will certainly lead to the best
possible result?" Is Dr. Fitch ignorant of what Methodists hold to? or
is he unwilling to identify himself with us? Ignorant of _my_ views he
could not be, I think, after reading my reply.--Why, then, does he
persist in talking of a difference where there is none?
Mr. Metcalf has taken a more correct view of the subject. After reading
my reply, he says, "if you will preach this doctrine to your Methodist
brethren thoroughly and forcibly, and sustain it with the strong
arguments on which the doctrine rests, if they do not call it Calvinism,
I will acknowledge they do not understand the term as I do. And if you
will preach in the same way to Calvinists, if they too do not call it
Calvinism, I will grant that even _they_ too sometimes differ about
terms. If you will take this course, I think when you shall see what the
doctrine will be called, the astonishment you express that it should be
regarded as Calvinism will wear away." Now how surprised Mr. M. will be
when he learns that we have always preached this doctrine as thoroughly
and forcibly as we could, and neither Methodists nor Calvinists ever
suspected it was Calvinism until he and those who believe with him
incorporated it into their creed, and _for some reason_ unknown to us,
called it Calvinism! And how surprised we all are to find that he who
was so anxious to be heard in the Christian Advocate and Journal, for
the purpose of informing Methodists what Calvinism was, and of
disabusing their minds of erroneous conceptions on this subject, himself
understands neither Methodism nor Calvinism!! Yet so it is, Calvinists
themselves being judges. Dr. Tyler, Dr. Griffin, Dr. Woods, the author
of "Views in Theology," the author or authors of the pamphlet by an
Edwardian, all condemn the New-Haven theory of predestination as
anti-Calvinistic, and as being essentially Arminian.
Dr. Fitch acknowledges that we agree in some of the first principles. In
reply to my answer he says, "It was certainly our intention to place
this contested doctrine on grounds which our Wesleyan brethren _could
not_ dispute, and it gives us pleasure to find that in this we have had
complete success!" There are two things a little remarkable connected
with this sentiment. One is, that the writer should so express himself
as to convey the idea that _he_ has traced up the subject to first
principles with much care, and, to his _great satisfaction, has
succeeded in convincing us_ of the correctness of his premises. Whereas
it is evident from the passages already given from Mr. Wesley, and from
the universal sentiments of the Wesleyan Methodists, that the New-Haven
doctors have _at length_ come on to our ground; and it gives _us great
pleasure_ to find that, from _some source_, arguments in favour of our
system have with them met with _complete success_. The other thing that
strikes me as remarkable is, that after the reviewer had acknowledged
that we were agreed in these first principles, he should immediately go
on to say, as has already been mentioned, that I and the Arminians hold
to the first view he has given of the three possible views that might be
taken of predestination, and deny the third; when at the same time the
third contains _those very first principles_ in which he says we are
agreed. This looks so much like a contradiction, almost in the same
breath, that I really know not what other name to give it. If these
gentlemen are disposed to come into the fortress of truth, and assist us
in manning our guns and working our artillery against error, we
certainly can have no objection. We are fond of help. But they must
pardon us if we revolt a little at the idea of their taking the lead in
this business, and accounting us as mere novices who have only learned,
and that too from themselves, some of the _elementary principles_. Nay,
they must not wonder if we refuse outright to be crowded from our
present commanding position in the fortress of truth, and to be placed
in front of our own batteries, merely to give our _new allies_ an
opportunity to blow us up _with our own ordnance!_
In reply to my objection to the reviewer that "it was an abuse of terms
to call the _permission of sin, not hindering it_, &c, a foreordination
or purpose that it shall be," &c, he has said, "If an evil, unavoidable
and hateful, is allowed by the Creator to come into his kingdom, in one
place and time rather than any other, and is thus _particularly disposed
of_ by his providence, because it is a disposition of it the best
possible, is there no purpose of God in relation to the thing? In doing
his own pleasure, in this case, does he not decide on the fact of the
entrance of sin into his kingdom just when and where it does?" Now I beg
the reader to go over this last paragraph once more, and then say if he
