repeated passages of Scripture, it necessarily limits the atonement. It
will surely not be expected, that we should attempt to prove that Christ
"tasted death for every man"--that he "gave himself a ransom for
all"--that he "died for all"--that he became "a propitiation for the
sins of the whole world"--because, these are so many express Scripture
propositions, and rest directly on the authority of God. And while these
stand, the doctrine of particular and unconditional election must fall,
for the two doctrines are incompatible. That particular election and
partial redemption must stand or fall together, has been acknowledged,
and is still maintained by most Calvinists; and therefore they have
endeavoured to explain away those passages, which so clearly declare
that "Christ died for all." But in this work they have found so many
difficulties, that others, and among them most of the Calvinistic clergy
in New-England, have acknowledged a general redemption, and have
undertaken to reconcile with it the doctrine of particular election and
reprobation. But this reconciliation is as difficult as the other. To
say nothing now of the utter uselessness of making an atonement for the
reprobates, unless for the purpose of making their unavoidable damnation
more aggravated, we would ask, What is the object of the atonement? Let
these very Calvinists themselves answer. They tell us, that its object
was, to open the way, by which it might be possible for sinners to be
saved. But has the atonement made it possible for the reprobates to be
saved? If so, then perhaps they will be saved, and therefore the idea of
unconditional election and reprobation is false. But if the atonement
has only made it possible for the elect to be saved, then it was made
only for the elect. Let the supporters of this system choose which horn
of this dilemma they please; either will destroy their doctrine. For as
it is absurd to talk about redeeming grace and Gospel provisions,
_sufficient_ to save those who are eternally and effectually excluded
from these blessings, so it is idle to talk about a redemption for
_all_, which includes provisions sufficient only to save the _elect_.
Not even the fiction of a _natural ability_ in all men to serve God and
get to heaven, will help this difficulty. For allowing, in the argument,
that the reprobates have ability to serve God and gain heaven, without
grace, and in spite of God's decree, still, as this is called a
_natural_ ability, it is plain it is not the fruit of the atonement. It
is equally irrelevant to argue that the atonement may be said to be
universal, because it contains enough to save the whole world, if they
would or could embrace it, and it is only their excessive depravity
which renders it impossible for them to receive the atonement. For this
is the same as to say, that a physician has an efficient remedy to heal
his patient, only he is so sick he cannot take it. This excessive
weakness is that for which the physician should prescribe, and to which
the medicine should be applied. And if it does not come to this it is no
medicine for this case. So the atonement, if it is not a remedy for
man's extreme depravity, it is no provision for him. If it does not give
a gracious power to all sinners to embrace salvation, it has
accomplished nothing for the depraved reprobate. Since, therefore,
according to Calvinism, the atonement provides for the reprobate neither
natural nor moral ability to serve God, nor makes it possible for him to
be saved, it follows, that the atonement is made only for the elect. But
as this is contrary to the word of God, the doctrine that leads to this
conclusion must be false.
5. If time would permit, I might here notice at some length several
objections to this doctrine:--Such as that it takes away all motives to
repentance, by giving the sinner just cause to say, "If I am to be
saved, I shall be, do what I may; and if I am to be damned, I must be,
do what I can;"--it leads to the idea of infant damnation--it weakens
the zeal and paralyzes The efforts of devotion and benevolence--it
destroys the end of punishment, the original design of which was to
prevent sin, but which, according to this doctrine, was designed merely
for the glory of God; and sin was ordained for the purpose of giving God
an opportunity of glorifying himself in punishing it. These and others
might be dwelt upon with effect; but passing them all, I hasten to the
conclusion of my arguments, by urging only one more objection to the
system I am opposing.