does not agree with me in the following sentiment, namely, there rarely
occurs in any writer an instance of so complete an evasion of a
contested question as is here exhibited. Is there no difference between
a "purpose in relation to a thing," and the foreordaining or decreeing
that the thing shall be? And pray what is meant by God's "deciding on
the fact of the entrance of sin into his kingdom?" You can make it mean
almost any thing. But taking the whole of Dr. Fitch's theory on the
subject, he means to say, doubtless, that since the entrance of sin was
unavoidable, God determined to restrain and control it so as to suffer
it to do the least harm possible--preferring holiness in its stead in
every place where it occurs. And this is foreordaining sin!! This is
predestination!! Let us illustrate this by a case in point. Cicero, a
Roman consul, knew that Cataline was plotting treason against the
commonwealth. Cicero perceived that this _hated treason_, though
unavoidable, was not wholly unmanageable. He determined therefore to
"make a disposition of it the best possible." He took his measures
accordingly. By these Cataline and the principal conspirators were
driven out of the city, and compelled, before their plans were matured,
to resort to open hostilities. Thus the citizens were aroused and
united, and the state saved. In this way the evils of the conspiracy
were suffered to come upon the commonwealth "in one place and time
rather than any other," and "were thus _particularly disposed of_" by
Cicero. In this case the consul had a special "purpose about the thing."
He determined to drive the conspirators into open war, rather than
suffer them privately to corrupt all they could, and then fill the city
with fire and slaughter. The question now is, and it is put not to the
reviewer, for he still persists in the use of his terms, but it is put
to the common understanding of community, Did the Roman consul ordain or
foreordain, or predestinate the treason of Cataline? If by common
consent all answer, No, such a statement is a libel upon the consul; and
if, in addition to this common understanding of the term, the
theological use of the term will not bear such a construction; if the
great body of the Calvinists of the present day, and of New-England
even, use the term in a different sense, it remains to be seen how the
New-Haven divines can stand up before the world and say, "We believe God
hath foreordained whatsoever comes to pass."
Before closing this number I ought, perhaps, to say a few things, if not
in the defence, at least explanatory of that course of reasoning in the
sermon in which I undertook to show that foreknowledge is antecedent to
foreordination. To this Mr. Metcalf and others have objected because,
say they, God must first have determined to make moral agents before he
could know they would sin: therefore his knowledge or his foreknowledge
in this case must depend upon his determination. This objection, at
least so far as the New-Haven theology is concerned, is founded in
error. What says Dr. Fitch? "That God, _foreseeing_ the conduct which
will certainly ensue on the different measures it is possible for him to
take, _purposes_," &c. The sermon says, "God knows all that is, or will
be, or might be, under any possible contingency," and that "his plan is
the result of his infinite knowledge--the decrees of his throne flow
forth from the eternal fountain of his wisdom." Where is the discrepancy
here? God saw this general plan, as a whole, before he resolved upon its
adoption; (I speak now of the order of thought;) he saw, if he made free
moral agents, and governed them as such, sin would ensue. And he also
saw what he might do in that case to counteract and overrule it to his
own glory and the good of the universe.--And he judged, in his infinite
wisdom, that such a moral universe, notwithstanding the sin that would
certainly result from it, would, on the whole, be the best; and
therefore upon this _foreknowledge_ of the whole, God _founded_ his
determination to create the universe, and govern it as proposed. God's
foreknowledge of the _certainty_ of any event in this universe, it must
be acknowledged, depended upon his determination to create and govern
the universe. And in _this sense_ his purpose was _causa sine qua non_,
a cause without which any given event would not have happened, and
therefore could not have been foreseen as _certain_. But then it should
be remembered that there was a foreknowledge anterior to all this, and
which was, in fact, the foundation of all subsequent instances of
knowing or decreeing. It is therefore true in the sense in which the
sentiment is advanced and sustained in the sermon, that "God foreknows
in order to predestinate, but he does not (primarily) predestinate in
order to foreknow."
To conclude: from the view taken in this number it appears that one
class of Calvinists acknowledge that predestination is chargeable with
all that was included in my definition of it. Another, and a rapidly
increasing class, have given up Calvinian predestination, and, in all
but the name, have in that point come on to the Methodist ground. There
is still another class, who are evidently not Arminians, but still deny
the correctness of my definition of their doctrine. They say they are
not chargeable with such a doctrine, either directly or by inference. In
the next number, therefore, an attempt will be made to sustain from
their own positions this definition.
NUMBER VII.
PREDESTINATION, CONTINUED.
From my last number the reader will perceive that there are two classes
of Calvinists, so-called, with whom we have no need to contend; with one
there is no cause of controversy, because they have given up the
doctrine; and with the other there is no _need_ of controversy, because
their plain manner of avowing the doctrine, _logical consequences and
all_, renders any arguments against it unnecessary. Its character is too
monstrous and abhorrent to gain much credit. There is yet another and a
larger portion, who, while they reject the views both of the New-Haven
divines and of the old school and Hopkinsian Calvinists, are
nevertheless strongly opposed to the issue proposed in the sermon. They
deny, as appears from some public intimations and many private
statements, that I have given a fair representation of the doctrine.
They appear to manifest as much horror as an Arminian would to the idea,
that "the responsible acts of moral agents are definitely fixed and
efficiently produced by the purpose and decree of God,"--that these acts
"are the result of an overruling and controlling power,"--"that the
will, in all its operations, is governed and irresistibly controlled by
some secret impulse, some fixed and all-controlling arrangement." Hence,
I suppose, if it can be proved that these are the genuine
characteristics of Calvinism, the system itself will, by many at least,
be given up. At any rate, since the exception is taken to the definition
of the doctrine, it may be presumed, by sustaining this, we sustain our
own cause and refute the opposite. The present inquiry then is, are
these, in very deed, the characteristics of absolute predestination? I
shall endeavour to maintain that they are. Let the intelligent and the
candid judge.
1. It may be urged as a consideration of no small weight in this
question, that all but predestinarians, as well as many predestinarians
themselves, have entertained these views of the doctrine. With respect
to anti-predestinarians, I know of no exception; all unite, in charging
these things, directly or by consequence, upon the Calvinistic system.
And will Calvinists say, this is owing to prejudice and to a want of
understanding the subject? With what kind of modesty will they assume
that they are free from blinding prejudice in _favour_ of their own
doctrine, and all the world beside are prejudiced against it? It may be
asserted, as it often has been, that these doctrines are humbling to the
pride of the natural heart, and this is the ground of the universal
opposition to them! But this is a gratuitous assumption of what ought
first to be proved, viz. that these doctrines are true; and it also
exhibits a most reprehensible spirit of pride and Pharisaism--a spirit
that says to a brother, "Stand by, for I am holier than thou!" There
have doubtless been as many eminently pious Arminians as Calvinists, and
how is it, that these men have never had this doctrine so explained to
them as to be able to see it free from these charges?
But not only anti-predestinarians have universally entertained these
opinions of this doctrine; even the advocates themselves have, in a
great variety of instances, acknowledged the same. Mention has before
been made, (in the sermon,) of the opposition raised against free will,
by the Calvinists of Mr. Wesley's day--and quotations have also been
given from the early Calvinistic authors, showing how decidedly they
held that God moved the will to sin, by a direct positive influence. To
these we may add all the Hopkinsians of modern days, who openly
acknowledge "that those scriptures which teach that God has decreed the
sinful acts of men, do imply that he is the efficient cause of moral
evil." (See review of my sermon in the Boston Telegraph.) It should not
be forgotten, moreover, that the New-Haven divines, who have studied
Calvinism all their lives, with the best opportunities for understanding
it, inform us that the view of Calvinism which makes sin preferable to
holiness in its stead, is unanswerably exposed to all the objections
brought against it in the sermon. It is known too, that most of the
Methodists in New-England, and many elsewhere, were educated
predestinarians; but have revolted from the traditions of their fathers
for the very reason that Calvinism is what we have described it to be.
The Universalists are almost all predestinarians, and they understand
that this doctrine necessarily implies the _Divine efficiency_ in
producing sin; and hence they very consistently infer that God is not
angry with them, and will not punish them for being controlled by his
decrees.