6. We are suspicious of this doctrine, because its advocates themselves
seem studious to cover up and keep out of sight many of its features,
and are constantly changing their manner of stating and defending their
system. A little attention to the history of the controversy between
predestinarians and their opposers, will show the truth and force of
this objection. The charge that Calvinism covers up and keeps out of
sight some of its most offensive features, does not lie so much against
its advocates of the old school, as those of the modern. With the
exception of some logical consequences, which we think chargeable upon
the system, and which they were unwilling to allow, these early
defenders of unconditional election came out boldly and fearlessly with
their doctrine. If modern Calvinists would do the same, we should need
no other refutation of the system. But even the early supporters of
Calvinism, when pressed by their opponents, resorted to various forms of
explanation and modes of proof, and also to various modifications of the
system itself. Goodwin, in his work entitled, "Agreement of Brethren,"
&c, says:--"The question, as to the object of the decrees, has gone out
among our Calvinistic brethren into endless digladiations and
irreconcilable divisions," and then goes on to mention nine of these
"irreconcilable divisions" that prevailed at his day. At the present day
these school subtleties are not so prevalent, but numerous changes of a
more popular cast, and such as are suited to cover up the offensive
features of the system, are now introduced. The modern defence of this
doctrine consists chiefly in the dexterous use of certain ambiguous
technicalities which, in this theology, mean one thing, and in common
language another. And this is carried to such an extent, that it is now
a common thing to hear parishioners contend strenuously that their
pastors do not hold to predestination, when it is well known to some, at
least, that they do; and that they are exerting themselves to spread the
sentiment.
This is a subject, permit me here to say, on which I touch with more
reluctance than upon any other point involved in this controversy. To
represent the thing as it is, seems so much like accusing our brethren
of insincerity and duplicity, that nothing but a regard to truth would
induce me to allude to it. Whether this arises from an excessive but
honest zeal for their system, or whether it is supposed the cause is so
important, and at the same time so difficult to be sustained, that the
end will justify what, in other cases, would be judged questionable
policy, and hardly reconcilable with the spirit of a guileless
Christianity, is certainly not for me to decide. With respect to their
motives, they will stand or fall by the judgment of Him that trieth the
reins. But the course, at any rate, seems very reprehensible. Take one
instance:--All sinners, we are told, may come to Christ _if they will;_
and therefore they are criminal if they do not.--Now this mode of speech
corresponds very well with Scripture and reason. And who, that had not
been specially instructed in the dialect of this theology, would
understand that this mode of speech, according to Hopkinsian technics,
implied an inability and an impossibility of obtaining salvation? And
yet this is the fact: for though, according to this system, if we have a
will to come to Christ, we _may_, yet by a _Divine constitution_ it is
as much impossible to have this will as it is to break the decree of
Jehovah,--Hence all such modes of speech are worse than unmeaning; they
have a deceptive meaning. They mean one thing in this creed, and another
thing in popular language. It never occurs to the generality of mankind,
when they are told they may do thus and thus, _if they will_, that there
is a secret omnipotent influence impelling and controlling the will.
They suppose these expressions, therefore, mean that, independent of all
irresistible foreign influences, they have, within themselves, the power
to choose or not to choose: and yet the real meaning of the speaker
differs as much from this, as a negative differs from an affirmative.
In perfect accordance with the foregoing, is the common explanation that
is given to the doctrine of election and reprobation. Reprobation is
kept out of sight; and yet it is as heartily believed by modern
Calvinists, as it was by John Calvin himself. It is taught too; but it
is taught covertly. And yet when we quote old-fashioned Calvinism, in
its primitive plain dress, we are told _these are old authors;_ we do
not believe with them: "if we had lived in the days of our fathers, we
would not have been partakers with them in _their errors_," and yet
"they are witnesses unto themselves, that they _are the children_ of
them" who taught these errors. They recommend their writings, they
garnish their sepulchres, they teach their catechisms to the rising
generation; they say, even in their Church articles of faith, "We
believe in the doctrines of grace, as held and taught by the _fathers_
and _reformers_ in the Church,"--and especially do they hold to that
root and foundation of the whole system, "God hath, from all eternity,
foreordained whatsoever comes to pass."
Since I have alluded to Church articles, it will be in support of this
objection to say that the written creeds of Churches partake of this
same ambiguous character. They are either expressed in texts of
Scripture, or in doubtful and obscure terms; so that different
constructions can be put upon them, according to the faith of the
subscriber. And instances have been known, in which articles of faith
have been altered, again and again, to accommodate scrupulous
candidates. And yet their candidates for holy orders, and for
professorships, in their theological institutions, are required to
subscribe to a rigid Calvinistic creed. In this way it is expected,
doubtless, that the doctrine will be maintained and perpetuated, though
in other respects public opinion should be accommodated. How would
honest John Calvin, if he could be introduced among us, with the same
sentiments he had when on earth, frown upon the Churches that bear his
name! He would not only call them "silly and childish," but he would,
doubtless, in his bold, blunt manner, charge them with disingenuousness
and cowardice, if not with downright duplicity, for thus shunning and
smoothing over and covering up the more repulsive features of their
system. How would he chide them for shifting their ground, and changing
their system, while they nevertheless pretend to build on the same
foundation of predestination! He would, we believe, sternly inquire of
them what they meant by saying, all sinners, not excepting reprobates,
may come to Christ and be saved?--why they pretended to hold to
election, and not to reprobation?--how they could reconcile general
redemption with particular election?--and especially would he frown
indignantly upon that new doctrine, lately preached and defended, in
what has been supposed to be the head quarters of orthodoxy in New
-England, by which we are taught that derived depravity is not any taint
or sinful corruption of our moral constitution, but consists,
exclusively and entirely, in _moral exercise!_ But probably he would get
little satisfaction from those who profess his creed and bear his name.
They would tell him that the old forms of this system were so repulsive,
the people would not receive them; and that, being hard pressed by their
antagonists, they had thrown up these new redoubts, and assumed these
new positions, not only to conceal their doctrine, but if possible to
defend it. And as he could get little satisfaction of _them_, he would
get less from us.--Could we meet the venerable reformer, we would thank
him for his successful zeal and labour in the Protestant cause; but we
would expostulate with him for giving sanction and currency to his
"horrible decree." We would tell him he had committed to his followers a
system so abhorrent to reason, and so difficult to be supported by
Scripture, that they had been _driven_ into all these changes in hope of
finding some new and safe ground of defence; and that, while we
considered this as a striking and convincing argument against the
doctrine itself, we viewed it as auspicious of its final overthrow; that
these changes, refinements, and concealments, were symptoms that the
doctrine was waxing old, and was ready to vanish away.
But I must conclude this discourse. To your serious consideration,
Christian brethren, I commend the sentiments contained in it. Whatever
you may think of the discourse itself, I cannot fail, I think, of
escaping censure. Those who accord with the sentiments here defended,
will of course approve; and those who believe in predestination will of
course be reconciled to the preaching because God hath decreed it. It
hath come to pass that I have preached as I have, and therefore it is a
part of the Divine plan. It hath come pass that Arminianism exists, and
therefore this is a part of the Divine plan. We beg our brethren who
differ from us, not to fight against God's plan if they say it is right
for us to fight against it, because this also is decreed--I answer, This
only confirms our objections against the system, for it arrays the Deity
against himself. From all such inconsistencies, _may the God of truth
deliver us_. Amen.
NUMBER I.
REPLY TO THE CHRISTIAN SPECTATOR.[3]
This sermon had been before the public almost two years before it
received any notice, so far as the author is informed, from any of the
advocates of predestination. After the third edition was announced,
there were several passing acrimonious censures in some of the
Calvinistic periodicals, which did not affect the merits of the question
at issue between us and the predestinarians. At length the Rev. Mr.
Tyler, of this city, (Middletown, Conn.) published a sermon which was
evidently written in reference to the sermon on predestination. This
sermon of Mr. T. might have been noticed; but its general positions were
so indefinite, and its modes of illustration so vague, it seemed hardly
calculated to narrow the field of controversy or hasten a decision of
the question at issue. For example: Mr. T. defines election to be "the
eternal purpose of God to renew, sanctify, and save every man whom he
wisely can, and no others." With such a proposition there certainly can
be no controversy, for it leaves the subject more vague, and the point
in dispute more confused than before a definition was attempted. There
are two errors, the antipodes of each other, which, in all controversy,
and especially religious controversy, ought to be carefully guarded
against. The one is an attempt to make the subjects of difference more
numerous and consequential than they are in truth; and the other is an
attempt to cover up real differences under indefinite propositions and
ambiguous terms. Both these errors may be the result of honest motives:
the former may arise from a jealous regard to the truth, and the latter
from a love of peace. Both, however, are injurious; for neither does the
one promote the cause of truth, nor does the other secure a permanent
peace. Indeed, bringing antagonist principles into contact gives an
additional impulse to their repellent forces, so that a transient union
produces, in the end, greater discord. Though the controversy in the
Church, between Calvinists and Arminians, has been long and injurious;
yet, as an individual, I never can sign a _union creed_ of doubtful
terms and ambiguous articles. Nor can I deem it worth my while to
contend about such terms and articles. I should fear the searching
interrogatory of Him who questioned Job: "Who is this that darkeneth
counsel by words without knowledge?" In the present controversy there is
danger of this ambiguity also from a less commendable principle than a
love of peace, viz. an adherence to old symbols of faith to avoid the
imputation of a change; while, at the same time, to escape the force of
unanswerable argument, vague propositions, ambiguous definitions, and
equivocal terms are made the bulwark of defence. This principle was
alluded to in the sermon on predestination; and although it has given
great offence to some of the Calvinists, and is represented by the
author of the review which we are about to notice as being "utterly
unworthy of the attention of a person who is honestly inquiring after
truth;" yet it seems to me he knows little of his own heart who thinks
himself incapable of such a course. Nor does it seem _utterly unworthy_
of an honest inquirer after truth to mark the effects of arguments upon
systems, since the changes effected in those systems, by the arguments
urged against them, show the strength of the one and the weakness of the
other. If; therefore, I should undertake to answer Mr. Tyler's sermon,
my strictures would consist chiefly in pointing out its indefiniteness
and incongruity. But this, without convincing, might give offence. And
although I see no way of continuing the controversy, as the Calvinists
now manage it, without alluding to this course of the advocates of
predestination, yet I am happy to say there is less of it in the
"review" before us than is common in modern treatises on that subject.
Though it is a laboured article of about forty-three pages, yet it is
generally in a manly style, and sustained by a train of close and
skilful argumentation. It would afford me great pleasure to be able to
equal the reviewer's ingenuity, and still more to throw into my reply
the serenity of his spirit. I have little occasion, however, in the
present case, to dread his talents or lose my temper; for if I
understand the reviewer, though his essay bears upon it, if not the
"rugged," at least the decided "aspect of controversy" with my sermon,
he is nevertheless in principle an Arminian. I allude now more
especially to his views of predestination. On election there is
evidently a greater difference between us; and yet it strikes me when a
man discards Calvinian predestination, consistency would require that
the peculiarities of Calvinian election should be discarded also. At any
rate, as the settling of the former question will have a very strong
bearing upon the other, I shall confine myself in this article to
predestination. I am not certain that I understand the reviewer; but his
candour authorizes me to believe that he will explain himself frankly,
and correct me if I misunderstand him. If we are agreed on this point we
ought to know it, and give over the controversy. If we are not, let us
know the precise ground of difference. And in either case we shall be
the better prepared to pursue the question of election.
The question in dispute is simply this: What relation is there between
the decrees or purposes of God and the responsible acts of man? The
Arminian views on this question, as I understand them, are these: God,
as a Sovereign, in deciding upon his works, had a right to determine on
such a system as pleased him; but, being infinitely wise and good, he
would of course choose, in the contemplation of all possible systems, to
create such a one as, all things considered, would bring the most glory
to himself, and the greatest good to the universe. In infinite wisdom he
decided that such a system would be a _moral government_, consisting of
himself, as the supreme and rightful Governor, and of intelligent
subjects, having full and unrestrained power to obey or disobey the
mandates of their Sovereign. He foresaw that one of the unavoidable
incidents of such a government would be the possible existence of moral
evil; and, in glancing through the proposed system, he foresaw that
moral evil would _certainly_ exist, involving innumerable multitudes in
its ruinous consequences. He did not approve of the evil; he did not
decree that it should exist: but still evil was a remote result of a
decree of his: for although he foresaw that _if_ he made such free
agents, and governed them in the manner proposed, they would certainly
sin, yet he determined, notwithstanding this _certainty_, to make these
agents and govern them as proposed. He determined, however, that they
should be under no necessity of sinning, either by his decree, or by the
circumstances in which they should be placed; but if they sinned, it
should be their own free choice. As he foresaw they would sin, he also
determined upon the plan he would pursue in reference to them as
sinners, and arranged, in the counsels of his own infinite mind, the
extended concatenation of causes and effects, so as to make the "wrath
of man praise him," and deduce the greatest possible good from the best
possible system. Such, it is believed, is Arminianism--such is
Methodism--such is the doctrine of the sermon--and such are the dictates
of the Bible and of sound philosophy.